Thesis Approved

By

[Signatures]

Major Advisor

Dean
PREFACE

My paper is the result of an interest to know why the tiny island of Ireland has come to be divided into two distinct nations. A vast amount of primary source material has been obtainable from Her Majesty's Stationery Office in Britain and from the Library of Congress. However, in dealing with Southern Ireland, primary source material has not been as easily obtainable. Neither the Library of Congress nor the Irish Stationery Office was equipped to send all the necessary documents and papers. Consequently, secondary sources were used as well.
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CHAPTER I

PRELUDE

Ireland is not unique in its long struggle for independence; many small nations have fought gallantly to preserve their liberty from a powerful neighbor. Yet Ireland's case is remarkable in the intensity of its resistance to foreign rule; England never felt that the Irish were truly conquered and periodically sent troops to reconquer this island. But in 1921, after seven hundred years of possessing Ireland, England realized that the task of Irish conquest had never been completed and doubted that it was even possible.

Irish resistance to foreign rule is explained by the universal instincts of religion, nationality, and of a people's right to its land. "Three facts give the Irish struggle its enduring force: the fact that an ancient Gaelic people was resisting a race whose civilisation was antipathetic to its own, that a Catholic nation was defending its faith against the forces of Protestantism, and that, under George V as under Elizabeth I, English rule meant disposition and humiliation for the Irish on their own soil."¹

The Irish temperament as such would most probably have

resisted foreign rule by any country. But emerging with the
Reformation, Anglo-Irish relations took a new dimension in animosity.

In Reformation times religious conformity meant political
loyalty. Since the Irish remained Catholic, the English considered
them disloyal subjects. But neither the brutal invasions from such
a man as Cromwell nor the Penal Code, described by Edmund Burke as
"a machine of wise and elaborate contrivance and as well fitted
for the oppression, impoverishment and degradation of a people and
the debasement in them of human nature itself, as ever proceeded
from the perverted ingenuity of man,"^ could prevent Catholicism
from becoming the backbone of Irish nationalism.

If the Irish could not be made loyal by conversion to
Protestantism, then the English believed that they should be made
subservient, so there would be no tie to connect them with conti-
nential rivals. Thus began the long history of Anglo-Irish conflict.

Francis Bacon proposed that if the Irish could not be made
loyal, why not plant loyalists upon Irish soil? "It would be a
work so religious, so politic and so profitable."^3

By order of James I vast tracts of land in the province of
Ulster were given to "loyal" Protestant Scotch and English subjects.
With the forceful removal of the Irish from their lands the rebel-

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^2Macardle, *Irish Republic*, p. 32.
^3Ibid., p. 34.
lion of 1641 broke out, but their forces were no match for the English and the rebellion was easily suppressed.

From 1691 to 1782, Ireland possessed its own parliament, but in reality it was subordinated to the British government. The Protestant minority enjoyed complete ascendancy over the Catholic majority for the Catholics were not allowed to vote. Thus the Irish were made second-class citizens in their own land.

Economically, Irish trade and commerce was sacrificed to that of the English, for England prohibited manufacturing and industry on Irish soil. Behind such restrictions lay the argument that Ireland might become England's economic competitor. However, the Irish questioned whether the English ever intended Ireland to become a part of the United Kingdom; Scotland did not have such restrictions, and yet was a part of the British Kingdom. Nevertheless, Ireland remained an agricultural colony of the English. In a phrase, she was made England's bread-basket.

Ireland's history during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is one of absentee land ownership, in which more wealth was taken out of Ireland than was reinvested, Ireland became a backward country surrounded by prosperous industrial neighbors.

The successful revolt of the American colonies had its repercussions in Ireland. One result was the grant of legislative independence in 1782--known as "Grattan's Parliament." Within a few years qualified Catholics were allowed the vote and Irish industry that would not be competitive was permitted. Irish linen
and Ulster ship building became Ireland's leading industries. Dublin, as the capital of Ireland, grew into a beautiful city with many parks and new buildings.

Nevertheless, the mass of Irishmen were not permitted the vote nor as Catholics could they hold any political office. Feudal laws that were disregarded or updated in England were kept in Ireland; thereby the masses of Irishmen were not only impoverished but were placed on an economic level far worse than their compatriots in Scotland or England. The situation climaxed in the revolt of 1789 in which Wolfe Tone, a republican idealist, attempted with French aid, to liberate Ireland. The revolt failed and led to the Act of Union.

With the Act of Union in 1800, Irish conditions went from bad to worse. What Pitt originally intended by his Act of Union was twofold; Ireland as Scotland would be incorporated into the British Parliament as part of the British Kingdom and that Irish Catholics would be given the franchise. However, Irish officials were not willing to concede the right of Ireland to govern herself. It took one of the largest bribes in British history to influence the Irish Orange officials to consent to the Act of Union. Once the Act was agreed upon, Catholics were denied the vote. If Pitt had had his way, Catholics would have been enfran-
chised but, due to the inflexible will of George III, the vote was denied.4

A few decades later Gladstone was to say, "There is no blacker or fouler transaction in the history of man. We used the whole civil government of Ireland as an engine of wholesale corruption . . . . We obtained that Union by wholesale bribery and unblushing intimidation."5

The Union was only two years old when it was challenged by the revolutionary spirit of Robert Emmet, a man of the same caliber as Wolfe Tone. Emmet's revolt was only a minor one but his patriotism and "martyrdom" bequeathed to Irish nationalism an inspirational legacy, treasured by later generations "to be done with" English rule.6

The crux of Anglo-Irish relations in relatively modern times revolved around the fact that the English procrastinated rather than solving Irish grievances. This was evident with the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829; emancipation was so long overdue that it not only embittered feelings between the two islands, but it also intensified Irish hopes for complete autonomy. The Irish now looked to Daniel O'Connell to lead them in this pursuit.


6Halligan, p. 13.
Instead of appeasing Ireland, England became reactionary. She outlawed the Irish language, history and literature in the compulsory schools. The philosophy behind such a move lay the hope that in denying the Irish culture, the Irish would accept the English culture as their own. However this was not the case. The Irish only became more tenacious to their own ways.

By the late 1830's and early 40's Ireland possessed over eight million people—a third of that of Great Britain. In addition, a new revolutionary wave swept Ireland that put real fear into the English on how to avoid a new revolt. Instead of a positive program by political concessions or reforms, the English sent large-scale military units into Ireland to preserve the status quo.

What succeeded in quelling the Irish was not the presence of the English troops but the potato famine. From 1844 through 1847, Ireland was beset by a series of rainy years in which a fungus developed upon the potato and caused it to rot. Since the potato was the chief crop of Ireland this was a serious matter. However, the failure of the potato crop need not have been as drastic as it proved to be. Ireland not only possessed an abundant supply of grain in those years but it had enough cows, hogs and sheep to keep everyone alive. But Ireland was beset by an evil for which it never forgave England.

England's problem on how to govern Ireland was now extremely simple. She would import the needed grains, cows, sheep and hogs and let nature have its course. The Irish population would be reduced and thus be made more manageable. Indirectly then, the Irish believed the English caused the real famine. In four years over 700,000 Irish died from starvation or famine fever. In addition thousands of other Irishmen died on emigration ships fleeing Ireland. The statistical number that died at sea is unknown, but it was so great that these emigrant ships were called coffin ships. By 1851 over two million Irishmen or one-fourth of the population had either died or emigrated. To the fear of starvation was added the terror of eviction. Irish landlords, many of whom lived abroad, took advantage of the famine to evict the peasant and thus reap the benefits of enclosure.

Speaking in the House of Lords on 23 March, 1846, Lord John Russell said, "More than fifty thousand families, in one year, have been turned out of their wretched dwellings without pity or refuge. "We made Ireland," he declared, "I speak it deliberately, we have made it the most degraded and most miserable country in the world. All the world is crying shame upon us; but we are equally callous to our ignominy as to the results of our misgovernment."
At least in English eyes, Ireland had become a conquered nation, from which nothing was to be feared or hoped. It was a country that was done for, that could never revive. The best policy was to draw from it as large a tribute as possible, of men and money for the Empire.\textsuperscript{11} "In Victorian England, Ireland became a by-word for wretchedness; her story of sorrow was so monotonous that it became a joke."\textsuperscript{12}

As a protest to their humiliating condition, the Irish revolted with no real hope of success in 1848 and again 1867. The 1867 uprising had some positive effects however, although the Irish did not gain their freedom, they did succeed in establishing a clandestine organization known as the Fenians who would not disband until Irish goals were met.

The year after the Fenian uprising, the Liberal Party came to power in England with the leadership of William Gladstone. Gladstone immediately announced, "My mission is to pacify Ireland."\textsuperscript{13} In order to accomplish this feat three problems had to be met, the land, political and religious grievances. The religious and land problems were met with direct action and surprising success. In 1869 the Church of Ireland was disestablished thus granting the

\textsuperscript{11} L. Paul-Dubois, \textit{The Irish Struggle and Its Results} (New York: Longmans, Green, 1921), p. 88.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

Catholic Church the privileges accorded to it as the religion of the majority of Irishmen.

In 1870, 1881, and 1903 various land acts were enacted until the Irish possessed their own land. Ireland became in the first few years of the twentieth century a land of peasant proprietors.

It can be said that with the leadership of Gladstone, England did improve some of the most obvious Irish grievances. However, the solutions to the religious and agrarian problems were not paralleled on the political front.

Gladstone, though indeed sympathetic to Irish grievances, could not support the idea of an Irish subordinate parliament. It took a man of the ability of Charles Stuart Parnell to convert Gladstone to this measure. But as success was mounting for the passing of a Home Rule Bill, Parnell became involved in a sex scandal which not only cost him his reputation but most probably his Home Rule Bill. Gladstone, Parnell, and Home Rule were defeated by a House vote of 341 to 311.\textsuperscript{14} With the defeat of the Liberals and the arrival of the Conservatives, there was no hope for success of Home Rule.

In retrospect, if Home Rule had been passed, more than likely there would not have been an uprising in 1916 nor partition in 1920.

