



*Journal of
Religion & Society*
Supplement Series

The Kripke Center

Supplement 17 (2018)

Religion and Secularism

Edited by Patrick Murray and Ronald A. Simkins

11. From Danish Cartoons to Norway's Anders Breivik

Secularism and Perceptions of Muslims in Scandinavian Social Imaginaries

Jennifer Elisa Veninga, St. Edward's University

Abstract

Over twelve years have passed since the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published a series of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed, an event which brought Denmark into the global spotlight and triggered protests around the world. Almost seven years ago, another Scandinavian nation was drawn into crisis when Anders Behring Breivik murdered 77 fellow Norwegians in what he believed to be an effort to resist the “Islamic colonisation of Europe.” This article argues that both events revealed particular conceptions of what it means to be fully human in a modern secular democracy, and according to this framework, Muslims do not meet these criteria. To examine this claim, the article first considers the perception of Muslims and immigrants as a threat to the secular social imaginaries of these societies, and then analyzes the nature of the “moral injury” experienced by Muslims and the corresponding *un*intelligibility of those injuries in these contexts.

Keywords: Danish cartoon crisis, Anders Behring Breivik, Islamophobia, Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood, Charles Taylor

Introduction

Over twelve years have passed since the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published a series of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed, a decision that would bring the small Scandinavian nation into the global spotlight and elicit contentious debate on the meaning of free speech, the role of Muslims in European societies, and the values and responsibilities of secular democracies. In the years since the original events, echoes of the cartoon crisis have been felt across Europe and even in the U.S. The cartoons have been reprinted multiple times, and the year 2015 alone, for example, saw the murders of twelve journalists at the French satirical newspaper *Charlie Hebdo*, followed by shootings at a free speech event and at a synagogue in Copenhagen, and later attacks at a Muhammad cartoon contest exhibit in Garland, Texas. Other terrorist attacks in Western Europe in recent years (Paris, 2015; Brussels, Nice, and Berlin, 2016; London, Manchester, and Stockholm, 2017) have exacerbated tensions over Islam and Muslims in the European public sphere. Several years earlier, on July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik murdered 77 fellow Norwegians to counter what he believed to be a dangerous embrace of Islam and Muslims in Norwegian society.

In this article, I draw on my previous research on the Danish cartoon crisis of 2005-2006 in light of recent events and ongoing analysis of Islam and Muslims in Western secular societies. While the focus of the article is the Danish cartoon crisis and its aftermath, I also examine elements of the 2011 attacks in Norway. Both events, I argue, reveal something crucial about way these secular European nations regard the Muslim minorities who reside within them. Specifically, I maintain that the Danish cartoon crisis suggested particular conceptions of what it means to be fully human in a modern secular democracy, and that according to this framework, Muslims (almost always conflated with “immigrants” and vice-versa) do not meet these criteria. Anders Behring Breivik’s paradoxical logic likewise operates within this framework, which was situated in an environment where anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes had become mainstream. I will thus raise the claim that the crises suggest a particular conception of the secular human being by first considering the notion that Muslims and immigrants constitute a threat to the secular social imaginaries of these societies and then examining the meaning of “moral injury” experienced by Muslims and the corresponding *unintelligibility* of those injuries in these contexts.

The Danish Cartoon Crisis¹

The cartoon crisis began in the autumn of 2005, when Flemming Rose, the now-infamous cultural editor of the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, issued an invitation to local cartoonists to draw Muhammad “as they saw him” (Hansen and Hundevadt: 15). Though in retrospect it is difficult to imagine that the cartoons would have elicited little or no response, few could have predicted what local and global reactions would follow from the publication of 12 images that Rose ran on September 30, 2005, with a short article under the title, “The Face of

¹ In this and subsequent sections on the cartoon crisis and its context in Denmark, I draw upon my previous research in *Secularism, Theology and Islam: The Danish Social Imaginary and the Cartoon Crisis of 2005-2006* published in 2014 by Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. I am grateful for their permission to include this material.

Muhammad” (“*Muhammeds ansigt*”). One image in particular by cartoonist Kurt Westergaard became the symbol of the cartoon crisis – an image of a man assumed to be the Prophet Muhammad with a bomb in his turban. Later, Rose explained to the press that the commissioning was a response to what he believed to be recent incidents of self-censorship in Europe “caused by the widening fears and feelings of intimidation in dealing with issues related to Islam.” The goal of publishing the cartoons, Rose continued, was to challenge what he believed to be an increase of “self-imposed limits on expression.” In particular, he said that the publication was a reaction to the situation of Danish author Kåre Bluitgen, who had sought to find an illustrator for a children’s book on Islam but found no one willing to take the job. Bluitgen did eventually find a willing artist, although he or she remains anonymous. Bluitgen’s book, *Koranen og profeten Muhammeds liv* (*The Koran and the Life of the Prophet Muhammed*), was published by Høst and Søn (Copenhagen) in 2006.

While several months passed before large-scale protests took place, already in October 2005, a group of ambassadors from Muslim-majority countries voiced their concern to then Danish prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, asking for a meeting to discuss the matter. Maintaining that the caricatures were demeaning to the Prophet Muhammad and Islam, they also argued that the publication was antithetical to the Danish spirit of tolerance (Ok et al.). Rasmussen, however, refused to meet with the ambassadors, maintaining that he had no power to take action against the media, nor did he want such responsibility (Marshall).

Anger began to spread across Muslim communities, and when a Norwegian newspaper reprinted the cartoons on January 10, 2006, Denmark itself was thrust into the international eye. Carsten Juste, editor-in-chief of *Jyllands-Posten*, offered an apology that month for having offended Muslims, but Prime Minister Rasmussen never apologized and continued to defend freedom of the press. Protests ensued and by the spring of 2006, over 100 people were left dead internationally, boycotts of Danish goods had caused millions of euros in lost revenue, *Jyllands-Posten* had received over 100 registered threats, and the cartoonists were in hiding. The affair was described in the press as the worst international crisis in Denmark since World War II (Buch-Andersen).

Most of the debate surrounding the cartoon crisis framed the affair in terms of freedom of speech. While issues related to freedom of speech were certainly central to the events, conceptualizing the situation in terms of the Western value of free speech vs. Muslim intolerance for religious blasphemy was, and continues to be, a generalization that is informed by absolutist interpretations of freedom of speech and essentialist conceptions of Islam and Muslims. As Danish social anthropologist Peter Hervik has argued, “The free speech strategy has become so ingrained today in the Danish news media that claiming the Muhammad cartoon conflict was not, at least in the beginning, a case about freedom of speech may seem utterly absurd. Nevertheless, this is the case” (276).

The crisis, of course, did involve issues of freedom of speech and questions about the nature of blasphemy in a secular society such as Denmark. In agreement with Hervik, however, I have maintained that the publication and many of the events that took place in its aftermath (especially within Europe) were related to more fundamental and challenging questions about the situation of Muslim minorities in Denmark and in Europe more generally. As I observed the 2005-2006 events as they unfolded, I wanted to understand more deeply why the crisis had

happened in Denmark when it did (Veninga). To do so, I employed Charles Taylor's concept of the "social imaginary," which he describes as "the ways people imagine their social existence," such as how they relate to others and what tacit expectations exist among them (2004: 23). My exploration of the Danish social imaginary yielded a broad claim that the cartoon crisis reflected the encounter between what I called (perhaps redundantly) a paradoxically "theo-secular" social imaginary on the one hand, and Islam on the other. The cartoons, I have argued, were a response to a perceived threat from a Muslim minority to core elements of the Danish social imaginary (Veninga).

Secularity in Denmark

What, then, is the nature of the secular social imaginary in Denmark? Denmark, along with its Scandinavian neighbors, is of course notorious for its low levels of religious participation. While over 80 percent of the Danish population officially belongs to the Danish Lutheran Church, the *Folkekirke*, the percentage of those who attend church weekly is as low as two percent.² This low level of religious participation can be interpreted in several ways according to theories of secularization.

