



## Latino Attitudes Toward Abortion and Marriage Equality Examining the Influence of Religiosity, Acculturation, and Non-Response

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### Abstract

Extant literature on Latinos' policy preferences suggests heightened acculturation is associated with more liberal moral policy preferences, while heightened religiosity is associated with more conservative moral policy preferences. This paper seeks to extend this literature by examining the influence of multiple dimensions of acculturation and religiosity on two contemporary moral policy issues: abortion and same-sex marriage. After controlling for high rates of non-response, we find that acculturation and religiosity work in opposite directions, but in more nuanced ways than previous research identified.

### Introduction

Moral issues have been at the forefront of the political debate in the United States since the 2004 presidential election. Since 2004, voters in 31 U.S. states have voted on 33 same-sex marriage<sup>1</sup> ballot measures and voters in 9 U.S. states have voted on 13 abortion ballot measures. Moreover, these issues have been key features of both the Republican and

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<sup>1</sup> We use same-sex union, same-sex marriage, and marriage equality interchangeably throughout the text.

Democratic Party legislative agendas. The Republican platform supports banning abortion and same-sex marriage and civil unions.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, in red states such as Texas, Ohio, Kansas, North Carolina, and North Dakota, Republicans have worked to pass restrictive abortion laws and bans on same-sex marriage. Alternatively, the Democratic platform has consistently supported pro-choice and same-sex couples' civil rights, with the most recent platform lending formal support for marriage equality.<sup>3</sup> In blue states such as Washington, Illinois, Massachusetts, and California, Democrats have worked to pass legislation that protects reproductive rights and same-sex marriage.

The American public faces two divisive moral issues: a longstanding issue and a recently emerging issue (Rimmerman and Wilcox). Abortion has been a controversial political issue for over four decades, since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in *Roe v. Wade* (1973). In contrast, same-sex marriage rights emerged as a national policy issue in the 2004 election, almost a decade after the enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). As Campbell and Monson put it, after "the huge spike in news media attention in early 2004 . . . same-sex union was no longer simmering; it had boiled over" (124).

The salience of these issues has sparked scholarly interest in public sentiment regarding these issues (Brewer and Wilcox; Carsey and Layman; Evans; Hoffman and Mills-Johnson; Jelen and Wilcox; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison). Interest in Latino attitudes on these moral issues has likewise increased (Bolks, Evans, and Polinard; Gibson and Hare; Ellison, Acevedo, and Ramos-Wada; Ellison, Echevarria, and Smith). Gaining insight into Latino preferences on these issues is important for two key reasons. First, the U.S. has experienced vast growth among the Latino population in recent years,<sup>4</sup> which has led to increased Latino political power (Barreto, Collingwood, and Manzano). As this group grows, the Democratic and Republican parties have fought to attract the "Latino Vote." Second, abortion and marriage equality have been and continue to be points of contention between the Democratic and Republican parties. In recent years, the Democratic Party has garnered more support among Latinos than compared to the Republican Party. However, if Latino preferences on these issues are not uniform, it may be possible for the Republican Party to use these moral issues to make inroads on the Latino vote. Is there a segment of the Latino population that may be swayed by the Republican Party's conservative appeals on marriage equality and abortion?

The literature on Latinos' attitudes on moral policy issues suggests acculturation and religiosity work in opposite directions: higher levels of religiosity are associated with more conservative preferences (Bolks et al.; Bartkowski, Ramos-Wada, Ellison, and Acevedo; Gibson and Hare; Ellison et al. 2005, 2011; Kelly and Morgan; Pantoja), and heightened

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<sup>2</sup> The 2004, 2008, and 2012 Republican Party platforms included bans on abortion and same-sex marriage.

<sup>3</sup> The 2004, 2008, and 2012 Democratic Party platforms supported abortion rights. The 2004 and 2008 supported civil rights for the gay community and the 2012 platform officially extends its support to same-sex marriage.

<sup>4</sup> The Pew Hispanic Center reports that the Latino population, already the nation's largest minority group, will likely triple in size by 2050. By that time, Latinos should comprise 29% of the U.S. population, roughly double their share in 2005 (Passel and Cohn).

acculturation is associated with more liberal preferences (Bartkowski et al.; Ellison et al., 2005; Hernandez, Davis, Pena, Schiopu, Smith and Loveland; Jones and Cox). However, studies examining Latinos' attitudes toward same-sex marriage and abortion often do not examine the impact of a full complement of religious and acculturation indicators. Some take into account only one or two dimensions of religiosity (e.g., Kerevel; Sanchez), while another subset only accounts for one dimension of acculturation (e.g., Bolks et al.; Ellison et al. 2005; Kelly and Kelly). Thus, a more comprehensive examination seems warranted.

Our analysis suggests that Latinos' attitudes toward abortion and marriage equality are not uniform. The willingness to offer an opinion on abortion and marriage equality points to the unique impact of religion and acculturation, and thus should not be ignored. Controlling for the propensity to offer a response, we find various dimensions of acculturation and religion influence Latino attitudes on both issues. Substantively, the findings suggest that there is a segment of the population that may be persuaded by conservative appeals on these policy issues.

### Latino Moral Attitudes and Religiosity

A common assumption is that Latinos are social conservatives because (a) they are predominantly Catholic (e.g., Green 2004; Maldonado 1999; Verba, Schlozman and Brady) and (b) Catholic moral theology strongly opposes same-sex marriage and abortion. However, for some Latinos, Catholicism is more of a nominal, identity-based affiliation. Latino Catholicism incorporates cultural elements, rituals, and symbols into its practice, and is thus "one in which religious and ethnic identity are closely intertwined" (Bartkowski et al.; see also Dolan and Deck; Ellison et al. 2011). In this sense, adherence to Catholic doctrine is more likely to be found among Latinos that regularly engage in religious practices than among those who express a more cultural Catholic identity. As such, it is premature to assume that Latinos are socially conservative based solely on the fact that a large portion of the Latino population identifies as Catholic.

