PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES AND THE
EAST WIND RAIN MESSAGE

BY
HELEN HOLM SIMMONS

A THESIS

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
Creighton University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of Master
of Arts in the Department of History

OMAHA, 1955
Thesis Approved

By

[Signature]
Major Adviser

[Signature]
Dean

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INTRODUCTION

In considering the problem of the East Wind Rain Message the historian is confronted with the task of reconstructing from a mass of raveled evidence and conflicting testimony data which will aid him in determining whether or not this controversial message ever existed. Had it existed, and had it been heeded, the East Wind Rain Message conceivably could have altered the course of American history. The importance of this message cannot be over-emphasized, for no other document in recent times has evoked such a storm of contradiction, controversy and denials, and rightly so. For had it been properly interpreted, if received, and had immediate practical application of the knowledge it imparted been effected, this message, very probably, could have prevented the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The value of preventing the Pearl Harbor attack can be appreciated by every American cognizant of the appalling casualty lists and terrific damages suffered in the worst naval defeat in our history. Very possibly, the element of surprise could have been turned against the Japanese, resulting in a speedier conclusion to the war, although this is merely conjecture. The historian’s task is doubly complicated by the fact that the message does not exist today, that there is divergence of opinion as to whether or not it ever existed, and, if it existed, there is considerable doubt as to its interpretation.
The development of this thesis will include a study of the eight investigations, why they were called, who conducted the investigations, what was investigated, and particularly, each committee's treatment of the subject of the East Wind Rain Message. Realizing that the question of whether such a message was intercepted is overshadowed by the larger question of why Pearl Harbor happened, and whether or not the United States goaded Japan into war, this topic, nevertheless, deserves minute study. There has been considerable divergence of opinion over its very existence as an examination of the conclusions of the several investigating committees has revealed, and the writer expects to include in this study the backgrounds of Pearl Harbor and the East Wind Rain Message, to evaluate the testimonies of the witnesses and the conclusions reached by the investigating groups regarding the existence of the message, with the view toward pointing out its extreme significance in the Pearl Harbor story. The ramifications of this subject reach far into high office, sometimes damaging the character of prominent leaders, and spreading doubt as to their judgment and efficiency.

It is generally understood that President Roosevelt and his advisers early in the European conflict recognized that the United States would undoubtedly have to come to the aid of England, and to prevent the spread of war to the American continent. On September 28, 1940, Japan, Italy and Germany signed the Tripartite Treaty in which they agreed to take united action against any nation which attacked one of the signatories. In implementation of his belief and in view of Japanese preparations in the
Pacific Area, Roosevelt and his administration applied economic pressure upon Japan, climaxing when the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands stopped their trade with Japan on July 25, 1941. Previously, by the ABCD Agreement (American, British, Chinese and Dutch) of March 27, 1941, agreement was reached that joint military counteraction would be applied in event of a Japanese attack. Mutual commitments were made with Churchill at Newfoundland in August of 1941 which promised mutual support in the event that the United States or Great Britain were attacked by Japan in the Pacific.

It is a logical conclusion that those who knew the facts of Pearl Harbor, in view of their patriotism and loyalty to President Roosevelt, felt that secrecy should surround the President's handling of the situation which resulted in the Pearl Harbor attack. There is justification for this feeling, especially during the waging of a war, but the reasons for continued lack of information concerning responsibility for the tragedy are not apparent. Open and frank discussion of the situations which involved our participation in World War II are demanded to avoid repetition of the disaster. We must analyze our policy and seek to justify our part in the conflict. Since it is necessary in war time to maintain high national morale to insure ultimate success, it is understandable that at the time a public display of all pertinent facts would be impossible.

The administration in Washington was successful in marshalling public opinion to its side and diverting suspicion from itself until the conclusion of the war by assigning responsibility for Pearl Harbor
to Admiral Kimmel and General Short. There is considerable information available which reveals that the responsibility of these two military leaders for the Pearl Harbor tragedy is minor and that we must look elsewhere for the full story. There is necessarily considerable repetition of testimony in this presentation, since such repetition is required to trace the development of the handling of the subject by the various investigating committees and to understand the final conclusions drawn.
SECTION I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

A general understanding of the circumstances which preceded the final armed conflict between Japan and the United States is essential in a study of the Winds Message. In 1938 and 1939 a series of commercial sanctions were applied by the United States to Japan. During those two years there had been effected a cessation of the United States' export to Japan of airplanes, aeronautical equipment, and certain other materials. There had also resulted a state of decline of export to Japan of strategic materials, and as of July 1940, under the Export Control Act, the President had curtailed or prohibited the export of basic war materials. Licenses were refused for the export to Japan of aviation gasoline and most types of machine tools as of September 1940. Also in September of 1940, the export of iron and steel scrap was prohibited. The effect of the United States policy was to cut off from Japan by the winter of 1940-1941 the shipment of many strategic commodities, including arms, ammunition, and implements of war, aviation gasoline and many other petroleum products, machine tools, scrap iron, pig iron and steel manufactures, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, and a variety of other commodities important to a war effort. In addition to this course of action by the United States was the decision in August of 1941 between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain that the United States
and Great Britain should take parallel action in cautioning Japan against new moves of aggression, and that the United States would continue its conversations with the Japanese government and offer her a reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which that country was embarked.

The testimony of the United States Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, as to his actions as reflected in the State Department's White Papers and in extracts from his diary indicate that he, too, was acting under what apparently was a conflicting policy but with a full recognition of the inevitable date of a final trial of strength with Japan. A review of Grew's communications to the State Department in the year of 1941 is an excellent perspective of the course of the fatal events that led to Pearl Harbor.

On January 27, 1941, Grew communicated by wire with the State Department indicating that an attack on Pearl Harbor by all means available to the military and naval forces of Japan was being discussed, and he felt that it was serious enough that it should be reported even though it was fantastic to consider it. On February 1, 1941, he said the outlook was never darker for peace and on July 25th when the United States froze Japanese assets, there was bitter resentment in Japan. On August 18th Grew reported the

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Japanese protest of the United States' economic pressure. On August 29th the United States applied the oil embargo and decided to send oil tankers to Russia and a military mission to China. On the 6th of September Grew reported the statement of the Japanese Premier that if the United States continued its economic sanctions it would prevent any settlement for six months to a year after they terminated. On September 29th Grew sent an important message to Washington that the Japanese could only be brought to a halt by a show of force. He pointed out that any agreement would be a mere breathing spell for Japan, that war was likely in any event, and unless results were shown in the negotiations, more than had been demonstrated to date, the Japanese would conclude that the United States was merely stalling for time and would act accordingly. On September 30th Grew protested at the secrecy of our conversations with Japan as practiced by the United States without advising the public, whereas it was common knowledge in Japan.

On October 9th Grew reported that the frozen-credit policy of the United States was driving Japan into national bankruptcy and she would be forced to act. His prediction in this respect was accurate because Tojo, the only Japanese Premier to stay on the active Army list in that position, was made Premier on October 16th. There was an indication of trouble when the Premier of Japan was a dominant military figure on the active Army list, and on October 25 Grew reported that the Emperor ordered the Privy Council before him and asked them if they intended war. When they
refused to answer, he instructed them that there should be no war with the United States. This was the final effort by conservative Japanese to avoid war.

Another revealing insight into United States policy in the days preceding Pearl Harbor is given in Henry L. Stimson's diary, parts of which were made available to the members of the Joint Congressional Committee when it was investigating the attack. Senator Ferguson read from the diary from notes on Friday, November 7, 1941. Stimson wrote that the Cabinet held a meeting that afternoon. The President opened with telling the story of Lincoln and his Cabinet—how he polled the Cabinet and found them all polling "no," and then he said "The ayes have it." With that Roosevelt started to have what he said was the first general poll of his Cabinet, and it was on the question of the Far East—whether the people would back up the administration in case it struck at Japan, and what the tactics should be. Stimson wrote that it was a very interesting talk—the best Cabinet meeting he thought they had ever had since he had been in it. Roosevelt went around the table, and it was unanimous in feeling the country would support the administration.

In a statement to the Joint Congressional Committee in March of 1946 Stimson wrote that in mid-October the Japanese Konoye cabinet fell and a new cabinet under General Tojo came into power, which Washington officials all expected would be even more aggressive and warlike. In summing up the salient features of the situation
as they appeared to him early in November of 1941, Stimson stated that he felt that war with Germany would ultimately be inevitable and that it was vitally important that none of the nations who were then fighting Germany—England, Russia—or China should be knocked out of the war before the time came when the United States would be required to go in. Stimson wrote that while the administration wanted more time in which to prepare, they felt nevertheless that they had a fair chance to make an effective fight against Japan for the Philippines. If war did come, he continued, it was important, both from the point of view of unified support of the American people, as well as for the record of history, that America should not be placed in the position of firing the first shot, if this could be done without sacrificing American safety, but that Japan should appear in her true role as the real aggressor.

At the meeting of the Cabinet on Tuesday, November 25, 1941, Stimson wrote that one problem troubled those present. In spite of the risk involved in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, the administration officials realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was extremely desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there

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should be absolutely no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors. Stimson related that at this meeting, the officials discussed the basis on which this country's position could be most clearly explained to the American people and to the world in case America had to go into the fight quickly because of some sudden move on the part of the Japanese. They discussed the possibility of a statement summarizing all the steps of aggression that the Japanese had already taken, the encirclement of American interests in the Philippines which was resulting and the threat to vital supplies of rubber from Malay. Stimson reminded the President that on August 19th Roosevelt had warned the Japanese Ambassador that if the steps which the Japanese were then taking continued across the border into Thailand, he would regard it as a matter affecting American safety, and suggested that he might point out that the moves the Japanese were then apparently on the point of making would be in fact a violation of a warning that had already been given.

At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President instead of bringing up the Victory Parade brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.  

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Office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan of national action in case of war in Europe.

JCC, Part 11, p. 5226.
Secretary Hull told Secretaries Stimson and Knox at this White House meeting of the President's War Council on November 25, 1941, that the time for negotiations had ended. National security and dealings with Japan were henceforth to be the responsibility of the Army and Navy. On November 26th Hull handed the President's Ten Points of Settlement to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. These proposals were verbally rejected by the Japanese Ambassadors at once, but they inquired as to any other basis of negotiation or a modus vivendi. On this same day Hull telephoned Stimson that he had decided not to make the proposition of the three month's truce that he had discussed with Knox and Stimson on the day before. The Chinese, Hull pointed out, had strong objections to the proposal, particularly the effect on the morale of their own people. Hull stated that he felt the best thing to do was simply to tell the Japanese that he had no further action to propose. Roosevelt was shocked, he reported, by the fact that G-2 (Army Intelligence) had received news that the Japanese were embarking a large expeditionary force of ships at Shanghai and that this expedition was proceeding along the China coast south of Formosa. Roosevelt took this move as further evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese, that while they were negotiating with him—negotiations in which the United States was asking for a withdrawal of

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5See Appendix D.
Japanese invading troops in China—they should be sending a further expedition down to Indochina.

On Thursday morning, November 27th, the news was still coming in on the movement of the large Japanese expeditionary force south from Shanghai and eventually headed toward Indochina, with a possibility that it might be proceeding to the Philippines or to Burma to cut off the Burma Road or to the Dutch East Indies. It seemed probable to Stimson that it was a concentration to move over into Thailand, from which the Japanese could be in a position to attack Singapore. Early that morning, Stimson telephoned Hull to find out what his final word had been with the Japanese. Hull told Stimson that he had broken the whole matter off. Hull's words were: "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox." Stimson then telephoned Roosevelt who told him that the talks had been called off, but that the administration had ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. This was the note of November 26th which the Japanese found impossible to accept, and which decided Hull to wash his hands of the whole matter. Regardless of Hull's contention to the contrary, the Japanese regarded this document of the 26th as an ultimatum and acted upon it. As a result of events up to this time it was decided to send a warning message to the Commanding Officers in the Hawaiian

6JCC, Part 11, p. 5422.
Department, Panama, Philippines and Alaska. The message as sent to General Short in Hawaii read as follows:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent period MARSHALL

This message has been criticized as ambiguous and described as a "do-don’t" message. On the same day a war warning was dispatched to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. Stimson admitted that he drafted the "do-don’t" message himself, since Marshall was away for the day.

Winston Churchill has described the period that followed as a week of deadly hush with the possibilities of a diplomatic settlement being exhausted. His deepest fear was that the Japanese would attack either Great Britain or the Dutch and that the constitutional difficulties would prevent the United States from declaring war. Churchill did not know how far Roosevelt had gone

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7 Ibid. p. 542.

and wrote to the President on November 30, 1941, that one important method remained unused in averting war between Japan and the United States and Great Britain. This method, he explained, was a plain declaration that any further act of aggression by Japan would lead immediately to grave consequences. He was cognizant, he wrote, of the United States' constitutional difficulties, but declared that it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her a clear picture of the dire character of a further aggressive step. Agreement had already been reached at the meeting of the President's War Council on 28 November 1941 that Hull, Stimson and Knox should draft warnings to Japan in messages to be sent by the President to the Emperor of Japan and to Congress. The President informed Churchill of this action on December 1st, but declined, as he had at the Atlantic Conference in August, to accept Churchill's suggestion that there should be a joint United States-British warning to Japan.

On Sunday, December 7th, 1941, Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox went over to Secretary Hull's office at 10:30 in the morning to discuss the Japanese situation. This was the day on which they knew that the Japanese were going to bring their answer to the Ten Point note of November 26th, and Hull said he was certain that the Japanese were planning some deviltry.
The messages they were then receiving indicated that the Japanese force was continuing on in the Gulf of Siam, and again the three officials discussed whether they would not have to fight if Malaya or the Netherlands were attacked and the British or Dutch fought. All three thought, according to Stimson, that America must fight if those nations fought. They realized that if Britain were eliminated it might well result in the destruction or capture of the British fleet. Such a result would give the Nazi allies overwhelming power in the Atlantic Ocean and would make the defense of the American Republics enormously difficult if not impossible:

When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people...The Japs have solved the whole thing by attacking us in Hawaii...This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed. For I feel that this country united has practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and divisions stirred up by unpatriotic men have been hitherto very discouraging.9

9JCC, Part 11, p. 5138.
Eight investigating committees in studying the circumstances surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese on December 7, 1941, have not succeeded in clearing up the mystery of whether there was or was not an East Wind Rain Message. These investigating committees and the dates of their investigations are the Roberts Commission, December 18, 1941 to January 23, 1942; the Hart Inquiry, February 12 to June 15, 1944; the Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to October 20, 1944; the Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to October 19, 1944; the Clarke Investigation, September 14 to November 16, 1944 and July 13 to August 11, 1945; the Clausen Investigation, November 23, 1944 to September 12, 1945; the Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945; and the Joint Congressional Committee, November 15, 1945 to May 31, 1946.

Before the attack on Pearl Harbor and the ensuing war with the Japanese nation, the United States Navy Intelligence and Communications Units had succeeded, as had other nations including Great Britain and the Netherlands, in breaking the Japanese code. On November 26, 1941, the Navy Department intercepted a message from Japan to its representatives in foreign countries indicating that she would announce her intentions in regard to the status of her relations with other nations by weather references inserted in short wave radio news broadcasts. On November 28, 1941, the
"Winds" Code was given:

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations and the cutting off of international communications) the following warnings will be added in the middle of daily Japanese language short wave radio broadcasts:

1) In case Japanese—United States relations in danger—Higashi No Kazeame—East Wind Rain.
3) In case Japanese—Great Britain relations in danger—Nishi No Kaze Hare—West Wind Clear.

This message indicated to everyone concerned the very likely probability of breaking off relations and of offensive warfare by Japan against the United States or the other nations mentioned. The second message, the "Winds Execute" message (so-called because it would execute the war plans of the Japanese), also termed the "Implementing Message", the "East Wind Rain" message or simply the Winds Message, is the one about which the controversy revolves. Navy radio intercepting stations had been instructed to wait for this message and special handling had been instituted in the Navy Department, bypassing regular channels, so extremely urgent was its nature.

Of all the witnesses appearing before the various committees, only one, Captain Laurence F. Safford, a cipher expert and radio intelligence expert, steadfastly maintained that there was indeed a Winds Message. Other witnesses changed their minds or

1JCC, Part 33, p. 738. (parentheses in text)
modified their previous statements by indicating lack of certainty or their confusion as to what the message meant; some stoutly denied its existence. Captain Safford (then Commander) was head of the Communications Security Section and the Communications Division of the Office of Naval Operations at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, and can be described as a competent witness and a man well qualified to know the facts. He was in charge of the section whose responsibility it was to monitor for the message. He would have seen it and handled it, and he said he did. He would have had it translated and would have seen that it reached his superior officer which he also said he did. Safford stated that he received a telephone call about an hour after sending the original of the Winds Message to Admiral Leigh Noyes, Director of Naval Communications to the effect that Guam ought to be notified to burn their excess codes and ciphers to prevent the Japanese from capturing them. This fact is significant in that it aids in establishing the date that the Winds Message was intercepted, because Guam was so notified and the Navy was unable to explain satisfactorily any other basis for the alarm at the time it was given. The warning to Guam proves also that the Japanese attack was not the great surprise which Washington pretended it to be. On the same afternoon of the day Safford stated the Winds Message was received, December 4, 1941, the Navy Department received a message from the Philippines informing officials in Washington that the Japanese had introduced a new
cipher system for its "Operation Code." Hence, the changing of their code by the Japanese on the day of December 4th lends credence to the possibility of the receipt of the Winds Message. Further substantiation is available in the fact that the United States Navy also changed its code on this very same day of December 4, 1941.

Conceding for the purpose of argument that the Winds Message never actually existed, it is reasonable to inquire for what reason did Captain Safford persist before five different investigating groups in his testimony that he saw the message, handled it and had it delivered to his superior officer? What was his motive in fathering such a monstrous fabrication, if such indeed it be? Was he merely a notoriety-seeker bent on personal publicity for himself? Did he nurse a private grievance against his superior officers to the extent that he would desire to embarrass them in the eyes of the public by imputing to them lack of judgment, negligence, dereliction of duty or deliberate conspiracy? As Garraghan writes: "A witness' truthfulness is particularly in evidence when in consequence of the blame he imputes to persons or groups, he has good reason to fear contradiction and enmity and to suffer loss of fortune." There is no doubt that Safford did, as a result of his testi-

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mony, incur contradiction and enmity. As an officer whose pros-
psects for advancement in status and position in the naval service
depended on the good will of his superiors, he did face the
possibility of future poor fortune at their hands. A logical ques-
tion would be what possible gain was in store for him as a result
of this intentional deceit, if such it be? Why, in the face of
incurring the displeasure of high officials in the government and
the military establishment, and at the risk of endangering his own
position and chances for promotion, would he steadfastly insist
on claiming that a Winds Message existed when the majority of the
investigating committees found otherwise? Was he really mistaken?
Was he, perhaps, suffering from hallucinations?

Considering now the possibility that a Winds Message was
actually intercepted, did Safford possibly misinterpret its mean-
ing? Did he in the light of afterthought read into the message
meanings which were not apparent at the time of its receipt?
This eventuality is highly unlikely because of the various inci-
dents which took place on the day that the Winds Message allegedly
was intercepted. On that day both the United States and the Jap-
anese Navy changed their codes. Guam, as well as other Pacific
posts and garrisons, was instructed to destroy its excess ciphers
and codes to prevent their capture by the Japanese. Captain
Arthur N. McCollum, naval expert on Far Eastern Intelligence, was
so gravely disturbed that he drafted a war warning to the Pacific
Fleet Commanders. Controversy centers about this message, also,
because it was never sent out and there is no copy of it in existence.

The aforementioned events lend credence supporting the theory of those who maintain that a Winds Message was intercepted, that Safford did not misinterpret the meaning of the message. It is difficult to believe that crucial action in so many different directions would have been undertaken without some motivation. Since no satisfactory explanations for the separate actions have been advanced, it is possible to nominate the Winds Message as the motivating factor behind their execution.

The chief corroborating witness to the existence of the Winds Message was Captain (then Commander) Alvin D. Kramer, Senior Language Officer for Navy Communications Intelligence. The path of the historian attempting to arrive at some degree of truth and probability relative to the existence of the Winds Message is strewn with odds and ends of conflicting and contradictory evidence and testimonies. As will be discerned, Kramer gradually modified his statements until it has become necessary to scrutinize them carefully and cautiously in the attempt to make a proper and logical evaluation of their worth. Kramer during the course of three investigations progressively altered his testimony from a point of positive identification of the Winds Message as authentic to a complete reversal of his testimony wherein he concluded that it might be "phony." Only the examination of the testimony of all the witnesses having knowledge of the Winds Message
will reveal the possibility or impossibility of its existence. A careful scrutiny of the composition of the investigating committees will enable the reader to evaluate and judge their conclusions regarding the Winds Message.
The Roberts Commission was set up by President Roosevelt on December 16, 1941. This was a five-man board of inquiry headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts of the United States Supreme Court. The other members were two retired admirals, Rear Admiral William H. Standley, former Chief of Naval Operations, and Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, former Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet; Major General Frank R. McCoy, Retired, and Joseph T. McNarney, Brigadier General on the active list of the Army Air Corps. The record of the Commission's proceedings and exhibits covers 2,173 printed pages.