In his well-known work *A Secular Age*, Charles Taylor describes what he understands to be three main senses of secularity, including 1) the secularization of public spaces (separating political structures and religion, for example), 2) a decline in religious belief and practice, and 3) his preferred frame for considering our modern social imaginary, which involves the conditions for belief and non-belief in a given society (2007:1-3). In terms of the latter, Taylor maintains that in modern secular societies, belief in God is simply one option among others. "A secular age," he suggests, "is one in which the eclipse of all goals beyond human flourishing becomes conceivable" (2007: 19-20). Characterized by its low levels of religious participation, the Danish secular imaginary provides us with a clear example of secularity two, and it exemplifies Taylor's third characteristic of a secular age by providing conditions that make *not* adhering to religious belief a viable and even expected option. These two elements, in fact, characterize all of the Scandinavian countries.

We might understand this stance as a reflection of what Taylor calls a modern "stadial consciousness" which suggests that becoming modern necessitates a growth out of, or away from, the idea that human flourishing can only come from religious transcendence (2007: 289; Casanova 2010: 265-66). Instead, life in the modern world involves existing fully within what he calls "the immanent frame," in which rationality is key and time is "pervasively secular." Taylor describes the human subject living in this immanent frame as the "buffered self," an individual identity marked by a turn toward self-exploration and a rejection of supernatural powers (2007: 539-40). Thus, the immanent frame is "natural" in contrast to being "supernatural" and "immanent" rather than "transcendent" (2007: 542).

² For yearly statistics, see Statistics Denmark (esp. "Culture and the National Church") and Aarhus University's Center for Samtidsreligion (esp. "Religion i Danmark"). Niels Valdemar Vinding and Lisbet Christoffersen also incorporate helpful numbers on the *Folkekirke* in *Danish Regulation of Religion, State of Affairs and Qualitative Reflections* (14–18). Along with Sweden and followed by the other Nordic countries, Denmark has been described as a likely contender for the least religious country in the world (see Zuckerman: 2).

The lack of religious participation in Denmark also corresponds to one of three aspects of secularization theory noted by sociologist of religion José Casanova: the “theory of the progressive decline of religious beliefs and practices as a concomitant of levels of modernization” (2011: 60). As Casanova aptly remarks, most Europeans (and I would add, certainly most Scandinavians) would say “of course I am not religious. What do you think? I am a modern, liberal, secular, enlightened European” (2011: 68).

And yet, despite the extremely low rates of church attendance and a general lack of interest in explicitly theological or religious concerns, Denmark remains a country entrenched in its Lutheran Christian history and identity, and the Lutheran Church in Denmark (*Folkekirke*) continues to play a central role for the Danish people, the *folk*. As Danish theologian Hans Raun Iversen argues, “The Danish Folk Church is the weakest monopoly Church in the world, but this is exactly how the Danes wish it to remain: weak, but a monopoly” (145). Even if it is “lazy” or “weak,” the Lutheran State Church in Denmark is, in fact a monopoly. This situation contrasts even with that of Sweden and Norway, which have loosened ties between their national churches and the state. While some ties still remain in Sweden, it officially separated Church and state in 2000 (Sweden.se), and in 2012, the Norwegian parliament passed a constitutional amendment that enabled an increased degree of separation between the Lutheran Church of Norway (*Den Norske Kirke*) and the state (*National Post*). While the state still collects a church tax and the monarch must be a member of the Church of Norway, the Constitution no longer proclaims that the Evangelical Lutheran religion is the religion of the state (Cranmer).³

British sociologist Grace Davie has described much of contemporary European religious life as “believing without belonging,” which is an appropriate description of the Danish context as well. While measures of ritual participation and institutional attachment reveal a high degree of secularization in Europe today, she argues that measures concerned with feelings, experience, and religious belief actually demonstrate a “considerable persistence” (5). Davie also introduces the concept of “vicarious religion,” indicating a situation in which “significant numbers of Europeans are content to let both churches and churchgoers enact a memory on their behalf” (19). Even if they themselves never attend, Danes continue to support the *Folkekirke* financially as well through their continued membership. “The Danes like the church at a distance,” explains Hans Iversen (146).

Indeed, the social and cultural significance of the *Folkekirke* is evident when considering that Charles Taylor’s concept of the social imaginary includes both shared *understandings* and *practices* among a people that tacitly inform and reflect the identity and values of a community. A crucial central shared understanding in Denmark that informs the *Folkekirke* is the concept of *folkelighed*, an idea formulated by influential Danish Lutheran bishop, theologian, and politician N. F. S. Grundtvig in the nineteenth century that continues to shape and inform secular and religious Danish identity. *Folkelighed* broadly translates as “popular,” but also

³ Debate continues regarding the degree of separation between Church and state in Norway. While the head of the Church’s National Council, Jens-Petter Johnsen, described the legislation as “the biggest organizational change of the church since the Reformation” and a “clear separation between church and state,” others point out that the Constitution still maintains that the Church of Norway, an Evangelical-Lutheran Church, will remain Norway’s national church and continue to be supported in part by the state (*The Local* 2016c).

indicates solidarity, mutual responsibility, democracy, and interdependence. While his vision of *folkelighed* had clear Christian elements, it was, I have maintained, secular in its emphasis on freedom and a separation of the worldly and religious. This is particularly true in Grundtvig's later writings, in which he proposed a separation between the religious and cultural-political spheres of nineteenth-century Denmark and argued for freedom from any civic compulsion of religion (for the original Danish, see Begtrup: 8: 76). In *The Danish State Church: An Impartial Examination* (1834), for example, Grundtvig advocates for "a free state church with a free congregation" (translated and quoted in Lausten).

The *folke* for Grundtvig was the community of Danes, connected by a shared language and history, which was a community that had a particular destiny in God's kingdom on earth. To be a member of the *folke*, one needed to be at home with the Danish language and to have a passionate commitment to the fatherland shared with their fellow Danes.⁴ The concept of the Danish *folke*, connoting a national family united by a shared history and language whose identity was solidified through a number of territorial losses, has informed the way that Danes imagine their Danishness (*Dansked*) in relation to non-Danes. The idea of *folkelighed* informs current Danish practices, enacted by two institutions: the People's Church (*Folkekirke*), mentioned above, and the Danish welfare system. Both the *folke*, the community itself, and *folkelighed*, the concept that shapes it, rely on certain assumptions about who belongs to the Danish community and who does not. Religious and cultural homogeneity has by and large been a defining characteristic of the Danish *folke*, which has been challenged recently as immigrants have settled in Denmark and the number of Muslims has grown.⁵

Muslims and Immigrants as Threat

In the discourse on immigration in Denmark, immigrants (i.e., Muslims) have largely been imagined as a *threat* to the identity and health of the nation. As Danish religion scholar Tim Jensen suggests, since the 1990s the populist Danish People's Party and its allies have "traded heavily, almost solely, on the Muslim Other," seeing in Islam the threat to all things Danish (133). While Muslims comprise only about 5.4% of the Danish population (Pew Research Center 2017), they elicit anxiety and distrust for many Danes. This "fear of small numbers," to use anthropologist Arjun Appadurai's phrase, manifests in part because Muslims represent the gap between what was a nearly homogenous *folke* and a common social imaginary, and what is now a more ethnically, culturally, and religiously diverse nation. Appadurai suggests that minorities are made, not born, in the context of modernity, as they depend upon particular conceptions of majority-minority relations (42). Small numbers excite such rage because they "represent a tiny obstacle between majority and totality or total purity. In a sense, the smaller the number and the weaker the majority, the deeper the rage about its capacity to make a majority feel like a mere majority rather than like a whole and uncontested ethnos" (53).

⁴ Grundtvig expresses this sentiment in many poems and narrative texts. See in particular his well-known 1848 poem, 'Folkelighed' (translated and quoted in Bradley: 420; for the original Danish, see Begtrup: 9: 140).

⁵ According to statistics from the Pew Foundation, the Muslim population in Denmark doubled between 1990 and 2010. In 2010, there were an estimated 226,000 Muslims in Denmark, or 4.1% of the total population (Pew Research Center 2011).