For guidance we turn to contemporary religion and politics research, which suggests the link between religion and political attitudes is best understood using a multidimensional approach (Green 2007; Kellstedt, Green, Guth, and Smidt; Kelly and Kelly; Layman 2001; Wald and Smidt). In this sense, religiosity is conceptualized as having three components: *belonging*, or religious affiliation, *belief*, or degree of doctrinal orthodoxy or traditionalism, and *behavior*, or level of engagement in religious practices. Further, this research suggests cleavages in public opinion on many social issues are less about interfaith differences, and more about the common moral values *across* religious traditions (Green 2004, 2007; Kohut, Green, Keeter, and Toth; Layman 2001; Olson et al.). This line of inquiry finds more devout individuals, as evidenced by frequent worship attendance or religious traditionalism, tend to hold more conservative social attitudes than those who are less religiously inclined (Guth and Green; Layman 1997; Petersen and Donnerwerth; Wald and Smidt).

There is evidence that the impact of belief and behavior on attitudes extends to Latinos. Latinos that subscribe to religious traditionalism and engage in religious practices more frequently are more likely to hold conservative attitudes (Kelly and Morgan; Pantoja). The research indicates that frequency of engagement is associated with opposition to abortion (Ellison et al. 2005; Gibson and Hare; Kerevel; Pantoja) and opposition to same-sex

marriage (Kerevel; Pantoja). Additionally, Pantoja finds that religious traditionalism is associated with opposition to abortion and same-sex marriage.<sup>5</sup>

Although scholars increasingly find that belief and behavior have a larger impact on political attitudes than religious affiliation, some denominational differences do remain. Extant literature finds Protestant Latinos, especially Evangelical Protestants, are the most conservative religious subgroup (e.g., DeSipio; Espinosa, Elizondo, and Miranda; Gibson and Hare).<sup>6</sup> Indeed, several studies find that Protestant Latinos are more likely to oppose abortion (Bartkowski et al.; Ellison et al. 2005; Gibson and Hare; Kelly and Morgan) and are more likely to oppose marriage equality than non-Protestant Latinos (Gibson and Hare; Ellison et al. 2011).

Herein, we account for the impact of the three dimensions of religiosity on Latinos' moral policy preferences. Based on findings in the literature we expect Latinos that regularly participate in religious activities and/or those with stronger religious orientations are more likely to oppose abortion and marriage equality. Further, we expect Protestant Latinos are more likely to oppose these policy issues than compared to non-Protestant Latinos.

### **Latino Moral Attitudes and Acculturation**

The extant literature investigates whether Latinos' increased exposure to U.S. culture is associated with a greater tendency to adopt mainstream attitudes and behaviors (see Citrin, Lerman, Murakami, and Pearson; de la Garza, DeSipio, Garcia, and Falcon; Fuchs). This research finds that acculturation – typically measured by factors such as nativity, generational status, and English language acquisition – influences Latino policy preferences (e.g., Branton; de la Garza, Polinard, and Wrinkle; de la Garza, Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria; Michelson). In the context of moral policy preferences, the extant literature generally suggests that acculturation has a liberalizing effect on abortion policy preferences (Bartkowski et al.; Ellison et al. 2005) and on attitudes toward same-sex marriage (Ellison et al. 2011).

On the issue of abortion, the literature offers mixed results regarding the impact of nativity on Latino attitudes. Kerevel finds no evidence that nativity is associated with attitudes toward abortion. Sanchez finds that foreign-born Latinos are more supportive of abortion than their native-born counterparts. Yet, a number of studies find that U.S.-born Latinos are significantly more pro-choice than foreign-born Latinos (Bartkowski et al.; Ellison et al. 2005; Hernandez et al.; Jones and Cox). On the issue of marriage equality, research suggests that foreign-born Latinos are less likely to support same-sex marriage than are U.S.-born Latinos (Ellison et al. 2011; Gibson and Hare; Kerevel; Jones and Cox).

The literature also considers the impact of linguistic acculturation – English language proficiency – on Latino attitudes on moral policy issues. Sanchez and Kerevel find no

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<sup>5</sup> Kelly and Morgan use a measure of traditionalism that includes components of both belief and behavior. Their findings likewise suggest that heightened traditionalism is associated with opposition to abortion.

<sup>6</sup> Although a large majority of Latinos identify as Catholic, a growing number of Latinos (23%) are Protestant or members of sectarian Christian faiths (Green).

relationship between linguistic acculturation and Latino attitudes on abortion, and Kerevel<sup>7</sup> finds no relationship between linguistic acculturation and attitudes toward same-sex marriage. Alternatively, Leal finds that Latinos preferring to be interviewed in Spanish are less likely to express support for abortion and homosexuality than are English speakers.

To examine the impact of acculturation on moral policy preferences we account for various facets of the acculturation experience including nativity, language skills, and time in the U.S. In accordance with the research above, we expect less acculturated Latinos to express more opposition to legalized abortion and less support for legal recognition of same-sex couples than more acculturated Latinos.

### **Data and Methods**

To examine Latino attitudes on same-sex unions and abortion, we utilize the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS). Our dependent variables measure attitudes toward abortion and same-sex unions. The abortion item asked, “Generally speaking, do you think abortion should be,” and had the following distributed responses: 1. legal in all circumstances (10.4%); 2. legal in most circumstances (7.7%); 3. legal only when necessary to save the life of the woman or in cases of rape or incest (47.9%); 4. illegal in all circumstances (20.4%). The same-sex union item asked, “What is your view about same-sex couples? Should they be permitted to,” and had the following distributed responses: 1. legally marry (18.5%); 2. enter into civil unions (7.1%); 3. should they receive no legal recognition (34.1%).