\textsuperscript{14} Halligan, \textit{Anglo-Irish Relations 1921-1949.} p. 19.
Although the Conservatives would not grant Home Rule, they did bestow economic benefits upon Ireland. Their motto was "Kill Home Rule with Kindness." Nevertheless, Home Rule was desired by the mass of Irishmen and they did not have it. Ironically, the period of English benevolence was at the same time the seeding of a new Irish nationalism. This new nationalism inspired by such authors as Yeats, Lady Gregory, and Synge, resurrected ancient Irish sagas that intensified the differences between the Irish and the English. "In the opinion of A. E. Standish, the intellectual character of the insurrection of 1916—so little understood outside Ireland—stems from the cultural nationalism evoked by the Gaelic revival." \(^{15}\)

The influence of the Gaelic revival was incorporated into an intellectual political philosophy by the ability of Arthur Griffith. Griffith's new movement known as "Sinn Fein", translated to mean "We Ourselves", "By Ourselves", or "Free Within", advocated an economic, cultural and political regeneration of his country. In his weekly journal, Griffith advocated the withdrawal of Irish representatives from the British Parliament, de-Anglization of the Irish nation, revival of Irish industries and a government within Ireland.

"Adaption of this policy," Griffith declared, "may involve

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more danger and more sacrifices than the policy of speech making in a foreign country, but it involves no degradation, no demoralization, no sinking of principles and no abandonment of ideals.\textsuperscript{16}

Co-existent with the Sinn Fein philosophy was the more extreme school—the Fenians, who believed in liberation through direct action; they were small in numbers but tightly knit. The Fenians took their inspiration from Wolfe Tone, Emmet, the martyrs of '48, and the Fenians of '67. "In their republican dreams they envisioned the regeneration of the ancient nation through their own blood sacrifices. For them, England's difficulty would be Ireland's opportunity."\textsuperscript{17}

There was a third Irish party that overshadowed both the Sinn Fein and the Fenians; it was the Home Rule party. After Parnell's disgrace John Redmond took up the cause of Irish Home Rule. He pointed out that the Irish were paying in taxation (for the privilege of being badly ruled by Great Britain) a sum enormously in excess of what it would cost the Irish to govern themselves.\textsuperscript{18} The Home Rule party was, however, beset by a major obstacle—the Ulster Unionists.

The majority of Protestants or Orangemen objected to


\textsuperscript{17}Halligan, Anglo-Irish Relations 1919-1921, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 26.
Home Rule on three grounds—religious, cultural, and economic. The first and most powerful argument was the religious issue. Religious bigotry had not abated since the Reformation; the Protestant minority feared a Catholic-dominated parliament in which they would be outnumbered. Secondly, the Orangemen were British in outlook and in loyalties. Great Britain was regarded as their mother country—the idea of incorporation into Gaelic Ireland was abhorred. Thirdly, Ulster had prospered since the Act of Union; her linen and cotton mills together with her ship building industry provided employment for a skilled artisan class. Free trade and political union enabled her to send her goods throughout the British Empire. "Ulster businessmen feared that their interests might be jeopardized by the establishment of a farmers' parliament in Dublin. To them, an Irish parliament was tantamount to complete separation on the installment plan."¹⁹

Nevertheless when the Irish sided with the Liberal party in 1910, Home Rule was practically guaranteed. The Asquith government needed the Irish votes in order to have a majority. Another advantage for the Irish was that the House of Lords, which had always defeated any Home Rule measure, was now ineffective as a political body.

However, the Home Rule Bill, if passed, threatened to cause civil war in Britain. The Orangemen set up a Volunteer Army that

would have the paradoxical aim of fighting Britain in order to remain part of Great Britain. British army officers threatened to resign rather than fight their loyal compatriots in Ulster. Heated debates divided England as well as Ireland. Lloyd George stated, "The last days of July, 1914, found the traditional British parties confronting each other in the fiercest political conflict waged since the suppression of the last Jacobite rebellion. The threatened uprising of Ulster against the dominion of an Irish Parliament was not a bluff." In addition Lloyd George pointed out that if bloodshed ensued, there would be no guarantee that it would be confined to Ireland. "There are towns on this side of the channel where it would have been difficult to keep peace if fellow-religionists in Ireland on either side were being slain."

Meanwhile Southern Ireland began to arm with the cry, "If Ireland is cheated once more, there will be red war in Ireland." The issue was one of principle, and for principle the Irish would fight. Twenty-five percent of the population should not be able to dictate to the seventy-five percent. The majority of Irishmen should not suffer at the expense of the minority. In actuality,

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21 Ibid.
only four out of the thirty-two counties in Ireland did not desire Home Rule.

As a logical solution the Asquith government proposed partition. But the Irish would not hear of it. John Redmond speaking for the majority of Irishmen declared, "Partition would create for all time a sharp, internal dividing line between Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants; it would mean the partition and disintegration of our nation." "To that," Redmond declared, "we as Irish Nationalists can never submit." 23

To this complex affair, the Asquith government was drawn into a world war. To unite the Kingdom, the Home Rule Bill was passed though its operation was suspended until after the war. This may have seemed to be a prudent decision, but it enraged Irishmen. "To the Irish Nationalist, one fact had been made plain, the promise of a fraction of liberty which decades of constitutional effort had at last wrung from England was to be thwarted now, with English connivance, to the threats of a small armed force. 24

23 Macardle, Irish Republic, p. 87.
24 Ibid.
CHAPTER II

THE UPRISING

Lloyd George, relating to the initial causes of the Irish Uprising remarked in his Memoirs, "Southern Ireland, seeing its hopes dashed at the moment when they were about to be realized, at first sulked in resentment and soon became a mass of seething disaffection; and, after an interlude of strife and suffering of a deplorable character, it had to be pacified by concessions far more extensive than would have satisfied it in 1914."¹

Both Lloyd George and Asquith admit that from 1914 to 1916 England had made innumerable blunders that radically increased Irish antagonism. When the World War broke out, Redmond immediately pledged Irish support for the British cause. His purpose was the hope of gaining English concessions after the war.

Recruiting in Ireland was led with the anthem of "God Save the King". Both the tune and the significance were an anathema to the Irish; it aroused every instinct of sedition. In addition, Northern Ireland's division was permitted its emblem of the Red Hand of Ulster while South Ireland was denied its

banner of the Irish Harp. This slap in the face crippled every spark of war enthusiasm.  

Bishop O’Dwyer of Limerick summed up Irish feeling in his statement, "This may be a just or unjust war, but any fair-minded man will admit that it is England’s war and not Ireland’s."  

With few Irish recruits, England threatened conscription. This immediately turned Irish discontent into open rebellion. In January of 1916, plans were made for an Easter Uprising. Roger Casement was sent to Germany to procure the needed arms. His mission was successful; the German government promised to send the needed munitions by way of ship during Easter week. However, because of mis-communication, the ship arrived earlier than expected. Consequently no one met the ship. When this discovery had been made, Eion Mac Neill, the nominal head of the I. R. A. (Irish Revolutionary Army) countermanded the order for the Uprising. 

The whole affair would have ended at this point, if it had not been for the leadership of five men, Patrick Pearce, John Mac Dermott, Horace Plunkett, James Connolly, and Thomas Clarke. These men argued that even if the uprising was doomed to failure, it would still arouse the people to a proper sense of their rights and needs.

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2 Ibid., p. 146.
With few arms, orders and counterorders, the insurrection was confined to Dublin. The provincial areas, with few exceptions were completely ignorant of the whole affair.\(^5\)

The insurrection took place on Easter Monday; "By Noon, of that day, the I. R. A. and the citizen army had seized the principal buildings in the city and just missed getting possession of Dublin Castle, the nerve center of British Administration in Ireland." "From the front steps of the conquered post office, Pearce read the Proclamation of the Republic--of which he had been proclaimed president."\(^6\)

The document read:

We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people.\(^7\)

The insurgents fought gallantly for six days against 20,000 British soldiers. On Saturday, Pearce gave the order to surrender; all surrendered but de Valera, who held out until Sunday.

The Easter rising took Ireland by surprise and in general was angrily condemned. "It was looked upon a treason


\(^6\)Ibid., p. 167.

\(^7\)Ibid., p. 168.
by Redmond and his Home Rule movement. Immediately John Redmond cabled a New York paper, Ireland, that "The rising was an attempt to torpedo Home Rule and the Irish Parliamentary Party, with Sinn Fein cranks and German agents at the bottom of it." One of the insurgents, Piaras Beaslai remarked, "On April 30, when we marched helpless, disarmed prisoner through the streets of Dublin, amid the silent or hostile demonstrations of the people, the national outlook seemed black indeed."

If it had not been for additional British blundering, the uprising may have come to naught. The seven signers of the Proclamation of Irish Independence plus the eight leaders of the uprising were shot. The only one spared was de Valera, who was born in the United States and might have possessed American citizenship. In addition, the whole country was put under martial law.

"The fifteen executions and the arrest of 3,000 men and women--many of whom had no connection or even sympathy with the insurrection caused a revulsion of feeling in the Country." 

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11 Ibid.
"Dismay, shock and anger replaced pride, grief and shame.\textsuperscript{12} The men of Easter week became Ireland's new heros and martyrs. The English unknowingly instigated that which they hoped to quell.

In addition, a further incident occurred that unnerved the Irish. General Maxwell, the supreme Commander of the British forces in Ireland, demanded that priests sympathetic with the insurgents be removed from Bishop O'Dwyer's diocese. The Bishop not only refused but condemned the abuses of martial law in Ireland \text"...as one of the worst and blackest chapters in the history of misgovernment in Ireland."\textsuperscript{13} The Bishop's words came as a benediction to Irishmen resolved to continue the Irish struggle.

"In America, the British Embassy was not only picketed, but the press denounced the harsh martial law policies of the British in Ireland. In Central Park, New York, a great Memorial Service was organized by the poet Joyce Kilmer for the Irish martyrs of Easter Monday.\textsuperscript{14} Irish relief agencies were set up all over the United States with forty archbishops and bishops as its patrons.