While this fear has certainly not led to ethnic cleansing as it has in other nations, it has contributed to an atmosphere that often feels discriminatory or hostile to its Muslim population. Public discourse propagated by the populist Danish People's Party, which has grown in popularity in recent years, reflects and perpetuates this hostility. As in a number of other countries in Europe, the Muslim hijab, burka, and niqab have been flashpoints for debate about immigration and Islam in the nation since the late 1990s. In the fall of 2016, government coalition parties announced their support for a ban on wearing face-masking clothing in public, which would include the burqa and niqab (*The Local* 2016a). A 2017 poll revealed that 62 percent of the population support a full ban on wearing the burqa and niqab in public (*The Local* 2017).

Often the discourse about the veil specifically, and Muslims and Islam more generally, revolves around a defense of women's sexual freedom (along with the rights of the LGBTQ community) over and against what is regarded as intolerant religious forces seeking to undermine those rights and freedoms. In her research on the Danish news media, Rikke Andreassen describes the portrayal of female "visible minorities" (assumed to be Muslim) since the 1970s as "oppressed by patriarchy," a stereotype that is imagined over and against "normal Danish life," which implies equal gender roles (162). Previous debates on the veil arguably set the course for a future public ban. In 2004, for example, Danish People's Party spokesperson Louise Frevert argued that "[A person wearing] a headscarf is the epitome of a person being against the concepts of norms and values in Denmark and in our culture" (Andreassen: 78-79).

Danish anxieties about Muslims and Islam has suppressed immigration into the country. In recent years, Denmark has accepted far fewer Muslim immigrants and refugees than its Scandinavian and Northern European neighbors, prompting commentators to describe Danish policies as enacting a "Muslim ban" of its own, much like the U.S. (Zucchini). In 2015, Denmark granted asylum to Iraqis in 29 percent of cases (58 percent in Sweden, 60 percent in Norway, and 99 percent in Germany) and to 35 percent of Afghani asylum-seekers (77 percent in Sweden, 84 percent in Norway, and 70 percent in Germany, with an E.U. average of about 68 percent) (Brown).

Since 2005, Denmark has curtailed its allowance of resettlement refugees – those who initially sought asylum in one country but must be relocated if that nation cannot protect them. Before 2005, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) worked with Denmark to resettle refugees in this vulnerable group, many of whom were Muslim. In 2005, however, Denmark's conservative government stopped resettling them. They resumed in 2013, but in 2016, the program, which received about 500 refugees through the UNHCR program, was suspended indefinitely (*The Local* 2016b). At the height of the refugee crisis in 2015, Denmark's Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing placed ads in Lebanese newspapers announcing their strict immigration laws, thus discouraging refugees and immigrants from settling in Denmark (A. Taylor). While writing before these latest developments, Danish social anthropologist Peter Hervik has placed these kinds of actions and attitudes in a larger context of what he describes as neoracism and neonationalism in Denmark. In his book *The Annoying Difference*, in which Hervik explores historical media events in Denmark, he writes, "In the eyes of the media, the general public, and mainstream

perceptions these minorities were annoyingly different, as they refused to reduce their visible and aural differences” (xii).

Moral Injury and (Un)Intelligibility

Public discourse representing Muslims and Islam as a threat to the Danish social imaginary is the context in which the cartoons were published and in which Muslims (and non-Muslims) issued their response to the 12 caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad published in *Jyllands-Posten* in 2005. Much of the original news reportage maintained that the spontaneous violent protests were due to the fact that Muslims around the world were religiously offended by the Danish cartoons. On October 17, 2005, *Politiken* ran a story that defended the cartoons. Citing the role of free expression in any democracy, the authors wrote, “Regardless of what one thinks about the drawings in *Jyllands-Posten*, the newspaper had the right to publish them . . . just as Muslims and others have the right not to care about them” (author’s translation). In February 2006, the Danish Institute for International Studies released a brief titled, “The Danish Ugly Duckling and the Mohammed Cartoons,” in which author Ulla Holm described the nature of the discourse: “At the beginning of the debate, hardly anybody contested the concept of freedom of press as being a stable and well-defined concept. . . . The debate was thus discursively constructed in binary terms: either you are *for* freedom of speech or you must be *against*.”

The predominate explanation for this offense had to do with prohibitions on representing the Prophet in Islam, stemming from ostensible strict blasphemy codes in the tradition. Free speech, the loudest voices maintained, must be defended against threats from Muslims and Islam. Some critics appealed to the Salman Rushdie affair in the late 1980s, when many Muslims were offended at what they perceived to be Rushdie’s blasphemous and heretical portrait of Muhammad, and others cited the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 by Dutch-Moroccan citizen Mohammed Bouyeri. Van Gogh was assumed to have been targeted because of his ten-minute film “Submission,” released early that year, based on a script by Islam-critic Ayaan Hirsi Ali, which tells the story of several fictional Muslim women who have been abused and argues that the Qur’an authorizes this behavior (for analysis, see Buruma). In regard to blasphemy, as many non-Muslims now know, however, there is no uniform consensus in Islam about depictions of the Prophet or other human figures. Some Muslim jurists argue that all representations of Muhammad and other prophets are forbidden at all times, while others (particularly in the Shia tradition) hold very different views (Hussain 290).

Anthropologists Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood have both argued that blasphemy, at least as interpreted by the defenders of the cartoons, was not the chief cause of most Muslims’ grievances. Asad argues that to his knowledge many Arabic-speaking Muslim critics did not actually use the Arabic word *tajdif*, which is usually translated as “blasphemy” in English. Nor, he continues, did they employ other synonyms that overlap with this word (2011: 288). “As accusations against non-Muslim journalists, they would, in any case, be inappropriate,” Asad explains (2009: 38). He cites the example of the statement given by the International Union of Muslim Scholars in support of the Danish boycott in January of 2006, noting that it used the word *isa’ah* rather than *tajdif*, which includes a meaning of “insult, harm, and offense” that is used in a secular context (2009: 38). The critique of perceived claims of blasphemy, however,

prompt Asad to probe the role of blasphemy in secular societies: “Are there any resemblances between the idea of blasphemy and the prohibitions established by secular law,” he asks? (2009: 27)

In a later article on the cartoons, Asad follows with another question: “If blasphemy indicates a religious limit transgressed, does it really have no place in a free, secular society?” (2011: 282). In response to both questions, Asad acknowledges that there is a difference between religious blasphemy claims on the one hand, and legal constraints on communication in secular societies, such as copyright, patent, and trademark, on the other. Yet both do define what may be communicated freely. “The flow of public speech,” he writes, “has a *particular shape* by which its freedom is determined” (2011: 283). The constraints on communication in a secular society, including those mentioned above – as well as indecency and child pornography laws – are, in fact, related to property rights. And this core concern with property, Asad maintains, tells us something about what it means to be a person in a modern secular nation. Laws against certain forms of communication in a secular society allow individuals to “demarcate and defend” themselves by means of their property, which crucially includes the body (2011: 283).

While her focus differs from Asad, Saba Mahmood agrees that blasphemy was not the chief reason why many Muslims were offended by the cartoons. She seeks to demonstrate that to accept that the crisis “exemplified a clash between the principles of blasphemy and freedom of speech is to accept a set of prior judgments about what kind of injury or offence the cartoons caused and how such an injury might be addressed in a liberal democratic society” (2009: 66-67). Instead, she maintains, the publication inflicted a kind of *moral injury* that went beyond whether or not the tradition *legally prohibits* representations of the Prophet. As Mahmood has explained, for many Muslims who believed that the Danish cartoons (and subsequent images published in other countries) depicted Muhammad in a derogatory manner, the action was felt to be a personal insult because of the deep connection they felt to Muhammad in their own lives. The concept of blasphemy often entails a legal transgression, but the kind of moral injury that she describes “no doubt entails a sense of violation, but this violation emanates not from the judgment that ‘the law’ has been transgressed but from the perception that one’s being, grounded as it is in a relationship of dependency with the Prophet, has been shaken” (2009: 78). The images, furthermore, were published in a context in which Muslims and Islam had for years been regarded with suspicion, as noted above.

In the contemporary liberal secular context of Denmark, the claims of moral injury experienced by Muslims was virtually impossible for many Danes to hear. Defenders of the cartoons who invoked freedom of speech as sacred secular right were dumbfounded that a single cartoon could cause so much anger and offense. As Mahmood writes, “Little attention has been paid to . . . what ethical, communicative, and political practices are necessary to make this kind of injury intelligible” (2009: 70). Thus, she asks, “What are the conditions of intelligibility that render certain moral claims legible and others mute?” (2009: 70-71). There was, it seems, something within the Danish social imaginary that inhibited the conditions necessary for moral injury to be recognized during the original cartoon crisis.