Previous research regarding marriage equality has relied on a dichotomous measure denoting support or opposition to same-sex marriage (Ellison et al. 2011; Gibson and Hare; Kerevel; Pantoja). The measure used herein includes a category for same-sex civil unions. This is advantageous as legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the U.S. encompasses legal marriage as well as more limited legal protections such as civil unions. As such, this measure is more reflective of the complex nature of this policy issue, which offers a more nuanced examination of Latino attitudes on marriage equality.<sup>8</sup>

One complication with these data is that a sizeable number of respondents offered a “no opinion” response on the same-sex union item (40.4%) and an “unsure” response on the abortion item (13.6%).<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, the distribution of missing data varies as a function of key demographics. Forty-four percent of the Catholic respondents did not respond on the same-sex union item, while 30 percent of non-Catholic respondents did not respond.

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<sup>7</sup> It is possible that Kerevel’s operationalization of the concept may have impacted the results. The model includes numerous measure of linguistic acquisition – media language, language preference, importance of Spanish, and language skills. This could serve to swamp the effect of linguistic acculturation by including numerous overlapping indicators.

<sup>8</sup> During the time in which the LNS was in the field, 1 state had no policy of same-sex relationships, 2 states had policies defining marriage as a union between a man and woman, 2 states had a domestic partnership policy, 3 states had policies establishing civil unions, 1 state had a policy making same-sex marriage legal, and the remaining states had amendments or laws banning same-sex marriage.

<sup>9</sup> A comparison of the remaining policy items on the LNS reveals that the average non-response rate is 12 percent. So, while the non-response on the abortion item is comparable to the general overall non-response rate on policy items, the rate of non-response on the same-sex union item is considerably higher.

Further, 45 percent of foreign-born respondents offered a “no opinion” response on the same-sex union item compared to 31 percent of native-born respondents. On the abortion item, 21 percent of respondents with no formal education failed to offer a response, while 9 percent with a college education offered no response. Finally, 16 percent of respondents with weak or no partisan attachment offered an “unsure” response compared to 11 percent with a partisan attachment.

The patterns of non-response suggest that respondents with certain attributes are more likely to non-respond on these two moral policy items. As such, we are left with a set of policy evaluations from a potentially non-random set of respondents. This could bias the parameter estimates and render error in terms that are correlated with the independent variables (Heckman). If unaccounted for, this may lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the factors that influence Latino attitudes on same-sex unions and abortion (Sherman: 362; see also Brehm; King, Honaker, Joseph, and Sheve).

To address this potential selection problem, we implement a Heckman “style” approach. First, we use probit regression to model whether or not a respondent is in the outcome model, where a “no opinion” and “unsure” is coded “1” and a substantive policy opinion is coded “0”. Second, based on the probit results, we compute the inverse mills ratio (IMR). Finally, we include the IMR as a predictor in the outcome model to “correct” for selection bias.<sup>10</sup>

The selection and outcome models include two main sets of covariates: acculturation and religious indicators. Acculturation is measured by linguistic acculturation, foreign born, and length of residency. Linguist acculturation is measured by a four-point scale, anchored such that “1” represents Spanish-language dominant and “4” represents English-language dominant.<sup>11</sup> Foreign born is coded “1” if the respondent is foreign born and “0” if native born.<sup>12</sup> Finally, length of residency is a measure of the number of years a foreign-born respondent has resided in the U.S. These acculturation indicators are included in the selection model based on the expectation that acculturated Latinos are more likely to have formed policy preferences and, thus, are more likely to offer a response on the policy items than compared to less acculturated Latinos. Substantively, we expect more acculturated Latinos to be more supportive of legalized abortion and legal recognition of same-sex couples than less acculturated Latinos.

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<sup>10</sup> This approach allows us to separate the decision to respond from the actual substantive response, which is important as some of the factors that influence policy preferences also influence whether or not a respondent offers a response. Including the IMR in the outcome model removes the part of the error term that is correlated with the independent variables (Achen); thus, eliminating the bias introduced by the selection process.

<sup>11</sup> The variable is coded “2” for Spanish speakers that are proficient in English and coded “3” for English speakers that are proficient in Spanish.

<sup>12</sup> The outcome model was also estimated using a measure of generational status that ranges from first to fourth generation. The results are substantively consistent with the results presented here using the more simplified foreign-born indicator.

To account for the impact of religion, the selection and outcome models include measures tapping into two dimensions of religion: belonging and behavior. Religious belonging is measured by a series of dummy variables representing a respondent's religious identification: Catholic, Protestant, non-traditional, or other religious domination, with no religious affiliation serving as the baseline category.<sup>13</sup> Religious behavior is represented by regular attendance, which is a dichotomous variable coded "1" if a respondent indicates she attends religious once a week or more. We expect that affiliation with a religious group and regular attendance likely provides information on moral policies (Gibson and Hare) and, thus, reduces the likelihood of non-response on the policy questions. Further, we expect respondents that identify themselves as Protestant and as frequent church attendees will exhibit more conservative attitudes on these moral policy items (Ellison et al. 2005; Ellison et al. 2011).

The outcome model includes a third dimension of religiosity: religious belief. Religious belief is measured in variety of ways including importance of religion, frequency of prayer, or if one is born again. Herein, we use "born again" as a proxy for religious belief.<sup>14</sup> Born again is coded "1" if a respondent considers herself a "born again Christian, spirit-filled Christian, or involved in the charismatic movement" and "0" otherwise. As the extant research reports, we expect individuals that ascribe to more traditional religious beliefs – those that are born again – will be more likely to exhibit conservative moral policy attitudes (Guth and Green; Layman 1997; Wald and Smidt).

In addition to the aforementioned religion and acculturation indicators, the selection models control for the influence of partisanship with a dummy variable coded "1" if the respondent identifies herself as a Republican or a Democrat.<sup>15</sup> We argue that identification with a specific party – regardless of the party – may lead a respondent to hold more substantive policy preferences than respondents with weak or no partisan ties. In essence, partisan ties should work to reduce the likelihood of non-response.

Extant research suggests that less educated and less informed respondents are more likely to non-respond on survey items than more educated and politically attentive respondents (e.g., Krosnick, Holbrook, and Berent). Based on this insight, the selection models control for respondents' education background and political attentiveness. Educational background is measured by an 8-category measure, which ranges from "0" reflecting no formal education to "7" reflecting a graduate or professional degree.<sup>16</sup> Political

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<sup>13</sup> Protestant is coded "1" if a respondent identified an affiliation with Assembly of God, Southern Baptist, Pentecostal, or "Other" Protestant. Non-traditional represents Jehovah's Witness, and Mormon.