Added to the turmoil was President Wilson's statement

\textsuperscript{12} Halligan, Anglo-Irish Relations 1921-1949, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{13} Macardle, Irish Republic, p. 163.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 192.
calling for international justice in the Irish affair, of which he believed England’s attitude was a complete repudiation.¹⁵

Protests were heard not only in America, but in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the rest of the dominions. For Irishmen over the world, the uprising of 1916 became a holy war of liberation.

World reaction to the Irish situation took England by surprise. Of all countries, she particularly did not want to offend America, for the Allies were in desperate need of American support. The Battle of Verdun was taking a heavy toll and in the naval battle off Jutland, Britain was faced with the most formidable attack ever sustained by her fleet. Unless America came into the war with fresh resources, the Allies would be faced with the possibility of eventual exhaustion and defeat.

The British Ambassador to America, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, cabled his government, "It is most unfortunate that it has been found necessary to execute the rebels. The attitude towards England has been changed for the worse by recent events in Ireland. . . . If we are able in some measure to settle the Home Rule question at once, the announcement will have a beneficial effect here, although I do not think that anything we can do would conciliate the Irish here. They have blood in their eyes when they look our way."¹⁶

¹⁵Macardle, Irish Republic, p. 192.
¹⁶Ibid.
Among British statesmen, the one who grasped the criticalness of the American-Irish situation most quickly was Lloyd George. In a conversation with William O'Brien and Sir Edward Carson on 30 May, he expressed his apprehension. "The Irish-American vote will go over to the German side," he said, "they will break our blockade and force ignominious peace on us, unless something is done, even provisionally, to satisfy America."\(^{17}\)

Prime Minister Asquith asked Lloyd George if he would give up his position as Munitions Director and take up the task of negotiating a settlement with the Irish Revolutionary leaders. Lloyd George stated in his Memoirs that he could not refuse Asquith's request.\(^{18}\)

Thus on 25 May, Asquith announced in the House of Commons that Lloyd George had been selected to seek a solution for the Irish situation.\(^{19}\) Immediately, the first series of negotiations began.


\(^{18}\) George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 1914-1918*, II, p. 148. (In accepting this position, Lloyd George literally saved his life; for as Minister of Munitions he was to go with Lord Kitchener to Russia for a conference. The ship was blown up off the Scottish coast and Lord Kitchener, together with the remaining crew, was killed. Lloyd George remarked, "I owe my life to Ireland." )

\(^{19}\) *Ibid.*, p. 149.
Before the Irish would meet with Lloyd George, they laid down two preliminary principles that the British Government had to accept before negotiations could proceed. First, the Irish party was to remain in the House in undiminished numbers; second, since it was a war emergency conference, all arrangements were to be temporary. Lloyd George not only accepted these conditions, but incorporated them into articles of agreement. Thus the Southern Irish delegation met with Lloyd George on 25 May, 1916, in London.

After several preliminary meetings, Lloyd George put before the Northern and Southern delegates these proposals:

1. Home Rule should be put into effect immediately.
2. As a strictly war emergency act, six of the nine Ulster counties would be excluded from Home Rule (the Amending Bill).

Lloyd George then proceeded to convince the leaders of Southern and Northern Ireland, John Redmond and Sir Edward Carson, that it was their duty to return to their respective areas and secure the acceptance of these proposals. He impressed them with

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1Hansard, 31 July, 1916, LXXXIV, 2120.
arguments of England's precarious position, their duty as British subjects and the balance of the United States in the world war. Lloyd George asked difficult requests from both delegates.

Ireland was divided up into four provinces, Munster, Leinster, Connacht, and Ulster. Within the North-east province of Ulster, there were nine counties of which five were Catholic and four Protestant. But even within the four Protestant counties, one-third of the population was Catholic. What Lloyd George asked Redmond to do was to convince two Catholic counties (Tyrone and Fermanagh) to incorporate themselves within the Protestant or Orange bloc. Unless such a measure was met, it was believed that the four Protestant counties could not stand alone.

Lloyd George asked as arduous a task from Sir Edward Carson. Carson was to deny Ulster three of its nine county area, thus permitting these counties to incorporate themselves within Southern Ireland. However, Lloyd George gave Carson a convincing argument. If the whole province of Ulster was excluded from Home Rule, the Catholics, since they were in the majority, could, by a provincial vote, re-incorporate themselves into the whole of Ireland. Besides, if Ulster only incorporated two Catholic counties within its sphere of influence, it could not only stand alone, but by its slim Protestant majority, could outvote the Catholic Nationalists. As a clinching statement to his proposal, Lloyd
George promised Carson that if Ulster would agree to six of the nine counties, he would see that this would be a permanent solution.3

Carson demanded assurance from Lloyd George that this was not just to be a temporary solution but a permanent separation of the six counties from Ireland. Lloyd George complied with the following letter:

"Whitehall Place S. W.
"May, 29, 1916.

"My dear Carson,

"I enclose Greer's draft propositions. We must make it clear that at the end of the provisional period Ulster does not, whether she wills it or not, merge in the rest of Ireland.

"Ever Sincerely,
"D. Lloyd George"

Before Redmond left for his difficult duty, he also demanded assurance from Lloyd George that he would keep the bargain, the temporary nature of the six excluded counties from Ireland. "Lloyd George verbally gave his most emphatic assurance, saying he had placed his life upon the table, and would stand or fall by


the agreement come to.\textsuperscript{5} "He assured us that this was the attitude of the Prime Minister."\textsuperscript{6}

Thus both Carson and Redmond headed back to Ireland with two contradictory promises from Lloyd George. Sir Edward Carson had seemingly no difficulty in convincing his colleagues of acceptance of the six-county area, while Redmond and his delegates won acceptance of the terms only \textquotedblleft... by straining our influence to the very utmost. We were very near to being defeated. Our people were against us. We went to our supporters and only by straining our political influence to the breaking point did we succeed in getting the terms accepted.\textsuperscript{7}

However, rumor soon found its way into the press that Lloyd George promised Carson the permanency of the six-county area; this caused anxiety not only in Tyrone and Fermanagh but in all Ireland. Aware of the emergence of a new crisis, Prime Minister Asquith immediately reassured the Irish Nationalists by saying:

\begin{quote}
I will say nothing about the negotiations which are going on under Mr. Lloyd George except that I am certain that all of us wish to those negotiations a successful issue. ... What is desired now is a provisional settlement.\end{quote}

The key word in Asquith's speech was the term provisional; its

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{5}Gwynn, \textit{The History of Partition}. p. 150.
\item \textsuperscript{6}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{7}Hansard, 31 July, 1916, \textit{IXXXXIV}, 2119.
\item \textsuperscript{8}Macardle, \textit{The Irish Republic}. p. 203.
\end{itemize}
effect was immediate. The Nationalist leaders regarded it as a public declaration from the highest authority in Britain (underscoring Lloyd George's emphatic pledges) that the proposals were only temporary. The London Daily News, 16 June, stated, "The Prime Minister's speech has undoubtedly relieved an awkward situation and made it clear that the present basis of settlement is provisional."^0

However, Carson made no public statement in reply to Asquith's speech. Rumors again began to spread about the silence of Carson. The Church of Ireland Gazette remarked:

It is not at all unlikely that into a settlement which involves such a variety of betrayals a little deceit has been imported as well. Mr. Lloyd George may well have told Sir Edward Carson that the settlement is to be permanent and to Mr. Redmond that it is to be temporary.\10

The uncertainty of the situation caused alarm for the people in the counties of Fermanagh and Tyrone; for Catholics in Ulster, unlike the Protestants in Southern Ireland, were the victims of discrimination. However, they would consent to be excluded from Home Rule if two conditions were met. First, if by some guarantee their exclusion was only to be temporary; second, if by their consent to the Protestant bloc, martial law would be replaced by Home Rule in the rest of Ireland.

\10 Gallacher, Indivisible Island, p. 116.
\11 Gallacher, Indivisible Island, p. 117.
Therefore, the importance of the temporary and provisional nature of the proposals was supreme in the eyes of Northern Nationalists. Everyone was anxious to see the outcome of the Ulster Convention. To add to the turmoil, The Irish Times declared in a sharp editorial on the eve of the conference that what Asquith said was false and that Carson was silent because he held a written guarantee. The editorial read:

Did he (Lloyd George) lay the same proposals on two different sets of proposals before the Ulster Unionist Council and the Nationalist Party? Will the Nationalist Conference at Belfast today be asked to vote on the same scheme which the Ulster Council has accepted? ... The Ulster Unionists have been told that the exclusion of the Six Counties is to be permanent. The Nationalists are assured by Mr. Redmond that it will be a provisional and the Prime Minister says Mr. Redmond is right. One might have supposed that the Unionists of Ulster, who are hard men in the matter of business, would have demanded an immediate explanation of this contradiction in terms. We shall tell the public why they have not demanded it. Sir Edward Carson possesses a written promise from Mr. Lloyd George that the exclusion of Ulster is to be permanent. There is no doubt about the terms of this document. It is clear and explicit. It means, if words mean anything, that Ulster is to be excluded from Home Rule 'sacula saculorum,' unless and until of her own free will she makes another choice.12

The editorial caused consternation at the Belfast Conference. When Redmond referred to the Irish Times' statement that partition would be permanent, a shout came from the hall, "Never!" Redmond went on, "I entirely re-echo that cry of 'never'. That statement is a lie. The proposals are temporary and provisional. If they

12Gallagher, Indivisible Island, p. 119.
were not, I would oppose them. If at any time or in any quarter
an attempt is made to turn them into permanent proposals, my
colleagues and I are determined to oppose them in every way.\textsuperscript{13}

Despite the reiteration and positive assurance of Redmond,
the Nationalist members of the assembly were still hesitant to
incorporate themselves within the Orange bloc. "In the end it
needed a threat by Redmond to resign the leadership and end his
life's work, a threat delivered with all the emotional power of
Irish oratory at its best and supported by his colleagues to
secure a favorable vote."\textsuperscript{14}

What Lloyd George had asked the Irish leaders to do had
been accomplished. Both the Nationalists and the Unionists had
accepted his proposals. Now according to promise, Home Rule
should have been granted to the twenty-six counties of Southern
Ireland, while the six counties of Northern Ireland would continue
to be governed by the British Parliament.