I would argue that in the Danish context, the reality of this kind of moral injury challenges the norms and expectations of the theo-secular *folkelig* character of the Danish social imaginary

enough to render the injury mute. Muslim claims to religious offense violated the rules of the Danish social imaginary which expect that individuals tolerate critique of religious or theological commitments, even if it causes personal or collective pain. The expectation in a secular democracy, in the words of *Jyllands-Posten's* former culture editor, Flemming Rose, is that “the individual must be prepared to suffer scorn, mockery, and ridicule” (32). Because freedom of speech is held as a virtually sacred value, those choosing to live in a Western democracy like Denmark must be ready and willing to be derided. The voices of those registering offense because of this mockery are deemed anti-democratic and, thus, go unheard or are ignored.

The Human Being in Secular Societies

Freedom and the Secular Self

As Charles Taylor and Talal Asad suggest in different ways, in the modern liberal, secular state, the human being is conceived of as a free agent who is fully in control of her body – her property – who possesses and exercises reason and rationality, and is not coerced or controlled by religious institutions, dogma, or tradition. The cartoon crisis and subsequent related events crystalized sentiment that was already present in debates across Europe which regard freedom of expression, furthermore, as the ultimate *sacred* secular value, and regard any appeal to blasphemy as a kind of secular version of blasphemy itself.

To be offended by the cartoons, critics maintained, meant that one was subservient to a coercive religious tradition and driven by passion rather than reason. This perceived ability to be influenced by religion runs contrary to the image of the ideal human person in a modern secular society, who is a free agent emancipated from archaic religious tradition. Examining the conception of the human being established by human rights discourse in liberal societies, Asad notes that the “essence of the human comes to be circumscribed by legal discourse: The human being is a sovereign, self-owning agent – essentially suspicious of others” (2003: 135). The free and sovereign human agent would not seek recourse to religious blasphemy codes because they would never adhere to them to begin with; and as Asad maintains, the concept of religious blasphemy itself is rejected because it relies on theological language. “Theology invokes dependence on a transcendental power, and secularism has rejected such a power by affirming human independence,” he writes (2009: 30).

Muslims have often been portrayed in the Danish media as the antithesis of this kind of modern independence, depicting them as belonging to a pre-modern era, and Islam as constituting a threat to Denmark as a dangerous remnant of the dark middle ages (Hervik: 141). It is no surprise, then, that along with the twelve images of Muhammad published in *Jyllands-Posten* on September 30, 2005, editor-in-chief Carsten Juste ran an editorial entitled “The Threat of Darkness” (*Truslen fra mørket*).

To be fully accepted into a society of this secular age necessitates not only the rejection of blasphemy but also the ability to tolerate criticism. To become fully human in the Danish context, then, meant allowing oneself to experience ridicule in the name of free speech. I would argue that in the context of the cartoons in Denmark, without the ability to resist the temptation to be offended, one cannot be considered to be a member of the Danish *folk*. The pain experienced by Muslims because of the cartoons, some critics maintained, was actually a

good thing because it gave them the opportunity to reexamine their beliefs, which is crucial for secular democracy. There was, Asad notes, a philosophical argument that it was good that Muslims were offended by the cartoons because the experience “might provoke people to reexamine their beliefs – something vital both for democratic debate and for ethical decision making” (2009: 39). In this way, freedom of speech becomes an obligation, a way of allowing the truth to enact freedom.⁶

Some went as far as arguing that because public religious satire has a long history in Denmark, the cartoons of Muhammad actually signaled that Danes recognized Muslims as part of their national community. Flemming Rose himself commented: “The cartoonists treated Islam the same way they treat Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and other religions. And by treating Muslims in Denmark as equals they made a point: We are integrating you into the Danish tradition of satire because you are part of our society, not strangers. The cartoons are including, rather than excluding, Muslims.” While it is difficult to imagine that the cartoons, which caused such extensive moral injury, ultimately suggested inclusion, Rose’s comment does support the idea that to be a citizen of this *folk* involves tolerating ridicule.

In secular European public discourse, however, Islam is often portrayed as a (if not *the*) religion incompatible with secularism. Despite its own reliance on theology and doctrine, Christianity is regarded as “the only religion capable of transcending its own historicity to spawn a truly universal modern of secular governance” (Mahmood 2016: 8), a view that Mahmood notes is promoted by Charles Taylor in his assessment that secularism is the unique achievement of “Latin Christendom.” In a critical essay on Taylor’s *Secular Age*, Mahmood asks, “how might the story of secularism be told otherwise?” (2010: 292) In other words, how might we understand secularism if we took more seriously Christianity’s historical encounters with other peoples and traditions, which not only affected the latter, but also transformed Christianity itself? Here Mahmood cites modern colonialism, but also earlier instances of the ways that Latin Christendom was influenced by other traditions. Even Augustine of Hippo, she notes, is central to Latin Christian narratives, but himself “hailed from a geospatial imaginary that precedes the emergence of an entity called ‘Europe’” (2010: 286). Insistence that secularism is the unique achievement of Christianity, however, does not simply reflect European prejudice:

They are . . . symptomatic of the fundamental centrality of Christian norms, values, sensibilities (however Judaic they are made out to be) to European conceptions of what it means to be secular. Prejudice against European Muslims today (and European and non-European Jews of the past) is constitutive of, and emanates from, this self-understanding of Europe as essentially Christian and simultaneously secular in its cultural and political ethos (Mahmood 2016: 8).

In her reflections on sexual politics and secular time, Judith Butler maintains that certain secular understandings of history and progress, which are key to understanding the secular self, rely on a particular version of freedom. This conception of freedom, as employed by

⁶ Ironically, Asad suggests, this secular concept seems to draw from the Christian biblical idea in John 8:32, that the “truth shall set you free” (2009: 39).

contemporary Western societies, often pits Islam over and against the values that these democracies are said to champion, including tolerance and freedom for women and LGBTQ individuals. This version of freedom is all too often used instrumentally to exclude and discriminate against Muslims. Here Butler offers the example of an exam administered to new immigrants in the Netherlands, which asked them to look at photos of two men kissing and ask whether or not they are offended by them.⁷ To be offended by the photos, the logic suggested, meant that one rejected the modern values of tolerance and freedom. Butler explains that of course she supports the freedoms of women and LGBTQ individuals but must ask whether these freedoms “are being instrumentalized in order to establish a specific cultural grounding, secular in a particular sense, that functions as a prerequisite for admission of the acceptable immigrant” (2009: 106).

There is, as Butler maintains, a certain paradox here of enforcing a set of cultural and religious norms as a prerequisite for joining a society which understands freedom as its ultimate value. “Is the exam a means for testing tolerance,” she asks, “or does it in fact represent an assault against religious minorities that is part of a broader coercive effort on the part of the state to demand that they rid themselves of their traditional religious beliefs and practices in order to gain entry into the Netherlands?” (2009: 107). Unfortunately, one of the consequences of regarding Muslims and Islam as antithetical to secular freedom has been that it has become increasingly difficult to simultaneously advocate *for* sexual freedom and *against* racism and Islamophobia. In this context, Islam is often regarded as a tradition emerging from a previous time, which must be rejected in this modern liberal secular age.