<sup>14</sup> Ultimately, we would include additional measures of religious believe. However, the LNS only included the born again indicator.

<sup>15</sup> The LNS includes an initial question of partisan identification followed by a series of questions attempting to persuade the respondents who identified as independent or other party to reveal some level of attachment to the Democratic or Republican party. We used the initial measure as these individuals likely have more of an attachment to the party than compared to those that identified as an independent or other party. This variable is used to construct the Partisan Tie measure included in the selection model.

<sup>16</sup> The median and mean category on the education covariate reflects a high school graduate.

attentiveness is measured by a 4-category measure of attention to politics, which ranges from “1” representing no attention to politics and “4” a lot of attention to politics.

Table 1. Respondent Evaluation of Same-Sex Marriage Policy

Variables	Selection	Variables	Outcome	
			(1)	(2)
Foreign Born	.19* (.09)	Foreign Born	-.51 (.33)	.50 (.44)
Language Skills	-.07† (.04)	Language Skills	.27* (.11)	-.13 (.16)
Time in the U.S.	-.01* (.00)	Time in the U.S.	-.01 (.01)	-.03* (.01)
<b>Belonging</b>		<b>Belonging</b>		
Protestant	-.30* (.13)	Protestant	-.29 (.43)	-1.62* (.63)
Catholic	.09 (.11)	Catholic	.09 (.27)	1.21** (.39)
Non-Traditional	.02 (.18)	Non-Traditional	-1.16* (.53)	-.47 (.82)
Other Religion	-.17 (.15)	Other Religion	.39 (.35)	-.04 (.52)
<b>Behavior</b>		<b>Behavior</b>		
Regular Attendance	.06 (.06)	Regular Attendance	-.43** (.16)	.11 (.20)
		<b>Belief</b>		
Attention to Politics	-.05† (.03)	Born Again	-.43** (.15)	-.62** (.20)
Partisan Identity	-.23*** (.06)	Married	-.51*** (.14)	-.25 (.19)
Education	-.06*** (.02)	Education	.12† (.07)	-.01 (.09)
		Democrat	.61** (.22)	-.35 (.25)
		Independent	.55** (.19)	.43 (.31)
		Cuban	.60† (.32)	.55 (.40)
		Puerto Rican	.22 (.23)	.26 (.30)
		Dominican	-.00 (.43)	-.16 (.47)
		South American	.48 (.31)	.90* (.36)
		Central American	-.23 (.27)	-.67 (.46)
		Age	-.03*** (.00)	-.01* (.00)
		Female	.48*** (.14)	.28 (.19)
Constant	.18 (.16)	IMR	-2.56* (1.19)	4.09** (1.51)
Wald $\chi^2$	136.04***	Constant	2.50* (1.05)	-5.36*** (1.33)
N Cases	3916	Wald $\chi^2$	279.32***	
		N Cases	2027	

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05; † p ≤ .10. (1) Legal marriage; (2) Civil unions. Baseline category: no legal recognition. Selection Model: Probit Regression. Outcome Model: Multinomial Logit Regression.

The outcome models include several control variables: partisanship, education, marital status, country of origin or descent, age, and female. Partisanship is measured by a dummy variable for Democrat and Independent identification, while Republican identification serves as the baseline category. The marital status variable is coded “1” if a respondent is married; “0” otherwise. Country of origin or descent is accounted for by a series of dummy variables: Puerto Rican, Dominican, Cuban, South American, and Central American, with Mexican American serving as the baseline category.<sup>17</sup> A respondent’s age is measured in years and gender is represented by a dummy variable that equals “1” if the respondent is female and “0” otherwise. Finally, the outcome models include the IMR from the selection model.

### **Analysis**

Table 1 gives the selection and outcome results for the same-sex union item. The first column gives the probit coefficients for the non-response model. The subsequent columns present the multinomial logit coefficients for the outcome model.<sup>18</sup> The second column gives the estimates for preferring legal marriage versus no legal recognition for same-sex couples, and the third column gives the estimates for preferring civil union versus no legal recognition for same-sex couples.

The results indicate that the pattern of missing data on the legal rights for same-sex couples’ item is, in part, a function of the main factors of interest: acculturation and religion. To highlight the extent to which these factors influence non-response, we turn to the top section of Table 2 which provides predicted probabilities for the selection model.<sup>19</sup> The predicted probabilities presented herein focus solely on the acculturation and religion indicators.<sup>20</sup>

The estimates indicate that a native-born Latino has a .05 lower probability of offering no response on the same-sex question than a foreign-born Latino. Additionally, the linguistic acculturation measure indicates that an English-language dominant Latino has a .07 lower probability of non-response than a Spanish-language dominant Latino. Further, for foreign-born Latinos, as length of residency increases from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean (1 year vs. 22 years), and the probability of non-response decreases by .04. Together, the results demonstrate that as acculturation increases the likelihood of non-response on the same-sex union item decreases.

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<sup>17</sup> Central American countries include Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama; South American countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

<sup>18</sup> The outcome models were estimated using ordered logit. The results are consistent with the multinomial logit findings.

<sup>19</sup> The predicted probabilities are estimated in STATA 12. The probabilities presented are based on scenarios in which the remaining independent variables are set to their mean.

<sup>20</sup> We chose to focus solely on our indicators of interest in an effort to focus discussion on these factors. Additional point estimates are available upon request.