Public opinion, enraged at the calamity wrought at Pearl Harbor, demanded an explanation, hence the appointment of the Roberts Commission by Executive Order. The Commission was charged with the responsibility of ascertaining and reporting the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese upon Pearl Harbor. According to the order, the purposes of the inquiry and report were to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of the United States Navy or Army personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the Japanese on the occasion of Pearl Harbor.

The appointment of Justice Roberts to head the inquiry possibly lent an air of impartiality to the hearings. The Commission
examined 127 witnesses and received a large number of documents. The conclusions of the Commission were not unexpected ones. Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, Chief of Staff Marshall and the Chief of Naval Operations Stark were found to have fulfilled their obligations and were not assessed any responsibility in the tragedy. Since a national disaster of the terrifying and shocking nature of Pearl Harbor naturally demanded a scapegoat, General Short and Admiral Kimmel, of the Hawaiian Department and the Pacific Fleet, respectively, were nominated by the Roberts Commission to assume this role. They were charged by the Commission of dereliction of duty, and thus, the administration in Washington and high naval and army officials were relieved of any responsibility in the tragedy. The American public was not satisfied, however, with this verdict, as the subsequent numerous investigations indicates, but the Roberts Commission conclusions sufficed to forestall any further inquiry until more than two years later. The matter of the East Wind Rain Message was not introduced before the Roberts Commission, and thus, no recommendation or conclusion regarding it were made. For two years the matter was held in abeyance until the appointment of the Hart Inquiry in the early part of 1944.

When Roberts was questioned by the Joint Congressional Committee in 1945 concerning the implementing Winds Message, he replied that he had no recollection of any such thing. The

\[\text{JCC, Part 7, p. 3265.}\]
Committee was impressed with the fact that in 1941 the United States was intercepting coded broadcasts from Japan and examined Roberts about the failure of General Marshall to get a warning message, written as a result of the Japanese Fourteen-Part message to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington, to Pearl Harbor. This was the Japanese reply to Secretary Hull's Ten-Point note of November 26, 1941, and it started coming in and was intercepted Saturday night, December 6, 1941, and Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. All fourteen parts of the message were in when Marshall arrived at his office after his Sunday morning horseback ride. According to Roberts' testimony, Marshall, after Stark had refused to join him in a warning, scribbled off the message in lead pencil. Stark reconsidered, phoned Marshall and said that he would join in the warning. Marshall then sent for his communications officer, Colonel French, and inquired as to how quickly the message could be sent to Pearl Harbor. Colonel French replied that it would take about half an hour and explained that he couldn't reach the Army by direct communication. Practice in that case, according to French, was to open the Western Union wire. French called the Western Union and asked them to open a wire to San Francisco which was done. The message was coded and sent. That action then required the Western Union in San Francisco to carry the message across the street to the cable office, RCA, to be sent. Justice Roberts added that if the teletype in Pearl Harbor had been working Sunday morning, the warning message would have been delivered within two or three minutes of its receipt.
It was not, however, the practice to run the teletype on Sunday morning. Roberts continued:

When the RCA operator found he couldn't get to General Short on the teletype he gave a little boy the message to take on a bicycle. The boy started out and went some distance when the first bomb dropped and then he went into the bushes and stayed there until about 2 o'clock when he delivered the message.²

It is a revelation of a sort to realize that despite elaborate and expensive communication devices at the disposal of the United States, the message which could have alerted Pearl Harbor to the impending Japanese attack and which could have saved many lives was, in the end, entrusted to a small boy on a bicycle.

Justice Roberts did not explain why General Marshall did not use the scrambler telephone on his desk to send the warning, and some question arises as to Roberts' evaluation of the evidence before his Commission which concluded that Marshall had fulfilled adequately his obligations.

²Ibid. p. 3270.
SECTION IV

EFFECT OF PUBLIC OPINION

The passage of Public Law 339 by the Congress of the United States on June 13, 1941, was the culminating result of mounting public opinion and political pressure greatly in evidence in the presidential election year. The Act directed both the War and Navy Departments to conduct separate inquiries into the facts of Pearl Harbor and was the impetus for the Army Pearl Harbor Board investigation and the Navy Court of Inquiry investigation. The pages of the Congressional Record for the year of 1941 are replete with the demands of the representatives of the people of the United States for more knowledge of the tragedy and for the assignment of responsibility to the guilty party or parties. Many members of Congress, including Republicans Vursel, Church and Ferguson and Democrats Outland and Sabath, took advantage of the privilege of extending their remarks to include in the Congressional Record newspaper editorials and magazine articles which were indicative of the feeling of the American people regarding their greatest naval disaster.

It is difficult to distinguish the motivations behind the demands which developed from 1941 on for further investigations of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. Some simply wanted to embarrass the administration in an election year. Some wanted to show that the administration had planned to get us into the war and purposely let Pearl Harbor happen. These had been ardent isolationists. Some
wanted to show that the success of the Japanese was due, not to lack of alertness by Kimmel and Short but by negligence or stupidity in Washington, specifically Marshall, Stark and their immediate subordinates and superiors—the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. Dewey, Republican candidate for President in 1944, had been told that the United States had broken the Japanese codes and so knew of the coming attack. Marshall had urged him not to reveal the fact that we had broken the codes. But short of saying this the Republicans could and did attack the handling of affairs and hint, indeed more than hint, at incompetence in civilian and military leaders. The criticisms culminated in a demand for further inquiry.

Senator Homer Ferguson, Republican of Michigan, introduced into the Senate of May 25, 1944, a joint resolution calling for an extension of time within which court-martial proceedings might be brought against any person or persons guilty of dereliction of duty in connection with the Pearl Harbor disaster. Ferguson stated that he had some information from newspaper reports indicating that the Navy had designated Admiral Hart to obtain affidavits in connection with the Pearl Harbor tragedy, but no detailed information of their contents or purpose was available to Congress. The reason for Ferguson’s resolution was that delay in bringing prosecution as a rule is beneficial to those who are guilty of any crime or dereliction of duty, and could as well be detrimental to the presentation of defense for those who have a legitimate defense. It is undoubted—
ly a logical assumption to suspect that Ferguson realized that the administration would be embarrassed by bringing Kimmel and Short to trial during an election year, and that it could not afford to lose face by refusing to approve the resolution. It is true that Ferguson may have been motivated by purely patriotic motives, but it is equally true that he was shrewd enough politically to be aware of the tremendous advantage to his party if he could succeed in forcing the court-martials, for which both Kimmel and Short pleaded, in an election year.

A reasonable conclusion to the consideration of introducing of the resolution calling for an extension of the time-limit for court-martials would be that at last Congress would have some voice in authorizing an investigation which would have to be made if the two officers, Kimmel and Short, were to be brought to trial. This neat maneuver was recognized by the leaders of the administration, but the campaign year of 1944 was not the time to be too vociferous against the measure, and so the Republicans under the leadership of Senator Ferguson were successful in focusing attention upon Pearl Harbor. Inasmuch as America was still at war, it would have been impossible for a Congressional investigation at that time, because of the possible bad effect on the prosecution of the war, and it is this fact which explains why the Army and the Navy were designated to ascertain the situation surrounding the disaster at Pearl Harbor.

On June 3, 1944, Charles A. Halleck, Republican of Indiana, addressed the Republican State Convention at Indianapolis and asked
many critical questions concerning Pearl Harbor. He was curious to learn why the Roosevelt administration, upon coming to the conclusion that world conditions were such between 1933 to 1941 as to warrant war, decided also that this information should be kept secret from the American people. Why, inquired Halleck, did the administration, being aware of the facts and character of Japan, continue to appease her by sending her oil and scrap iron to be used against China and eventually America. He asked why the administration dared not bring to trial Kimmel and Short whom it had charged with the responsibility of Pearl Harbor, and then proceeded to place the full blame upon the President. Halleck's inquiries are indicative of the widespread doubt as to the administration-appointed Roberts Commission and its findings as well as the growing demand for more of the particulars of Pearl Harbor.

All opinion, however, was not against the administration. An editorial of June 8, 1944, in the Washington Post, stated as pure politics the successful attempt of the passage of Public Law 339 with its charge to discover the facts of Pearl Harbor, assign responsibility and to bring Kimmel and Short to trial immediately. In the interests of national security the trial should be postponed, argued the editorial, and scored the unusual interest in Pearl Harbor at that time as merely indicative of possible political maneuverings in a campaign year.¹

¹ Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, p. A2904.
On August 21, 1944, as the presidential campaign wore on, and both parties were marshalling their strength for the crucial test in November, Ralph E. Church, Republican of Illinois, took issue with Missouri Democratic Senator, Harry S. Truman, relative to Truman's article which appeared in Collier's magazine on the 20th of August. Truman at that time was the Democratic candidate for the Vice-Presidency of the United States. The thesis of his article was that American armed forces had to be unified. Basing his argument for consolidation on the fact of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, he contended that the Japanese surprise attack was successful because of a lack of coordination of forces under the command of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Truman implied that these two, Kimmel and Short, were not even on speaking terms, contrary to Kimmel's statement on the morning of August 21, 1944, in the Washington Times-Herald that such an assumption was untrue. Kimmel stated that he and Short, as well as their subordinates, coordinated the efforts of their commands in close, friendly, personal and official relationships.

Addressing his remarks to the Speaker of the House, Church stated his opinion that the Roberts Report was nothing more than a political document, designed to allay the public clamor for information as to the party or parties responsible for our armed forces being taken by surprise. It was designed not to present the truth.

Ibid. p. A3653.
continued Church, but to prevent the people from knowing the truth. Church stated that he was personally convinced that the people really responsible for the Pearl Harbor catastrophe were in Washington on December 7th and not in the Pacific. The administration, said Church, knew that to be true, for how else could one explain its unwillingness to hold the court martial of Kimmel and Short. Church placed the fact of the surprise at Pearl Harbor on official Washington negligence, stating that to cloak this fact, the Roberts Report was devised to prevent knowledge of Pearl Harbor from being known by the American people and the court-martial of Kimmel and Short was postponed indefinitely.

The issue of Pearl Harbor continued to be a much-discussed one during the fall of 1944. On the 21st of September Adolph J. Sabath, Democrat of Illinois, stated on the floor of the House that he wanted to make some observations on two resolutions recently introduced by Republican Representatives Scott and Harness of Pennsylvania and Indiana, respectively, providing for further investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster. It will be noted that these two resolutions were introduced after the passage of Public Law 339 on June 13, 1944, providing for similar action. Representative Sabath believed that these two resolutions, identical in wording, must have been prepared by Republican propagandists who were working overtime in and around Wall Street. None of the resolution, in either case, he said, contained any real truths, but were merely verbiages to effect publicity that might injure President Roosevelt.
and the administration. It could not have been for any other purpose, emphasized Sabath, because only last June, the Congress had passed Public Law 339 directing the War and Navy Departments to proceed immediately with an investigation of the conditions existing immediately prior to and at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Sabath felt that the Army and Navy were in a better position to investigate the matter than Congress; but if Congress honestly desired to start an investigation, why, he inquired, had not the effort been made before? Why wait until three days before the Congress was scheduled to take a recess and only six or seven weeks before the general election?

Sabath charged that Representatives Scott and Harness knew that their resolutions were introduced for the sole purpose of gaining a little cheap publicity and perhaps giving the newspapers additional opportunity for saying that the administration refused to try Short and Kimmel. Sabath inquired as to what were the facts as to the position of Congress with respect to the investigation of the Pearl Harbor investigation—the Roberts Commission? He asked what did the Second Session of the 78th Congress do in further relation to Admiral Kimmel and General Short? Sabath invoked the record to speak. The Congress, he said, had enacted Senate Joint Resolution 133, the Senate approving it June 5, 1944, and the House passing it the following day, with the President approving it on June 13, 1944. This Congressional legislation became Public Law 339 which provided that the time limit for immunity be extended for a further
period of one year, and that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to investigate into the facts surrounding the catastrophe, and thereafter in their discretion to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. This action showed, said Sabath, that a Democratic Congress and a Democratic administration had courage properly to deal with the question. Sabath neglected to mention that the passage of Public Law 339 was due primarily to the efforts of Republican Senator Homer Ferguson, and that the Democratic majority had no other alternative than to approve the measure. Any efforts of the administration to kill the bill would have led to widespread suspicion on the part of the American public regarding the allegations of the Republican opposition regarding the Pearl Harbor disaster. The Democrats in Congress merely showed an ordinary amount of political wisdom in adding their approval to the new investigation, realizing that the War and Navy Departments, under the direction of their Secretaries appointed by the President, could suppress any facts detrimental to the welfare of the Democratic party and the administration.

Evidence of conflicting opinion regarding Pearl Harbor was provided in an editorial written by Mr. A. L. Sessions in the California Labor Review in which Sessions stated that it was inevitable that during the presidential campaign the Republicans would attempt to make a political football of the Pearl Harbor disaster, and try to blame Roosevelt for it. It was Sessions' opinion that no indi-
vidual or group of individuals was responsible for Pearl Harbor, not even Kimmel and Short. Writing in November of 1944, Sessions stated that the entire American people were to blame. We lived in a fool's paradise, believing that there couldn't be a war:

We, in the United States, Britain and France were seriously affected with Pearl Harboritis when we nonchalantly watched the Japanese occupy Manchuria and refused to back up Henry Stimson's demands that we do something about it.3 While there is possibly some element of truth in Sessions' charge of indifference of the American people to the possibility of war during the pre-Pearl Harbor period, it must be pointed out that the public does not occupy the position of advantage accorded to the administration in power. The American public, furthermore, did not have at its disposal the evidence of mounting diplomatic tension between the United States and Japan, and hence it is unfair to blame the people for the ultimate conflict and particularly the Pearl Harbor tragedy. The public has the right to expect that the administration in charge of its national and international affairs will seriously consider all aspects which might involve it in a show of arms with another country and take steps to prevent such an outbreak if at all possible.

There is little evidence available in either the Congressional Record or in magazines or newspaper editorials of opinion regarding the investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster between

3 Ibid. p. 4566
the periods of November 1944 to September of 1945 when a resolution for a Congressional investigation was introduced in the Senate of the United States. The findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry had not yet been released up to August 28, 1945, and during the intervening period from November of 1944, the American public was content to wait for the release of the official findings.

On August 29, 1945, the reports of the Army and Navy investigating groups were released by President Truman. August 29th was also the day of the Allied landings in Japan, and the date of release was the result of either masterful maneuvering or remarkable coincidence. These reports failed to satisfy the public or Congress, and a new Republican drive for a full scale Congressional investigation was launched, gathering so much momentum that it could not be stopped. Congress was back in session less than an hour on September 6, 1945, when the Democratic Senator from Kentucky, Barkley, arose in a surprising move. He out-maneuvered the Republicans with a sweeping pledge for a Congressional investigation which caught the Senate Republicans flatfooted. Only the day before Senator Homer Ferguson had announced that he would introduce an inquiry resolution, and that his action had been formally approved by the Senate Republican steering committee. In the House, Republican Leader Joseph W. Martin demanded that the resolution be amended to provide for equal representation for both parties, but it was only a gesture, since all knew that it would be defeated. Both parties realized that Pearl Harbor might provide a major issue for the Con-
gressional elections in the next year.

In calling for a new investigation, Barkley summarized the efforts up to that time that had been made to clear up the issue, stating that on December 18, 1941, President Roosevelt appointed by Executive Order the Roberts Commission to investigate Pearl Harbor. The Commission made its report to the President on January 29, 1942, and the report was immediately made public. Then on June 13, 1942, continued Barkley, the Congress directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to designate boards of inquiry to ascertain the facts about Pearl Harbor. It is significant enough to point out that Barkley did not mention the inquiry conducted by Admiral Hart under order of the Secretary of the Navy on February 12, 1942. This inquiry lasted until June 15, 1942, and the public and the Congress were not informed of its existence, accounting for Barkley's lack of knowledge. Barkley was ignorant also, of the Clarke, Clausen and Hewitt investigations which lasted from September of 1942 until July of 1945. These inquiries which were secretly conducted followed the Army and Navy investigations authorized by Public Law 339. They were initiated by the Secretaries of the Navy and War Departments who refused to accept all the findings of the two Boards and suppressed their reports.

Barkley continued that the Army Board under Lieutenant General George Grunert made its report to the Secretary of War on October 20, 1942, and this report was released to the public on August 29, 1945. Barkley stated that although the Army Board criticized
certain military and other officials, it made no recommendations to the Secretary of War. Barkley made no mention of the fact that part of the report of the Army Board was suppressed at the time of the general release. The Navy, continued Barkley, appointed Admiral Orin G. Murfin as president of its Court of Inquiry. The Navy Court finished its inquiry on October 19, 1944, then adjourned to await the action of the convening authority, the Secretary of the Navy. The report of the Navy Court went into some detail concerning the circumstances of the Pearl Harbor attack, said Barkley, and recommended that no further proceedings be had in the matter.

After studying the Army and Navy reports, Barkley said, as well as that of the Roberts Commission, he was convinced that a further searching inquiry should be made under the authority and by the direction of the Congress of the United States. The reports were confusing and conflicting when compared with one another, Barkley remarked, and to some extent contained contradictions and inconsistencies within themselves. Under these circumstances, he said, it was not strange that widespread confusion and suspicion prevailed among the American people and among the members of Congress. The inquiry he proposed, continued Barkley, should be of such dignity and authenticity as to convince the Congress, the country and the world that no effort had been made to shield any person who might have been directly or indirectly responsible for the disaster, or to condemn unfairly or unjustly any person who was in authority, military, naval or civilian, at the time or prior thereto. Barkley
stated that the joint investigation ought not to be conducted for the sole purpose of vindicating or aspersing any man now in office, or who had been in office during the period involved; to enhance or retard the welfare of any political party, or political aspirants; to cast aspersions upon men who had rendered outstanding services to their country and to the world; nor to whitewash any person guilty of wrongdoing in connection with the Pearl Harbor affair.

Senator Homer Ferguson interrupted to say that the Roberts Commission was only authorized to inquire into possible derelictions of duty on the part of Army or Navy personnel, and he was anxious that possible civilian negligence be also subject to inquiry in the proposed Congressional investigation. Ferguson stated that the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War were not satisfied with the reports of their respective boards of inquiry and each decided to continue the investigations, which had not been revealed to the public. Ferguson closed his remarks by stating that the curiosity of the people about their public affairs is the sole bulwark of a republican government, and it is a citizen's duty to be curious, but also his right to have the whole truth about a subject which cost so much in the blood and treasure of the American people.

On October 10, 1945, John M. Coffee, Democrat of Washington, speaking in the House of Representatives presented for inclusion in

4 Congressional Record. 79th Congress, 1st Session. p. 8339.
the Congressional Record an article by Ernest K. Lindley, as printed in the Washington Post, which presented the view that Thomas Dewey would have lost, not gained, by divulging military secrets within his knowledge during the 1944 presidential campaign.

It was not astonishing, wrote Lindley, that Governor Dewey knew during the 1944 campaign that in the days just before Pearl Harbor the United States Government had secret information that Japan was at the point of breaking diplomatic relations and making war. John Chamberlain in Life magazine, said Lindley, seemed to think that if Dewey had made public the information in his hands he would have been elected President. This assumed, continued Lindley, that Dewey's information was accurate, damaging to Roosevelt and that Dewey could have used it without damage to himself.

Our success in breaking certain Japanese codes, asserted Lindley, was of immense value during the war. It saved untold numbers of American lives and shortened the war. The fact that we had found the keys to certain Japanese codes was therefore one of our most closely guarded secrets. That is why General Marshall and Admiral King wanted Dewey to keep quiet about the intercepted messages of December, 1941. The principal victim of such a disclosure would have been Dewey himself, said Lindley, and he would have forfeited the confidence of many who voted for him because they considered him patriotic and responsible enough to be President.

Ibid. p. 317.
It is apparent that the Joint Congressional Committee investi-
gation, initiated after the cessation of hostilities, would be
better able to ascertain the true facts of Pearl Harbor than had the
previous seven committees who were burdened by the restrictions im-
posed upon them by the necessity of wartime secrecy. The course of
the Congressional Committee investigation, however, was beset with
much difficulty in its proceedings because of administration attempts
to force passage of a bill, earlier in the year, to prevent the dis-
closure of any coded matter except by permission of the head of a
government department or by the President. Many persons, including
Admiral Kimmel, felt that this attempt was an effort to prevent the
revelation of pertinent knowledge damaging to the administration
leaders and to fasten responsibility for Pearl Harbor upon the pre-
viously selected scapegoats, Kimmel and Short. This bill was de-
feated in the House of Representatives, but when the Joint Congress-
ional Committee convened bitter opposition arose when President Tru-
man signed an Executive Order concerning the subpoenaing of witnesses
and records.

On October 29, 1945, in the House of Representatives,
Charles W. Vursell, Republican of Illinois, inserted into the Congres-
sional Record an editorial from the Chicago Daily Tribune of
October 27, 1945, entitled "What is Mr. Truman Trying to Hide?"
The editorial stated that President Truman had given the New Deal

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6 Ibid. p. 44555.
majority of the Pearl Harbor investigating Committee the power to suppress incriminating evidence against his party and its wartime leader, Franklin Roosevelt. Truman had signed an Executive Order providing that witnesses and records might be subpoenaed only by majority vote of the committee members. Since there were six Democrats and only four Republicans, another whitewash, declared the article, was inevitable. The editorial continued that there had already been two whitewashes of administration responsibility for the events of December 7, 1941. The Roberts Commission appointed by the White House was directed to look somewhere else than Washington in determining guilt for the disaster. The Army and Navy Boards authorized to conduct new investigations by Congress in 1944 were allowed greater latitude and displayed greater courage in criticizing Secretary of State Hull, General Marshall and Admiral Stark. This criticism was partially responsible for the refusal by the Secretary of Navy and the Secretary of War to accept the reports of the Army and Navy Boards in their entirety and led to the subsequent Clarke, Clausen and Hewitt investigations.