Pain and Grievability

While we may be familiar with discourses which describe secularism in terms of freedom, Talal Asad has suggested that the secular can best be understood indirectly, arguing that conceptions of *pain* are a significant marker of the secular. Generally, secular democracies have striven to eliminate suffering and pain, which is particularly evident in human rights discourse that proclaims to seek to end cruelty and torture. Yet as European colonists sought to “civilize” indigenous populations and outlaw practices that they regarded as inhuman, they inflicted pain and suffering on those populations. “In the process of learning to be ‘fully human’ only some kinds of suffering were seen as an affront to humanity, and their elimination sought. This was distinguished from suffering that was *necessary* to the process of realizing one’s humanity – that is, pain that was adequate to its end, not *wasteful* pain” (Asad 2003: 111). As Asad suggests, we could describe the suffering experienced by indigenous peoples – or anyone with beliefs and traditions that differ markedly from the majority – as cruelty. Yet this kind of pain is often regarded as a (perhaps necessary) symptom of relinquishing dangerous antiquated beliefs. Asad writes:

For that anguish is seen as the consequence of a passionate investment in the truth of beliefs that guide behavior. The modern *skeptical* posture, in contrast, regards such passionate conviction to be “uncivilized” – a perpetual source of danger to others and of pain to oneself. Beliefs should either have no direct connection to the way one lives, or be held so lightly that they can easily be

⁷ As Butler notes, the exam was ruled illegal in July of 2008 (2009: 106 n. 4).

changed. Otherwise secularism as a political arrangement cannot work very well (2003: 115).

While modern human rights discourse rejects the use of cruelty and modern liberal societies seek to reduce pain generally, there is an unspoken assumption that some forms of pain and suffering are tolerable – or perhaps even to be sought out, as in the case of the Danish cartoons. There is, Asad writes, “a readiness to cause pain to those who are to be saved by being humanized” (2003: 62). Muslims, according to this logic, must be saved from their own religiosity in order to be recognized as full human beings and citizens of secular society.

The intelligibility of particular moral injury claims is, furthermore, related to the ways in which some lives in secular democracies seem to be valued more than others. Judith Butler has described this phenomenon in terms of “grievability.” In her reflections on mourning and the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11, she asks, “Who counts as human? Whose lives count as lives? And finally, What *makes for a grievable life?*” (2004: 20). If lives are not really regarded as lives – if they are seen as unreal – then violence done against them “fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already negated” (2004: 34). Butler is concerned with interrogating the conditions that makes some lives grievable and by what logic others are excluded. Examining the ways in which Americans failed to grieve Iraqi lives lost in the wars after 9/11 and the ways in which the concerns and lives of Palestinians are (mis)represented in American media, Butler asks, “Is our capacity to mourn in global dimensions foreclosed precisely by the failure to conceive of Muslim and Arab lives as *lives?*” (2004: 12)

The context of the Danish cartoon crisis is markedly different from that of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as ongoing conflicts in Israel and Palestine. Yet I maintain that there is a similar logic between a society’s inability to hear, see, or recognize moral injury, on the one hand, and a society’s inability to grieve the loss of particular lives, on the other. The pain and suffering experienced by Muslims in Denmark and beyond due to the publication of the cartoons, and the loss of Muslim lives in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine because of American intervention and Israeli occupation, by and large were, and are, rendered invisible to non-Muslim Americans and Europeans.

Anders Behring Breivik and Norwegian Secularism

Norway’s involvement in the cartoon crisis began publicly on January 10, 2006, when *Magazinet*, a conservative Christian Norwegian newspaper, reprinted the cartoons.⁸ The Norwegian publication was a decisive moment in the crisis; two weeks after the republication, on January 25, Saudi Arabia recalled its ambassador to Denmark, citing the Danish government’s inattention to the affair (BBC 2006a), and shortly thereafter, the Saudi government began to implement a comprehensive boycott of Danish products. In contrast to

⁸ As Solveig Steien notes in a study on the cartoon crisis in Norwegian media, other Norwegian media outlets did publish the cartoons, but the *Magazinet* publication received the strongest reaction. *Dagbladet*, Norway’s third largest newspaper, published the cartoons in an evening Internet edition just before the *Magazinet* publication was distributed, and in October of 2005, *Aftenposten* published a facsimile in their Oslo-based evening edition (*Aften*), but no reaction ensued at that early date (2).

the Danish government, Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs directed embassies in the Middle East to apologize for offence caused by the republication (Klausen: 77).

This was not the first time that Norway had dealt with issues of freedom of speech in relation to Islam. The first translation of Salman Rushdie's controversial book, *The Satanic Verses*, was published in Norway in 1989 by one of Norway's largest publishers, Aschehoug Forlag, and in October of 1993, CEO of Aschehoug, William Nygaard, was shot and wounded outside of his home in Oslo (Robinson). Several years after the assassination attempt, the Norwegian government created the Commission on Freedom of Expression, which issued a pamphlet entitled *The Dangerous Freedom of Expression* in 1994 (Bangstad 2014: 197).

Setting a precedent for future deliberations on freedom of speech, the report "advances the view that the principles of freedom of expression constitute one of 'our' (i.e. Norwegians) 'fundamental rules for ordered co-existence,'" and as Bangstad notes, it suggests that certain groups pose particular threats to freedom of expression in Norway (2014: 197). Muslims, the authors maintain, do not have a tradition of valuing freedom of expression, so it will have to be taught to them (Bangstad 2014: 197-198). The Rushdie affair in Norway led to a particular way of framing issues of free speech in the Norwegian context, which was affirmed by the cartoon crisis in 2005-2006. Crucial to this frame is the idea that Muslims constitute the central threat to freedom of expression in Norway (Bangstad 2014: 195-97).

The belief that Muslims and Islam constitute the most significant threat to freedom of speech, a value held as virtually sacred in secular democracies like Denmark and Norway, was also central to the right-wing ideology of Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik. On July 22, 2011, six years after the publication of the cartoons in Denmark, Breivik detonated a bomb at the government building in Oslo, killing eight, and then shot and killed 69 youth at a social democratic Labor Party (*Arbeiderpartiet*) summer camp on the tiny island of Utøya near Oslo. Initial reports assumed that the perpetrator was a Muslim extremist, but quickly the public learned that the violence was committed by an ethnic Norwegian from the Oslo area (Wiggen: 586). Breivik was "one of us," to borrow from the title of Norwegian journalist Åsne Seierstad's recent book on Breivik.

In his 1,500-page manifesto, *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*, which he posted online the day of the attacks, Breivik justified his violence by calling for a crusade against Islam, multiculturalism, "cultural Marxism," and perhaps surprisingly, feminism. Drawing from (and sometimes plagiarizing⁹) authors who promote "Eurabia" theories and engage in Islamophobic "counterjihad" activism,¹⁰ he called for a restoration of Christendom where "Nordic genotypes" are preserved and Muslims are no longer present (Breivik: 3.943). Breivik includes an "interview" with a "Justiciar Knight Commander of the PCCTS [Knights

⁹ Breivik claims to have "written approximately half of the compendium myself. The rest is a compilation of works from several courageous individuals throughout the world" ("About the Compendium").

¹⁰ Examples include multiple American authors who promote these discourses, including American Robert Spencer, who operates the Jihad Watch website (cited 64 times) and Pamela Geller, the founder of Islamophobic website Atlas Shrugged. Spencer and Geller together founded Stop Islamization of America (SIOA) in 2010 (Lenz and SPLC). Breivik is also fond of Eurabia theorist Ba'et Yor, who, along with her followers, maintains that European and Arab leaders are conspiring to transform Europe into an Arab and Muslim continent (Kundnani).

Templar],” who maintains that “History has shown again and again that you cannot co-exist peacefully with Islam,” and that “the only thing you can do is to isolate it as our forefathers have done for the last 1400 years” (3.153). It is unclear whether the “Commander” is Breivik himself, but it is evident that Breivik holds the same beliefs.

But why, if Muslims were a central target of Breivik’s terror, kill ethnic Norwegians?¹¹ Breivik regarded the youth of the Labor Party as the means by which the “evils” of multiculturalism, Islam, and feminism would continue to be promoted. “In this metaphorical rendering,” Sindre Bangstad explains, members of the Norwegian social democrats, including the Labor Party, “represent the leaking pipe, whereas Muslims and their presence in Norway are merely a result of that leakage” (2014: 106). Even when they are present, Breivik “is not prepared to recognize Muslims as worthy of being acknowledged as fellow citizens and human beings” (2014: 106). Is Breivik’s refusal to regard Muslims as human beings the same basic refusal that we see in the modern secular democracies that I have been describing? Furthermore, we might ask, how exactly are we to understand the relationship of Breivik’s xenophobic, racist, and Islamophobic beliefs to secularism in his ideology?