Table 2. Same-Sex Marriage: Predicted Probabilities

Selection Model: Pr (Y=Non-Response)	Min	Max	Δ Prob
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Foreign Born vs. Native Born	.42	.37	-.05 (.03)†
Language Skills: Spanish vs English Dominant	.42	.35	-.07 (.04)†
Time in the U.S.: 1 S.D. ± Mean	.44	.40	-.04 (.02)*
<i>Religious Factors</i>			
Protestant vs. Catholic ( <i>Belonging</i> )	.28	.43	.15 (.03)***
Outcome Model: Pr (Y=Legal Marriage)	Min	Max	Δ Prob
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Language Skills: Spanish vs. English Dominant	.22	.40	.18 (.07)**
Foreign Born vs. Native Born	.22	.35	.13 (.05)**
<i>Religious Factors</i>			
Non-Regular vs. Regular Attendance ( <i>Behavior</i> )	.32	.23	-.09 (.03)**
Non-Born Again vs. Born Again ( <i>Belief</i> )	.30	.24	-.06 (.03)*
IMR: 1 S.D. ± Mean	.43	.15	-.27 (.09)**
Outcome Model: Pr (Y=Civil Union)	Min	Max	Δ Prob
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Time in the U.S.: 1 S.D. ± Mean	.17	.11	-.06 (.04)†
<i>Religious Factors</i>			
Protestant vs. Catholic ( <i>Belonging</i> )	.02	.20	.18 (.03)***
Non-Born Again vs. Born Again ( <i>Belief</i> )	.14	.09	-.05 (.02)*
IMR: 1 S.D. ± Mean	.04	.26	.22 (.07)***
Outcome Model: Pr (Y=No Recognition)	Min	Max	Δ Prob
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Language Skills: Spanish vs. English Dominant	.65	.53	-.12 (.07)†
Time in the U.S.: 1 S.D. ± Mean	.60	.68	.08 (.05)†
<i>Religious Factors</i>			
Protestant vs. Catholic ( <i>Belonging</i> )	.74	.54	-.20 (.08)**
Non-Born Again vs. Born Again ( <i>Belief</i> )	.56	.67	.11 (.03)***
Non-Regular vs. Regular Attendance ( <i>Behavior</i> )	.58	.64	.07 (.03)*

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05; † p ≤ .10. The probabilities are based on scenarios in which the remaining independent variables are set to their mean, with two exceptions. The “Foreign Born” is set to “1” to calculate the probabilities for “Time in the U.S.” The “Time in U.S.” is set to “0” to calculate the probabilities for Native Born Latinos.

The results also indicate that religious belonging is associated with non-response, while religious behavior and belief are not. For instance, there is no significant difference in non-response when comparing Latinos that regularly attend church and those who do not regularly attend church. Yet, there is a significant difference in non-response between Latinos that identify as Protestant and Latinos that identify as Catholic. Indeed, Catholics have a .15 higher probability of non-responding on the same-sex item than do Protestants.<sup>21</sup> This suggests that Protestants have a more definitive position on this issue compared to Catholics.

The same-sex union outcome model is presented in the second and third column of Table 1. On average, Latinos are most likely to support no legal recognition (Pr=.61), as opposed to legal marriage (Pr=.29) or civil unions (Pr=.10). However, we do find evidence that attitudes toward same-sex union vary as a function of acculturation and religion. Additionally, the IMR coefficients suggest there is a significant selection effect: Latino evaluations of this policy are *not* drawn from a random subset of all respondents.

Returning to Table 2, we offer a detailed discussion of the outcome results. First, the results reveal that acculturation is associated with each policy option. The probability of an English-language dominant Latino supporting same-sex marriage is .18 higher than a Spanish-language dominant Latino. The probability of a native-born Latino supporting same-sex marriage is .13 higher than a foreign born Latino. Together, these findings suggest nativity and linguistic acculturation serve to heighten support for same-sex couples' legal rights. However, for Latino immigrants the findings do suggest that as the length of time in the U.S. increases the probability of supporting civil union decreases and the probability of supporting no legal recognition increases (see Ellison et al. 2011 for a similar finding).

Second, these findings highlight the impact of religion on Latino attitudes toward same-sex unions. Religious belief – as measured by born again – is associated with decreased support for same-sex marriage and civil unions, yet greater support for no legal recognition. The probability of a born again Latino supporting no legal recognition for same-sex couples is .11 higher, the probability of supporting legal marriage is .06 lower, and the probability of supporting civil unions is .05 lower than compared to a non-born again Latino. Religious behavior is likewise associated with decreased support for legal marriage and support for no legal recognition. Indeed, for a Latino that attends church regularly the probability of supporting same-sex marriage is .09 lower and the probability of supporting no legal recognition is .07 higher than a Latino that does not attend church regularly. Finally, the findings indicate that religious belonging is associated with attitudes toward marriage equality. Catholics have a .18 higher probability of supporting civil unions for same-sex couples and .20 lower probability of supporting no legal recognition than Protestants.

Third, the IMR estimates offer insight regarding the impact of non-response on the outcome model. As the IMR increases from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean, the probability of supporting legal marriage decreases by

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<sup>21</sup> There are other significant differences when comparing Latinos of differing religious backgrounds. We have opted to focus on the two main – Catholics and Protestants – as they represent the main religious affiliation for Latinos. Indeed, in this survey 84.5 percent of the respondents identify as either Catholic or Protestant.

.27.<sup>22</sup> Further, the results indicate that probability of supporting civil union increases by .22 as the value of the IMR increases from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. Together, this suggests that the unobserved factors that lead to non-response tend to be associated with a higher probability of supporting legal marriage and a lower probability of supporting civil union.

Next we turn to Latino attitudes toward abortion. The first column in Table 3 gives the probit coefficients for the likelihood of offering a non-response. The subsequent columns present the multinomial logit coefficients for the outcome model. The second column gives the estimates for preferring abortion to be legal in all circumstances, the third column gives the estimates for preferring abortion to be legal in most circumstances, and the fourth column gives the estimates for preferring abortion to be legal only to save the mother or in cases of rape or incest. The baseline category prefers abortion to be illegal in all circumstances.