The Executive Order, continued the editorial, indicated one reason why President Truman insisted on clinging to his wartime powers, for under them he could frustrate any effective action to develop the truth about his predecessor's culpability in sacrificing the fleet and the lives of 3,000 men to his desire for war. To allow the evidence to become public knowledge might well arouse such public outrage as to wreck Truman's party and personal prospects.
The fear, however, that the Joint Committee would be denied
full access to all pertinent data was unfounded, because all avail-
able records, including Top Secret material, was placed at its dis-
posal.
The Hart Inquiry was launched by the Navy in February of 1944. The inquiry was a secret one initiated by the Secretary of the Navy, and the public and Congress were not aware of its existence. There is no indication that the inquiry in any way had any political undertones even though 1944 was a presidential election year. It is possible that Secretary Knox, cognizant of the pressure which was sure to be felt when the war ended, was anxious to have a more detailed picture of the tragedy than was available in the Roberts Commission report. Not unmindful of the possible responsibility of the Navy in the disaster and eager to exonerate himself and his department of criticism, Knox appointed Admiral Thomas C. Hart to conduct the inquiry. The impartiality of a naval inquiry, appointed by the Secretary of the Navy and conducted by a naval officer may be suspect, but at least an effort was being made to make a more complete investigation of the most horrifying naval catastrophe in modern times.

The Hart Inquiry was ordered by the Secretary of Navy to record testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, in a precept addressed to Admiral Hart and dated Washington, February 12, 1944:

Whereas, on 7 December 1941, Japanese armed forces made an attack against Army and Navy installations and ships of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor,
Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, which attack was a complete surprise...and...

Whereas, regrettable loss of life and extensive damage resulted from the said attack, and...I hereby detail you to examine such members of the naval forces thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the said surprise attack and fully record the testimony given thereby...In view of the fact that Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, was, on 7 December 1941, serving on active duty as the commander-in-chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of Admiral, U. S. Navy, and therefore, has an interest in the matter into which this examination is being made, you will notify him of the times and places of the meetings to be had and that he has the right to be present, to have counsel, to introduce, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce matter pertinent to the examination and to testify or declare in his own behalf at his own request.*

The inquiry began on February 12, 1944, and was completed on June 15, 1944. Admiral Kimmel was not examined. In his story of Pearl Harbor published on December 10, 1954, Kimmel wrote that he was invited by the Navy Department to collaborate in the investigation of Pearl Harbor. Admiral Hart intimated to him that Secretary Knox was favorably disposed towards him (Kimmel) and that the investigation would benefit him. Kimmel stated that an exchange of letters with Knox developed certain stipulations which Kimmel must agree to before his assistance would be acceptable. According to Kimmel, these unindicated (by Kimmel) stipulations placed his fate completely at the mercy of the Secretary of the

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1JCG, Part 26, p. 3-4.

Navy, and therefore he declined to take any part in the Hart inves-

Captain L. F. Safford was examined on April 29, 1944. He was the officer in charge of the Communication Security Section of Naval Communications. The term "Communication Security" was a covering title to include Communication Intelligence. Safford was asked if his unit obtained during November and December any definite information which indicated the objectives which the Japanese were preparing to attack. He replied in the affirmative. Safford was permitted to make any statements he thought should be a matter of record and stated that the Communication Intelligence Unit in Washington had no authority to forward to the Communication Intelligence Units in Pearl Harbor or Corregidor, or to any Commanders-in-Chief direct, any information other than technical information pertaining to direction finding, interception, and so forth. The dissemination of intelligence was the duty and responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence. On the 14th of December, testified Safford, Commander Arthur N. McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the Winds Message, and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent. Admiral Wilkinson, continued Safford, approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in Safford's presence. When Admiral Noyes read McCollum's warning, he remarked that he thought it was an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief (Kimmel).
Admiral Wilkinson stated that he did not agree, that Admiral Kimmel was a very busy man, and might not see the picture as clearly as they (Wilkinson and Noyes) did. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, continued Safford, he thought that this warning message had been sent, and did not realize until two years later, when he studied the Roberts Report that McCollum's message had not been sent. Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored after November 26th by twelve intercept stations, as follows: Netherlands East Indies at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corregidor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard.

The Winds Message, according to Safford's testimony before the Hart Inquiry, was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the Winds Message was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The Winds Message, stated Safford, was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Safford's statement continued that Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down
that evening and identified that message as the Winds Message which the Navy had been looking for:

The significant part of the "Winds Message" read: "HIGASHI NO KAZE AME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO KAZE KUMORI." The literal translation of these phrases is: "EAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY." The meaning of this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: "War with the United States. War with Britain, including the N.E.I., etc. Peace with Russia." I first saw the "Winds Message" about 8:00 A. M. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U.S.N.R., came into my office with a big smile on his face and a piece of paper in his hand and said, "Here it is!" as he handed me the "Winds Message." As I remember, it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant "Winds" underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S.I.S. in the War Department.3

Safford continued that as the direct result of the Winds Message he prepared a total of five messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station. Also, as a direct result of the Winds Message, stated Safford, McCollum drafted the long warning message, previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but which the Navy Department Communication Intelligence Unit believed had been sent. Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department Communication Intelligence Unit regarded the Winds Message as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain, stated Safford, whereas

3JCC, Part 26, p. 394.
the information of earlier dates had been merely statements of intent:

We believed that the Japanese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the latest. The following officers recall having seen and having read the "Winds Message": Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following officers knew by hearsay that the "Winds Message" had been intercepted but did not actually see it themselves: Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander G. W. Lima, U. S. N. R., Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N., and Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve.4

Safford also named officers who should have had some recollection of the Winds Message: U. S. Navy--Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Captain A. H. McCollum, Colonel R. A. Boone (U. S. Marine Corps), Commander G. W. Welker, Commander A. D. Kramer, Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Ship's Clerk H. L. Bryant. U. S. Army--Brigadier General T. J. Betts, Colonel O. K. Sadtler, Colonel R. S. Bratton, Colonel Rex Minckler, Colonel Moses Pettigrew, Colonel Harold Doud and Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Shukraft. As will be seen from a study of later investigations, most of these witnesses named by Safford were unable to corroborate his statements.

Safford concluded that he last saw the Winds Message about December 15, 1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer, checked by

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4 Ibid. pp395 f. (Lieutenant Commander Lynn's name is misspelled in text).
Safford, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission.

Testifying before the Hart Inquiry on June 6, 1941, Admiral R. E. Ingersoll said he was cognizant of the special code of Japan to inform its nationals concerning the breaking off of relations between that country and the United States, Britain and Russia.

Q: Do you recall having seen, on or about 4 December, the broadcast directive, thus given, indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States?
A: Yes.

Q: Do you know why that particular information was not sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?
A: I do not know except that it was probably supposed that the intercept stations in the Hawaiian Islands had also received this broadcast. However, it may have been because of a message sent in regard to the destruction of Japanese codes which had been sent to London and Washington which indicated that war with the United States and with Great Britain was imminent.

Lieutenant Commanders Murray, Brotherhood, Freeman and Lynn, Commanders Kramer and McCollum and Admiral Noyes did not testify before the Hart Inquiry. Admirals Turner and Wilkinson appeared but were not questioned concerning the Winds Message. The only witnesses who testified about the Winds Message before this inquiry were Safford and Ingersoll.

At the conclusion of the inquiry, Admiral Hart submitted no findings, conclusions or recommendations. His report included only the testimony taken and exhibits. The first conclusion regarding the Winds Message was not rendered until the investigation of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

\[5\text{Ibid. p. 469.}\]
The Army Pearl Harbor Board was appointed pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, Seventy-Eighth Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and by order dated July 8, 1944 of the Adjutant General, War Department. The Board was directed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper. The Board held sessions beginning July 20, 1944, and concluded its investigation on October 20, 1944. Its record and exhibits cover 3,357 printed pages. Members of the Board were Lieutenant General George Grunert, President; Major General Henry D. Russell and Major General Walter A. Frank.

The testimony of various witnesses on the subject of the Winds Message was not taken in the regular record but was included in Top Secret data. On September 29, 1944, General George C. Marshall testified that the records of the War Department showed that prior to December 7th, none of the War Department monitoring services had picked up the Japanese broadcast relating to the Winds Message. There had been no allegation that the War Department had intercepted the Winds Message, so this statement by Marshall was a voluntary one. Marshall stated that he was informed that on the 28th of November 1941, Colonel Bratton, who was in charge of
all secret matters, made arrangements for listening for Japanese broadcasts that might include the Winds Code. It appeared from the record, continued Marshall, that on the 5th of December 1941, Colonel Sadtler, in the office of the Chief Signal Corps Officer, was informed by Admiral Noyes, Naval Communications Officer, that a Japanese message using the Winds Code had been intercepted the previous night and that the message decoded meant that Japanese-British relations were to be broken; that on December 5, 1941, Colonel Sadtler so informed General Miles, Colonel Bratton, General Gerow, Colonel Gaily, General Gerow's executive officer, and General Walter B. Smith, who was then Secretary of the General Staff, but that General Miles or Colonel Bratton never informed him (Marshall) personally of the Sadtler information. The presumption was, said Marshall, that General Smith had informed him. Marshall further stated that the records showed that Colonel Bratton prior to that time had been informed by the Navy that Commander Rochefort of the 14th Naval District in Hawaii knew all that the Navy Department in Washington knew about the Winds Code message, and that on the 5th of December Bratton caused the following message to be sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately through Commandant 14th Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

This action is significant in that it indicates the anxiety of the War Department to intercept if possible the Winds Message.

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1 JCC, Part 29, p. 2325.
and shows the importance placed on it by the military officials. Marshall testified that he found that no officer of the Navy ever advised General Miles or Colonel Bratton that any message implementing the Winds Code had been received by the Navy, which was true. However, Marshall ignored his previous statement to the effect that Admiral Noyes had so notified Colonel Sadler, who in turn, relayed this information to General Miles and Colonel Bratton.

Marshall was then questioned by General Russell who was conducting the interrogation concerning his interpretation of the Winds Message. Russell stated that the Navy had said that the order executing the code words meant that war was coming with the United States and with Britain, but not with Russia; and the message which Marshall had just submitted to the record was to the effect that trouble would come with Britain alone. Marshall did not dispute Russell's version of the interpretation of the message, but this is relatively unimportant, because if it had been received, the course of action by the United States would have had to be the same, inasmuch as the United States was committed, under the ABCD Agreement, to come to Britain's defense in the event of a Japanese attack. A question which arises in this regard is whether or not high officers in the Army and Navy, or anyone outside the War Council knew of the ABCD Agreement and its implications. A lack of this vital knowledge, would of course, influence interpretation of an intercepted Winds Message. However, as was indicated in later
testimony high military and naval officers, as well as men in the lower echelons were aware of the Agreement and its implications.

Colonel Rufus Bratton, then Chief of the Far Eastern Section, G-2, War Department, was questioned concerning his knowledge of the Winds Message. Bratton disclosed that shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor it came to his knowledge that the Japanese would inject into their weather broadcasts from Tokyo code phrases which would have a certain significance. Bratton further testified that the Federal Communications Commission called him on the telephone during the first week in December on one or two occasions repeating what appeared to be the weather code signal for which he was waiting. Examination of the intercept, however, disclosed, according to Bratton's testimony, that it was not the code that he was looking for. He further stated that the message that he was waiting for would indicate a break in the relations between Japan and the United States and that it never reached him from any source whatever prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

On the morning of December 5, 1941, Bratton continued, he vaguely recalled a meeting in General Miles' office where Colonel Sadtler was present, in which he (Sadtler) said something to the effect that the message had come through. Questioning developed the fact, however, that the message Sadtler was talking about was one which indicated a break in diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Japan. Bratton attempted to minimize the importance of this message, stating that such information was beside the point.
at that time, because it was the belief in the War Department that relations between Japan and Great Britain were on the point of rupture and had been for several days. Bratton added that there were several codes sent out by the Japanese foreign office at about this time, to their diplomatic officials abroad, which they hoped to use in the case or in the event of a sudden rupture of communications. He stated that there were several versions of this wind and weather code sent out. Bratton testified that he discussed these codes with his opposite number in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Commander McCullom, on a number of occasions. Learning from McCullom that the Navy was monitoring the Japanese communication system in Honolulu as a function of naval communications, and that their expert there was Commander Rochefort, who was thoroughly familiar with the whole matter, Bratton testified that he deemed it advisable, on or about the 5th of December, to have G-2 in Honolulu contact Commander Rochefort, with the end in view that the latter could explain to G-2 what it was the War Department was waiting for.

Bratton was asked if he knew whether or not Colonel Fielder, G-2, Hawaii, ever got the message about contacting Rochefort, and he replied that he did not know. He did not know either whether or not Fielder had received any information from Rochefort concerning the message. When informed that Colonel Fielder had testified that he had never received such a message, Bratton countered that the message had been dispatched.
On October 2, 1944, Captain L. F. Safford, head of the Communications Security Division in Naval Operations in December of 1941 was asked directly if, on or about December 4th, he had received information which indicated that the Japanese Empire had employed the Winds Code and the intercepted messages indicated final decisions affecting the United States, Russia and Great Britain. Safford replied that the Navy did receive such an implementing message on Thursday, December 4, 1941. According to him, it was received about 8 o'clock at one of the Navy's East Coast intercept stations and sent into the Navy Department by teletype. Safford stated that he saw it when he first came to the office. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who was the senior language officer, and Lieutenant Murray who was the watch officer from Safford's section, came into the office. Lieutenant Murray held up a yellow teletype sheet and said, "Here it is."

Safford testified that the message was about 200 words in length and contained the Winds Code which was underscored, with writing at the bottom in lead pencil in Kramer's handwriting, "War with England, war with America, peace with Russia." The message as received, stated Safford, was not the way in which it was expected because the Japanese had mixed up their voice procedure with the Morse code message. The original message, said

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\(^2\)Ibid. p. 2371.
\(^3\)Ibid. p. 2372.
Safford, was taken up by Lieutenant Murray and given to Admiral Noyes, in accordance with special orders which had been issued for the occasion. Safford further testified that the original message could not (at the time of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing) be located, and had not been seen since the time it was given to Admiral Noyes, unless it was given to the Roberts Commission and filed with their papers. Safford stated that after a six months search no written record of the message could be found in the office with which he was associated at the time of Pearl Harbor. Safford was asked what was done in connection with the delivery of the message to the War Department. He replied that the duplicate copy from the teletype was taken and translated in normal fashion and four copies of the translation interpretation made. Two were sent out to the War Department, presumably that morning. Also, in the Navy Department, a copy was distributed around noon, in connection with the daily routine distribution of translations, and it went to the Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Naval Communications, Director of Naval Intelligence, Director of War Plans Division, the State Department and to the White House. Safford testified that he had been active in the search for the missing message, and stated that one copy of the translation should have been filed under the JD number, which he thought was 7001, because that number was missing and unaccounted for, and fell very close to the proper date. Safford stated that the last time he saw the message after the attack on Pearl Harbor
was on or about the 15th of December when Admiral Noyes called for
the assembling of all important messages into one file to show as
evidence to the Roberts Commission. Kramer assembled the papers
and Safford checked them over for completeness. The Winds Execute,
said Safford, was included in those papers.

Safford testified that the message was delivered in the
War Department to the Signal Intelligence Service, and from that
section to G-2, and to Colonel Bratton who was head of the Far
Eastern Section. Safford stated that the message was intercepted
on the East Coast, and that all the station logs unfortunately
had been destroyed sometime during 1943:

The ones that had been sent into the Navy Depart-
ment had all been burned up. Every time they moved in
connection with expansion a lot of stuff got burnt. 4

When asked what proof he had that the message had been sent
to the White House, Safford replied that everything received from
November 12th on was sent to the White House, and that it was
taken over personally by Commander Kramer and was given by him to
the Naval Aide to the President, Admiral Beardall, who took it in
to the President.

Safford stated that he discussed the message with Kramer
and Murray who had assured him of its existence, because according
to Safford, it looked as though his (Safford's) memory had been

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{4}} \text{Ibid. p. 2373.} \]
playing tricks on him, because a lot of people knew about it by hearsay, but had not seen it themselves. Safford was questioned at great length concerning the existence of the Winds Message and testified that there was a possibility that the original distribution of the message was in existence in the Navy Department, in the hands or in the safe of some high official, probably the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, or possibly the Secretary of the Navy. Of sixty messages about which Safford testified, the Winds Message was the only one missing. Safford stated that Admiral Hart had made a statement to him which implied that he (Hart) had sighted it, and that Safford was not justified in the statement that all copies of the Winds Message had been destroyed, or all the Navy Department copies had been destroyed.

Before concluding his testimony, Safford suggested to the Board that it call Colonel Sadtler as a witness, because according to Safford, Sadtler knew a great deal about the message.

On October 6, 1944, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, in charge of military codes and ciphers, Chief Signal Office, was next questioned by the Army Pearl Harbor Board. He stated that his position was one of operations only and that he was concerned primarily with the collection of data that came to his unit's attention through various intercept means, and that his unit was not concerned with the evaluation or the analysis of the content of those messages. Sadtler informed the Board that the War Department and the Navy Department exchanged information which each had obtained through
their various intercepting methods. Sadtler testified that he was familiar with the message which set up the Winds Code and his interpretation was that the message, when it was implemented, would mean that Japan would go to war with one, two or all of the countries mentioned in the set-up. Other witnesses maintained in later investigations that the code set-up meant merely a break in diplomatic relations and not war, necessarily. Sadtler stated that all information received in his section was turned over to Colonel Bratton. Further testifying, Sadtler stated that when a message was received from Tokyo regarding the destruction of codes, the Winds Code set-up began to assume a great deal of importance, and that this was his estimation as well as that of General Miles and Colonel Bratton.

Colonel Sadtler testified that on the morning of the 5th of December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval Communications at that time, called him on the telephone about 9:30 with words to the effect, "Sadtler, the message is in!" Sadtler asked which one it was and Noyes replied that he didn't know, but thought it was the one that meant war between Japan and Great Britain. Sadtler then asked Noyes for the Japanese word, and Noyes said that he didn't know, but for Sadtler to tell G-2. Sadtler, further testified that he went immediately to General Miles' office and told him that the word was in. General Miles then called Colonel Bratton.

\[^5\text{Ibid. p. 2430.}\]
into his office. When Sadtler reported what Noyes had said, continued Sadtler, Bratton took out a small notebook and inquired as to which of the three words it was. Sadtler replied that he didn't know, but that Admiral Noyes had said it was the one meaning war with Japan and Great Britain. Bratton then replied that it might be a false alarm, and Sadtler replied he would go back to his office and call Admiral Noyes on the secret phone. Admiral Noyes stated that he couldn't verify the meaning right then as he had to attend a meeting in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and said he would do it later. Sadtler continued that he then went back to General Miles' office and informed him and Bratton that Noyes was unable to verify the word at that time, but he was positive that it was the word meaning Japan and Great Britain, and it was the implementation of the Winds Message. Sadtler then went to see General Gerow who was head of War Plans and told him in effect what Noyes had said, and added that it might be advisable to send a message to Panama, the Philippines and Hawaii. General Gerow replied that these installations had had plenty of notification and dropped the matter. Ever patient, Sadtler then went to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Walter Bedell Smith, and told him the same thing. Smith wanted to know what Sadtler had done about it, and when he learned that Sadtler had talked to G-2 and War Plans, Smith refused to discuss the matter further.

Sadtler was asked by General Russell, one of the Board members, why he had discussed this message with the War Plans Divi-
sion and with the Secretary of the General Staff. Sadtler replied that he was sure that war was coming, and coming very quickly, and on this note, the questioning was concluded.

Colonel Bratton was recalled and was questioned about the action of the 5th of December of sending messages to G-2, Hawaiian Department and to the Panama Canal Zone. General Russell inquired whether this action was taken as a result of the code-destruction message of December 3, and the conversations about the Wind Implementing Message of December 5th. Bratton replied that to the best of his recollection and belief they were the results of his receipt of the order to the Japanese Ambassador to destroy his code and machine. General Russell reminded Bratton that his message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department contained a reference to the weather. Bratton agreed that this was true, and General Russell stated that if this were the case, Bratton must have had in mind the possibility of the implementing Winds Message. Bratton confirmed this and added that he had been told by Commander McCullom of the Navy Department that Commander Rochefort had the same intercepts, and that this was a device on Bratton's part to bring Colonel Fielder and Commander Rochefort together after he had been prevented from sending out a warning message by General Gerow.

When fifty-two suppressed pages of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report were finally made public December 11, 1945, after the Joint Congressional Committee investigation had been in progress twenty-one days, it was found that the Board had stated that the
Winds Message had been intercepted and that in 1944 there was substantial agreement as to this fact as well as to the meaning of the signal. The Board stated also that there could be no question that between the dates of December 4 and December 6, 1941, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and Sunday, December 6 and 7, was clear-cut and definite. The most that could be said relative to the Top Secret information available in Washington, continued the Board's report, was that a keener and more incisive analysis by the intelligence sections of either service of the over-all picture presented by the intercepted messages might have led to an anticipation of the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl Harbor at or about the time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to make such an estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the light of after-occurring events, and read into each message a significance which was not obvious at the time of receipt.