However, this was not the case. According to Lloyd
George, "The plan which held out such promise for a settlement
of the ancient grievances of Ireland, and which was accepted by
both parties in Ireland itself, was thereafter deliberately smashed
by extremists on both sides."\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} Gallagher, \textit{Indivisible Island}, p. 119.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} Lloyd George, \textit{War Memoirs of David Lloyd George 1914-1918},
II, 153.
The extremists Lloyd George was talking about were from the threats of a radical group of Irish Nationalists and from the disgruntlement of five Unionist peers, one of which (Lord Shelborne) resigned his post as President of the Board of Agriculture in protest. Thus Lloyd George maintained that in light of the hostile forces against Home Rule, a re-evaluation of the whole situation would be necessary.

From the Irish point of view, Lloyd George never intended to grant Home Rule, or in fact, to grant any concessions to Ireland at this time. His purpose was twofold: First, he wanted to satisfy America that something was being done to solve the Irish problem; second, he had counted on either Northern or Southern Ireland rejecting his proposals.

The Nationalists believed that Lloyd George had secretly conferred with the Unionists and therefore was more anxious that Southern Ireland would reject his proposals. However, to his and his colleagues embarrassment, both sides had said, "yes". Had either said, "no", British war propaganda in the United States would have taken the line that the British Government had been ready to settle the Irish problem, but the Irish could not agree among themselves. Therefore, the British would be justified in handling the situation as they saw fit.¹⁶

¹⁶Gallagher, The Indivisible Island, p. 120.
The next day the London Daily News and the London Daily Chronicle expressed surprise at the British government refusing her own proposals. The Daily Chronicle reported:

Certainly no one anticipated that when Mr. Redmond, Sir Edward Carson, and Mr. Devlin had come to terms—their agreement would be repudiated from the British side.¹⁷

On 11 July, 1916, Lloyd George's position was made apparent. First he demanded that the Irish delegates leave the British Parliament. The Irish maintained the reasoning behind this maneuver was obvious; without the Irish representatives in Parliament, Britain could secure a more favorable treaty for herself. Second, Lloyd George demanded that the six counties of Northern Ireland must be under the British Crown or Ireland would be denied Home Rule.¹⁸

Remond made an immediate protest, reminding the British Cabinet of the assurances that it had guaranteed Ireland upon its entrance into negotiations. Redmond declared in the House of Commons on 24 July, 1916, that England was handling the Irish affair with no consultation with Irish representatives. He remarked that when he protested, he was snubbed and informed that the Cabinet would consult him when it felt that it was necessary.¹⁹

Lloyd George, in reply to Redmond's speech, admitted that

¹⁷Gallagher, The Indivisible Island, p. 120.
¹⁸Ibid.
¹⁹Ibid.
he had made proposals of a temporary and provisional nature. "However," he said, "the Tories in the Cabinet found it impossible to support the proposals." He then went on to explain the changes (virtually the whole agreement) that had been altered.

Lloyd George ended his speech by insinuating that if negotiations broke down it would not be the fault of the British; for the British were willing to grant Home Rule if the Irish were willing to accept partition.

More than likely Lloyd George knew that Redmond and Dillon could not persuade their fellow countrymen to accept partition in order that they might have Home Rule and that Ulster might stand alone. Lloyd George, satisfied that the Irish would not accept partition, said: "I deeply regret it. . . . They know their own country, they know its difficulties, they know the conditions. It is for them to decide. The Government ought not and will not force (Home Rule) upon them." Even though negotiations broke down, Lloyd George seems to have gained these objectives. America was pacified that something was being done about the Irish situation. British propaganda demonstrated that a solution had been found and now it was the problem of the Irish to agree among themselves. Secondly, the grudging assent that Lloyd George got for a temporary

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21Ibid., p. 14434.
partition could be used with deadly effect at future negotiations. Thirdly, that Home Rule could continue to be denied until Britain was in a more favorable atmosphere to negotiate.

Another result that came of these negotiations was the fact that not only did Redmond and Dillon lose their position of influence, but that the Sinn Fein movement now overshadowed the Home Rule party. Sinn Feiners, as the Fenians of 1867, were determined to be done with British rule.

Before Redmond and Dillon returned to Ireland, they put in the House record the fact that they had been deceived. Dillon said, "I am bound to say that the consequences of this breach of faith with us puts an end to all prospects of a settlement. . . . You (the British Cabinet) have struck a deadly blow at the whole future government of Ireland. How will you ever get the Irish people to have confidence in the terms and words of British Ministers? What must be the opinion of the Irish people that does that kind of thing?" 

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23 Ibid., 2124.
CHAPTER IV

NEGOTIATIONS 1917-1919

Within a month after the collapse of the 1916 negotiations, another incident occurred that re-enkindled Anglo-Irish animosity. Sir Roger Casement, who negotiated arms for the 1916 uprising, was sentenced to death for treason. The irony of the situation was that Casement was tried by an Orangeman, who himself had threatened treason against the British Crown if Home Rule had been given to Ireland in 1914.

Casement’s last speech was full of Irish patriotism and nationalism. With his execution, Casement became the last hero and martyr of the 1916 uprising. His speech read:

Let me pass from myself and my own fate to a far more pressing, as it is a far more urgent theme— not the individual Irishman who may have tried and failed, but the claim and the fate of the country that has not failed. Ireland has outlived the failure of all her hopes— and yet she still hopes. Ireland has seen her sons— aye, and her daughters, too— suffer from generation to generation always for the same cause, meeting always the same fate, and always at the hands of the same power; and always a fresh generation has passed on to withstand the same oppression. For if English authority be omnipotent— a power, as Mr. Gladstone phrased it, that reaches to the very ends of the earth— Irish hope exceeds the dimensions of that power, excels its authority and renews with each generation the claims of the last. The cause that begets this indomitable persistency, the faculty of preserving through centuries of misery the remembrance of lost liberty, this surely, is the noblest cause men ever strove for, ever lived for,
ever died for. If this be the cause I stand here today in a goodly company and a right noble succession.  

By 1917, the chaotic situation in Ireland was becoming a real problem for the British. There were more Irish rebels in British jails and camps than the government knew how to control. In addition, England found herself in a paradoxical situation. She was governing Ireland as a conquered country and yet calling for conscription in Ireland to defend the fatherland. She emphasized President Wilson's statement that the war was being fought to preserve the rights of small nations and yet her military presence in Ireland seemed to contradict it.

"Prime Minister Asquith felt obliged on 18 October, 1916, to admit stupidities and blunders of his government in the Irish situation." It was not long before a shake-up in the British government caused a change in administration. But from the Irish viewpoint the political situation went from bad to worse. In the coalition government, Lloyd George became the new Prime Minister; Edward Carson became the First Lord of the Admiralty, and Bonar Law, the Conservative leaders and a staunch Orangeman became Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of Commons.

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1 The Times (London), 1 August, 1916.
2 Macardle, Irish Republic, p. 203.
3 Ibid., p. 203.
4 Ibid., p. 204.
With this new political situation, Irishmen believed nothing could come from negotiation. Total independence became the cry.

With the recurring news of Irish rebels dying for liberty, protests again poured into Britain from her Dominions and from America. Lloyd George's reaction was twofold. He denounced Carson and his colleagues as "madmen", and claimed that he had been trying to settle the Irish question in spite of them. Secondly, he proposed these measures to Redmond to reopen negotiations:

1. Britain would establish Home Rule immediately for twenty-six counties; the Six Ulster counties to remain part of the United Kingdom and to be governed direct from London for five years after which Parliament would reconsider the question. A Council of Ireland would be set up on which the Six Counties and the Twenty-Six would have equal representation to deal with questions common to both areas.

2. Alternatively, that a Convention of Irishmen of all parties be assembled for the purpose of procuring a scheme of Irish self-government... for the purpose of drafting a Constitution for their country.

Redmond rejected the first proposal on the grounds that the time for even a temporary division of Ireland had passed. He accepted the second proposal with the stipulation that what the Convention decided would be made law.

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5 Halligan, Anglo-Irish Relations 1921-1949. p. 43.
On 21 May, 1917, Lloyd George in the House of Commons gave the following pledge to Redmond:

The Government is prepared to say this: that if substantial agreement should be reached by the Convention for the future Government of Ireland within the Empire, they will accept the responsibility for taking all the necessary steps to enable the Imperial Parliament to give legislative effect to the conclusions of the Convention.\(^7\)

Redmond agreed to the proposed Convention. But as has been previously stated in a series of by-elections, the Irish turned against Redmond's Home Rule party in favor of the Sinn Fein movement and independence. Even the Sinn Fein party had moved from moderate to radical views. At the Sinn Fein Convention of 25-27 October, 1917, the party elected Eamon de Valera to construct a new constitution and to form a republic. The former president, Arthur Griffith, believed that a republic was not in the realm of possibility, but acquiesced in order not to split the organization.\(^8\)

Lloyd George maintained that the representatives to the Convention should be carefully selected and nominated. Thus of the one hundred proposed delegates, only five were to represent Ireland's major party—Sinn Fein. The remaining ninety-five members were to be selected from Ireland's mayors, urban representatives, Southern Unionists, Ulster Unionists, church

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\(^7\)Hansard, 21 May, 1917, LXXXIII, 1998.

\(^8\)Macardle, Irish Republic. p. 245.
representatives, labor representatives, and minority groups. It was as the New York Times described it, "a hand picked body."  

The Sinn Fein party stipulated that it would only join the Convention if the Convention had the right to declare itself independent. This condition was refused, and the Sinn Fein did not accept membership.

Even with the elimination of the radicals from the Convention, Lloyd George assured Carson, as he had done in 1916, that his delegation need not agree to any decision the Convention might take. "On Ulster's say so, Britain would refuse to implement the Convention's findings." Sir Edward Carson declared that Lloyd George stated that Lloyd George guaranteed him these three points:

1. That unless the Ulster Unionists agree with the proposals at the Convention, nothing could come of it.
2. That their position was not to be prejudiced by going into the Convention.
3. That he (Lloyd George) adhered to the statement that there should be no coercion of Ulster.