The selection results indicate that the pattern of missing data on the abortion item is, in part, a function of one of the main factors of interest: acculturation. Linguistically, acculturated Latinos are more likely to non-respond than their less linguistically acculturated counterparts. To highlight the extent to which this factor influences non-response, we now turn to the top section of Table 4, which provides predicted probabilities for the selection model. The estimates indicate that an English-language dominant Latino has a .12 higher probability of non-response than a Spanish-language dominant Latino. This result is in contrast to the relationship between linguistic acculturation and non-response on the same-sex item. Heightened acculturation leads to decreased non-response on the same-sex item and increased non-response on the abortion item. Further, in the case of abortion, religiosity plays no significant role in predicting non-response, but there were sizeable differences as a function of religious affiliation. We argue that differences in non-response across the two policy items are a product of the familiarity of abortion and the relative lack of familiarity of same-sex marriage.

Next, we turn to the model of abortion attitudes presented in the second, third, and fourth columns in Table 3. On average, Latinos are most likely to support legal abortion in limited circumstances (Pr=.61), as opposed to legal abortion in all circumstances (Pr=.09), legal in most circumstances (Pr=.06) or illegal in all circumstances (Pr=.23). Yet, there is evidence that Latino respondents' evaluation of abortion policy varies as a function of acculturation and religiosity. Further, the IMR coefficients are significant, suggesting there is a significant selection effect on this policy item as well. The bottom panel of Table 4 offers a more detailed view of the outcome results.

First, linguistic acculturation is associated with each abortion policy option. English-language dominant Latinos are more supportive of less restrictive abortion policy options than Spanish-language dominant Latinos. For example, the probability of supporting legal abortion under any circumstance is .12 higher for an English-language dominant Latino than

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<sup>22</sup> Note that large IMR values are associated with *lower* probabilities of non-response, while smaller values are associated with *higher* probabilities of non-response.

for a Spanish-language dominant Latino. Further, the probability of viewing abortion illegal in all circumstances is .20 lower for an English-language dominant Latino than for a Spanish-language dominant Latino.

Table 3. Respondent Evaluation of Abortion Policy

Variables	Selection	Variables	Outcome		
			(1)	(2)	(3)
Foreign Born	.17 (.12)	Foreign Born	-.14 (.39)	.22 (.42)	.16 (.27)
Language Skills	.14*** (.04)	Language Skills	.72*** (.20)	1.17*** (.20)	.24† (.13)
Time in the U.S.	-.00 (.00)	Time in the U.S.	.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)
<b>Belonging</b>		<b>Belonging</b>			
Protestant	.15 (.17)	Protestant	-1.03* (.48)	-.25 (.51)	.37 (.35)
Catholic	.18 (.14)	Catholic	-.07 (.37)	.21 (.42)	.78* (.32)
Non-Traditional	-.07 (.22)	Non-Traditional	-1.38* (.60)	-3.00*** (.75)	-.39 (.40)
Other Religion	.17 (.19)	Other Religion	-.33 (.49)	.15 (.56)	.51 (.41)
<b>Behavior</b>		<b>Behavior</b>			
Weekly Attendance	.04 (.07)	Regular Attendance	-.70*** (.20)	-.65** (.21)	-.37** (.14)
		<b>Belief</b>			
Attention to Politics	-.07* (.03)	Born Again	-.08 (.19)	-.31 (.21)	.04 (.13)
Partisan Identity	-.20** (.07)	Married	-.31† (.18)	-.30 (.20)	-.23† (.13)
Education	-.06** (.02)	Education	.24** (.08)	.05 (.11)	-.01 (.05)
		Democrat	.64* (.25)	.10 (.26)	.03 (.18)
		Independent	.82** (.26)	.62* (.30)	.18 (.17)
		Cuban	.61 (.46)	.50 (.47)	-.05 (.36)
		Puerto Rican	.47† (.29)	-.25 (.33)	-.23 (.24)
		Dominican	-.75 (.49)	.87† (.46)	.40 (.29)
		South American	.42 (.43)	.45 (.61)	-.01 (.33)
		Central American	-.86* (.42)	-.11 (.42)	-.36† (.22)
		Age	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.00)
		Female	.16 (.18)	.01 (.20)	.12 (.12)
		IMR	-.61 (1.21)	3.79** (1.36)	1.42† (.79)
Constant	-1.29*** (.21)	Constant	-1.54 (2.41)	-9.68*** (2.53)	-2.22 (1.55)
Wald $\chi^2$	32.91***	Wald $\chi^2$	345.67***		
N Cases	3916	N Cases	2878		

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05; † p ≤ .10. (1) Legal (2) Legal Most Cases (3) Legal When Necessary. Baseline category: no legal abortion. Selection Model: Probit Regression. Outcome Model: Multinomial Logit Regression.

Table 4. Abortion: Predicted Probabilities

Selection Model: Pr (Y=Non-Response)	Min	Max	Δ Prob
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Language Skills: Spanish vs. English Dominant	.09	.18	.09 (.03)**
Outcome Model: Pr (Y=Legal in All Circumstances)			
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Language Skills: Spanish vs. English Dominant	.06	.18	.12 (.06)*
<i>Religious Factors</i>			
Protestant vs. Catholic ( <i>Belonging</i> )	.05	.10	.05 (.02)**
Non-Regular vs. Regular Attendance ( <i>Behavior</i> )	.12	.08	-.04 (.02)*
IMR: 1 S.D. ± Mean	.12	.07	-.05 (.03)†
Outcome Model: Pr (Y=Legal in Most Circumstances)			
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Language Skills: Spanish vs. English Dominant	.02	.27	.25 (.06)***
<i>Religious Factors</i>			
Non-Regular vs. Regular Attendance ( <i>Behavior</i> )	.08	.05	-.03 (.01)*
Non-Born Again vs Born Again ( <i>Belief</i> )	.07	.05	-.02 (.01)†
IMR: 1 S.D. ± Mean	.04	.09	.05 (.02)*
Outcome Model: Pr (Y=Legal Limited Circumstances)			
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Language Skills: Spanish vs. English Dominant	.62	.44	-.17 (.08)*
Outcome Model: Pr (Y=Illegal All Circumstances)			
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Language Skills: Spanish vs. English Dominant	.30	.10	-.20 (.05)**
<i>Religious Factors</i>			
Protestant vs. Catholic ( <i>Belonging</i> )	.29	.21	-.08 (.03)**
Non-Regular vs. Regular Attendance ( <i>Behavior</i> )	.19	.27	.08 (.02)***
IMR: 1 S.D. ± Mean	.27	.20	-.07 (.04)†

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05; † p ≤ .10. The probabilities are based on scenarios in which the remaining independent variables are set to their mean, with two exceptions. The “Foreign Born” is set to “1” to calculate the probabilities for “Time in the U.S.” The “Time in U.S.” is set to “0” to calculate the probabilities for Native Born Latinos.