It is understandable that an Army investigation committee would have considered the evidence presented concerning the Winds Message and arrived at this conclusion. While it is perfectly reasonable and logical that the Army Board could have concluded thus without allowing prejudice to color its findings, it is also equally reasonable and logical, in view of the intense rivalry between the sister services, to suspect that such a conclusion would be immeasurably aided by the natural desire of the Army to dispell any aura of doubt about its own judgment or lack of judg-
ment on the subject of the Winds Message, and to foist the major share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor tragedy upon the Navy.

A significant finding of the Army Pearl Harbor Board was its conclusion that General Marshall had failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to keep General Short fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation of which information, said the Board, Marshall had an abundance and Short had little. Marshall was also criticized by the Board for failing to get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this. General Short was likewise criticized for failing to place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The information which he had was, according to the Board, incomplete and confusing, but it was sufficient to warn Short of the tense relations between the American and Japanese governments and that hostilities might be momentarily expected.

In a memorandum for the Secretary of War, dated November 25, 1941, the Judge Advocate General of the United States, Major General Myron C. Cramer, disagreed with the Board's findings regarding Marshall as unjustified and erroneous, but offered no evidence to substantiate his belief or to disprove the Board's conclusions. The findings regarding Marshall are extremely
important, because they provide the impetus which initiated the
calling of two more groups to investigate the Pearl Harbor attack—
namely, the Clarke and Clausen Investigations.
The Navy Court of Inquiry was appointed pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, Seventy-Eighth Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and by order dated July 13, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal. Public Law 339 was responsible also for the initiation of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The Court was ordered to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further ordered to give its opinion as to whether any offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, it was to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had. The Court held sessions beginning July 24, 1944, and concluded its inquiry on October 19, 1944. The record of its proceedings and exhibits covers 1,397 printed pages. Members of the Court were Admiral Orin G. Murfin, Retired, President; Admiral Edward C. Halbfus, Retired, and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, Retired.

The appointment of the Navy Court of Inquiry occurred on the same day as the appointment of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and ended one day before the conclusion of the Army Board's investigation. Apparently, the Congress was of the opinion that
parallel investigations by both branches of the service would result in the complete story of why Pearl Harbor happened and where the responsibility should be assigned.

The testimony of the witnesses on the subject of the Winds Message was extracted from the regular proceedings in the interest of national security and deposited with the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal. It was included in Top Secret information which was made available to the Joint Congressional Committee and published as part of the Congressional Committee's hearings.

That part of Admiral Harold Stark's testimony about the Winds Message revealed that he did not recall having seen or having heard of such a message. Under repeated questioning he stated that he had not the slightest recollection of a discussion of the Winds Message between December 1 and December 14. Stark did not recall having heard the phrase "Winds Message" in connection with Japanese-United States relations during the period of two weeks preceding December 7, 1941. This is a strange revelation on the part of the Chief of Naval Operations. The subject of the Winds Message was much discussed by his subordinates during the time period he mentioned, and it is only logical that Admiral Stark, in his capacity, have known about it also. Stark likewise did not recall having discussed at any time with Admiral Ingersoll concerning the Winds Message and steadfastly insisted:

I don't have the slightest recollection of the so-called Winds Message for a month preceding Pearl Harbor
or any time around that time.  

Therefore, having no knowledge himself about the Winds Message, Stark testified that he sent no word regarding it to Admiral Kimmel or to anyone else. At this point, the Judge Advocate objected to this line of questioning on the ground that no evidence had been laid before the Court of anything with reference to a Winds Message, but this objection was overruled and the questioning continued. Stark testified that he did not recall during the two week period prior to December 7th, receiving information of a false weather broadcast in plain Japanese language emanating from Japan as a signal for an attack or the beginning of war by Japan against the United States. Neither did he recall Commander McCollum originating and presenting to him a dispatch to Admiral Kimmel, which dispatch was never sent.

Captain L. F. Safford was then examined regarding the Winds Message. He identified Document 15 of Exhibit 63 of the Navy Court of Inquiry as being the set-up of the Winds Message which was translated and available in the Navy Department on November 28, 1941. Safford testified further that the Navy Department received confirmation of this original set-up a few hours later from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station who had received it from the British at Singapore. Double confirmation was received on the 4th of December from the Dutch at Batavia who gave the information

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\(^1\) JIC, Part 33, p. 730.
The Dutch gave it also to Colonel Thorpe, senior military observer, who passed it on to the War Department via the Navy Department and the naval observer in Batavia. After receipt of the three dispatches, Safford continued, the Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor the Japanese stations for the prospective Winds Message. Teletype instructions to intercept stations at Bainbridge Island, Washington, Winter Harbor, Maine, and other East Coast points, were made to guard for the message and send it in. A radio message was also sent to the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts giving them the latest information on Tokyo's broadcast schedules.

Safford stated, as he had in the hearing before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, that on the morning of Thursday, December 7th, at 8:00 o'clock or shortly thereafter, Lieutenant Murray with Commander Kramer came into his office with a yellow teletype sheet in his hand and announced that the message was in, and that it meant a break in relations between Japan and the United States and Great Britain, but not with Russia. Responding to questioning concerning the existence of the intercept message, Safford stated that he had made many discreet inquiries, that Commander Brotherhood had told him that he knew of its disposition but did not care to tell Safford. Lieutenant Murray was not questioned by the Navy Court. Lieutenant Brotherhood testified that he saw a false message on the day of December 7th. The other two watch officers, Lieutenants
Lynn and Pering testified to the effect that they did not see a message of any kind on the day mentioned.

Safford then repeated previous testimony given before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that a regular distribution of the message was made. He was then asked whether this information regarding the intercept message had been passed to either the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to the Combat Intelligence Unit of the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor. Safford replied in the negative, but stated that an attempt had been made to do so by Commander McCollum, repeating his previous testimony that Noyes had considered the message an insult to Admiral Kimmel's intelligence. The message, like the Winds Message, was not sent, stated Safford, and there was no record of its existence.

Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, Stark's assistant in the Office of Naval Operations, was examined by the Navy Court of Inquiry concerning the Winds Message. Ingersoll stated that he knew definitely that the Japanese were setting up a code to be used in a weather broadcast. He did not recall whether this set-up was discussed with Admiral Stark. Ingersoll was then asked, if on or prior to December 7th, he had received any information as to whether or not code words had been received in the Navy Department which would put into effect the action contemplated by the so-called Winds Message. To this question Ingersoll answered: "Yes."
Ingersoll testified that he could not recall if he had seen the intercept Winds Message before or after December 7th, 1941. If it was after December 7th, he stated there would be no purpose in sending it out. If it had been prior to December 7th, he thought that it was not sent out because it was considered that the dispatch sent to all fleets regarding the destruction of codes by the Japanese was ample warning that war was imminent, and that the dispatch then would have been merely confirmatory.

Commander F. M. Brotherhood, one of the watch officers in the office of the Director of Naval Communications, testified that he had seen the set-up of the Winds Message. He was asked whether he had ever seen any message emanating from Japan in which this code was used, and he replied, as has been previously pointed out, that he knew of one that at the time was presumed to be in this code. He testified further that this message was received on Thursday, December 4th, which would coincide with Safford's testimony. Brotherhood continued that he had received a telephone call from the Federal Communications Commission from an official whose name he didn't remember:

Unfortunately I don't remember at this time the text of the dispatch but I know what it did not say. I recall, in receiving it, that there seemed to be something missing from what I was looking for and that is, he gave me the first portion of it...When I say that the text was not what I was looking for, I mean that it did not contain the phrase in Japanese, Higashi No Kazeame, which, to me, would have indicated that diplomatic relations severance, followed by war, would come to the U. S.3

3Ibid. p. 839f.
Questioned about the location of this message, Brotherhood stated that it was oral, and hence there would be no record of it.

Commander A. D. Kramer, head of the Translation Section of the Communication Security Group, in the office of Naval Communications was next examined by the Court. Kramer identified the set-up of the Winds Message and stated that it was written by his section. The phraseology of the set-up was prepared on six cards to facilitate handling in the event the intercept came in.

Various officers were in possession of these cards on order of Admiral Noyes. Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, when such a message came through, either on the third or fourth of December, Kramer stated that he was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it as being of this nature, and walked with him to Captain Safford's office. From there on, Kramer stated, Safford handled the matter. Kramer was asked if he had received some Japanese plain language words which corresponded with the language contained in the set-up code. Kramer replied that he did not receive it, but he was shown it. He was then asked what Japanese words he received and he testified:

Higashi No Kazeame, I am quite certain. The literal meaning of Higashi No Kazeame is East Wind Rain. That is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United States...I am almost certain it was typewritten. I believe it was on teletype paper...I don't recall the name of the officer who had it. It was, however, the GY watch officer,
the man who had the watch breaking down current systems that were being read...my recollection is that it came in on teletype (and) would indicate that it was (from) a U. S. Navy intercept station. 

Kramer stated that he had no recollection of what disposition was made of the communication after he saw it. He did not handle the distribution of this particular message because of the fact that special arrangement had been made to handle the Japanese plain language message which had special meaning. This testimony reveals an inaccuracy in Safford's statement that Kramer made disposition of the message. Kramer stated that he had no first-hand knowledge of the McCollum message, mentioned by Safford, but that he had first heard of it several weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Kramer was asked if there was any uncertainty in the Translation Unit with respect to the meaning of the words in either the Winds Code set-up or in the message of execution. He replied that it was very simple language and there was no doubt whatsoever of the literal translation of the terms and that his section had no difficulty in making the translation.

Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Chief of War Plans Division, Navy Department, was questioned about his knowledge of the McCollum message. He stated that he remembered discussing it with Commander McCollum, initialling it with the expectation that the Director of Naval Intelligence would send it to the Commander-

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in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel. He corrected a previous statement that he did not recall the execute of the Winds Message, and testified that Admiral Noyes called him on the telephone on or about December 5th saying that the Winds Message was in. It was Turner’s presumption that Admiral Noyes had informed Admiral Stark. On Friday, December 5, 1941, a discussion was held among Admirals Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and Turner, Chief of Navy War Plans. Admiral Turner stated that they all felt that all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons of command preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary. When Turner was asked when he heard the news from Admiral Noyes that an execute of the Winds Message had been received, did he consider it of such high significance that the Commander-in-Chief, in the Pacific should be immediately notified? Turner replied: “No. I assumed he had it.” Turner was then recross-examined by Admiral Kimmel as the interested party and asked if it was Turner’s understanding that the execute of the Winds Code referred to United States–Japanese relations. Turner replied that such was his understanding.

Admiral Leigh Noyes, Director of the Office of Naval Communications, was examined by the Navy Court of Inquiry regarding the set-up and the intercept Winds Message. He did not recall the preparation of the six cards mentioned by Kramer, to be distributed

\[\text{JCC, Part 8, p. 3793.}\]
to persons in the Navy Department who would be particularly interested upon the receipt of the execution of the Winds Code. These cards were, according to Kramer's testimony, prepared upon direct order of Admiral Noyes. Noyes stated that he didn't think any such message as the Winds Execute had ever been received by naval means. He confirmed that he did not learn from anyone of the execution of the Winds Message in any form and at no time did he tell anyone of the execution in any form of the Winds Message. This is in the face of Sadtler's and Turner's testimony that Noyes had telephoned them that the message was in. Noyes stated, under questioning by Admiral Kimmel, that he had received some information which was taken to mean that an execute of the Winds Message had been received, but that it turned out not to be correct. To the best of his recollection, Noyes testified, there was a false alarm about the message. Continuing his questioning, Admiral Kimmel asked Noyes that in this case he did hear from some source about the execution of the Winds Message, to which Noyes replied that he could only say that to the best of his remembrance no execution of the Winds Message was finally received. In re-examination by the Court Noyes was asked if he ever discussed this Winds Message or the receipt of it with Admiral Stark. Noyes testified that when the message came in, as he remembered it, he and Stark considered it more important than a later study of it indicated. He was then asked again directly if he had personally discussed it with Stark and Noyes replied in the affirmative, stating that
Stark had a copy of it. Under further cross-examination by Admiral Kimmel, Noyes could not state from where the false report on the Winds Message was received, or who gave it to him (Noyes). Neither did he recall the wording of the message which he later determined was false, nor offer to furnish it for evidence.

Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Assistant Director of Naval Communications, testified that he had never seen the execute of the Winds Message, but that he had heard discussion about it as to its exact meaning. He stated that he had heard about this from Admiral Noyes and from Commander Kramer.

Concerning the competence of Admirals Turner and Ingersoll as witnesses, it may be concluded that they were in a position to know the truth and to communicate it. It may be assumed that they were truthful since they would have nothing to gain if the testimony they gave was false. It is extremely difficult to attach any probability to the statement of Admiral Noyes that he could not remember the Winds Message wording, in light of the testimonies of Admirals Turner and Ingersoll regarding their various explanations as to why Admiral Kimmel had not been notified of its receipt. It is unlikely that Turner and Ingersoll, independent of each other, could or would have elaborated to the extent they did concerning the Winds Message had it not existed. Admiral Noyes' denials can be attributed to his desire to cover up a bad mistake and escape punitive action.

Concerning Admiral Stark's emphatic denial of all information about the Winds Message, including both the set-up and the
implementing message, it becomes necessary to discover, if possible, his motivation for such a declaration. Assuming that Stark did admit that he knew of the broadcast setting up the code for the subsequent implementing message, and that he knew about the intercept, he would by his failure to warn the Pacific Fleet in the light of this knowledge, incur upon himself the full responsibility for the disaster at Pearl Harbor. He would be admitting to poor judgment, negligence and dereliction of duty, a possibility which no officer would relish. In view of Admirals Turner's and Ingersoll's statements that they met with Stark (a meeting which Stark denied) to consider the situation, it is presumed safe to dismiss Stark as an unreliable witness and assume that his failure to recall was prompted by his desire to save face and obviate the possibility of a court martial. It would be much easier in this case to forget than to explain.

Admiral Kimmel was examined by the Court and asked what information was contained in the Winds Message as regarded the possible relations of the United States and Japan. Kimmel testified that the Winds Message contained a statement that at most the Japanese were going to declare war on the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies; that they were going to have peace with Russia; and that at the least, that Japan was going to break off diplomatic relations with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies, and maintain diplomatic relations with Russia. Kimmel stated that it was a very strong
belief by most of the Japanese language students that the translation in fact meant

that they were going to declare war, and a definite statement such as that—would have led me to know that, the war was coming, and coming almost immediately.6

Neither Admiral Wilkinson nor Commander McCollum, who were alleged by Safford to have had knowledge of the Winds Message, was a witness before the Navy Court of Inquiry, as both were at the time actively engaged in combat operations.

The Court found that Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operation of the Fleet, and having important information in his possession during the critical days before Pearl Harbor, especially on the morning of December 7th, failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington. The Court found also that the defense of the permanent base of Pearl Harbor was the direct responsibility of the Army, and that the precautions taken by Admiral Kimmel for the security of his Fleet while at sea were adequate and effective. No naval units were either surprised or damaged while operating at sea in the Pacific prior to or on December 7, 1941.

The Navy Court of Inquiry found further that an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing the Winds Code was received

6JCC, Part 33, p. 922.
in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations, said the Court, either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States or war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat. The message, continued the Court's report, could not be located in the Navy Department. Finally, the Court was of the opinion that no offenses had been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any persons or persons in the naval service and recommended that no further proceedings be had in the matter.\(^7\) In an endorsement to the record of the proceedings of the Navy Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry and to Admiral Hewitt's report to the Secretary of the Navy, dated July 12, 1945, Secretary Forrestal wrote that in connection with the failure of Admiral Stark to advise Admiral Kimmel of the implementation of the Winds Message, he (Forrestal) approved the conclusion reached by Admiral Hewitt that no message was intercepted prior to the Pearl Harbor attack which used the code words relating to the United States, thus disapproving of the Navy Court's conclusion in this regard.\(^8\) The fact that the Navy Court of Inquiry did find that an implementing Winds Message had been received undoubtedly explains the later Navy investigation conducted by Admiral Hewitt.

\(^7\) JCC, Part 39, p. 321.

\(^8\) Ibid. p. 366.
SECTION VIII

CLARKE INVESTIGATION

Secretary of War Stimson, after receiving the Army Pearl Harbor Board report and suppressing it in October of 1941, undertook three personal investigations, presumably to erase the responsibility for Pearl Harbor assessed to General Marshall and so, indirectly, to the War Department as a whole. The Army Board had criticized Marshall for failing to keep the Hawaiian Department adequately informed, especially on the evening of December 6th and the morning of December 7th when the Japanese Fourteen-Part reply was in Marshall's hands. Stimson first commissioned Major General Myron C. Cramer to prepare a summary of the most damaging evidence against himself, the War Department and the administration. He then appointed Major Henry C. Clausen to make a trip around the world seeking out witnesses and refreshing their memories, guided by Cramer's outline. A third independent Army investigation was undertaken by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, subsequently promoted to Brigadier General. Not until November of 1945, when Major General Sherman Miles informed the Joint Congressional Committee of Clarke's activities, was it known that there ever had been such an inquiry.

The investigation conducted by Colonel Clarke was undertaken to study the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled and was ordered pursuant to oral instructions of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army. Colonel
Clarke was appointed by Major General Clayton Bissell, Chief of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, under authority of a letter dated September 9, 1944, from the Adjutant General. This investigation was conducted from September 14 to 16, 1944, and from July 13 to August 4, 1945. Testimony was taken regarding the handling of intercepted Japanese messages known as "Magic" which included the Winds Message. Testimony was also taken regarding the handling of intelligence material by the Military Intelligence Division, War Department and particularly, the handling of the message sent by General Marshall to General Short at Hawaii on the morning of December 7th, 1941. This message, it will be recalled, was finally distributed by a little boy on a bicycle several hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. There is no question but that the Clarke Investigation was undertaken as a personal investigation by General Marshall on his own behalf, and that the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board regarding his negligence was responsible for the initiation of this new inquiry to relieve him of responsibility in the disaster.

Testimony of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, head of the Far Eastern Section, was taken on September 14, 1944. Under questioning Colonel Bratton could not remember that Colonel Sadtler had ever told him about an implementing message to the Winds Code. His memory which was vague before the Army Pearl Harbor Board was equally vague before the Clarke hearings when he stated that he dimly recalled a conversation about a code message indicating a
break in relations between Japan and Great Britain, but this, said Bratton, was beside the point for such a break had been expected for some time. The code message they were waiting for, testified Bratton, was one indicating a break between Japan and the United States. This was a weak attempt to evade responsibility for appropriate action, because the United States was secretly pledged to aid Great Britain in the event of a Pacific war. Colonel Bratton revealed the thinking of Washington top officials by his statement regarding the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor by remarking that high officials in the Army always listed, mentally at least, an attack on Hawaii as a capability, but in their discussions of the situation with their counterparts in the Navy, it was always emphasized by the latter that their forces in the Pacific were alert and so stationed as to make such a Japanese attack impracticable or suicidal, and they therefore relegated such an attack to the realm of remote possibility.

Colonel Bratton was questioned about his evaluation and action had he been informed that an actual implementing message had been received. He replied that his evaluation would have been that Japan would immediately sever diplomatic relations with the United States and that hostilities against the United States would ensue forthwith. He further stated that had he received such a report he would have taken immediate and vigorous action, through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to see that the proper officials were alerted and warned to be on guard against any and
all eventualities.  

Bratton repeated his statements that he had never been notified by anyone in the Navy Department that an implementation of the Winds Code had been received prior to Pearl Harbor. He did recall, however, that Kramer and McCullom had received what appeared to be garbles of variations of the Winds Codes message on one or two occasions, but that to the best of his knowledge and belief, no clear cut Winds Message was received prior to Pearl Harbor indicating that relations between Japan and the United States, or Japan and Great Britain or Japan and Russia had been or were about to be severed.

Mr. William F. Friedman, principal cryptanalyst in the Signal Intelligence Service, was questioned on September 16, 1941. He testified that he was familiar with the set-up for the Winds Message, and that he had made a diligent search from all possible sources available to see if the Army Signal Service, through its monitoring stations, had ever received any executing message to the Winds Message. Thus far, Friedman stated, he had not found a single bit of evidence to indicate that an Army station actually intercepted a Winds Execute Message. This bit of information would indicate the Army's anxiety to absolve itself of any responsibility whatsoever for the action demanded by an implementing Winds Message.

1 JCC, Part 3\textsuperscript{1}, p. 25.
and was unnecessary, for there had never at any time been any suggestion that the Army was responsible for the actual interception.

Major General L. T. Gerow, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, testified that he was familiar with the Winds Message set-up, but could not recall discussing with General Miles or Colonel Bratton any message which implemented it and which would indicate the severance of relations between the United States and Japan. His testimony was one of strict evasion for he could not recall ever being informed by Colonel Sadtler of the fact that Japan had decided to declare war on Great Britain, and that he was not informed by Colonel Bratton or General Miles of that information, despite Sadtler’s sworn testimony to the contrary. Major General Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was questioned about the Winds Message, but could not remember discussing it with General Marshall. When asked if he had ever received any information that the Winds Message had been implemented, General Miles stated that he had been trying to remember and that his memory was hazy about it. He did not remember seeing any document on it or any written statement on it.