In regard to the latter query, I note that the question is complicated from the onset by the issue of whether the proclamations and sentiments present in his “Declaration” constitute an ideology in the first place. Those who would challenge the idea that Breivik acted with a discernible ideology maintain that ideologies are coherent and rational systems of thought which operate on concrete narratives (Bangstad 2014: 76-77). Because of the erratic and often contradictory nature of Breivik’s thought, so the argument goes, his declaration may only reflect the delusional and unconnected ramblings of a “mad man” that actually had little to do with coherent ideological critiques of Muslim immigration or fear of a creeping Eurabia (Dutton 2011). Former London mayor Boris Johnson remarked, for example, that Breivik was “patently mad” and it “wasn’t really about ideology or religion.”

If, however, we understand ideologies as ways of structuring and interpreting our social and political worlds, then we can better regard Breivik as operating with an extreme right-wing ideology (Bangstad 2014: 77-78). Particularly in the first year after the massacre, the question of whether Breivik operated with an ideology was inflected by debate about whether he could be deemed legally sane. In November of 2011, a team of forensic psychiatrists declared that Breivik was insane during the attacks (BBC 2011), but in August of 2012, an Oslo district court ruled him to be sane and sentenced him to 21 years in prison (Smith-Spark; Bangstad 2012a).

Along with debate about the ideological character of Breivik’s sentiments, commentators have taken various positions on the role of religion, and specifically Christianity, in his worldview as represented in his Declaration. Of particular interest to journalists and academics alike was whether or not Breivik himself can be identified as a Christian, and to what extent his ideology can be described as Christian extremism (Gibson). The title of his compendium alone reflects his militant desire to defend a Christian Europe; the title, *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*, refers to the 400th anniversary of the Ottomans’ failed siege of Vienna which prevented most of Europe from becoming part of the Islamic Empire

¹¹ Here I note that a number of the 69 victims killed on Utøya were, in fact, Muslim (Bangstad 2012b).

(Breivik:1.21).¹² Breivik believed that his actions would similarly halt the Islamization of Norway and Europe, which if permitted to continue, would lead to its destruction. Claiming to be a member of the Knights Templar, a Christian military order established in the 10th century to battle Muslims during the Crusades (Bright), Breivik calls for the defense of Christendom in Norway and Europe against the Muslims (as well as multiculturalists, Marxists, and feminists) who wish to destroy it. Breivik encourages his readers to act quickly to resist this onslaught, as he believes that soon “our major cities are completely overwhelmed demographically by Muslims” (“A Message from the Author”).

Breivik argues that those who care about the future of Norway and Europe must ensure that “a sustainable and traditional version of Christendom is propagated” (3.139), yet he is unclear about what exactly this “traditional version” looks like. According to this viewpoint, one does not have to have a personal relationship with God in order to defend “our Christian cultural heritage and the European way,” and in fact, agnostics and atheists can find themselves in unity with other Europeans under the symbol of the cross (Breivik: 3.153). Breivik wants to build a society based on Christian “cultural” values rather than doctrinal or theological commitments, or so it seems. “In many ways, our modern societies and European secularism are a result of European Christendom and the enlightenment,” the author writes, “It is therefore essential to understand the difference between a ‘Christian fundamentalist theocracy’ (everything we **do not** want) and a secular European society based on our Christian cultural heritage (what we **do** want)” (3.153). Breivik himself identifies as “100% Christian,” but a “cultural Christian” who is not “an excessively religious man” and is rather “first and foremost a man of logic” (“Q&A with Breivik”).

Despite his admission to not being very religious, Breivik clearly understands himself to be Christian and his declaration of war against Muslims is framed in terms of defending the Christian character of Europe. In reference to Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer writes, “If [Osama] bin Laden is a Muslim terrorist, Breivik and McVeigh are surely Christian ones.” More significant than Breivik’s self-identification as Christian, however, is his concern with defending Christendom, which as noted above, he understands to be instantiated through a “secular European society based on our Christian cultural heritage” (Breivik: 3.153). Although he seems to advocate for the idea that religion involves personal choice, he argues that preserving this secular European society involves reviving a state church: “I fully support that the Church gains more or less a monopoly on religion in Europe (government policies, school curriculum, etc., at least)” (“Q&A with Breivik”).

Breivik’s vision of a secular and culturally Christian Europe is not unlike the way that many other Scandinavians conceive of their national and European identities. As described above in the context of Denmark, many Scandinavians want the church to have a monopoly,

¹² As political scientist Şener Aktürk points out, many critiques of Breivik’s “2083” ideology perpetuate the myth that the history of the European continent should be identified exclusively with Christianity. Instead, Muslims and Jews have been in Europe for centuries; among other examples, Aktürk highlights the Islamic rule of Spain and Portugal from 711 to 1492.

but at a distance. Breivik, after all, claims that he does not want a “Christian fundamentalist theocracy.” Breivik’s claim that European secularism is the result of European Christendom, furthermore, corresponds to mainstream theory including that of Charles Taylor. This insistence that Western secularism is the unique result of Christian influence is, as mentioned, exactly what Saba Mahmood critiques. Prejudice against Muslims, she argues, emanates from the belief that this European cultural blend of secularism and Christianity is not only unique, but is superior (2010: 289-90). In his proclamations of European Nordic superiority, Breivik certainly embodies this idea. Unlike many others who might share this belief, of course, Breivik committed an atrocity to support it. Still, the extent to which Breivik’s extremism mirrors mainstream Norwegian views on immigration and Islam is not necessarily evident.

In the aftermath of July 22, many Norwegian media editors sought to make a clear distinction between words and actions in order to challenge the idea that the Norwegian political climate contributed to Breivik’s Islamophobic and xenophobic positions and actions (Bangstad 2014: 107-8). Much of this commentary framed the murders as the actions of a mentally unstable lone wolf as described above. Yet even if Breivik acted alone, which seems to be the case, this does not mean that his views are not shared by the larger society, and in fact, they may have shaped Breivik’s development. Those who did suggest that some of Breivik’s views were present in the larger Norwegian society largely point to Islamophobic and anti-immigrant positions within the “populist right-wing” Norwegian Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*)¹³ to which Breivik belonged from 1997 to 2004.

Like the People’s Party in Denmark which inspired it, the Progress Party had for decades portrayed Muslims as a threat to Norwegian identity and society (Bangstad 2014: 111-14). The year before Breivik committed his acts of terror, for example, Progress Party Parliament member Christian Tybring-Gjedde penned an opinion piece in the Norwegian newspaper, *Aftenposten*, in which he argued that multiculturalism was a “dream from Disneyland.” In a 2009 speech, party leader Siv Jensen coined the phrase “stealth Islamisation” in a critique of supposed demands from Muslims, including providing halal food to prisoners, permitting Muslim police women to wear the hijab, and providing gender-segregated schools in Oslo (Bangstad 2016: 56).

Given its anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rhetoric, many on the left blamed the Progress Party for the July 22 massacre. As Mette Wiggen has argued, however, the Progress Party alone was not responsible for shaping Breivik’s xenophobic and Islamophobic attitudes. Progress Party rhetoric on immigration, she maintains, is not all that different from other political parties in Norway and the anti-immigrant sentiment in Norwegian society (595). Just months before the attack, for example, the Labor Party – Breivik’s target – released its Strategy for Integration, which reflected an increasingly strict immigration policy that simultaneously

¹³ Sindre Bangstad defines the Progress Party in this way (2014: 109). According to Mette Wiggen, the Party can be classified as a “neoliberal populist right party” (585), while Emily Schultheis describes it as a “moderate right-wing populist” party in an effort to distinguish it from other European populist parties like the Front National in France or the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, which tend voice their anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim positions more directly in the public sphere. Wiggen emphasizes that definitions of the populist right, far right, and extreme right are often unclear (589).

emphasized the role of immigrants in the labor market.¹⁴ The Strategy was welcomed by the Progress Party and the Conservative Party (Wiggen: 595-96).

While careful not to suggest that correlation implies causation, Sindre Bangstad has argued that far-right discourses on Islam and Muslims in Norway has become mainstream, developing in parallel with the rise of the Progress Party (2016: 46). In this sense, as it uses general fears of Islam as an opportunity to advance its own platform, the Progress Party is both “a symptom and a cause of islamophobia in Norway” (Bangstad 2016: 61). As he aptly maintains, “The greatest material threats to equal rights to citizenship, inclusion and participation in contemporary liberal democracies in western Europe remain those emanating from the exclusionary discourses and from the mainstreaming and sanitizing of extreme right-wing discourses and rhetorical tropes by the populist right wing in Norway and other Scandinavian and western European countries” (2014: 219).