In the opinion of the Irish historian Frank Gallagher, here again was the revival of the veto of the minority over the decisions of the majority. On the one hand the British Prime

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11 Ibid., p. 293.
Minister had set up a Constituent Assembly to pass into law whatever findings on which the Assembly had "substantial agreement". At the same time, he gave "specific pledges", in the name of the same Government, to a small Irish minority that no legislation could be made without their acceptance. To measure the extraordinary nature of the Ulster veto, one has but to recall that the Ulster Unionist Council was to nominate only five delegates of a Convention of one hundred members.

However, Lloyd George's secret pledges to Carson remained private. There was no rumor of intrigue.

The Convention met with the enthusiasm of Lloyd George's promise. "The Imperial Parliament will give legislative effect to the conclusions of the substantial agreement of the Convention." The Convention sat for eight months and surveyed the whole field of Irish self-government--in its national, political, financial, judicial, and general aspects. It came to its main conclusions by decisive majorities.

The proposal for the establishment of an Irish Parliament was passed by a vote of 51 to 18; that this Parliament would have authority over all Ireland was passed by a vote of 51 to 19. A bill that was introduced to exclude Ulster from the rest of

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12 Gallagher, Indivisible Island, p. 130.
13 Ibid.
Ireland was rejected by a vote of 52 to 19, a majority of 73 percent.\textsuperscript{15}

Other remarkable facts that appeared in the voting tallies were: the Unionists of twenty-six out of the thirty-two counties, who, as their name implies, had opposed the national demand for self-government since the passing of the Union in 1800, now accepted the majority view and pressed Ireland's claim for a National Parliament, though within the Empire and subject to the Imperial Parliament in London. Secondly, several prominent Belfast Labor Leaders signed a statement to the effect that an all-Ireland Parliament would be in the best interest of Labor.\textsuperscript{16}

It was therefore no exaggeration of the Convention's Chairman, Horace Plunkett, to report of an "Irish agreement unprecedented in history" to the British Government. Lloyd George's hand-picked Assembly had voted for Home Rule and had soundly voted against partition. Among the signers against partition were such pro-British spokesmen as the Earl of Middleton, the Earl of Desart, Lord Dunraven, Lord Cranmore and Browne, the Earl of Mayo, His Grace Dr. Crozier, Archbishop of Armagh and Protestant Primate of all Ireland; His Grace Dr. Bernard,


\textsuperscript{16}Gallagher, Indivisible Island. p. 132.
Protestant Bishop of Dublin, Dr. Mahaffy, the Provost of Trinity College.\textsuperscript{17}

As the Convention reached finality, Redmond learned of Lloyd George's secret promise to Carson. He exclaimed, "This explains the extraordinary attitude of the Ulstermen in the sub-committees."\textsuperscript{18} He then prophesied that nothing would come of the Convention. As another crisis neared, Lloyd George asked that a representative delegation meet with him in London.

On 13 February, 1918, the Irish delegates were received with an address by Lloyd George that, "Afterwards, no two delegates were ever agreed on the actual words or even the meaning of the Prime Minister's utterances."\textsuperscript{19}

In the ensuing discussions, Lloyd George learned how substantial the agreement was reached by all but one section. He also learned that the Nationalists were divided on the single major point of whether the proposed Parliament should have control of Irish Customs or not (all were agreed on the control of Excise).

Within a few weeks Lloyd George wrote to Horace Plunkett stating that his government could not act upon the Convention's findings for several reasons. First, that a substantial agree-

\textsuperscript{17}Gallagher, \textit{Indivisible Island}, p. 132.


\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 132.
ment had not been reached, since Ulster was not in accord. Second, that a settlement must not only be made within the Empire, but must be made without disturbing "the fundamental unity of the United Kingdom". His statement came to mean that Britain would accept an Irish Parliament with certain restrictions. However, the delegates believed that these restrictions nullified the whole purpose of a separate Parliament. Third, in view of Britain's precarious situation in the World War, England would not act upon any measure that might excite strong opposition in Great Britain. Strong opposition meant the act of Ireland taxing itself in war time. His statement read:

It would be practically impossible to make such a disturbance of the fiscal and financial relations of Great Britain and Ireland in the midst of a great war. It might also be incompatible with that federal re-organization of the United Kingdom in favor of which there is a growing body of opinion.  

Although Lloyd George's reasons were perfectly logical from the English viewpoint, the Irish were incensed. They questioned why Lloyd George had called for a convention if he refused to act upon its findings. In anticipation of this question, Lloyd George promised to bring in legislation at a later date based upon the Convention's report.

Events may have been stabilized in Ireland, had not the English again threatened conscription. England was faced with

a draft shortage and consequently began to draft men in their forties and fifties. These men protested and demanded that the young men of Ireland be conscripted in their place. Pressure began to build and Lloyd George took steps to draft Irishmen.

However, when the Irish learned of Lloyd George's intention, resistance intensified. To threaten conscription with the collapse of two attempts at negotiation, with no political freedom, and with martial law in Ireland was too much. Protests came from every branch of Irish society.

Labor protested by a general strike over all of Ireland except Belfast on 23 April, 1918. Shops, factories, trains, and trams were suspended while orderly throngs of working people walked about the streets. No newspapers appeared in the south or west. All licensed premises were closed. In large hotels, guests were obliged to attend to their own needs. Hackney-cab drivers refused to take people to the Punchestown Races, even when offered fares up to ten pounds.

Even the Catholic Bishops made a stand against conscription; their statement read:

We consider that Conscription forced in this way upon Ireland is an oppressive and inhuman law which the Irish people have a right to resist by every means that are consonant with the law of God.

Finally, de Valera, as head of the Sinn Fein movement

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22. The Bishop's Manifesto, April, 1918, as given in Dorthy Macardle's, Irish Republic, p. 250.
directly threatened war, if Irishmen were conscripted. He made
this announcement:

Taking our stand on Ireland's separate and distinct
nationhood and affirming the principle of liberty that the
government of nations derive their just powers from the
consent of the governed, we deny the right of the British
Government or any external authority to impose compulsory
military service in Ireland against the clearly expressed
will of the Irish people. The passing of the Conscription
Bill by the British House of Commons must be regarded as
a declaration of war on the Irish nation.23

Fearful of a more violent uprising, Lloyd George formally
backed down on conscription. However, he sent Lord French into
Ireland as the new martial law commander and ordered him to either
recruit Irishmen or shoot them as rebels.24 In the remaining
eight months of the war, there were more imprisonments than
shootings of Irish rebels.

With the end of the World War, Home Rule, according to
the 1914 statute, was to be granted to Ireland. However, Lloyd
George announced that with the hostile attitude in Ireland, Home
Rule would be out of the question.25

Within a few weeks after the war (27 December, 1918), a
general election took place throughout the United Kingdom. Lloyd
George banned the Sinn Fein party in Ireland as a fanatical
movement among a small minority. Britain maintained a rigorous
censorship throughout Ireland, suppressing all Republican papers

23Macardle, Irish Republic, p. 250.
24Ibid.
25Ibid., p. 263.
and magazines. Although all newspapers were censored, the Sinn Fein delegates managed to get their views heard by distributing leaflets. Their aims were twofold:

1. The withdrawal of Irish Representatives from the British Parliament, and by denying the right and opposing the will of the British Government or any other foreign government to legislate for Ireland.

2. By making use of any and every means available to render impotent the power of England to hold Ireland in subjection by military force or otherwise.

Through the years English propaganda had swept through the United States representing Irish Republicanism (Sinn Fein) as a party already discredited and defeated. Consequently the election was viewed with extreme interest in America, as in the rest of the Irish world.

The results of the election showed that the people had voted for Sinn Fein by a majority of seventy percent. The (London) Times maintained that, "The Sinn Fein movement won by a landslide." In fact, no English Party had ever received from the electors of Great Britain a majority so overwhelming as the Irish people had given to Sinn Fein.

26 The Manifesto of Sinn Fein, as prepared for circulation of the General Election of December, 1918. As in Dorthy Macardle's Irish Republic, pp. 919-921.

27 Macardle, Irish Republic. p. 265.


The British government did not deny the overwhelming demand for independence, but just ignored it. However, the newly elected Sinn Fein candidates did not; they regarded the ballot returns as a mandate from the Irish people for a "de facto" government of their own. On 7 January, 1919, the Irish Parliament of Dail Eireann was set up as the Independent Constitution Assembly of the Irish Nation. Since England refused to set up an Irish Parliament, the Irish did it themselves.

On 21 January, Dail Eireann met to declare its independence from Britain. The Irish Declaration of Independence maintained that for seven hundred years the Irish people had never ceased to repudiate the foreign usurpation of their country. English rule has always been based upon force and fraud and maintained by military occupation against the declared will of the people. Therefore the Irish people are resolved to secure and maintain its independence in order to promote the common weal, to ensure peace at home and good will with all nations and to constitute a national policy based upon the people's will with equal right and equal opportunity for every citizen. "We solemnly declare foreign government in Ireland to be an invasion of our national right which we will never tolerate and we demand the evacuation of our country by the English Garrison." 30

30 Declaration of Irish Independence, 21 January, 1919, as in Dorthy Macardle's Irish Republic, p. 168. For full declaration see the Appendix.
The new president and vice-president of Ireland were Eamonn de Valera and Arthur Griffith, respectively. However, both these men, plus one half of the members of the Dail Eireann, were in British jails. Thus the British Government continued its policy of ignoring the operations of Sinn Fein.

Nevertheless, the operations of Dail Eireann became exceedingly successful. By May of 1920, landowners, merchants, and the laboring class were appealing to the Dail to enforce law and order— which the British could no longer guarantee. In almost all respects but recognition, Sinn Fein became the government of Ireland.

Although Irish delegates continued to ask for a hearing at the Versailles Peace Conference, they were refused. England maintained that the Irish situation was a domestic affair and would not tolerate foreign intervention or interference. She likened it to the American Civil War.