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Chief of Army Communications Service, and responsible for the production of what was known as "Magic" intelligence was questioned on September 16, 1944. He repeated previous testimony that he first heard of the receipt
of an implementing message to the Winds Code on the morning of December 5, 1941, when Admiral Noyes called him and said that the message was in. Sadtler summarized previous testimony to the effect that he took this information to the office of General Miles, talked with both Miles and Bratton, and returned to his own office to get verification from Admiral Noyes. He then went back to General Miles' office where it was decided that unless there was something definite as to the meaning of the word under question, the message might be a false alarm. Sadtler testified that he had informed General Walter Bedell Smith of this occurrence, but did not know if General Marshall had been informed.

On August 13, 1945, in a memorandum to General Marshall, Colonel Clarke wrote that he had completed his investigation. He wrote further that he had been instructed to re-open the inquiry to investigate certain statements made by William F. Friedman in testimony before Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the Department of the Navy earlier in July of 1945. Friedman's testimony before Hewitt concerned alleged destruction of certain War Department records pertaining to Pearl Harbor.

The investigation was re-opened on July 13, 1945, in the Pentagon Building in Washington, D. C. Testimony under oath was taken of William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, War Department; Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Officer of the Army Ground Forces; Brigadier General Isaac Spalding, then stationed at Fort McPherson, Georgia; Major General
Ralph C. Smith, then Military Attache to France and, during the
days of Pearl Harbor, Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence
Division; and Brigadier General John T. Bissell. At the time of
Pearl Harbor, General Bissell was Chief of the Counter-Intelligence
Branch of the Military Intelligence Division. There was also in­
troduced into evidence the testimony of Mr. Friedman as given
before Admiral Hewitt. In Paragraph 6a of his memorandum to
General Marshall, Clarke wrote that shortly before July 19, 1945,
Friedman testified before Admiral Hewitt in an investigation
pertaining to the Pearl Harbor disaster. In his testimony Fried­
man stated, among other things, as follows:

Approximately a year and a half ago I had a conversa­
tion with Colonel Sadtler...and we talked about Pearl Har­
bror because of the fact that he had been the head of our
communications service at the time, and he indicated that
he had tried his best to urge that some specific warning
message be sent out to the Department commander. He
indicated that the "winds" code execute message had come
in on the--some time on the 4th or 5th of December...If
I remember correctly, he was either notified himself by
somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the
message was in...or it may be that the Navy source called
Army G-2 and indicated that they had had word that the
message was in, and that Colonel Sadtler was then called to G-2 to corroborate the interception of the message.
At any rate, there was a question as to the exact
word, the Japanese word that was used...whereupon the
G-2 authorities simply passed the matter over.

Then, if I remember correctly I asked Colonel Sadt­
ler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy
of this message, and his answer was...that he hadn't him­
self seen a copy, but that he had been told by somebody
that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed

2 Ibid. p. 70.
by General Marshall. Of course, I regarded this as merely hearsay evidence and nothing more than that: highly inconceivable that such a thing would happen. And when I talked over the Pearl Harbor story with Captain Safford, I probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started. I shouldn't have done it. I certainly had no idea that he would repeat it. (This last paragraph is italicized in the text.)

In concluding his memorandum to General Marshall, Colonel Clarke wrote that he found that no written message implementing the Winds Code was ever received by G-2 and that no records pertaining to Pearl Harbor had been destroyed by G-2 or by anybody connected with G-2.

Friedman was examined again on July 13, 1945, and his testimony was substantially as that given to Admiral Hewitt. Colonel Sadtler was also re-examined and stated that he had never seen the Winds Execute and had no knowledge that such a message was ever in the War Department. Sadtler was asked whether he told Mr. Friedman that he had been told by somebody that the copies of the Winds Execute had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Sadtler flatly denied Friedman's statement, testifying that as far as he knew, that message was never in the War Department, and that he had never made any statement that General Marshall ordered it destroyed, or that anyone had told him that General Marshall ordered it.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{ibid. p. 75-76.}\]
destroyed. Sadtler admitted that the time when Admiral Noyes had advised him that the Winds Execute was in that he (Sadtler) prepared a draft of a message that he wanted to suggest be sent to the Commanding Generals of the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama. He stated that in substance the message was about as follows:

Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future. Take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur. Notify the Navy. Signed Marshall.4

After leaving General Miles' office where General Miles and Colonel Bratton, in Sadtler's words, more or less casually regarded this information about the execute of the Winds Message, Sadtler went back to his office. He thought something should be done, typed up the message he wanted to send, took it up to General Gerow and suggested that Gerow notify the Commanders in the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama. Gerow replied that they had already been adequately notified. Then Sadtler went to see the Secretary of the General Staff, then Colonel Bedell Smith, and told him what had been done, suggesting that Smith send a message. Smith's reply, according to Sadtler, was that he refused to discuss the matter any further.

In the final analysis only one man in the War Department, Colonel Sadtler, regarded the information he had received from Admiral Noyes as alarming enough to send out a war warning, but

4Ibid. p. 87.
his judgment was overruled. Other officers mentioned by Sadtler as having knowledge of the message could not recall the incident, being burdened by faulty memories. All the witnesses testified that they knew nothing of any orders from General Marshall or anyone else relative to the destruction of any records, thus supporting Colonel Clarke's conclusions. As a result of the Clarke Investigation, General Marshall was absolved of any responsibility or lack of judgment in the Pearl Harbor tragedy. An investigation ordered by Marshall, conducted by one of his subordinates and revolving about persons in a department under his command, would scarcely have concluded otherwise.
SECTION IX

CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson announced on December 1, 1941, that the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board had been submitted to him and that in accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, he had decided that his own investigation should be further continued until all the facts were made as clear as possible, and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts could be obtained. By memorandum dated February 6, 1945, for Army personnel concerned, Stimson stated that pursuant to his directions and in accordance with his public statement of December 1, 1941, he had appointed Major Henry C. Clausen, Judge Advocate General Department, to conduct the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The investigation was begun on November 23, 1944 and was concluded on September 12, 1945. The record of its proceedings and exhibits covers 695 printed pages.

The Clausen Investigation, like the Clarke Investigation, was another attempt to eradicate the responsibility of the War Department, and of General Marshall in particular, in the Pearl Harbor episode. The investigation, as is noticeable from a comparison of dates, ran almost concurrently with the Clarke Investigation. Guided by General Cramer's outline, Clausen travelled over 55,000 miles by air and interviewed 92 Army, Navy and
civilian personnel in various parts of the United States, England, Germany, France, Italy, Guam, Honolulu, the Philippine Islands and Saipan. He was successful in refreshing the memories of witnesses and submitted affidavits to them to sign, altering their previous testimony on relevant points. There is no question but that this mission succeeded in smudging the Pearl Harbor record.

The application of the Winds Message to Roosevelt's engagements under the ABCD Agreement had been pointed out in the memorandum of Major General Cramer, giving Major Clausen instructions as to what he was to investigate on the world-tour he was undertaking for Secretary Stimson. Cramer instructed Clausen, in attempting to determine the validity of the Winds Message to discover whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U.S. Joint Action Agreement, in which event they would have known that a "War with Britain" message would necessarily have involved the United States in war.

The leads which General Cramer listed indicated the belief of the Army's chief legal officer that there was a Joint Action Agreement among the United States, Britain and Holland, that it was known to General Marshall and Admiral Stark, and that President Roosevelt was aware of the provision of this agreement that the United States was bound to attack Japan if Japan attacked British or Dutch possessions, when, at the urging of Churchill,

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1 JCC, Part 35, p. 6-7.
he delivered his ultimatum to Admiral Nomura on August 17, 1941, warning Japan against further encroachments in the Pacific area.

In his press release of December 1, 1941, Stimson stated that the Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, continued Stimson, he agreed with some but not all of the Board's conclusions. As far as General Short was concerned, said Stimson, he was of the opinion that his (Short's) errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a command status. Stimson concluded his statement by saying that it was absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during the war, the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it was based.

In his memorandum to Major Clausen, General Cramer suggested several unexplored leads in the Pearl Harbor Investigation. Some of these unexplored leads included (1) the terms and origin of the Joint Action Agreement, if any, with Britain and the Netherlands, and whether Japan was officially advised of this agreement or discovered its existence; (2) Whether Short was sent official notice

\[\text{\underline{2} Ibid. p. 4.}\]
\[\text{\underline{3} Ibid. p. 7.}\]
of the Joint Action Agreement. General Cramer suggested also that significant details regarding the Winds Intercept might be explored including (1) the original of the Navy Department message and translation, probably part of the original Roberts Report records; (2) The Navy's alleged delivery of two copies of the translation to the Army, as to just what procedure there was for delivery, as to who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to check up on whether the transmission was received; (3) Whether, as has been previously mentioned, General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton or Captain Safford knew about the Joint Action Agreement, in which instance they would have known that a "War with Britain" message would necessarily have involved the United States in war; (4) Whether the partial implementation "War with Britain" was brought to Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action Policy. Other possible unexplored leads, according to General Cramer, were whether or not (1) the Navy notified in any way Admiral Kimmel or Commander Rochefort of the implementation intercept; (2) the Honolulu intercept stations independently received the activating Winds Message. There was substance to the hypothesis, concluded Cramer, that General Short was relying upon the warning he would expect to receive when the implementing Winds Message had been intercepted, thus giving advance notice of hostilities.
In his interview with General Fielder on January 9, 1945, Clausen found that concerning the December 5th Washington G-2 message to the Hawaiian Department G-2 to contact Commander Rochefort regarding the Winds Message, Fielder said he didn't remember the message, but that it might have come in as routine.

Clausen received an affidavit from Captain (then Commander) Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, who was Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. Rochefort was attached to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Hawaii. His opposite number in the Army at Pearl Harbor was Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. Rochefort stated that he was familiar with documents numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 2532 now commonly referred to as the Winds Code. He was familiar with these documents before December 7, 1941. His assignment with respect to those documents was to monitor for an implementing message, and he in turn so informed then Colonel Fielder during the latter part of November 1941. Rochefort stated that he did not receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which he had been instructed to monitor.

Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew was Executive Officer of the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., from August to December 7, 1941. Pettigrew stated that he recalled reading on or about November 26 to November 28, 1941, while in the performance of his duties, two intercepts, SIS No. 25392 and SIS
No. 25432, the Winds Code. He further testified that someone whom he did not recall showed him on or about December 5, 1941, an implementation intercept which had been received from the Navy and which indicated that Japanese-United States relations were in danger. In view of the prior intercepts which he had read he took the implementation message to mean that anything could happen, and consequently, he had prepared for dispatch to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, at the request of someone whom he did not recall, a secret cablegram. This cablegram dated December 5, 1941 and signed by General Miles read as follows: "Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather." Pettigrew stated that he was under the impression from statements by someone in the Navy whom he did not recall that Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Washington had; and that the Navy had a crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii under Commander Rochefort which was monitoring and receiving the intercepts and breaking and translating the codes. The file copy of the cablegram contained his initials, stated Pettigrew, as well as those of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. He stated that he sent the secret cablegram as a precautionary measure since he felt it might have been possible that the Army in Hawaii did not get the same information.

\[4\]Ibid. p. 24.
Colonel George W. Bicknell was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian
Department in charge of Counter-Intelligence. His immediate chief
was Colonel Fielder. Bicknell testified that he saw on December
5th, on Fielder's desk, the secret cablegram from Washington, D. C.,
signed by General Miles. Bicknell communicated with Commander
Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information and was advised
that Rochefort also was monitoring for the execution of the Winds
Code. Colonel Fielder had previously stated that he did not see
the cablegram.

General Douglas MacArthur testified in an affidavit to
Colonel Clausen that he did not see the messages described as the
Winds Code, nor any activating or implementing message. He fur-
ther stated that dispatches from the War Department gave him ample
and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting
the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis which was
done prior to December 7, 1941.

An affidavit was obtained from Lieutenant General Walter
Bedell Smith, who, during the months of November and December of
1941, was Secretary of the War Department General Staff. At the
time the affidavit was taken, General Smith was stationed in
Germany. Smith stated in response to Colonel Otis K. Sadtler's
testimony that Sadtler had requested him to act on information
from Admiral Noyes that the Winds Implementing Message was in that
he, Smith, did not recall Sadtler's visit as stated. However,
continued General Smith, since the matter in question was
obviously a difference of opinion between the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, (Miles) and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division (Gerow), both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which Smith stated he had any responsibility or authority.

Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow submitted an affidavit to Major Clausen regarding the Winds Message. He was asked to comment by Major Clausen on certain testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the effect that on December 5, 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Corps, informed General Gerow that the Japanese Winds Code had been implemented to signal the break of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain, and asked that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, be notified. According to Sadtler's testimony, General Gerow had replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent. Regarding Sadtler's statement, Gerow stated that he had no such recollection of the meeting with Sadtler, and that he believed Sadtler was mistaken. It was his understanding at the time that Sadtler was purely a Signal Corps Officer, and that he was not concerned with dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." To the best of his knowledge, stated Gerow, he did not receive, prior to December 7, 1941, notification from any sources of an implementing message to the Japanese Winds Code. If he had received such a message, he believed he would recall the fact, in view of its importance. It was possible, he stated, attempting to modify his pointed inference questioning
Sadler’s testimony, that Colonel Sadler told him of an unverified report, or that he (Sadler) had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, said Gerow, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Department as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person’s memory.

An affidavit was obtained from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton concerning the Winds Code. Bratton recalled a meeting about December 5th, 1941, with General Miles and Colonel Otis K. Sadler, which meeting General Miles was unable to recall. At that time Sadler presented information he had received from Admiral Noyes of a possible implementation. There had been several false alarm reports, stated Bratton. In view of an intercept which had already been received and translated, being an order from Tokyo to the Embassy of Japan at Washington to destroy their codes, an implementation message to the Winds Code, in Bratton’s opinion, was superfluous and no longer of importance, since the purpose, he said, would be to effect a destruction of the codes. This is highly contradictory, since if the Japanese Embassy had already received one message to destroy their codes, another would be unnecessary. The purpose of the implementing message was not to effect a destruction of codes, but to indicate a definite break in relations and possibly war between the United States and Japan.

Bratton’s pale explanation can be attributed to his desire to
the matters and events set forth, and a better recollection than when he previously testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and was made after having his memory refreshed in several ways and respects.5

Colonel Otis K. Sadler submitted an affidavit dated August 13, 1945. Referring to his testimony on October 6, 1944, before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to information of a possible Winds Code execute message given him on December 5, 1941, by Admiral Noyes, Sadler stated that he wished to add further that following his second telephone conversation with Admiral Noyes on that day, as set forth in the Top Secret transcript of the proceedings of the Army Board, he did nothing further to ascertain from Admiral Noyes or any other person the exact wording of the intercept or information which Noyes had conveyed to Sadler, and as far as he knew nothing further was done to get more information from Admiral Noyes. Sadler assumed that the basis of the information before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned Sadler was an intercept which would, according to the standard practice, be transmitted without delay to G-2 of the Army. Sadler said he made the recommendations to General Gerow and General Smith on December 5, 1941, without getting additional information from Admiral Noyes on his own initiative and without informing any representatives of G-2. Sadler stated that he was alarmed by

5Ibid. p. 97-98.
the series of Japanese diplomatic and consular intercepts which he had been reading over a considerable period of time, and the mounting tension, and the information which Admiral Noyes had given him. After he had conferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton, as he testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, he went to his office and personally typed a proposed warning which he intended to recommend be sent to the overseas commanders. The warning read substantially: "C. G. - P. I., Hawaii—Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall." Sadtler stated that he had since checked with his office staff at the time and they had no recollection of the drafting of the proposed warning message. He said he did not show it to anyone. He did not know where the message was and made no copy at the time. After he had typed the message he conferred with General Gerow and General Smith as he testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. He stated that he did not show them the message he had typed. Sadtler testified that he had read the affidavits of General Gerow and General Smith submitted to Major Clausen regarding Sadtler's testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to Sadtler's conference with them for the purpose stated on December 5, 1941. Sadtler stated that he believed the comments by General Gerow

Ibid. p. 99.
and General Smith contained in the affidavits mentioned, wherein they denied meeting with Sadtler, were correct statements of fact. By this action Sadtler repudiated his previous testimony that he had attempted to persuade Generals Gerow and Smith to send out the warning message Sadtler had prepared. 7 In view of the military rank of Gerow and Smith compared with that of Sadtler, such a modification of testimony on Sadtler's part is perhaps understandable, although hardly admirable. It would possibly be considered advisable to accept Sadtler's earlier testimony as more closely approaching the truth, rather than that secured after his memory had been refreshed by Colonel Clausen (then Major), acting on Stimson's orders.

Sadtler further stated that he had seen no intercepts and no information came to his attention which pointed to Pearl Harbor as an attack target prior to December 7, 1941. The actual attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to him, he said, and he thought that the Panama Canal would be the surprise attack target. Sadtler continued that he did not see any execute message to the arrangement for sending such a message as contemplated by the so-called Japanese Winds Code, and as far as he knew there was no such execute message received in the War Department. He stated that at no time had he urged General Sherman Miles, G-2, or any other representative of G-2, to send any warning message to the overseas commanders. He had, however, urged Generals Gerow

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and Smith to send such a warning message in his testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Sadlier further denied the testimony of William F. Friedman given to General Carter W. Clarke on July 13, 1945, to the effect that he could not get the execute message from Admiral Noyes, and reiterated that other than making the telephone call, as he testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, he made no further efforts to obtain the execute message mentioned by Admiral Noyes. Sadlier further denied the testimony of Mr. Friedman given General Clarke to the effect that he (Sadlier) had collected and had material in a safe deposit box concerning the Pearl Harbor disaster. He had not collected any such material in a safe deposit box, Sadlier continued, although he thought he had done so. Perhaps Major Clausen's art of persuasion convinced Sadlier that he had not collected the aforementioned data, although earlier Sadlier thought he had done so.

Major General Sherman Miles in an affidavit to Major Clausen stated in reference to testimony regarding a meeting he was said to have had with Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadlier, on December 5, 1941, concerning information received by Colonel Sadlier from Admiral Noyes of a possible Winds Code execute message, he could not specifically recall any such meeting, nor having received the information stated. He stated that to the best of his knowledge no authentic execute message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak of hostilities. He stated, however, that he did have some recollection that there were several
messages intercepted which, while thought at first to be the execute message, proved on analysis not to be authentic, or to be too vague for definite acceptance as such. It was Miles' belief that the meeting with Colonel Sadler on December 5, 1941, if it occurred, concerned such a message. It may have resulted, he continued, in the message to Hawaii about Commander Rochefort on that date.

General Miles concluded his affidavit by stating that to his knowledge, no records of G-2, War Department, pertinent to Pearl Harbor, were ever ordered destroyed by General Marshall, or any other person. Specifically, Miles stated, General Marshall did not ever order destroyed any copies of a possible Winds Code execute message.

Clausen, later promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, said before the Joint Congressional Committee that he was directed by Stimson to make his inquiry because of discrepancies in evidence before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and because the Board had not taken testimony from most witnesses on code intercepts. In commenting on the irregularity of Clausen's activities, Chief of Staff Marshall said he had never known any other instance of a junior officer investigating actions or statements of superior officers. Senator Ferguson asked Marshall if he knew of any other case where an investigation was taken away from a board of general officers and given to a Major. Marshall stated that he couldn't recall a similar situation, and added that the Clausen Investigation was controlled by the civilian side of the War Department—that is, by Stimson.
Claussen's major accomplishments were to effect a change of previous testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board regarding the delivery of the first thirteen parts of the final Japanese reply to high ranking officers on the night of December 6, 1941, and to obscure the previously established fact that a Winds Message had been intercepted several days before the attack. In an appended statement to the Army Board report when he finally released it, Stimson stated that Colonel Bratton had "corrected his testimony" of having delivered the Japanese thirteen part message to three of Marshall's principal aides on the night of December 6, 1941.

Claussen also successfully induced Colonel Sadtler, who had previously testified that a Winds Message had been received to retract this statement. Two other officers who were persuaded by Claussen to deny the existence of the Winds Message were Colonel Harold Doud, in charge of the Code and Cipher Section of the Army Signal Corps Intelligence Service, and Colonel Rex W. Minckler, who was in charge of the Signal Intelligence Service. Neither of these officers was called as a witness before the Joint Congressional Committee.

In his official report regarding the Pearl Harbor disaster Secretary of War Stimson again pointed out that the primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of the Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor insofar as the Army was concerned rested upon the Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, General Walter C. Short. Stimson felt that during the year 1941 and particularly
during October and until the latter part of November General Short was repeatedly advised of the critical events which were developing. Short’s failure adequately to defend Pearl Harbor and Hawaii, according to Stimson, was not from indolence or indifference or willful disobedience of orders but from a vital error of judgment, that is, the failure to comprehend the necessities of the situation in the light of the warnings and information which Stimson contended Short had received. Short contended that to put into effect a different degree of alertness than he actually did would have interfered with the training program which he was carrying out and would have involved the danger of alarming the population, against which Short had been cautioned. However, remarked Stimson, in weighing such considerations Short entirely lost sight of the fact that the defense of his command and station against Japan was his paramount duty.