Conclusion

In this article, I have sought to elaborate on the claim that the Danish cartoon crisis and Anders Behring Breivik’s ideology suggest particular conceptions of what *it means to be fully human in a modern secular democracy*, and that according to this framework, Muslims (almost always conflated with “immigrants” and vice-versa) do not meet these criteria. In both the Danish and Norwegian contexts, Muslims and immigrants constitute a threat to secular social imaginaries which nonetheless continue to reflect their historically Lutheran Christian identities. Because the practices and commitments of Muslims are perceived by the majority to be incompatible with *secular* values such as freedom of speech, sexual freedom, and reason, they themselves are seen as being incapable of ever fully joining the *folk*. Because the secular notion of the human being involves being a free and sovereign human agent, and Muslims’ agency is perceived to be compromised because of an ostensible irrational theological dependence, Muslims cannot therefore be regarded as full human beings. Claims of moral injury sustained by Muslims, furthermore, are often rendered mute in these contexts; members of the majority are unlikely to recognize their suffering and pain or grieve the losses that they may experience.

Over a decade after the cartoon crisis, it seems that Islamophobia and polarization between Muslims and immigrants and ethnic Danes has only increased. In 2017, six years after the July 22 tragedy, Norway voted for the Progress Party to govern for another four years in a coalition with the Conservative Party (Schultheis).¹⁵ Populist parties in other countries in Europe (and the U.S.) have become more normalized, and particularly after the 2015 refugee crisis, anti-immigrant attitudes have become more widespread. These crises, which continue to linger in the social imaginaries of Northern Europe, should prompt us to ask: How can liberal secular democracies create the conditions that allow for claims of moral injury to be

¹⁴ As reported in 2013, compared with other European countries, immigrants in Norway have a high labor market participation at 69.1 percent, while the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average is 62.8 percent (Ladegaard).

¹⁵ The Progress Party received 15.3 percent of the vote – just a percentage point lower than in 2013 (Schultheis 2017).

made intelligible? Is it possible for secular European societies to recognize their Muslim citizens and residents as fully human *qua* Muslims? If so, how? While I raise these questions in relation to Europe, they are perhaps equally germane for Americans to ask in the face of rising Islamophobic and white supremacist sentiment in the U.S. today (Potok; Kishi; Meltzer and Dokoupil).

Bibliography

Aktürk, Şener

- 2012 "September 11, 1683: Myth of a Christian Europe and the Massacre in Norway." *Insight Turkey* 14, 1 (Winter 2012). Available online at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2012/aug/28/anders-breivik-norway-islamophobia-muslims>.

Andreassen, Rikke

- 2005 *The Mass Media's Construction of Gender, Race, Sexuality, and Nationality: An Analysis of the Danish News Media's Communication about Visible Minorities from 1971–2004*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto.

Appadurai, Arjun

- 2006 *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Asad, Talal

- 2003 *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- 2009 "Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism." Pp. 20-63 in *Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech*. Edited by Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood. The Townsend Papers in the Humanities 2. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 2011 "Freedom of Speech and Religious Limitations." Pp. 282-97 in *Rethinking Secularism*. Edited by Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bangstad, Sindre

- 2012a "After Anders Breivik's Conviction, Norway Must Confront Islamophobia." *The Guardian* (August 28). Available online at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2012/aug/28/anders-breivik-norway-islamophobia-muslims>.
- 2012b "Terror in Norway." *American Anthropologist* 14, 2: 351-58.
- 2014 *Anders Breivik and the Rise of Islamophobia*. London: Zed Books.
- 2016 "Re-coding nationalism: Islam, Muslims and Islamophobia in Norway before and after July 22 2011." Pp. 44-66 in *Islamophobia Studies Yearbook* 7. Edited by Farid Hafez. Vienna: New Academic Press.

Begtrup, Holger, editor

1904-1909 *N. F. S. Grundtvigs udvalgte skrifter*. 10 volumes. Copenhagen: Gyldendal.

Bradley, Sid, editor and translator

2008 *N. F. S. Grundtvig: A Life Recalled; An Anthology of Biographical Source-texts*. Grundtvig in English Series 1. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.

Breivik, Anders Behring (Andrew Berwick)

2011 *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*. Available online at <http://www.democratie.ulg.ac.be/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Breivik-Manifesto.pdf>.

Bright, Arthur

2012 "Why Does Norway's Breivik Invoke the Knights Templar?" *The Christian Science Monitor* (April 18). Available online at <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2012/0418/Why-does-Norway-s-Breivik-invoke-the-Knights-Templar>.

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)

2006a "Saudis Recall Envoy in Danish Row." BBC (January 26). Available online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4651714.stm>.

2006b "Denmark Row: The Power of Cartoons." BBC (October 3). Available online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5392786.stm>.

2011 "Norway Massacre: Breivik Declared Insane." BBC (November 29). Available online at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-15936276>.

Brown, Samantha Ruth

2017 "Denmark Already Had a Muslim Ban. It Was Just Called Something Else." *The Washington Post* (March 23). Available Online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/23/denmark-already-has-a-muslim-ban-its-just-called-something-else/?utm_term=.1c4070024b3f.

Buch-Andersen, Thomas

2006 "Denmark Row: The Power of Cartoons." BBC (October 3). Available online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5392786.stm>.

Buruma, Ian

2006 *Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance*. New York: Penguin.

Butler, Judith

2004 *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*. London: Verso.

2009 *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* London: Verso.

Casanova, José

2010 "A Secular Age: Dawn or Twilight?" Pp. 265-81 in *Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age*. Edited by Michael Warner, Jonathan Van Antwerpen, and Craig Calhoun. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

2011 "The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms." Pp. 54-74 in *Rethinking Secularism*. Edited by Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Center for Samtidsreligion, Aarhus University

2009-2017 "Religion i Danmark." Available online at <http://samtidsreligion.au.dk/religion-i-danmark>.

Cranmer, Frank

2017 "Separation of Church and State in Norway." *Law and Religion UK*. Available online at <http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2017/01/02/separation-of-church-and-state-in-norway>.

Davie, Grace

2002 *Europe: The Exceptional Case*. London: Darton, Longman and Todd.

Dutton, Kevin

2011 "Guns and Roses-The Jilted, Juxtaposed Mind of Anders Breivik." *Psychology Today* (July 29). Available online at <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/psychgeist/201107/guns-and-roses-the-jilted-juxtaposed-mind-anders-breivik-0>.

Gibson, David

2011 "Right-Wing Extremist or Christian Terrorist?" *Christian Century* 128, 17(August 23): 14-16.

Hansen, John, and Kim Hundevadt, editors

2006 *Provoen og profeten: Muhammedkrisen bag kulisserne*. Copenhagen: Jyllands-Postens Forlag.

Hervik, Peter

2011 *The Annoying Difference: The Emergence of Danish Nationalism, Neoracism, and Populism in the Post-1989 World*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Holm, Ulla

2006 "The Danish Ugly Duckling and the Mohammed Cartoons." Danish Institute for International Studies Brief (February 2006). Available online at http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/52652/uho_muhammed1.pdf.