A final appeal was made to President Wilson, to remind him of his own declaration, that every nation has a right to self-determination. The President replied:

You have touched on the great metaphysical tragedy of today. When I gave utterance to those words I said them without the knowledge that nationalities existed which are coming to us day after day. Of course, Ireland's case, from the point of view of population, from the point of view of the struggle it has made, from the point of interest it has excited among our own people, whom I am anxious to serve, is the outstanding case of a small nationality. You do not know and cannot appreciate
the anxieties I have experienced as the result of these many millions of peoples having their hopes raised by what I have said.31

The period from 1917-1919 marked the emergence of an Anglo-Irish war with 12,589 British raids on private homes and Irish counter-attacks and hunger strikes. However, in August of 1919, real war broke out when the British attempted to suppress the Dail Eireann.32

Britain now freed from World War commitments attempted to crush the lingering Irish rebellion. Tanks, artillery, and 50,000 troops swarmed into Ireland. "The army of occupation would cost England ten million, eight hundred thousand pounds a year."33 According to a newspaper correspondent, Dublin looked like occupied Belgium with hundreds of tanks, armoured cars, and motor lorries.

To face this opposition, the Irish Republican Army, assembled 15,000 men; there was no hope of defeating the British in battle, so guerrilla tactics were devised. The main unit of operation was the "flying column" in which a group of men organized themselves into small parties to harass the enemy. Occasionally

33 Ibid.
they banded together and found engagements involving up to one
hundred men, but ordinarily their plan was this:

1. Shooting the British police.
2. Shooting civilians engaged in the British service.
3. Ambushing British troops.
4. Shooting persons suspected of having given
   information to the British forces.
5. Destruction, by arson or other means, of public
   or private property, roads and bridges.
6. General espionage and reprisals.34

The most deadly unit of all was "the Squad" under Michael
Collins' personal direction. It consisted of twelve men operating
full time and paid four pounds, ten shillings a week.35 These
men were responsible for the most dramatic killings in Dublin
in which dangerous G-men, secret service agents, spies, and com-
mon informers were "removed". In retrospect, it was the work of
these men that finally crippled the British Intelligence system
in Ireland.

While the guerrilla war was intensifying, de Valera
escaped from his English prison and proceeded to America where he
hoped to gain contributions for the Irish cause. His mission was
amazingly successful. From New York to San Francisco, he was
received with honors normally reserved for the Heads of State.
Crowds overflowed at his talks from coast to coast. Everywhere
resolutions were passed expressing sympathy for the Irish cause
and many meetings called upon the United States Government to

34 James O'Connor, History of Ireland 1798-1924 (New York:
35 Ibid.
recognize the Republic of Ireland. Recognition was not forthcoming, but money was; de Valera returned to Ireland with contributions in the millions.\textsuperscript{36}
CHAPTER V

THE BLACK AND TANS: PARTITION, AND THE KING'S CALL TO PEACE

Lord French, who had been the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in Ireland, was assassinated in County Cork in 1919. To replace him, the British Government appointed Sir Nevil Macready, whose duty was, "To suppress the rebellion by whatever means may be requisite."¹

To accomplish this task a new type of force was recruited. The English press advertised for a mercenary army that would be paid ten shillings a day.² The men who enlisted, "... helped to relieve England of a very dangerous type of unemployable, men of low mentality whose primitive instincts had been aroused by the war and who were now difficult to control."³ When these men arrived in Ireland, they were dressed in khaki coats with black trousers and caps, thus they were labeled the Black and Tans.

With the arrival of the Black and Tans, the barbarity of the war developed. Both sides mastered tactics that shocked

¹Macardle, Irish Republic, p. 396.
²Ibid., p. 397.
³Ibid., p. 378.
the world. Tortures were developed that burned prisoners, bashed in skulls, and tore hearts, tongues, and other organs out. The Black and Tans hoped to panic-stricken the population into submission, while the I. R. A. hoped to prove to the British that Ireland could not be subdued.

As in any war, innocent people were killed and no place was sacred. Homes, churches, schools, and convents were raided, and frequently inhabitants were shot.

During the war, Ireland's economy was severely crippled. Factories, creameries, and shops were burned. When the Black and Tans destroyed Irish farms, the I. R. A. burned English castles. A group of the I. R. A. organized themselves in England and when a signal was transmitted to them, an English castle with all of its priceless art objects went up in flames. The English press and people were outraged at such devious means of reprisal. However, after the fourth castle was burned, Irish farms were spared. 4

Although no part of Ireland was untouched by violence, the Catholics in Ulster suffered the worst effects of the war. Orangemen labeled Catholics, "Sinn Feiners" (which most of them were), and forced them at gun point to leave their homes and belongings and migrate to South Ireland. Their houses were burned and many small towns in Ulster would not tolerate one Catholic

to remain. A London Daily News correspondent reported that:

Since the early days of the German invasion of Belgium, when I witnessed the Civil evacuation of Alost and the flight from Ostend I had seen nothing more pathetic than the Irish migration.5

In the latter part of August, 1920, over one hundred Catholic homes in Belfast were burned. The destruction of property was prodigious. But there were too many Catholics in Belfast to force a mass migration, for they numbered over 100,000.6 Nevertheless, Catholics were forced into ghettos and 5,000 Catholic workmen found themselves jobless in the Belfast shipyards.7

From 24 August, to 3 September, 1920, thirty-one civilians, mostly Catholics, were shot in Ulster.8 In addition a political test was instituted before any Catholic could apply for a job. As a result, the rest of Ireland boycotted Ulster's goods until the political test was removed.

As the religious-political situation intensified in Ulster as in the rest of Ireland, a growing minority of Englishmen led by Belloc and Chesterton, demanded an end to the war. The English press also began to put pressure on the government to negotiate. The fact that the British had not reduced the Irish to despair during these hard years was due to the incalculable moral and

5Macardle, Irish Republic. p. 385.
6Ibid.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
material support of America. As a solution to the Ulster problem and possibly to the whole Irish question, the British government introduced a measure called, "A Bill for the Better Government of Ireland"; it has since been known as the Partition Act.

The British Government stated that the purpose of the Partition Act was to supersede the Home Rule Bill of 1914. The question of partition was finally resolved when two parliaments were devised for North and South Ireland. The majority of the six-county area of Ulster was satisfied, however, South Ireland was not. They had moved from Home Rule to complete independence two years previously. The Irish argued that the limited amount of power in the 1914 Home Rule Bill might have been acceptable then, but it definitely was not now. They had suffered too much to be satisfied with a token amount of freedom and "de facto" partition. Nevertheless, the British Government passed the Government for Ireland Act on 23 December, 1920.9 The struggle for independence went on.

As the government of Northern Ireland began to take shape, Southern Ireland was making a stronger impression than ever on its opponents; yet, it was suffering from increasing difficulties. One-third of the I. R. A.'s forces (5,000) were in British prisons. Another 1,500 were serving terms of penal servitude. Ammunition was running short and the weather of 1921 proved to be extremely

9Gallagher, The Indivisible Island, p. 146.
dry, enabling the British to travel on the mountain roads and carry out large sweeping operations with increasing success.

The British were also running into increased difficulties. The I. R. A. was resorting to burning and to destroying government property. Invaluable information on taxing and custom reports went up in flames; thus the British found it increasingly difficult to govern Ireland. In addition, the was was a heavy expense on England, especially just after emerging from a world war. Besides there seemed to be no end to the war, even though the British were in possession of Ireland's major cities, the people would not be subdued.

To this stalemate, King George visited Northern Ireland on the formal opening of the first Parliamentary session, (22 June, 1921). His address was characterized by obvious emotion and deep concern. He appealed, "To all Irishmen to pause, to stretch out the hand of forbearance and conciliation, to forgive and forget."

He hoped that his coming to Ireland might be the first step towards the end of strife in Ireland. He concluded by saying, "May this historic gathering be the prelude of the day in which the Irish people, North and South, under one parliament or two, as those parliaments may decide, shall work together in

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10 "Ireland," Round Table. II (September, 1921), pp. 67-68.
common love for Ireland upon the sure foundation of mutual justice and respect."^[11]

The Cabinet utilized this opportunity to try a new course of action. "On June 24, 1921, Lloyd George sent invitations to de Valera and to Sir James Craig the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, to a conference in London, to explore to the utmost the possibility of a settlement."^[12]

11"Ireland", *Round Table*, II (September, 1921), pp. 767-768.

CHAPTER VI
CORRESPONDENCE FOR NEGOTIATIONS

The letter de Valera received from Lloyd George did not lay down preliminary conditions to re-open negotiations. His letter simply stated that the British government:

... felt it incumbent upon them to make a final appeal... for a conference between themselves and the representatives of Southern and Northern Ireland. I write, therefore, to convey the following invitation to you as the chosen leader of the great majority in Southern Ireland, and to Sir James Craig, the Premier of Northern Ireland. (1) That you should attend a conference here in London in company with Sir James Craig to explore to the utmost possibility of a settlement. (2) That you should bring with you for the purpose any colleagues whom you may select.\(^1\)

However, in accepting an invitation for a conference de Valera set forth two conditions that he considered fundamental for a lasting peace: attainment of the 'essential unity' of Ireland (no partition) and recognition of the principle of national self-determination.\(^2\)

Both sides came to agree that no successful negotiations could be carried on without a cessation of bloodshed, so a truce was signed on 8 July, 1921, that ended the Irish stalemate. In

\(^1^\) "Ireland," Round Table. II (September, 1921), pp. 767-768.

\(^2^\) De Valera to Lloyd George, 28 June, 1921, in "Ireland," Round Table. XI (September, 1921), pp. 768-769.
the two-year span since the arrival of the Black and Tans (1919-1921), Irish casualties mounted to 1,600 killed or wounded while British casualties numbered 1,800. Of all Ireland, Ulster, by her civil war, within a war, suffered the worst casualties, 2,450 Irish Catholics and Protestants were killed or wounded.  

Lloyd George's invitation to Sir James Craig, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, met with a prompt refusal unless de Valera first recognized the political entity of Ulster. Besides Craig believed that he had not only British backing on partition, but Ulster's position might be put into jeopardy by entering into further negotiations. 