The underlying cause of this error of judgment, continued Stimson, was General Short’s confidence that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbor. In fairness to him, said Stimson, it must be borne in mind that this belief was shared by almost everyone concerned including his superior officers in the War Department in Washington. Short was undoubtedly influenced by the then prevailing psychology which completely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and particularly the advance which the Japanese had made in the use of aircraft. Stimson stated also that General Short knew that the Naval command at Hawaii, which he regarded as
being better informed than he (Short) because of their facilities and the widespread nature of their operations, was confident that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was most unlikely. The information which was being received of Japanese naval activity pointed to operations in Southeastern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines.

Stimson stated that General Short denied receiving information that the Japanese had circulated from Tokyo about November 20, 1941, to their representatives abroad, a plan to the effect that in case of severance of diplomatic relations or war with the United States, Great Britain or Russia, a certain signal in the form of a false weather report would be broadcast in a news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. Stimson found, although he did not reveal his source, that this information was available to General Short or his command prior to December 7, 1941. The evidence as to whether the agreed signal indicating severance of relations or war with the United States was subsequently given and made known to the War Department, continued Stimson, was confusing and contradictory, and no written evidence of such a signal had been found.

The War Plans Division, stated Stimson in his report, like the other divisions and activities of the General Staff in Washington was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall. Evidently for this reason, said Stimson, The Army Pearl Harbor Board was led to criticize the Chief of
Staff as being responsible for some of the shortcomings of the officers of the General Staff. In his opinion, stated Stimson, this criticism was entirely unjustified. Marshall's paramount duty was to advise the President and the Secretary of War, and to make plans for and supervise the organization, equipment, and training of a great army for a global war. It would hopelessly cripple the performance of great and paramount duties should a Chief of Staff allow himself to become immersed in administrative details by which the plans for defense are carried out in many outposts. Stimson stated that he believed that Marshall had acted with his usual great skill, efficiency and energy.

JCC, Part 35, p. 13f.
HEWITT INQUIRY

Upon receipt of the report of the Navy Court of Inquiry into the Pearl Harbor disaster, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, initiated a private investigation, which ran concurrently with the Clarke and Clausen Investigations for the War Department. This inquiry was intrusted to Admiral H. K. Hewitt, but again a junior officer, Lieutenant Commander John Sonnett, actually conducted the investigation.

In his story of Pearl Harbor published in the U. S. News & World Report of December 10, 1954, Admiral Kimmel wrote that Forrestal, displeased with the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry, requested Admiral J. O. Richardson, Kimmel's predecessor as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, to conduct a further investigation of the disaster. Admiral Richardson, who had been relieved by President Roosevelt prior to the attack and replaced by Kimmel because of a disagreement with the President over the berthing of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, declined the appointment. Richardson, according to Kimmel's report, stated that he would not be available to conduct the investigation because the primary qualification for an investigator was to have no preconceived ideas as to the assignment of responsibility and no fixed ideas upon the subject.

1Kimmel, op. cit., p. 158f.
In his own mind Richardson was disqualified because of his firm conviction that much of the responsibility for the tragedy rested upon the administration, and that nothing could change his opinion.

The inquiry conducted by Admiral Hewitt was initiated under precept dated May 2, 1945, from Secretary of the Navy Forrestal to conduct further investigation of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The precept stated that upon review of the evidence obtained by the examinations conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart and by the Navy Court of Inquiry, the Secretary had found that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the naval service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington. The Secretary found further that the previous investigations, in his opinion, had not exhausted all possible evidence. Accordingly, Forrestal decided that the investigation directed by Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts could be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted. Admiral Hewitt was directed to make a study of the Hart Inquiry and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and then to conduct such further investigation as might appear necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby. The Hewitt Inquiry began on May 11, 1945, and was concluded on July 11, 1945. The record of its proceedings and exhibits covers 1,312 printed pages. The Navy apparently was extremely anxious to dispell the respon-
sibility of the Navy in the Pearl Harbor matter, and was undoubtedly upset by the findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry regarding the Winds Message. By appointing his own special assistant, John Sonnett, actually to conduct the Hewitt Inquiry, Secretary Forrestal was reasonably sure of receiving findings and conclusions to his liking.

On the opening day of the hearings, Admiral Hewitt stated that he had found, after studying the record of proceedings of the Naval Court of Inquiry, that further investigation was necessary in order to obtain the information now available concerning the composition and movements of the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941; to obtain the information which was available at Pearl Harbor, at Cavite, and at Washington during the period of October 14 to December 7, 1941; to determine whether or not Japanese submarines operated in and around Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, 1941; to obtain the information received in Hawaii through the interception of Japanese telephone and cable messages by the Office of Naval Intelligence, or so obtained by other agencies of the United States Government or of other governments and communicated to the Naval Intelligence at Hawaii; to determine who obtained the intercepted Japanese messages concerning ship movements, sent to and from Honolulu, and how, when, and where they were obtained and decoded; to determine whether or not there was a Winds Code message relating to the United States; to interview Admiral Wilkinson, Chief, Office of Naval Intelligence,
generally and with particular reference to combat intelligence and to the Winds Code; to interview Captain McCollum, Chief, Far Eastern Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, generally and with particular reference to the Winds Code; and to determine what were the reasons for the air reconnaissance which Admiral Kimmel directed on or about July of 1941, toward the Jaluits. Admiral Hewitt then announced that the counsel in the investigation would be John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy.

On the second day of the proceedings, Tuesday, May 15, 1945, Captain Arthur H. McCollum, in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence was examined. McCollum's duties consisted of evaluating all forms of intelligence received concerning the Far East, correlating it, and advising the Director of Naval Intelligence and through him the Chief of Naval Operations on political developments in the Far East and all forms of information concerning the Japanese Navy and other countries in the Far East and their defenses and state of preparation for war.

In response to questioning McCollum stated that Captain Safford's unit produced a source of intelligence which was shown to McCollum and which was one of the most valued sources of intelligence concerning the Far East. Admiral Hewitt reviewed for McCollum previous testimony in prior investigations that he, McCollum, on about the 4th of December had prepared a long warning message to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commander-in
Chief, Asiatic Fleet, summarizing the significant events up to that
date and quoting the Winds Message. McCollum testified that he did
draft in dispatch form a general summary of the Far Eastern situ-
ation, indicating the probability that diplomatic relations might
be ruptured at almost any time. He said that he did not remember
specifically quoting any Winds Message or referring specifically
to a Winds Message in that dispatch. McCollum stated that he sub-
mitted the dispatch to Admiral Wilkinson and thought that Wilkinson
had tried to get it out. McCollum did not remember having a
collection wholly on the subject of the Winds Code with Captain
Safford. McCollum was not asked whether or not he had ever seen
the Winds Message intercept or heard reference made to it.

Captain Laurance F. Safford, Chief of the Communications
Security Section, Office of Naval Communications, was examined by
Admiral Hewitt who summarized Safford's previous testimony con-
cerning the Winds Message, made in previous investigations. Safford
testified that in the fall of 1943 it appeared that there was
going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel and that
he realized that he would be one of the important witnesses. His
personal investigation was conducted for the purpose of preparing
himself to take the stand as a witness in a prospective court
martial of Admiral Kimmel. Regarding Safford's conversation with
Lieutenant Brotherhood concerning the disposition of the Winds
Message, Safford stated that Brotherhood had misunderstood him
and that the message Brotherhood had in mind was a false one which
Brotherhood had received from the Federal Communications Commission and which Kramer had discarded in a wastebasket. Safford admitted that he had no acceptable evidence that the Army had ever received copies of the Winds Message relating to the United States and stated that his information was third-hand. Admiral Hewitt pressed for information and Safford replied that the information he had received was that written copies of the Winds Message had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall, that he preferred not to give the direct source of the information, but that it might be confirmed by the testimony of Colonel Sadtler before the Army investigation. On the insistence of Admiral Hewitt, Safford stated that the source of his information was William F. Friedman, Principal Cryptanalyst, War Department. It will be remembered that Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, in the Clarke Investigation, flatly denied any knowledge of the destruction of records in the War Department, and repudiated the testimony to the contrary of Friedman. It was on the basis of Friedman's testimony in this regard before the Hewitt Inquiry that the Clarke Investigation was re-opened.

Admiral Hewitt then asked for the names of the watch officers in Safford's section, through one of whom the Winds Message execute must have passed. Safford identified the watch officers as Lieutenant Commanders George W. Lynn, Francis M. Brotherhood, A. V. Pering and Allan A. Murray. These officers, when questioned later, did not recall seeing any intercept which used the code words
indicating the breaking of relations with the United States or war with the United States.

Safford summarized his previous testimony concerning the Winds Message and stated that Captain Kramer had informed him within the past month that a copy of the Winds Message and other papers relative to the break in diplomatic relations with Japan were not turned over to the Robert’s Commission, but were given to then Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal on about December 9, 1941, while he was Acting Secretary in the absence of Mr. Knox, who had flown to Hawaii. Safford continued:

So far as Kramer knows, this folder was never turned over to the Robert’s Commission. I had stated it was my impression—not that it was a fact, but it was my impression. Kramer said that he went over this folder with Mr. Forrestal and spent about two hours explaining the significance of the various messages. Kramer did not recall the “winds” execute specifically... We had to go out in the corridor to get any privacy. I recall that the message was fouled up somehow and did not come in the exact form which we expected and Kramer remarked, “You can always count on those monkeys to do something that you don’t expect.”... And Kramer now is not certain whether the United States was specifically mentioned or not, but he is certain that there was a “winds” execute message which we were expecting and that it came in the middle of the week before Pearl Harbor.2

Safford further recounted that Kramer informed him that no written copy was furnished the Army and no written copy was distributed in the Navy Department in the customary manner because Admiral Noyes had given specific orders not to do so and that he would

2JCC, Part 36, p. 71f.
handle dissemination of the message himself. Regarding the inability to find a record of the Winds Message in the intercepting stations, Safford stated that the logs of Winter Harbor, Maine, were destroyed in the spring of 1943 to make room. The logs at Cheltenham, Maryland, were destroyed when that intercept unit left Cheltenham and moved up to Chatham, Massachusetts, some time earlier than that.

Next to be examined by the Hewitt Inquiry was Captain Alwin D. Kramer, head of the Translation Section, under the supervision of Captain Safford, although Kramer was primarily responsible to Captain McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Kramer stated that he wanted to go over his previous testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry in the light of thinking it over since that time. He did recall a message some days before December 7, 1941, and did recall definitely being shown such a message by the GY watch officer and walking with him to Captain Safford's office. Asked to recall the general subject of the message, Kramer stated that it was a Winds Code message, but that he did not recall the wording of it. It might have been "Higashi No Kaze Ame," specifically referring to the United States as he previously testified, but that he was less positive of it (at the time of the Hewitt Inquiry) than he was at the time of the investigation by the Naval Court of Inquiry.

I am now at least under the impression that the message referred to England and possibly the Dutch rather
Kramer was not questioned concerning the inclusion of the Winds Message in the folder which he prepared for Forrestal, mentioned by Safford in his testimony. When Admiral Hewitt asked him if the message could possibly have referred to Russia, Kramer replied:

"I just don't know." Later testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee will reveal possible factors in Kramer's obvious indecision.

Admiral Hewitt then addressed the body present concerning the Winds Message and stated that there was yet no other evidence (other than Safford's testimony) that a message relating to the United States was received. Reviewing the sworn testimony of Admiral Noyes given before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Hewitt stated that Noyes recalled no such message and that he (Noyes) did not believe that any such message relating to the United States had ever been received by the Navy, although he had some recollection of a "false alarm." Accordingly, Hewitt determined that no useful purpose would be served by calling Admiral Noyes as a witness in the investigation, and directed that the portions of his previous testimony relating to the subject be incorporated in the record.

3Ibid. p. 81.

4JCC, Part 9, p. 3970.
The first nine days of the proceedings were spent in Washington examining witnesses with Admiral H. K. Hewitt conducting the investigation. Proceedings of the tenth to the eighteenth days were held at Pearl Harbor where Mr. John F. Sonnett conducted the investigation. On the fifteenth day Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence on December 7, 1941, was examined. Wilkinson was asked if he recalled whether or not any message using the Winds Code was ever intercepted, and he replied that he recalled that along about December 6th or 7th that he heard that there had been a portion of the code used in one of the broadcasts. He presumed that he had heard mention of this fact from Commander McCollum. He did not recall the dispatch which McCollum had prepared summarizing the situation which McCollum desired to have released and sent out. Wilkinson stated, however, that it was possible that he did take the warning message prepared by McCollum to Admiral Ingersoll, Stark's assistant, but that he did not recall it specifically. He added that at the time there was considerable reluctance to any widespread information which would indicate Navy operations and Navy success in breaking codes. Regarding the McCollum warning message, the failure to recall by Wilkinson is questionable, since both Safford and McCollum testified that Wilkinson was shown the document, although they disagreed as to its content. It would be virtually impossible to determine to any degree of certitude the veracity of the witnesses in this instance as to the contents or references of the
warning because it was not sent out, there is no copy of it in existence and the witnesses are so few in number. Here is posed the perplexing problem of trying to approximate the truth in a situation wherein Witness A admits the existence of a document, gives his opinion of its content and cites Witness C as possessing similar knowledge; Witness B admits the existence of the document, cites Witness C as possessing similar knowledge, but disagrees with Witness A as to its content; and Witness C denies both the existence and the content of the document, thereby refuting the testimonies of Witnesses A and B. The difficulties demonstrated in the above instance are typical of those encountered in attempting to establish the truth regarding the Winds Message.

Captain Kramer was next recalled as a witness on the twenty-fifth day of the proceedings in Washington, D. C., and was examined by Sonnett. Kramer was asked if, since his last testimony in the Hewitt investigation, he had obtained any additional information concerning the receipt or non-receipt of an intercept message relating to the United States. He repeated his previous testimony that he did recall a Winds Message, but had no clear recollection as to which country the message referred.

In its report the Hewitt Inquiry stated that prior investigations conducted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry resulted in findings that prior to December 7, 1941, there had been a Winds Code Message by the Japanese in
which the code words relating to the United States were used, and that this message had been intercepted by the Navy Department prior to the attack and communicated to the Army but that no copy of it could be found in the Army or Navy files. It appeared, continued the Hewitt report, that these findings were based primarily on the testimony of Captain Safford and of Captain Kramer of the Navy Department. It should be noted, stated the Hewitt report, that a Japanese message using the Winds Code words relating to the United States, if received on December 3rd or 4th, or at any other time prior to December 7, 1941, would have conveyed no information of importance which the Navy and War Departments did not already possess. This is the same weak attempt frequently used to minimize the importance of the implementing Winds Message, because such a message would have indicated the imminence of an immediate break in relations and possible war. If the Navy and War Departments knew of this eventuality and its probable date, there can be no valid excuse for not alerting the military and naval forces of the United States to the possibility of war. To admit that the Army and Navy already had this information is obviously an admission of guilt and of lack of judgment. As it was, the high Washington officials were not sure when such a break in relations or war would occur, hence the extreme importance of the implementing Winds Message.

The conclusions of the Hewitt Inquiry regarding the Winds Message hinge upon Captain Kramer's failure to recall, which fail-
ure is inconsistent with his known excellent retentive prowess. This is an assumption only, but it is hardly possible that an investigating committee, appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, conducted for the most part by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, headed by an Admiral charged with the task of determining Navy responsibility in the Pearl Harbor disaster, would have concluded in any other manner than did the Hewitt Inquiry:

Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messages, one known as the winds code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message was received prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States."

For the Hewitt Inquiry to have found otherwise would have resulted in serious doubt among thoughtful people regarding the judgment and, in extreme instances, perhaps, the integrity of high Navy officers. This is a conclusion which the Navy would naturally desire to avoid, and explains the fact that no responsibility was ever fixed concerning the failure to warn the Pacific Fleet of the interception of the Winds Message. The conclusion of the Hewitt Inquiry regarding the Winds Message was readily accepted by Secretary Forrestal. It is worth pointing out, that while the Hewitt report found that no message relating to the United States was received, the possibility could nevertheless exist that a

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5 JCC, Part 39, p. 523.
message relating to Great Britain might have been, in which case
the action by the United States would have had to be the same.
Only the insistence of Captain Kramer that he saw a Winds Execute
message, even though unable to recall the wording, prevented the
Hewitt Inquiry from denying emphatically the existence of an
implementing message, for the Hewitt investigations apparently
placed no value whatsoever upon Captain Safford's testimony.

In an article in the U. S. News & World Report for
January 28, 1955, John F. Sonnett, who assisted Admiral Hewitt,
took issue with Admiral Kimmel's story of Pearl Harbor in re-
lation to Captain Safford's testimony concerning the Winds
Message. As a basis for his disagreement Sonnett quoted exclu-
sively from an article which appeared in that same magazine on
February 15, 1956, which doubted Safford's story. In the article
of January 28, 1955, Admiral Kimmel replied to Sonnett's state-
ment and charged that Sonnett made no denial that Sonnett, in
effect, conducted the Hewitt investigation, that Captain Safford
claimed Sonnett sought to convince him that he, Safford, suffer-
ed hallucinations, and that witnesses testifying before the
Hewitt Inquiry changed the testimony they had previously sworn
to. Admiral Kimmel wrote that one of Sonnett's statements revealed
very clearly the frame of mind with which he approached the secret

6"More on the Pearl Harbor Story." U. S. News & World
Report, January 28, 1955. p. 116-118. (Contains statements by
Sonnett, Kimmel and Theobald).
Hewitt Inquiry. Sonnett had stated prior to the investigation, that he had discovered that Captain Safford was the source of the "erroneous rumors" concerning the Winds Message intercept.

According to Kimmel, at the time Sonnett began the Hewitt Inquiry, evidence on the subject of the execute of the Winds Message had gone very far beyond the realm of erroneous rumor. Evidence supporting Safford's version of the facts was available in the testimony of Admiral Turner and Captain Kramer before the Navy Court of Inquiry and in the testimony of Admiral Ingersoll before the Hart Inquiry. Both the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry had found that there was an execute of the Winds Message on the basis of more evidence than Safford's testimony alone.

The proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board had not been published when the U. S. News & World Report published on February 15, 1946, the article which Sonnett quoted. These proceedings as well as those of the Hart and Hewitt Inquiries were published only in the last days of the Joint Congressional Investigation. The press, therefore, had no way of knowing what previous testimony on the Winds Message had been made, nor what findings the Navy Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board had made regarding the execute message.
To put an end once and for all to the contradictory findings of the various Army and Navy investigations, Congress appointed a Joint Congressional Committee as a final judge over the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor tragedy. The hearings of the Joint Committee began on November 15, 1945 and were concluded on May 31, 1946.

The Senate, with the House of Representatives concurring, resolved that there should be established a Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, to be composed of five members of the Senate, not more than three of whom were to be members of the majority party, to be appointed by the President, pro tempore; and five members of the House of Representatives, not more than three of whom were to be members of the majority party, to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. The Joint Committee was charged with making a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and was to report the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it might deem advisable to the Senate and the House of Representatives.

1 JCC, Part 1, p. 3.
The members of the Committee were Alben W. Barkley, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman; Jere Cooper, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman; Walter F. George, Senator from Georgia; Scott W. Lucas, Senator from Illinois; Owen Brewster, Senator from Maine; Homer Ferguson, Senator from Michigan; J. Bayard Clark, Representative from North Carolina; John W. Murphy, Representative from Pennsylvania; Bertrand W. Gearhart, Representative from California and Frank B. Keefe, Representative from Wisconsin. The counsel through January 14, 1946, were William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel; Jule M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel and John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel. The counsel after January 14, 1946, were Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel; John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel; Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel and Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel. The total number of witnesses heard in all combined investigating groups were 332 and their testimony is included in the Joint Committee's published hearings which comprise 39 volumes.

Captain Arthur H. McCollum, Head of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, was examined by the Joint Committee concerning his knowledge of the Winds Message. McCollum's only previous appearance before an investigating group had been before the Hewitt Inquiry when he was not asked whether or not he had ever seen the Winds Message intercept
or heard reference made to it. He recalled, before the Joint Committee hearings, that about the middle of the week preceding Pearl Harbor he had heard that an execute, which would have meant that relations with Russia were in danger, had been received. On checking this message, McCollum testified, it was determined that it was merely a part of an ordinary weather broadcast. He stated that he had never had called to his attention any execute message which contained the words relating to the United States' relations with Japan. McCollum was informed of Safford's testimony that upon the receipt of the Winds Message, McCollum had prepared a dispatch to go to various outposts. McCollum admitted preparing such a dispatch, but insisted that it was not predicated on the Winds Execute. McCollum was not asked nor did he attempt to explain upon what basis his warning message was prepared, nor why he decided upon it at the particular time he did. He repeated previous testimony wherein he stated that he took the message to Admiral Wilkinson, and after that, saw no more of it.

Captain Safford was examined by the Joint Congressional Committee and testified that sometime prior to December 15, 1941, he and other officers were called into conference in the office of the Director of Naval Communications with Captain Redmond, Assistant Director, presiding. The meeting was called of all section heads and the discussion was directed toward all section heads to ask their subordinates not to talk about the Pearl Harbor incident. It was pointed out in the meeting that there would
undoubtedly be an investigation later and that anybody who had anything to say would be called before that investigation and permitted to say all he had to say. If anyone had anything written out, he was ordered to destroy it immediately. Safford stated that he complied with these orders and destroyed notes concerning statements given him by Lieutenant Lynn, Commander Kramer and other people who were intimately associated with them.