Second, the findings highlight the impact of religion on Latino abortion attitudes. Religious behavior is associated with decreased support for abortion rights. For example, Latinos that attend church regularly have a .04 lower probability of supporting legal abortion in all circumstances and a .08 higher probability of supporting abortion being illegal in all circumstances than those that do not attend church regularly. The findings indicate that

religious belonging is also associated with abortion attitudes. Further, Latinos that identify as Catholic have a .05 higher probability of supporting legal abortion in all circumstances and .08 lower probability of supporting abortion being illegal in all circumstances than Protestants. There is limited evidence that religious belief is associated with abortion attitudes. Born again Latinos have a .02 lower probability of supporting abortion being legal in most cases than those that are non-born again.

Third, as the IMR increases from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean, the probability of supporting the legalization of all abortions decreases by .05 and the probability of supporting legal abortion in most cases increases by .05. Finally, the probability of supporting illegal abortion decreases by .07 as the value of IMR increases from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean. This suggests the unobserved factors that lead to non-response tend to be associated with a lower probability of supporting legalizing all abortion and outlawing all abortions and a higher probability of supporting legal abortion in most cases.

### Discussion

Our contributions to the literature are both theoretical and methodological. First, our results complement and extend existing research on Latinos' attitudes toward abortion and legal recognition for same-sex unions. As noted, some scholars have investigated the impact of multiple dimensions of religiosity on moral policy preferences, while others have analyzed the impact of acculturation. Their findings suggest acculturation and religiosity are counterbalancing forces, but the concomitant impact of a full complement of religiosity and acculturation variables was unclear. We bring these two streams of research together by examining the relationship between moral policy attitudes and multiple dimensions of religiosity and acculturation.

The results indicate that linguistic acculturation is consistently related to attitudes on abortion and marriage equality, while the other measures of acculturation only predict attitudes toward same-sex marriage. In general, acculturation has a liberalizing effect on moral policy attitudes. Linguistically acculturated Latinos are more likely to support legal marriage for same-sex couples and legalized abortion than linguistically less acculturated Latinos. Additionally, the findings suggest that all three dimensions of religiosity are associated with Latino policy preferences. With regard to the *belonging* dimension, the findings indicate that Protestant Latinos are more likely to oppose legal recognition of same-sex unions and legalized abortion than their Catholic counterparts. Further, in reference to the *behavior* dimension, the results indicate regular church attendance decreases the likelihood of endorsing the most liberal position on both issues and increases the likelihood of preferring the most restrictive position. In terms of the *belief* dimension, the results indicate that born-again Latinos are more likely to prefer no legal recognition for same-sex couples than *any* recognition; while the impact of *belief* on abortion attitudes is marginal.

In general, the impact of religion on Latino moral policy attitudes is similar to the impact of religion on non-Latinos (Green 2004, 2007; Kellstedt et al.; Layman 2001). Indeed, consistent with the extant literature, we find that multiple dimensions of religion influence moral policy attitudes. Further, the nature of the relationship between the dimensions of religion and Latino policy attitudes are consistent with the extant literature. Religious

affiliation alone does not fully capture the impact of religion on Latino moral policy attitudes. The complex patterns commonly found between religion and moral policy attitudes in the general literature also emerge in this examination of Latino moral policy preferences.

Table 5. Same-Sex Marriage and Abortion: Predicted Probabilities (Ignore Non-Response)

Same-Sex Marriage: Pr (Y=Legal Marriage)	Min	Max	Δ Prob
<i>Religious Factors</i>			
Protestant vs. Catholic ( <i>Belonging</i> )	.15	.32	.17 (.03)***
Non-Regular vs. Regular Attendance ( <i>Behavior</i> )	.32	.25	-.07 (.03)*
Non-Born Again vs. Born Again ( <i>Belief</i> )	.32	.25	-.07 (.03)*
Same-Sex Marriage: Pr (Y=Civil Union)	Min	Max	Δ Prob
<i>Religious Factors</i>			
Protestant vs. Catholic ( <i>Belonging</i> )	.04	.14	.10 (.02)***
Non-Born Again vs. Born Again ( <i>Belief</i> )	.13	.09	-.04 (.02)*
Same-Sex Marriage: Pr (Y=No Recognition)	Min	Max	Δ Prob
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Time in the U.S.: 1 S.D. ± Mean	.58	.67	.09 (.04)*
<i>Religious Factors</i>			
Protestant vs. Catholic ( <i>Belonging</i> )	.80	.53	-.27 (.04)***
Non-Born Again vs. Born Again ( <i>Belief</i> )	.55	.67	.12 (.03)***
Non-Regular vs. Regular Attendance ( <i>Behavior</i> )	.57	.64	.07 (.03)*
Abortion: Pr (Y=Legal in All Circumstances)	Min	Max	Δ Prob
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Language Skills: Spanish vs. English Dominant	.05	.27	.22 (.04)***
<i>Religious Factors</i>			
Protestant vs. Catholic ( <i>Belonging</i> )	.05	.10	.05 (.02)**
Non-Regular vs. Regular Attendance ( <i>Behavior</i> )	.11	.08	-.03 (.01)*
Abortion: Pr (Y=Legal in Most Circumstances)	Min	Max	Δ Prob
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Language Skills: Spanish vs. English Dominant	.04	.16	.12 (.03)***
<i>Religious Factors</i>			
Non-Regular vs. Regular Attendance ( <i>Behavior</i> )	.08	.05	-.03 (.01)*
Abortion: Pr (Y=Legal Limited Circumstances)	Min	Max	Δ Prob
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Language Skills: Spanish vs. English Dominant	.64	.44	-.20 (.05)***
Abortion: Pr (Y=Illegal All Circumstances)	Min	Max	Δ Prob
<i>Acculturation Factors</i>			
Language Skills: Spanish vs. English Dominant	.27	.14	-.13 (.04)***
<i>Religious Factors</i>			
Protestant vs. Catholic ( <i>Belonging</i> )	.28	.21	-.07 (.03)*
Non-Regular vs. Regular Attendance ( <i>Behavior</i> )	.19	.27	.09 (.02)***

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05; † p ≤ .10. Probabilities are calculated with the remaining variables are set to their mean, with two exceptions. The “Foreign Born” is set to “1” to calculate the probabilities for “Time in the U.S.” “Time in U.S.” is set to “0” to calculate the probabilities for Native Born Latinos.