"When the Irish delegation arrived, Lloyd George was full of friendliness and flattery, telling de Valera that the British needed a Celt to run Irish affairs."  

As he showed de Valera through Parliament, he came to the Cabinet room where he pointed out the various chairs of the Commonwealth, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and a vacant chair, indicating the possibility of Ireland's new status. But de Valera remained unimpressed.  

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6 Ibid., p. 54.
"Afterwards Lloyd George stated that negotiating with de Valera was like trying to pick up mercury with a fork. De Valera answered that if he had filled up the gaps and used a spoon he might have succeeded."7

Realizing that de Valera was not another John Redmond, Lloyd George got down to business. Dominion status, subject to these limitations, was offered to Ireland immediately. First, that the Royal Navy should alone control the seas around Ireland and Ireland must accord to it such rights and liberties . . . as are essential for naval purposes in the Irish harbors and on the Irish coast. The second limited the size of any Irish territorial force. The third demanded for Great Britain rights and liberties on Irish soil in regard to facilities for aviation for both defence and communications. The fourth hoped Ireland would contribute in proportion to her wealth to the regular naval, military, and air forces of the Empire and permit the voluntary recruitment for these forces . . . throughout Ireland.

The fifth limitation demanded that no protective duties or other restrictions be imposed on the flow of transport, trade, and commerce between all parts of these islands. And the sixth paragraph demanded that the Irish people shall agree to assume responsibility for a share of the present debt of the United Kingdom.

7Gallagher, Anglo-Irish Treaty, p. 54.
and of the liability of pensions arising out of the Great War. ⁸

In addition, the proposals concluded with carefully phrased paragraphs which included a clause tantamount to acceptance of the permanent partition of Ireland. The clause stated:

That any settlement must allow for full recognition of the existing powers and privileges of the Parliament and Government of Northern Ireland, which can not be abrogated except by their own consent.⁹

"De Valera immediately rejected the proposals. Lloyd George threatened war. De Valera, reaching for his hat, said, 'We are ready for it.' Lloyd George, changing his tune, threatened to publish the offer at once so that the Irish people might see what they were losing. De Valera countered with the statement that he would at once publish his rejection and his reason for it."¹⁰

As a stalemate again threatened, Lloyd George asked de Valera if he would give a considered reply to the offer.¹¹ De Valera answered that he would submit the proposals to his Cabinet and the Dail, and write him the outcome.

Thus began the test of will, wit, and endurance. Both

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⁹Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁰Gallagher, Anglo-Irish Treaty, p. 56.

¹¹Ibid., p. 56.
men were brilliant, intensely patriotic, and each was convinced that his cause was just. Thirteen letters and telegrams passed back and forth before an agreement could be made on the nature of negotiations.

On 10 August, President de Valera replied to Lloyd George confirming the fact that his proposals were unacceptable to both his Irish ministers and the Dail Eireann. The letter went on to say that Ireland's destiny could best be realized in political detachment from imperialistic entanglements that would involve herself in ruinous wars, crushing burdens and social unrest which such entanglements inevitably meant. Ireland wanted to be independent, threatening no nation and to be free from aggression.  

The letter then dealt with the proposed "Dominion status" which Ireland claimed to be illusory. "The freedom which the British Dominions enjoy is not so much the result of legal enactments or treaties as of the immense distances which separate them from Britain and have made interference by her impractical. The most explicit guarantees, including the Dominions' right to secede, would be necessary to secure for Ireland an equal degree of freedom. There is no suggestion, however, in the proposals made, of any such guarantees."  

In regard to partition, de Valera wrote:

We cannot admit the right of the British Government to mutilate our country, either in its own interest or at the call of any section of our population. We do not contemplate the use of force. If your Government stands aside, we can effect a complete reconciliation.¹⁴

Finally de Valera proposed a solution to the complex affair; he advocated a type of free association that would unite an unpartitioned Ireland with the British Commonwealth. This he said, would satisfy the allegiance of the present dissenting minority (Ulster).¹⁵

Lloyd George, in reply, emphasized the point that no British Government could acknowledge the claim of Ireland’s right to secede from the United Kingdom. Ireland should recognize the force of geographical and historical facts which govern the problem of Anglo-Irish relations. "The conditions of the proposed settlement (the restrictions of Dominion status in Ireland) do not arise from any desire to force our will upon people of another race, but from facts which are as vital to Ireland’s welfare as to our own. They contain no derogation from Ireland’s status as a Dominion, no desire for British ascendency over Ireland, and no impairment of Ireland’s national ideals."¹⁶

Two days later, de Valera answered Lloyd George’s letter

¹⁵ Ibid.
by stating that Ireland was a nation that has never submitted voluntarily to British rule and consequently owed no allegiance. Now the Irish government is asked to accept the principle of "geographic propinquity" by which Ireland's rights as a nation are obliterated. "If a small nation's right to independence is forfeit when a more powerful neighbor covets its territory then there is an end to liberty." Holland and Denmark should be made subservient to Germany, Belgium to France, and Portugal to Spain.

"In Ireland's case, to speak of her seceding from a partnership she has not accepted, or from a partnership she has not undertaken to render, is fundamentally unjust. To neither can we, as the representatives of the Nation, lend countenance." Yet to keep open the possibility of negotiation, de Valera added that peace can be secured if England will consent to the principle of government by the consent of the governed. To that end the, "Dail Eireann is ready to appoint its representatives."

Lloyd George declared that the British Government was profoundly disappointed with the Irish attitude. In demanding that Ireland be treated as a separate sovereign with no allegiance to the Crown or to the sister nations in the Commonwealth, the

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17 Correspondence Relating to Proposals of His Majesty's Government for an Irish Settlement. Cmd. 1502, p. 27.
18 Ibid., p. 27.
19 Ibid.
Irish leaders were asking more than all her most famous leaders from Gratton to Parnell and Redmond. She was asking more than His Majesty's Government could give. Having deplored the lack of progress towards a basis for negotiation, Lloyd George ended his letter with this significant sentence: "If you are prepared to examine how far these considerations can be reconciled with the aspirations which you represent, I shall be happy to meet you and your colleagues." 20

This was the first time that Lloyd George was willing to concede the prerequisite of allegiance before another conference could be held. This concession was what de Valera was waiting for. In his reply to Lloyd George, 31 August, 1921, de Valera stated that the past proposals were only based on the British view: "They were not an invitation to Ireland to enter into a 'free and willing' partnership with the free nations of the British Commonwealth." 21 But were an invitation for Ireland to enter into a form of Dominion status that was far inferior to that of other Dominions. Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand, all had guarantees against the domination of the major state, not only by constitutional controls but by the thousands of miles that separated them from Great Britain.


21 Ibid., p. 29.
Ireland would have neither the guarantees of distance nor right.\textsuperscript{22}

De Valera concluded with the same statement as before, that Ireland should be governed by the principle of government by the consent of the governed. "On this basis and this only (do) we see a hope of reconciliation; and on this basis we are ready at once to appoint plenipotentiaries."\textsuperscript{23}

Lloyd George, in contrast to his immediate replies to de Valera's other letters, was silent for a week. Then came his reply from Inverness, Scotland. It still said that the British Government could not accept an interpretation of 'government by the consent of the governed' which would mean the setting up of an independent Republic and thus repudiate the allegiance of the Crown; but it did say that if de Valera had objections to the British proposals, as prejudicing Irish freedom, why not bring those objections to the conference table? The last paragraph of his 7 September, letter read:

You will agree that this correspondence has lasted long enough. His Majesty's Government must therefore ask for a definite reply as to whether you are prepared to enter a Conference to ascertain how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire can best be reconciled with Irish National aspirations. If, as we hope, your answer is in the

\textsuperscript{22}Further Correspondence Relating to the Proposals of His Majesty's Government for an Irish Settlement. Cmd. 1539, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., pp. 27-30.
affirmative, I suggest that the Conference should meet at Inverness on the 20th instant.24

De Valera's reply was the most significant of all the correspondence, for he used Lloyd George's technique of exploiting an ambiguous phrase to make a point. With the concession that Ireland must be somehow connected with the British Commonwealth, de Valera now attempted to show how Ireland could be independent and yet possess external union. He wrote on 13 September: "We have no hesitation in declaring our willingness to enter (into) a conference to ascertain how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire can best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations."25 "In this final note we deem it our duty to reaffirm that our position has not changed. Our national has formally declared its independence and recognises itself as a sovereign State. It is only as the representatives of that State and as its chosen guardians that we have any authority or power to act on behalf of our people."26

"As regards to the principle of government by the consent of the governed . . . we have suggested no interpretation of that

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26 Ibid., p. 30.
principle save its every day interpretation—the sense, for example, in which it was understood when on January 5th, 1918, you said:

The settlement of the new Europe must be based on such grounds of reason and justice as will give some promise of stability. Therefore it is that we feel that government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war.

"The principle was then understood to mean that nations that have been annexed to empires against their will might now free themselves from the grappling hook. In reality it is your Government, when it seeks to rend our ancient nation and to partition its territory, that would give to the principle an interpretation that would undermine the fabric of every democratic State, and drive the civilised world back into tribalism."^{28}

An exchange of telegrams now replaced the exchange of letters. Lloyd George replied that if de Valera insisted on maintaining that Ireland was a sovereign state there could be no negotiations. "I offered to regard (your) letter as undelivered in order that you might have time to reconsider ... despite this intimation you now have published the letter in its original form. I must accordingly cancel the arrangements for conference and consult my colleagues on the course of action which this new situation necessitates."^{29}

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28 Ibid., p. 32.
29 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
De Valera in his reply expressed surprise that the meeting was canceled. He stated:

Throughout the correspondence you have defined your Government's position. We have defined ours. If the positions were not so definitely opposed there would, indeed, be no problem to discuss.