Captain Safford presented his statements concerning the Winds Message to the Joint Congressional Committee. He repeated his testimony given before previous committees that the Winds Message was intercepted on the morning of December 4, 1941, by the U. S. Navy at the radio receiving station at Cheltenham, Maryland, which served the Navy Department. He reiterated that he saw the Winds Message typed in page form on yellow teletype paper, with the translation written below. Safford stated that he immediately forwarded this message to his Commanding Officer, Admiral Noyes, thus fully discharging his own responsibility in the matter. Safford explained to the Committee the preparations made for interception of the message, and the facts of the actual interception. He testified that the Japanese Ambassador in London had destroyed his secret codes three days previously, and that a Winds Message was the only way that Tokyo could get news to him secretly. He repeated previous testimony that the frequency, distances, and time of day were such that the Winds
Message could be heard on the East Coast of the United States and Canada, while it was a physical impossibility for it to be heard (except under freak conditions) on the West Coast of the United States and Canada, Pearl Harbor, Manila Java and Singapore.

According to Safford, everything checked perfectly; there was no element of doubt as to conditions of radio wave propagation. Tokyo, in Safford's words, realized before the Winds Message was sent, that it probably would not be received in Washington or in Rio; that was immaterial—the Winds Message was intended for London. Reception or non-reception at other points was irrelevant.

Regarding the distribution of the Winds Message, Safford stated that he immediately sent the message to Admiral Noyes by one of the officers serving under him, and in a few minutes received a report to the effect that the message had been delivered. It was Safford's recollection that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the Winds Message to the War Department, to the "Magic" distribution list in the Navy Department, and to the Naval Aide to the President, thus substantiating Colonel Sadtler's testimony to the effect that Noyes had telephoned him regarding the message. For that reason, Safford continued, no immediate distribution of the smooth translation of the Winds Message was made in the Navy Department. It was not until 19:14, stated Safford, that any suggestion or criticism was offered that any official on the "Magic" distribution list had not
been notified that the Winds Message had been received, or that it had been translated in any terms other than war and peace.

About an hour after he had sent the original Winds Message to Admiral Noyes, Safford testified, he received a call from Noyes to the effect that Guam should be notified to burn their excess codes and ciphers, which was done. This notice for Guam to destroy their codes is important in that it helps establish the date the Winds Message was intercepted, and also the time and date of McCollum's warning message. The Winds Execute theory, according to Safford, received strong confirmation from a secret message received from the Philippines in the early afternoon of December 4, 1941. This message contained information that the Japanese Navy had introduced a new cipher system for its so-called "Operations Code" at 0600 GCT that date. This time was \( \frac{7}{8} \) hours before the Winds Message was broadcast. The unusual hour and unusual date at which the Japanese Navy changed its "Operations Code," combined with the Winds Message and other collateral information available in the Navy Department, made this message highly significant to the Japanese Navy. Safford continued that it was common belief that if the Japanese did suddenly attack the United States, the attack would come on a week-end or a national holiday. The Winds Message and the change of the Naval Operations Code came in the middle of the week; 2 days to Saturday and 3 days to Sunday. It was unthinkable, declared Safford, that the Japanese would surrender their hopes of surprise by delaying until the week-
end of December 13-14, 1941. In his concluding statement Safford stated that the War and Navy Departments had been given 72 hours advance notification of the attack on England and the United States by the Japanese themselves.

Safford was examined by Mr. Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel, at great length relative to the apparent discrepancies in his testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee and previous investigations. Before the Hart Investigation and the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Safford had testified that the Winds Message was intercepted on the evening of December 3rd, 1941.

Safford stated to the Joint Committee that he did not know from first-hand knowledge exactly what time it was received, that he had made notes which he later destroyed on order of Captain Redmond. Richardson continued his examination by questioning Safford about his preparations in the fall of 1943 when he concluded that he might be called as a witness:

Now, Captain, I want you to know that I do not care a tinker's dam whether the winds execute message came in or whether it did not...I do not want to mislead you or browbeat you, if I talk rather loudly...I just want to make it clear that when you started in the fall of 1943 to prepare yourself as a witness, your whole recollection was exceedingly hazy as to what had happened 2 years before, wasn't it?²

Safford replied that there were a few outstanding facts, but that the details linking them together were hazy. Richardson pursued his questioning of Safford eliciting the fact that Safford

²JCC, Part 8, p. 3601.
was not a Japanese linguist, did not decode the message, but had
relied merely upon Kramer's handwritten explanation of the message,
without checking to see if the code words were repeated twice in
the message. Richardson confronted Safford with the statement
that Kramer had three times in sworn testimony heretofore, denied
that he saw anything in the message with reference to Japanese
words relating to the United States. (This is an inaccuracy on
Richardson's part, since Kramer was certain in his testimony
before the Navy Court of Inquiry that the code words used re-
ferred to the United States. It was not until his second appear-
ance before an investigating group, the Hewitt Inquiry, that
Kramer developed his indecision regarding the country referred
to in the message. At the time of Safford's testimony before
the Joint Congressional Committee, Kramer had not yet testified.)
Safford replied that he was not aware of the nature of Kramer's
testimony, as quoted by Richardson, and gave his opinion that
Kramer had been pretty well befuddled by the middle of 1945.

Mr. Richardson. Well, did the befuddling, Cap-
tain, apply only to Kramer? Were you befuddled at
all in 1945?\(^3\)

Safford, in replying to this question, stated that there
was a determined effort made to have him reverse his testimony
before previous investigations and to say that he had never seen
the Winds Message. Safford testified that he had prepared on

\(^3\)Ibid. p. 3606.
July 14, 1945, 2 days after the conclusion of the Hewitt Inquiry, a memorandum for the purpose of having a record of events which he considered rather unusual. Reading from his memorandum, Safford stated that on May 11, 1945, he was called to an unofficial conference conducted by Lieutenant Commander John Sonnett in the Navy Building, Washington, D. C. Sonnett was a legal adviser to Admiral Hewitt in the Hewitt Inquiry and was a special representative of the Secretary of the Navy. Sonnett requested that Safford give him written memoranda to be used as a basis of study and examination on the subject of the Winds Message, which was done. Safford continued that it was apparent to him that Sonnett was acting as a counsel for the defense for the late Secretary Knox and Admiral Stark, rather than as the legal assistant to the investigating officer. His purpose seemed to Safford to be to refute the testimony (before earlier investigations) that was unfavorable to anyone in Washington, to beguile hostile witnesses into changing their stories and to introduce an element of doubt where he (Sonnett) could not effect a reversal of testimony:

Above all, he attempted to make me reverse my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and to make me believe I was suffering from hallucinations.

Safford further testified that Sonnett on a later occasion tried to persuade him that there had been no Winds Execute Message

Ibid. p. 3609.
that his memory had been playing him tricks, that he had confused
the false winds message with what he had been expecting, and that
he ought to change his testimony to permit reconciling all pre-
vious discrepancies and thereby wind up the affair. Safford con-
tinued that he distinctly recalled Sonnett making the following
statements to him during the course of the above-mentioned con-
ferences:

"You are the only one who seems to have ever seen the
'Winds Execute' Message."

"How could the 'Winds Execute' be heard on the east
coast of the U. S. and not at any of the places nearer
Japan?"

"It is very doubtful that there ever was a 'Winds
Execute' Message."

"It is no reflection on your veracity to change your
testimony."

"It is no reflection on your mentality to have your
memory play you tricks after such a long period."

"Numerous witnesses that you have named have denied
all knowledge of a 'Winds Execute' Message."

"You do not have to carry the torch for Admiral
Kimmel."

Safford concluded his statement from the memorandum by
saying that he believed that Sonnett had employed similar tactics
on other witnesses whose testimony had favored Admiral Kimmel,
particularly Rochefort and Kramer. Safford was examined for
five days before the Joint Congressional Committee, and his
testimony covers 309 printed pages in the published record of the
hearings. Although the same questions were asked over and over
again, and the General Counsel, Richardson, as well as some of the

5Ibid. p. 3610.
members of the Committee, were obviously hostile towards him. Safford clung to his testimony that the Winds Message was received in the Navy Department in the middle of the week preceding Pearl Harbor. Great emphasis was placed upon the Winds Message by Senator Lucas, who considered it the most important matter before the Committee. Confronted with evidence that other witnesses whom he had cited would support his testimony had, in fact, refused to corroborate his statements, Safford refused to change his testimony, patiently adhering to his opinion.

Regarding Safford's statement before the Joint Committee on February 2, 1946, when he stated that Sonnett, did, before the Hewitt Inquiry convened, attempt to make him reverse his testimony and make him believe he was suffering from hallucinations, it becomes presumable, granting the acceptability of the other contrary testimony, that a pathological disorder could be the only explanation and justification for Safford's behavior. However, states Garraghan, if a person is subject to hallucinations, this abnormal condition would undoubtedly be known to his close friends and therefore open to investigation. Since at no time was Safford requested to submit to medical examination nor any official doubt raised as to his mental competence, it may be reasonably assumed that he was well qualified as a witness.

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Garraghan, op. cit., p. 284.
Captain Kramer was examined for the first time by the Joint Committee on February 6, 1946. Kramer confirmed that he had been shown the Winds Message by the GY watch officer, but that to his recollection this was on the morning of December 5th and not December 4th. He stated also that previous to this he had, on the instructions of Admiral Noyes, prepared six 3 x 5 cards which bore the English translation of the terms given in the set-up of the Winds Code of November 25th. The English translation read "East wind rain; United States. North wind cloudy; Russia. West wind clear; England." Under questioning by Mr. Richardson, Kramer stated that he had no recollection of writing upon the Winds Message which was brought to him by the watch officer whom he identified as Lieutenant Murray, although he was not positive. In response to Richardson's statement that Safford had testified that the words "War with the United States," were written on the bottom of the message, Kramer replied that if he had written anything he would most positively have not used the word "war." He agreed, however, that while the set-up of the messages themselves was primarily a means of communication by a news broadcast in case of cutting off of communications, there might be deduced from that an implication of imminent war. Kramer testified that after that morning he never saw the Winds Message again, and that he had nothing to do with the preparation of files and documents that were turned over to the Roberts Commission, thus refuting Safford's testi-
at the time that it was an authentic broadcast of that nature:

I am still of that opinion, that it used that precise wording, keeping in mind, as I indicated this morning, that my recollections on that are that only one country was involved...it was England. 7

Kramer testified that he was admitted to Bethesda Naval Hospital on September 28, 1945, shortly after the Hewitt Inquiry ended, but that he had not been beset, beleaguered or badgered by an effort to break down his testimony as had been reported in the New York Times on November 12th, 1945, and also in the Washington Times-Herald and the Washington Post. Kramer was questioned concerning the following quotation from the Scranton Times of Scranton, Pennsylvania, United Press dispatch of November 7, 1945:

The Navy today denied Republican charges that a potential witness in the Pearl Harbor inquiry had been "broken in mind and body" and was being held incommunicado in a hospital psychopathic ward. 8

Kramer denied that he was held incommunicado and stated that during his hospitalization at Bethesda nothing in connection with des- cryption or testimony was brought up in any conversation in which he engaged. Kramer was then questioned again concerning his testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry when he stated that the Winds Message he saw might have referred to the United States. He stated

7 JCC, Part 9, p. 3936.
8 Ibid. p. 3966.
9 Ibid. p. 3967.
that he was of the opinion, in his testimony before the Joint Committee, that the United States did not appear in the message. This opinion, he said, came as a result of recent study.

The following day, February 8, 1946, Kramer asked permission to read a statement he had prepared after a broadcast the previous night in which Mr. Fulton Lewis, Jr. applied the terms "irate," "antagonistic," and "reluctant" to testimony which Kramer had given. Kramer explained that he was out of condition physically and apologized to the Joint Committee if he had created any impression of irrationalism, antagonism or reluctance, and assured the members that his only intention in tone of voice or manner was emphasis on points he was making.

Senator Ferguson continued the examination by pointing out to Kramer that he had testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry in 1944 that the Winds Message he saw definitely referred to the United States and suggested a break in relations, even implying war. Kramer stated that his reaction at the time was that in view of the fact that the country was in the midst of a serious war with Japan, that the country mentioned must have been the United States; however, in the light of his present recollection, he wished to contradict his previous testimony before the Navy Court. Senator Ferguson next brought up Kramer's conversations with Lieutenant Commander Sonnett, previous to his testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry. Kramer confirmed that the subject of these conversations was concerned with discrepancies in his
testimony with that of other witnesses regarding the Winds Message. Sonnett stated that the discrepancies were such that Kramer would have an opportunity to change his testimony if he wanted to. It will be recalled that in his testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry, following the conversations with Sonnett, Kramer changed his testimony given before the Navy Court and stated that it was his impression that the message referred to England, and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although, in his words, it may have referred to the United States also.

On February 11, 1946, after five days of testimony which covered 328 pages in the published hearings, Kramer stated that he reached the conclusion himself sometime in early December of 1945, after he began a study of the interrogations conducted the previous fall, that the Winds Message was a phony. Senator Ferguson asked Kramer if he based his conclusion upon Japanese statements that they did not send out the Execute Message. Kramer replied that it was not based solely on that.

Senator Ferguson. And up until you saw the Japanese messages from Japan to MacArthur, you felt all the time that it was authentic, and then you came to the conclusion that it was a phony?

Captain Kramer. That was very likely it, sir. I do not know still whether it was or not...It was just a general conclusion I came to.10

Kramer, during the course of three investigations progressively altered his testimony from a point of positive identi—

10 Ibid. p. 1191.
fication of the Winds Message as authentic, and from a definite memory of the wording and meaning, before the Navy Court of Inquiry in 1944, to a less positive stand before the Hewitt Inquiry in 1945, where he did not recall the wording, did not recognize the phrase "Higashi No Kazeame," and thought that the message referred to "England and possibly the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, also."

Kramer gave yet further evidence of his increasingly noticeable indecision in his admission before the Joint Congressional Committee that the MacArthur findings influenced his testimony to the point that he concluded that the message he saw was a false one, although still not sure. It becomes the duty of the historian to examine these inconsistent testimonies with the view towards establishing the highest degree of probability and certitude. As Garraghan points out:

> When a witness gives contradictory versions of the same incidents, the circumstances under which the various versions are given will sometimes render it possible to determine which is correct.\(^{11}\)

Captain Kramer before the Joint Committee testified that he had had several conversations with Lieutenant Commander Sonnett, the assistant to Admiral Hewitt, previous to the Hewitt Inquiry. Kramer denied that he had been pressured to change his previous testimony, and insisted that Sonnett had simply pointed out cer-

\(^{11}\)Garraghan, op. cit., p. 312.
tain discrepancies between Kramer's testimony regarding the Winds Message and that of other witnesses who denied the very existence of the message. Kramer stated that his meetings with Sonnett didn't change his mind concerning the Winds Message, and that his testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry was substantially the same as previous testimony with one exception, that of which country the message referred to. Regardless of Kramer's interpretation, "substantially the same" is not "exactly the same," and the fact remains that his testimony was changed considerably. Whereas, he formerly believed that the country referred to was the United States, he testified before the Hewitt Inquiry that that recollection was false, and that the country referred to was England, or perhaps the Netherlands.

Only the most credulous could believe that the meeting with Sonnett did not influence Kramer's testimony, for what purpose otherwise would there have been a meeting at all? It is a matter of conjecture only, but a fact that deserves consideration, that since Captains Safford and Kramer were both approached by Sonnett regarding their respective testimonies, it may be safely presumed that other witnesses were also interviewed by him, particularly the four watch officers, none of whom could ever recall having seen the Winds Message in any form, and who were not questioned about it before the Hewitt Inquiry.

12 JCC, Part 9, p. 4056f.
It is significant to the critically minded that Captain Kramer was confined to the Bethesda, Maryland, Naval Hospital in the neuropsychiatric ward for treatment of his nerves on September 28, 1945, shortly after the Hewitt Inquiry ended. Kramer arouses one's sympathy, for it is understandable that no one could have changed his mind, or had his mind changed, so many times about a matter so vitally important, or could have offered so many conflicting and contradictory testimonies as he did, without suffering some damage to his nerves. After the hearings by the Joint Congressional Committee were concluded, Captain Kramer was retired by the Navy. During his appearance before the Joint Committee, Kramer at times reacted as though in a trance—like a person who has memorized all the answers only to have the sequence of the questions changed. In some instances he completely circumvented direct questions by lengthy discourses on an irrelevant subject:

Senator Lucas: Well, if you never saw this so-called execute message after your conversation with Safford on either December 4th or 5th, where, in the course of natural events, or in the course of understanding, would that message go after it left Safford's office?

Captain Kramer: I have already indicated, Senator, that that particular message came in as a part of a news broadcast coverage which we had not been customarily covering during the course of 1941, except occasional sampling of that coverage, primarily because of the fact that the FCC then had that function of monitoring foreign broadcasts. That coverage was instituted only after we were aware of the Japanese setting up this particular winds system of signals. It was an added burden not only to my section, with limited translating talent, but, of course, to Captain Safford's whole organization, including the monitoring stations and his watch
officers in the decrypting section to examine this plain language coverage.\textsuperscript{13}

Considering Kramer's inconsistent testimonies before the several investigating groups, the most logical conclusion would be to accept his first testimony, that given before the Navy Court of Inquiry in 1944, as the one nearest the truth. Subsequently, Kramer had been subjected to outside influences, some of them consciously operating to effect a change in his testimony, which fact was accomplished. His hospitalization, the first in over 15 years according to him, and the only one in his career which necessitated treatment of his nerves, is ample evidence that he was emotionally and mentally upset by the proceedings and hence, unable to give acceptable testimony. In light of these revelations, it is reasonable to discount the value of any testimony after his first one which substantiated the existence of the Winds Message, and to accept his initial statements, made of his own free will, and before attempts had been made to have him modify his statements, as being the most significant in trying to unearth the truth concerning the East Wind Rain Message.

Admiral Ingersoll was next examined by the Joint Committee regarding the Winds Message. It will be recalled that when Ingersoll testified before the Hart Inquiry, he testified that he saw or heard on or about December 1, 1941, the broadcast directive in-

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.} p. 3948.
dicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Great Britain and the United States. In his testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry he did not recall whether he saw the Winds Message prior to December 7 or afterwards. Ingersoll was asked by Mr. Richard-
on if he saw the Winds Message before or after December 7, 1941. Ingersoll stated that he was not absolutely positive of that ex-
cept that he was absolutely certain that it was after the Navy Department had sent out the messages regarding the destruction of the codes. He recalled, however, that the message referred to all three countries as specified in the set-up of the Winds Code of November 28, 1941, and that the officers who called it to his attention took it away with them when they left. Ingersoll, like Kramer, progressively changed his testimony during the course of three investigations, from a positive identification of the date as being before the Pearl Harbor attack, to a non-committal reply during the last investigation.

On February 18, 1946, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler was ques-
tioned before the Joint Committee concerning the Winds Message. Sadtler repeated his testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that on December 5, 1941, at about 9 a.m. he received a phone call from Admiral Noyes to the effect that the message was in, and that it implied a break in relations between Japan and Great Britain. Sadtler explained that it was very easy to miss part of an inter-
cept and that when Noyes reported that the message read of a break between the Japanese and Great Britain, that it was possible all
of the message had not been received, and that the United States was included; hence his anxiety to have his proposed warning sent out. It will be remembered in the Clausen Investigation that Sadtler, upon reading the affidavits of Generals Gerow and Bedell Smith to the effect that he had not contacted them relative to his warning message, had stated that he believed their comments were correct statements of fact. However, in the hearings before the Joint Congressional Committee, Sadtler repeated his original testimony that he had gone to the office of General Gerow who thought the various departments had been adequately warned, and thence to the office of General (then Colonel) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General Staff, who refused to discuss the matter further. Sadt­
ler stated that he considered the Winds Message, as reported by Noyes, as genuine, and that it meant war:

When the winds message was first brought to my atten­tion by Colonel Bratton, he emphasized the destruction of codes, that it could mean one thing, and that was war. Here we had practically all the codes in the United States destroyed except the one left in the Embassy in Washington, Japanese Embassy in Washington. That meant that we were going to have war in a very short time.\(^\text{14}\)

Admiral Leigh Noyes was next examined by the Joint Committee. He recalled the six cards which he had instructed Kramer to prepare regarding the English translation of words in the original Winds Code set-up of November 23, 1941. It is pointed out that when he testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Admiral Noyes

\(^{14}\text{JCC, Part 10, p. 1636.}\)
was unable to recall the preparation of the six cards by Kramer, to be distributed to persons in the Navy Department who would be particularly interested upon the receipt of the execution of the Winds Code. In his appearance before the Joint Committee Noyes testified that prior to December 7, 1941, no genuine Winds Execute message was brought to him or to his attention by anyone in the Navy Department. Furthermore, he did not recall the phone call which Sadtler testified he had received from Noyes.