Second, we examine the effects of Latino non-response to moral policies. To demonstrate the importance of accounting for the impact of non-response, we consider the results from models that ignore the selection effect (see full results in the “Supplementary Information” in the Appendix). The top panel in Table 5 presents the significant predicted probabilities for our variables of interest – religious and acculturation indicators – on the marriage equality item, while the bottom panel presents the significant predicted probabilities on the abortion item. In comparing these results with the outcome models in Tables 2 and 4, one will see that overlooking the selection effect can inflate and deflate parameter estimates and standard errors.

For instance, in the case of the same-sex marriage, ignoring the selection issue would lead one to conclude that acculturation yields no impact on attitudes toward the legal marriage option, while the model accounting for the selection issue demonstrates sizeable and significant differences among Latinos as a function of linguistic acculturation and nativity. In the case of the abortion model, ignoring the selection issue overstates the impact of linguistic acculturation in the case of legalization of abortion in all circumstances and understates the impact of linguistic acculturation in the remaining abortion policy options. This suggests Latino non-response on moral policy issues should not be ignored as this may result in misleading conclusions.

In general, the findings suggest Latino policy preferences on these divisive issues are not uniform. Less acculturated and religiously conservative (born again, evangelical, and practicing) Latinos exhibit a more conservative position on these issues than more acculturated and religiously moderate. As such, the results suggest that less acculturated and religiously conservative Latinos may be susceptible to culturally conservative appeals made by the Republican Party, and that more acculturated and religiously moderate Latinos are likely less to be susceptible to the appeals of the Republican Party on these issues. Attention to these policy issues will likely continue in the U.S. Efforts to chip away at women’s reproductive rights on the part of Republican leaders in red states, the recent Supreme Court rulings on DOMA, and California’s Proposition 8 suggest these issues will be tethered to the parties’ agendas in the coming elections. These policies may provide an opportunity for the Republican Party to sway the culturally conservative segment of the Latino population and the Democratic Party may maintain favor among more acculturated and less religiously conservative Latinos.

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Appendix

Supplemental Information: Evaluation of Abortion and Same-sex Marriage (Ignoring Selection)

Variables	Same-Sex Marriage		Abortion		
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Foreign Born	-.14 (.28)	-.03 (.37)	-.10 (.34)	-.30 (.42)	-.02 (.25)
Language Skills	.15 (.10)	.10 (.14)	.80*** (.12)	.72*** (.14)	.09 (.09)
Time in the U.S.	-.02* (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)
<b>Belonging</b>					
Protestant	-.89** (.33)	-.58 (.49)	-.96* (.46)	-.60 (.49)	.23 (.33)
Catholic	.28 (.26)	1.01** (.36)	.00 (.34)	-.32 (.38)	.55† (.30)
Non-Traditional	-1.14* (.52)	-.52 (.81)	-1.43* (.60)	-2.79*** (.75)	-.34 (.39)
Other Religion	.08 (.32)	.48 (.48)	-.25 (.47)	-.39 (.52)	.28 (.39)
<b>Behavior</b>					
Regular Attendance	-.35* (.15)	-.11 (.20)	-.68*** (.20)	-.78*** (.21)	-.43*** (.13)
<b>Belief</b>					
Born Again	-.43** (.15)	-.60** (.20)	-.11 (.19)	-.29 (.21)	.01 (.13)
Married	-.52*** (.14)	-.19 (.18)	-.29 (.18)	-.24 (.20)	-.20† (.12)
Education	.01 (.04)	.17** (.06)	.21*** (.06)	.25*** (.07)	.06† (.04)
Democrat	.26† (.16)	.06 (.23)	.61** (.20)	.57** (.23)	.23 (.14)
Independent	.61*** (.19)	.22 (.29)	.89*** (.25)	.50† (.29)	.16 (.17)
Cuban	.55† (.32)	.66† (.39)	.61 (.45)	.73 (.46)	.03 (.35)
Puerto Rican	.21 (.23)	.30 (.30)	.44 (.28)	-.23 (.32)	-.24 (.23)
Dominican	.01 (.42)	-.23 (.47)	-.76 (.48)	.81† (.46)	.36 (.27)
South American	.41 (.31)	1.00** (.35)	.44 (.44)	.65 (.63)	.08 (.33)
Central American	-.19 (.26)	-.65 (.45)	-.85* (.42)	-.05 (.42)	-.30 (.21)
Age	-.03*** (.00)	-.01* (.00)	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.00)
Female	.51*** (.14)	.26 (.19)	.20 (.18)	.00 (.20)	.13 (.12)
Constant	.51 (.14)	-2.28*** (.66)	-2.76*** (.61)	-2.54** (.81)	.45 (.46)
Wald $\chi^2$	275.94***		344.28***		
N Cases	2083		2961		

\*\*\*p ≤ .001; \*\*p ≤ .01; \*p ≤ .05; † p ≤ .10. Same-sex marriage item: (1) Legal marriage; (2) Civil unions. Baseline category: no legal recognition. Abortion item: (1) Legal (2) Legal Most Cases (3) Legal When Necessary. Baseline category: no legal abortion. Multinomial Logit Regression estimates.