Hussain, Amir

2010 "Images of Muhammad in Literature, Art, and Music." Pp. 274-92 in *The Cambridge Companion to Muhammad*. Edited by Jonathan E. Brockopp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Iversen, Hans Raun
1997 "Leaving the Distant Church: The Danish Experience." Pp. 139-58 in *Leaving Religion and Religious Life*. Edited by Mordechai Bar-Lev and William Shaffir. Religion and the Social Order 7. Greenwich: JAI Press.
- Jensen, Tim
2007 "Islam and Muslims in Denmark: An Introduction." *Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones* 21: 107-38.
- Jerichow, Anders, and Mille Rode, editors
2006 *Profet-affæren: Et PEN-dossier om 12 Muhammed-tegninger – og hvad siden bændte . . . Dokumenter & argumenter*. Copenhagen: Dansk PEN.
- Johnson, Boris
2011 "Anders Breivik: There Is Nothing to Study in the Mind of Norway's Mass Killer." *The Telegraph* (July 25). Available online at <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/borisjohnson/8658872/Anders-Breivik-There-is-nothing-to-study-in-the-mind-of-Norways-mass-killer.html>.
- Juergensmeyer, Mark
2012 "Is Norway's Suspected Murderer Anders Breivik a Christian Terrorist?" *Religion Dispatches* (April 17). Available online at <http://religiondispatches.org/is-norways-suspected-murderer-anders-breivik-a-christian-terrorist>.
- Kishi, Katayoun
2017 "Assaults Against Muslims in U.S. Surpass 2001 Level." Pew Research Center (November 15). Available online at <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/15/assaults-against-muslims-in-u-s-surpass-2001-level>.
- Klausen, Jytte
2009 *The Cartoons That Shook the World*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kundnani, Arun
2012 "The Anti-Islamist: Anders Behring Breivik's Manifesto." International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (April 23). Available online at <https://icct.nl/publication/the-anti-islamist-anders-behring-breiviks-manifesto>.
- Ladegaard, Isak
2013 "Norway's Problem with Integration." *Science Nordic* (January 28). Available online at <http://sciencenordic.com/norways-problem-immigration>.
- Lausten, Martin Schwarz
2002 *A Church History of Denmark*. Burlington: Ashgate.

Lenz, Ryan

- 2011 “Christian Crusader.” Southern Poverty Law Center (August 24). Available online at <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2015/christian-crusader>.

The Local

- 2016a “Denmark Government Announces Support for Burqa Ban.” *The Local* (October 6). Available at <https://www.thelocal.dk/20171006/denmark-government-announces-support-for-burqa-ban>.
- 2016b “Denmark Suspends Quota Refugee Programme.” *The Local* (November 22). Available online at <https://www.thelocal.dk/20161122/denmark-suspends-quota-refugee-programme>.
- 2016c “Norway Prepares for ‘Biggest Change to the Church Since Reformation.’” *The Local* (December 28). Available online at <https://www.thelocal.no/20161228/norway-prepares-for-biggest-change-to-the-church-since-reformation>.
- 2017 “Majority of Danes Want to Ban Burqa.” *The Local* (September 29). Available online at <https://www.thelocal.dk/20170929/majority-of-danes-want-to-ban-burqa-survey>.

Mahmood, Saba

- 2009 “Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?” Pp. 64–100 in *Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech*. Edited by Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood. The Townsend Papers in the Humanities 2. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- 2010 “Can Secularism Be Other-wise?” Pp. 282-99 in *Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age*. Edited by Michael Warner, Jonathan Van Antwerpen, and Craig Calhoun. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- 2016 *Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Marshall, Paul

- 2006 “The Mohammad Cartoons: Western Governments Have Nothing to Apologize for.” *Weekly Standard* 11, 2 (February 13). Available online at <https://www.hudson.org/research/4847-the-mohammed-cartoons-western-governments-have-nothing-to-apologize-for>.

Meltzer, Lauren, and Tony Dokoupil

- 2017 “Hate Rising: White Supremacy’s Rise in the U.S.” CBS News (August 21). Available online at <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hate-rising-cbsn-on-assignment>.

National Post

- 2012 “Norway Goes Secular, Removes Lutheran Church as State Religion.” *National Post* (May 24). Available online at <http://nationalpost.com/holy-post/norway-goes-secular-removes-lutheran-church-as-state-religion>.

Norwegian Contact Point, European Migration Network

- 2012 “Annual Policy Report 2011: Report to the European Migration Network from the Norwegian Contact Point.” Available online at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/annual-policy/2011/no_20120430_annual_policy_report_2011_en.pdf.

Ok, Fugen, Mohammed Ibrahim Al-Hejailan, Ahmad Daniali, Javed A. Qureshi, Mona Omar Attia, Perwitorini Wijono, Latifa Benazza, et al.

- 2005 Letter to Anders Fogh Rasmussen (October 12). Pp. 24-25 in *Profet-affæren: Et PEN dossier om 12 Muhammed-tegninger – og hvad siden bændte . . . Dokumenter & argumenter*. Edited by Anders Jerichow and Mille Rode. Copenhagen: Dansk PEN.

Pew Research Center

- 2011 “Muslim Population by Country.” *Religion and Public Life* (January 27). Available online at <http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/#>.
- 2017 “Europe’s Growing Muslim Population.” *Religion and Public Life* (November 29). Available online at <http://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population>.

Politiken

- 2005 “I Guds navn: Forstemmende sag om tegninger.” *Politiken* (October 17). Available online at <http://politiken.dk/debat/ledere/article126405.ece>.

Potok, Mark

- 2017 “The Year in Hate and Extremism.” Southern Poverty Law Center, *Intelligence Report* (February 15). Available online at <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism>.

Robinson, Eugene

- 1993 “Norwegian Publisher of ‘Satanic Verses’ Is Shot.” *Washington Post* (October 12). Available online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/10/12/norwegian-publisher-of-satanic-verses-is-shot/658e8f45-4331-4023-967e-34344fbdb2b6/?utm_term=.e963056ca525.

Rose, Flemming

- 2006 “Why I Published Those Cartoons.” *Washington Post* (February 19). Available online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021702499.html>.

Schultheis, Emily

- 2017 "What Right-Wing Populists Look Like in Norway." *The Atlantic* (September 12). Available online at <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/norway-progress-party-populism-immigration/539535>.

Seierstad, Åsne

- 2015 *One of Us: The Story of Anders Breivik and the Massacre in Norway*. Translated by Sarah Death. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Smith-Spark, Laura

- 2012 "Norway Killer Anders Breivik Ruled Sane, Given 21-Year Prison Term" (August 24). CNN. Available online at <https://www.cnn.com/2012/08/24/world/europe/norway-breivik-trial/index.html>.

Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC)

- 2018 "Pamela Geller." Available online at <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/pamela-geller>.

Statistics Denmark

- 2018 "Culture and the National Church." Available online at <https://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/emner/kultur-og-kirke>.

Steien, Solveig

- 2008 "‘Almost at War’. The Mohammed Cartoon Crisis in Norwegian Media." *Conflict and Communication Online* 7, 1: 1-14. Available online at https://kipdf.com/almost-at-war-the-mohammed-cartoon-crisis-in-norwegian-media_5ab3eea41723dd349c8153f0.html.

Sweden.se

- 2013-2018 "10 Fundamentals of Religion in Sweden." Available online at <https://sweden.se/society/10-fundamentals-of-religion-in-sweden>.

Taylor, Adam

- 2015 "Denmark Puts Ad in Lebanese Newspapers: Dear Refugees, Don't Come Here." *Washington Post* (September 7). Available online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/07/denmark-places-an-advertisement-in-lebanese-newspapers-dear-refugees-dont-come-here/?utm_term=.7e35ffe5e851.

Taylor, Charles

- 2004 *Modern Social Imaginaries*. Durham: Duke University Press.
2007 *A Secular Age*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Tybring-Gjedde, Christian

- 2010 "Drøm fra Disneyland." *Aftenposten* (August 27). Available online at <https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk/i/kaxkv/Drom-fra-Disneyland>.

Veninga, Jennifer Elisa

2014 *Secularism, Theology and Islam: The Danish Social Imaginary and the Cartoon Crisis of 2005-2006*. London: Bloomsbury.

Vinding, Niels Valdemar, and Lisbet Christoffersen

2012 *Folkekirke in Danish Regulation of Religion, State of Affairs and Qualitative Reflections*. Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen Press.

Wiggen, Mette

2012 "Rethinking Anti-Immigration Rhetoric after the Oslo and Utøya Terror Attacks." *New Political Science* 34, 4: 585-604.

Zucchino, David

2016 "I've Become a Racist: Migrant Wave Unleashes Danish Tensions over Identity." *New York Times* (September 5). Available online at <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/world/europe/denmark-migrants-refugees-racism.html>.

Zuckerman, Phil

2008 *Society without God: What the Least Religious Nations Can Tell Us about Contentment*. New York: New York University Press.