Admiral Noyes. I cannot say that Captain Safford did not on the 4th of December forward some form of message on yellow teletype paper to me. If it was such a message as he describes, it was not a correct execute of the winds message.15

Regardless of content, the message should be available in the files of the Navy Department. Since it cannot be found, it can only be assumed that the message was an implementation of the Winds Code, and was probably destroyed when its full implication became known. After considerable questioning, Noyes steadfastly denied that he ever saw a genuine execute Winds Message, despite the testimony of Safford, Kramer and Ingersoll to the contrary. Noyes stated that even if a correct Winds Message had been received on either the 4th or 5th of December and brought to him he would not have recommended that any action be taken on it, because the Navy had already informed their people in the field everything that the message would have told. If such were the case, if Admiral

15 Ibid. p. 4740.
Kimmel for instance had been aware of the imminence of the breaking of diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, it is likely that he would have been on the alert and that the Pearl Harbor attack would not have been as devastating as it was. In a letter dated July 20, 1953, from Admiral William Halsey to Admiral Kimmel, Halsey refutes the inference of Noyes that the commanders in the field were informed of the growing tension between the United States and Japan as indicated in the intercepted messages:

...Had we been in possession of the "Magic" messages with clear implication from the Japs, by their anxiety to be constantly informed of ships berthing, that an attack on Pearl was intended, and the further pointed fact that the date was Dec. 7th, the Enterprise and Lexington would never have gone on their missions to Wake and Midway, and further the Fleet would not have been in Pearl Harbor on that date. It is probable that we should have been able to locate the Jap fleet by air scouting before they could reach their take off position...As you know I have always thought, and have not hesitated to say on any and all occasions, that I believe you and Short were the greatest military martyrs this country has ever produced, and that your treatment was outrageous...Again all good luck and God bless you...As ever--Bill Halsey.

The Joint Congressional Committee examined John F. Sonnett on February 19 and 20, 1946. At the time of the Congressional Hearings, Sonnett was an Assistant Attorney General of the United States. In the previous year he had served as counsel for Admiral Hewitt in the Hewitt Inquiry with the rank of Lieutenant Commander. He was questioned about his interviews with Captain Safford prior to the Hewitt Inquiry, and was requested to direct his attention

16 Kimmel, op. cit., p. 159.
particularly to any attempt made by him to persuade Captain Safford to change testimony that he had previously given. He categorically denied that there was any such attempt at any time with respect to Captain Safford or any other witness. Sonnett was then asked if he had received any citations for his service in the Navy, and he replied that he had received a citation from Secretary Forrestal for outstanding service as his Special Assistant, and had also received a commendation from Admiral Hewitt at the completion of the Hewitt Inquiry, both apparently in appreciation of Sonnett's efforts in helping to confuse the issue of the Winds Message.

The Joint Committee excused General Sherman Miles and General Leonard T. Gerow from questioning on the subject of the Winds Message and decided, instead, to examine General George C. Marshall, who stated that although he was familiar with the Winds Code set-up of November 28, 1941, he had no recollection of either seeing or hearing of a later implementing message.

Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, stated that he recalled seeing an implementing message of the Winds Code set-up, but that it was after the actual attack on Pearl Harbor. He did not recall specifically Captain McCollum's warning message, but stated that McCollum had since told him that he brought a message to Wilkinson and that Wilkinson was concerned about it in connection with the Winds Message. After the discussion, McCollum took it, by Wilkinson's direction to Admiral Turner, Chief of the War Plans Section in the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Turner showed McCollum a warning message which had gone out which he (Turner) thought covered the situation. Of all this, Wilkinson testified, he had no clear recollection, and was simply repeating what Captain McCollum had told him.

Admiral Richmond K. Turner testified before the Joint Committee that on December 5th Admiral Noyes called him on the telephone and said:

...words to this effect, "The first weather message has come in" and I said, "What did it say?" And he said, "North wind clear." And I said, "Well, there is something wrong about that," and he said, "I think so, too," and he hung up.17

Turner stated that he never saw a draft of that particular message and did not know from his own knowledge where Noyes got it. If it had come in and had been authentic Turner was certain he would have received a copy of it. Turner also recalled seeing after the attack on Pearl Harbor an intercepted message picked up by the Federal Communications Commission, which contained the exact phrase set up in the Winds Code for war with Great Britain.

Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations in 1941, was examined by the Joint Committee and was asked by Mr. William Mitchell, Chief Counsel, if he was familiar with the message which set-up the Winds Code. Stark replied that his recollection was

17JCC, Part 4, p. 1968.
not clear on the Winds Message but that he "undoubtedly" saw it. The Winds Message referred to here was the one setting up the code. Stark also stated that he "undoubtedly" knew that naval monitoring stations had been alerted to try to intercept such a message as the Winds Code set-up contemplated. Under repeated questioning, the most Stark would admit was the he "assumed" that he saw the set-up message, and he stated emphatically that no implementing message was ever brought to his attention prior to December 7, 1941. Stark was later relieved from his position as Chief of Naval Operations and was forbidden ever to assume a position requiring the exercise of superior judgment by Secretary Forrestal in his endorsement of the Naval Court of Inquiry report.

Thus, a number of witnesses agreed that there had been a Winds Message, but no two of them agreed when it was received or what meaning it had. Some who were willing to admit that the message had been intercepted were reluctant to admit that it was directed against the United States, contending that it meant war by the Japanese against Britain. Others suggested that it meant war with Russia—an interpretation that Japan could never have conveyed since she had no intention of fighting Russia, while she did plan war against the United States, the British and the Dutch.

Captain Safford at the last was the only witness who held to his original story. He said that the Winds Message had the meaning it necessarily must have possessed if it were received—that Japan intended to go to war with the three powers with which
it did actually go to war. Kramer and Admiral Ingersoll agreed with him that the message had been received, but after originally stating that the message meant war with the United States and Great Britain, both finally took the position that it applied only to war with Great Britain, though Kramer was at times hesitant on this point. The only other theory advanced, except the untenable argument of the administration that there never was a Winds Message, is that of Kramer and Ingersoll that the message meant war with Great Britain, but not with the United States. However, from America's commitments under the ABCD Agreement, from Roosevelt's warning of August 17, 1941, and from the warnings to Japanese officials that a Japanese attack upon British possessions would bring America into the war, it is obvious that a Winds Message forecasting a Japanese war with Britain would also have meant that Japan inevitably would have to fight the United States. Therefore, all efforts of the administration to evade the implications of the Winds Message dissolve.

After reviewing the testimony given concerning the Winds Message, the Majority Report of the Joint Congressional Committee concluded:

In view of the preponderate weight of evidence to the contrary, it is believed that Captain Safford is honestly mistaken when he insists that an execute message was received prior to December 7, 1941. Considering the period of time that has elapsed, this mistaken impression is understandable. 18

It is unlikely that Safford was merely "honestly mistaken."
There is considerable evidence to support his contention that a Winds Message did exist, although the evaluation of that evidence by the various investigating committees has been highly contradictory. It is interesting to point out that on February 12, 1946, the Navy awarded the Legion of Merit, one of its highest decorations to Captain Safford, who had upset the applecart by insisting that there was a Winds Message, the existence of which official Washington wanted to forget. Although Safford was intercepting all of the Japanese code messages throughout 1941, the medal was given for his services during the period from March 1942 to September 1945. The citation said that the officer, whose testimony his own superiors and colleagues had done their utmost to discredit, "was the driving force behind the development of the perfected machines which today give the United States Navy the finest system of encipherment in the world."\(^{19}\)

The Majority Report of the Joint Congressional Committee attempted to dispose of the Winds Message controversy in these words:

Granting for purposes of discussion that a genuine execute message applying to the winds code was intercepted before December 7, it is concluded that such fact would have added nothing to what was already known con-\(^{19}\)New York Times, February 12, 1946, 15:3.
cerning the critical character of our relations with the empire of Japan.

The conclusion that even if it had been intercepted, the Winds Message would have added nothing to our knowledge concerning the critical nature of our relations with Japan can be readily refuted. If the message had been as insignificant as the Majority Report sought to infer, the elaborate set-up to intercept it would never have been inaugurated, and there would not be the seemingly endless controversy about it to this day. On analyzing the conclusions reached in the Majority Report, it must be borne in mind that the majority of the committee was composed of members of the incumbent political party and administration during whose tenure the attack and war occurred. The administration was responsible for the conduct of our foreign affairs, diplomatic relations and finally the war, and the members of that administration, understandably, would be naturally reluctant to cast reproach upon their own abilities, judgment or choice of leaders, thereby incurring the possibility of being turned out of office by an aroused and wrathful electorate. Conceivably then, in view of all the evidence submitted and considering the manifold possibilities of interpretation of that evidence, the only recourse available to the majority members of the Joint Congressional Committee would be to minimize the importance of the East Wind Rain Message.

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of November and December 1941. Monthly reports which were supposed to be retained for permanent record in the Navy Department, as well as all their intercepted messages, are missing from the files of these two stations. This fact presumably should silence forever the arguments of those who insist that the Winds Message existed. It only succeeds, however, in strengthening one's conviction that perhaps the Winds Message was received, and in heightening the search for more or newer evidence. The problem of the Winds Message has all the ingredients of a historical detective story, and it remains for some future historian, equipped with fuller knowledge and evidence, to assemble the pieces in their true relationship. At present the historian faces the almost impossible task of examining and evaluating the integrity of a document which is without existence. Reconstruction of the text must of course precede any evaluation, and this has been rendered extremely difficult. Any reconstruction will at best be merely fragmentary, for one can arrive only at a degree of probability based upon the testimonies of the witnesses and upon circumstantial evidence.

The Minority Report of the Joint Congressional Committee partially stated that although the knowledge gained from Japanese spy and diplomatic intercepts was sufficient to warn high authorities in Washington that Japan was on the verge of start-

\[22\text{ Ibid. p. 3708.}\]
ing hostilities, reference should be made in this connection to
the Winds Message concerning which the Minority thought there had
been much dispute and great mystery. The Army Pearl Harbor
Board, continued the Minority Report, as well as the Navy Court
of Inquiry, had evidence to the effect that the execute of the
Winds Message had been received. The evidence before the Joint
Congressional Committee, stated the Minority Report, was admitted-
ly confusing and conflicting, but after reviewing it, Admiral
Royal E. Ingersoll and Admiral Richmond K. Turner both stated
that they did not know until 1945 about the allegation that there
had been no Wind Execute Message. According to the Minority Report,
even if the Wind Execute Message which the two Admirals had seen
was a false one, they believed it true at the time and should
have acted accordingly. The Minority Report concluded with regard
to the Winds Message that even though the receipt of the activating
or execute message were to be wholly discounted, such discounting
in no way affected the other items of unmistakable evidence which
demonstrated that high authorities in Washington had sufficient
knowledge of Japanese designs to convince them before the attack
that war with Japan was an imminent certainty:

In the lower, operating echelons of the Army and
Navy, on the other hand, men seemed to see or to sense the
gathering crisis and even the immediate danger to

23 Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack, op. cit., p. 31.
Hawaii. They tried to take steps to meet it but were discouraged by their superiors. This was notably evident in the testimony of Capt. Arthur McCollum, chief of the Far Eastern section of Naval Intelligence. Alarmed by conditions on Dec. 4, 1941, he prepared a dispatch to fully alert the fleets in the Pacific. He tried to get permission to send this dispatch at a meeting attended by Admirals Stark, Ingersoll, Turner, and Wilkinson but was discouraged from doing so on the ground that the messages of Nov. 24 and 27 to Admiral Kimmel were sufficient. He protested that they were not sufficient and that he would like to send his Dec. 4 dispatch anyway. The dispatch he prepared and wanted to send was never sent, and the result was tragic.\textsuperscript{24}

Regarding the tremendous publicity which the Winds Message has received, and the controversy revolving about it, it is significant to point out that an attempt was made to enact Congressional legislation which would have suppressed completely the code-cracking evidence under such severe penalties as to prohibit publication or discussion. Admiral Kimmel, in his story of Pearl Harbor,\textsuperscript{25} stated that on March 31, 1945, he read a five-line dispatch which indicated that a bill had been introduced in the Senate to prevent the disclosure of any coded matter except by permission of the head of a government department or by the President. Senator Ferguson was notified by Mr. Rugg, Kimmel's chief counsel, that the passage of this bill would close the door to any investigation of Pearl Harbor. When Ferguson returned from a Caribbean trip, the bill had already been passed by the Senate on

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid. p. 46.
\textsuperscript{25} Kimmel, op. cit., p. 66-159.
on April 5th. Kimmel stated that on his pressure, the Washington Post and the Washington Times-Herald gave the matter such publicity that the House voted to make a thorough investigation. When the bill was brought to the floor of the House two months later, it was defeated. Kimmel takes credit completely to himself for defeating the passage of the bill. While he undoubtedly did work avidly against its passage, it is logical that other thoughtful persons were cognizant of the possibility of a complete suppression of knowledge surrounding Pearl Harbor contained in the bill, and also labored diligently to defeat it. The matter of this piece of legislation is important in that it is an indication of the determination of an interested group to deny to the public full knowledge of the Pearl Harbor tragedy.
CONCLUSION

It is this writer's belief that at the present time we are too close to the subject to approximate much more than a high degree of certitude in determining the existence or non-existence of the East Wind Rain Message. Even though definite and absolute proof is lacking, we are able, by careful examination of circumstantial and testimonial evidence, to establish a very likely certainty that the Winds Message did have existence. This presumption can be reasonably supported by the following points:

(1) The circumstances surrounding the disappearance of valuable records which would have solved the riddle of the East Wind Rain Message lend strong suspicion to the possibility of unwholesome activities with the likely view of protecting some person or persons guilty of at least poor judgment from the consequences of that poor judgment. These missing records include those at Cheltenham, Maryland, and Winter Harbor, Maine, Navy intercept stations, and from the official files of the Navy Department—in particular JD-1-7001.

(2) The destruction of codes and ciphers on Guam on December 4, 1941.

(3) The Japanese change of their Operations Code on December 4, 1941.

(4) The change of the United States Navy code on December 4, 1941.
(5) The testimony of Captain Safford before five investigating committees that he saw an execute of the Winds Message before Pearl Harbor, on December 4, 1941.

(6) The testimony of Captain Kramer, before attempts were made to change his mind, that he saw a genuine execute of the Winds Code set-up on December 4, 1941.

(7) The testimony of Admiral Ingersoll that he saw the Winds Message before December 7, 1941.

(8) Captain McCollum’s attempt to send a warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief, of the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, on December 4, 1941.

(9) Colonel Bratton’s secret cable of December 5, 1941, to the Commanding General, Hawaii, requesting him to contact Commander Rochefort about news broadcast from Tokyo reference weather.

(10) Colonel Bratton’s recollection of the meeting in General Miles’ office where he, Miles and Sadtler discussed the Winds Message on December 5, 1941.

(11) Colonel Sadtler’s efforts after Admiral Noyes called him on the phone regarding the receipt of an implementing Winds Message to urge Generals Gerow and Smith to send a warning message on December 5, 1941, to Panama, Hawaii and the Philippines.

(12) The testimony of Admiral Turner that Admiral Noyes called him about the Winds Message on December 5, 1941, and the subsequent meeting on that day between Stark, Ingersoll and Turner wherein all felt that all necessary orders had been made.
(13) Admiral Redman's testimony that he heard about the Winds Message before Pearl Harbor from Noyes and Kramer, although there was some question as to its meaning.

(14) The testimony of Colonel Pettigrew that an anonymous person showed him an intercept indicating that Japanese-United States relations were in danger on December 5, 1941. Pettigrew had a cablegram sent to Colonel Fielder, Hawaii, at request of someone he didn't remember (probably Bratton) to contact Rochefort with reference to Japanese weather broadcasts.

(15) Admiral Noyes' testimony that he talked with Stark about a "false" message before Pearl Harbor, and both considered it more important than later study indicated it to be. Noyes stated that Stark had a copy of the "false" message.

(16) The absence of a copy of McCollum's warning message, Sadtler's warning message and the "false" message cited by Admiral Noyes.

The evidence offered by General MacArthur's interrogations in which high Japanese officials denied the Winds Message had been broadcast can be discounted, for these same Japanese also denied all knowledge of the Winds Code set-up itself, of which fact there is absolute proof.

It is conceivable that the Winds Message was recognized for its worth and was deliberately destroyed by a party or parties unknown, although the suspicion of duplicity in the Pearl Harbor tragedy is a terrifying and loathsome thought. Realizing the
inevitability of an ultimate conflict with the totalitarian powers, our diplomacy preceding Pearl Harbor was primarily pointed toward provoking Japan to attack us, not specifically at Pearl Harbor, but at some minor outpost in the Pacific. War with Japan was considered inevitable and imminent and our statesmen were occupied with the desire to have the Japanese precipitate the conflict by providing the incident. With this thought in mind we are forced to ask if the Pearl Harbor attack was coldly anticipated and allowed to eventuate with the design and desire of rallying the American people behind the administration in an all-out war effort. There is no evidence available which convinces this writer that such was the case, or that our government and military leaders deliberately allowed our naval forces to be practically annihilated in order to arouse popular support for an unpopular war. Rather, it is probably the case, that our leaders misjudged the point of attack by the Japanese, and that they were smugly naive in believing that the Pearl Harbor fortress was impregnable.

It is a well known fact that much evidence compiled by the investigating groups was at first suppressed by administration leaders who saw in the reports and conclusions much material and data of a character damaging to themselves. It is obvious that a great deal of information had to be withheld for security reasons, and the reference here is to reports which could have been released without endangering national defense. It is possible that when all the principal actors in the controversy have left
the stage, and when there is no eventuality of embarrassment to living persons, that we may gain more knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the Winds Message. Perhaps, some day, one or more of the witnesses will reveal new evidence, possibly in the form of diaries or memoirs, which will aid us in our endeavor to learn the truth about the Winds Message mystery.

Once the mystery is solved, America will be better able to re-evaluate and re-examine the leadership and circumstances which led her into a conflict which still threatens to destroy our civilization, and perhaps extract from the mass of evidence a lesson for future action. It is to be prayerfully hoped that the lesson will not come too late, and that men can yet learn to live together peacefully in a peaceful world.
APPENDIX
### APPENDIX A

**NAMES AND DATES OF VARIOUS COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING PEARL HARBOR**

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<td>Robert's Commission</td>
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APPENDIX B

NAMES OF SOME OF WITNESSES TESTIFYING BEFORE
THE VARIOUS COMMITTEES

Britton, Rufus S., Col., Chief, Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

Clausen, Henry C., Lieut. Col., Judge Advocate General's Office, Assisting Army Pearl Harbor Board and conducting supplemental investigation for Secretary of War.

Grov, Leonard T., Maj. Gen., Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, War Department.

Grew, Joseph C., United States Ambassador to Japan.

Hart, Thomas C., Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Navy Department.

Hull, Cordell, Secretary of State.

Ingersoll, Royal E., Admiral, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.

Kimmel, Husband E., Rear Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Navy Department.

Kramer, A. D., Commander, Chief, Translation Group, Communications Security Division, Navy Department.

Marshall, George C., General, Chief of Staff, United States Army, War Department.

McCollum, Arthur N., Captain, USN, Chief, Far Eastern Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.

Miles, Sherman, Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence Division, War Department.

Noyes, Leigh, Rear Admiral, Chief, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.

Richardson, J. C., Admiral, Former Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Pacific Fleet, Navy Department.
APPENDIX B

(Continued)

Roberts Owen J., Mr. Justice, Chairman, Roberts Commission.

Rochefort, Joseph John, Captain, Communications Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, Navy Department.

Sadler, Otis K., Colonel, Chief, Military Branch, Army Communications Service, Army Signal Corps, War Department.

Safford, L. F., Captain, USN, Chief, Communications Security Division, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.

Short, Walter C., Major General, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, War Department.

Sonnett, John F., Lieutenant Commander, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, and Assistant to Admiral H. K. Hewitt in his inquiry.

Stark, Harold R., Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.

Stimson, Henry L., Secretary of War (sworn statement and sworn replies to interrogatories only.).

Turner, Richmond K., Rear Admiral, Chief, War Plans Division, Navy Department.

Welles, Sumner, Undersecretary of State.

Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Admiral, Chief, Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
APPENDIX C

"The Federalist (No. 70)—by Alexander Hamilton.

But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds—to censure and to punishment. The first is the most important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage of misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

"I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point." These and similar pretexts are constantly at home, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task, if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those parties?
Secretary of State Cordell Hull's note to Nomura and Kurusu dated November 26, 1941, included the following proposals:

1. The government of the United States and the government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States.

2. Both governments will endeavor to conclude an agreement among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands, and Thai governments whereby each of the governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

3. The government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

4. The government of the United States and the government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the national government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

5. Both governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. Both governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concession under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The government of the United States and the government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
APPENDIX D

(Continued)

(7) The government of the United States and the government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

(8) Both governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

(9) Both governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

(10) Both governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

### APPENDIX E

**CHART SHOWING APPEARANCES OF WITNESSES BEFORE THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES**

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
The research for this thesis has been concerned mainly with primary sources in the form of the thirty-nine volumes of the Joint Congressional Committee Hearings on the Pearl Harbor Attack. This work contains a complete, documented record of all of the committees officially investigating the attack at Pearl Harbor, excerpts from the diaries, memoirs and correspondence of key officials and official memoranda of the State, War and Navy Departments. Use has also been made of available diplomatic correspondence, the Congressional Record, and a wealth of newspaper, periodical and secondary sources.

The most valuable source for this work has been the Joint Congressional Hearings and the diaries of Secretary Stimson and Ambassador Grew. Of value also has been the Congressional Record, newspaper editorials and magazine articles as reflecting public opinion. Of lesser value, but still worthy of notice, has been secondary works particularly those of Tansill, Morgenstern, Kimmel, Theobald, Feis, Morrison and Rauch, but the first four of these works must be read with discernment since the authors in their eagerness to prove their own theses often overlook important evidence and hence are unable to achieve the historian's goals of objectivity and impartiality.
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<td>December 3, 1945, pp. 24-25</td>
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