It should be obvious that in a case like this, if there is to be any result, the negotiators must meet without prejudice and unhampered by any conditions whatsoever except those imposed by the facts as they know them.30

In reply, Lloyd George telegraphed that if the British Government conferred with de Valera after his claim that Ireland was a sovereign state, it would be tantamount to a British recognition of the Irish Republic.31

De Valera's telegraphed comment was:

We have not asked you to abandon any principle—even informally—but surely you must understand that we can only recognise ourselves for what we are.

If this self-recognition be made a reason for cancellation of the Conference, we regret it.

Believe me, we have but one object at heart—the setting of the Conference on such a basis of truth and reality as would make it possible to secure through it the result which the peoples of these two islands so ardently desire.32

Lloyd George in answering the telegram, stood his ground:

"My colleagues and I cannot meet them (the Irish delegates) as the representatives of a sovereign and independent State without disloyalty on our part to the Throne and the Empire. I must, there-

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30 Further Correspondence Relating to the Proposals of His Majesty's Government for an Irish Settlement. Cmd. 1539, pp. 33-34.

31 Ibid., p. 34.

32 Ibid., p. 34.
fore, repeat that unless the second paragraph in your letter of
the twelfth is withdrawn, conference between us is impossible."

De Valera answered and asked if Ireland was being faced
with an ultimatum? "If you seek to impose preliminary conditions,
which we must regard as involving a surrender of our whole position,
we cannot meet." We request you, therefore, to state whether
your letter was a demand for a surrender on our part, or an
invitation to a Conference free on both sides and without prejudice.
"It is precisely because neither side accepts the position of
the other that there is a dispute at all, and that a Conference
is necessary to search for and to discuss such adjustments as
might compose it." 35

Ten days elapsed before Lloyd George answered the latest
letter; and then he insisted that a conference be proposed that
would be free from the implications of past correspondence,
less Great Britain's position be in some way restricted to recog-
nize Ireland's claim to independence. He replied: "We, there­
fore, send you herewith a fresh invitation to a conference in
London on 11 October, where we can meet your delegates as spokesman
of the people whom you represent with a view to ascertaining how

33 Further Correspondence Relating to the Proposals of His
Majesty's Government for an Irish Settlement, Cmd. 1539, p. 34.
34 Ibid., p. 34.
35 Ibid., p. 34.
the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as
the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish national
aspirations."\textsuperscript{36}

De Valera's final reply, dated 30 September, was brief:

... Our respective positions have been stated and are understood, and we agree that conference not corre­
spondence, is the most practical and hopeful way of an understanding.\textsuperscript{37}

The exchange of letters and telegrams had gone on for over two months. What was the result? Clearly, it had been an Irish victory, for Lloyd George had sought by every means to force the Irish position to accept Partition and a type of Dominion status as a prerequisite for negotiation. He not only failed but feared his own position as being compromised. De Valera not only rejected the British proposals of 20 July, but demanded and won a free conference without preliminary conditions.

\textsuperscript{36}Further Correspondence Relating to the Proposals of His Majesty's Government for an Irish Settlement, Cmd. 1539, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., p. 35.
CHAPTER VII

FINAL NEGOTIATIONS AND PARTITION

De Valera working on his own initiative, and through the Dail Eireann, arrived at the Irish aims for negotiations long before Lloyd George set the actual date for such a conference. During the correspondence with Lloyd George, de Valera had apparently relinquished the idea of getting recognition of a totally independent Irish republic. Hence, he advocated the idea of "external association" with the British Commonwealth. The basis of this political philosophy was intricately worked out with Erskin Childers, a man gifted with literary excellence and devoted to the Irish cause.

External Association came to mean that Ireland would be independent of English rule and management; there would be no oath of allegiance to the King, no Governor-General, and no common citizenship with England.\(^1\) However, Ireland would associate with the British Commonwealth in matters of common concern; she would enjoy the reciprocal advantages and obligations inherent in the Commonwealth but would not be dominated by Britain. Ireland would be independent and yet belong to the British Empire.

As an outline for the delegates to follow, de Valera drew up a list of proposals labeled "Draft Treaty A"; within this draft treaty lay the proposals and arguments for external association and the broad objectives of defense, finance, trade, Ulster, and national status. Of these, the last two were the most important. In fact, the Ulster issue was the determining factor of all the negotiations. "The price which the Irish were willing to pay for 'essential unity' and the price which the English were willing to pay for Irish acceptance of dominion status made Ulster the focal point of the negotiations."²

With Ulster determining the course of negotiations, it is ironic that Ulster was the one issue on which both Lloyd George and de Valera were in accord; for both agreed, in principle, of the desirability of a united Ireland.³

However Northern Ireland was adamant on this point and she was in a strongly entrenched position since the establishment of her own government in 1920. In a Belfast speech coinciding with the opening of the Anglo-Irish conference, Prime Minister Craig warned: "Ulster is not a cheese to be nibbled at. It is a rock of granite that will break the teeth of those men that attempt to bite it. Whether they are Sinn Feiners or any other."⁴

²"Ireland", Round Table, XII (December, 1921), p. 72.
³Hansard. 1921, CXLIX, 35.
⁴"Ireland", Round Table, XII (December, 1921), p. 66.
The delegates to the Convention were selected by de Valera and ratified by the Dail Eireann. There were to be nine delegates of which three were drawn from the Irish Cabinet; Arthur Griffith, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Michael Collins, Chairman and Minister of Finance; and Robert Barton, Vice-Chairman and Minister for Economic Affairs. Two legal advisors were asked to be a part of the delegation, Eamon Duggan and George Duffy. In addition, four secretaries were sent with the negotiators, Erskin Childers, Finian Lynch, Diarmuid O'Hegarty, and John Chartes.

De Valera refused to join the delegation for several reasons. First, he wanted to emphasize the fact that he was the democratically elected president of Ireland and that his position as president was to send ministers for a settlement. Secondly, he believed that if a temporary breakdown in negotiations occurred, it would be useful to have himself in a neutral position so that he might reopen the conferences.\(^5\)

Although the logic behind de Valera's arguments was valid, his decision not to go to the conference table was definitely a mistake. De Valera was the most persuasive negotiator that Ireland had; he had already proved his ability on his successful correspondence with Lloyd George. Time had proved that Lloyd George had the ability to handle such men as Redmond and Dillon. Now that Ireland was finally in a position to gain more objectives

than it ever had before, a firm negotiator was needed. As France needed Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna, so now Ireland needed de Valera at the London Conference.

The English government aware of the criticalness of the Irish situation, appointed its ablest diplomats to the peace conference. Together with Lloyd George came the Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead; the Secretary of State for War, Sir Worthington Evans; the leader of the House of Commons, Austen Chamberlain; the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, and the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Sir Hamar Greenwood. In addition, Sir Gordon Hewart, British Attorney-General, was appointed to act as a member of the Conference whenever constitutional questions were being discussed. Lionel Curtis and Thomas Jones acted as secretaries.6

The basis for the English negotiations was this: England would admit that she often had been the cause for the breakdown of Anglo-Irish relations. However, now by offering Dominion status to Ireland, she was not only reasonable but generous. If the Irish insisted in demanding total independence they were now the unreasonable ones; for the two islands of Britain and Ireland lie in such close geographic proximity that an interweaving of their political and economic relationships was inevitable.

6Macardle, Irish Republic, p. 530.
Before the Irish delegates left for London, de Valera forewarned them that peace and external association would not be easily obtained. "The Power against us will use every artifice it knows in the hope of dispiriting, dividing and weakening us. The threats that could force a surrender in one vital particular would be relied on to force surrender in another and another until all were lost. Of necessity Ireland must stand where she is, unyielding and fearless on the rock of right, or be out-maneuvered and defeated in detail. We must all be beware."  

Each plenipotentiary was presented with written instructions of which the following two were the most important:

1. It is understood that before decisions are finally reached on the main questions that a despatch notifying the intention of making these decisions will be sent to the members of the Cabinet in Dublin and that a reply will be awaited by the Plenipotentiaries before the final decision is made.

2. It is also understood that the complete text of the draft treaty about to be signed will be similarly submitted to Dublin and reply awaited.

The Anglo-Irish conference lasted from 11 October, to 6 December, 1921. In retrospect, the negotiations seem to have resolved themselves into five stages. The first was to last from 11 October, to the 24th.

The first few days of the negotiations dealt with minor

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issues such as finance, defence, and conditions of the truce. Finally, Lloyd George asked the delegates to present a document which would define their position on allegiance to the Crown and membership in the Empire.

On 24 October, Arthur Griffith presented Lloyd George with "the Memorandum of the Proposals of the Irish Delegates to the British Representatives"; the Memorandum's preamble warned that the conference could produce no result as long as the British representatives failed to realise that Ireland was not a colony or dependency, but an ancient and spirited nation. The realities were stated briefly; England desired the security of her Empire while Ireland desired her freedom. Both these aims could be reconciled by a treaty that would guarantee to each country its desires. As regards to the Six Counties of Ulster, England must regard this as an Irish domestic matter.

Lloyd George immediately declared that the British were adamant on allegiance to the Crown and membership in the Empire. Without the Irish consent on this point there could be no settlement.

Griffith stated that the delegation was authorized to propose external association as Ireland's utmost concession,

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9 Halligan, Anglo-Irish Relations 1921-1949, p. 53.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
made only for the purpose of getting "essential unity". He then stated, "We will accept the Crown as the head of the association." 12 Neither in Draft Treaty A, nor in the Memorandum was there any authorization for acceptance of the Crown at all.

Realizing that a major concession had been uttered, Lloyd George proposed that the pace of the Conference could be quickened by a reduction of the members in attendance. 13 Griffith and Collins were asked to meet with Lloyd George and Winston Churchill in a sub-conference. The sub-conference would not only eliminate the other delegates, but also the secretary, Erskine Childers, whom the British regarded as a fanatical opponent of dominion status for Ireland. 14

The moment this was agreed to, the whole character of the negotiations changed, much to the distress of the Barton, Duffy, Childers combination. 15 The Irish delegation never sat in the conference room as a unit again.

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13 Ibid.
14 Halligan, Anglo-Irish Relations 1921-1949, p. 42.
15 At the exhaustive Cabinet meeting of 3 December, Brugha asked who was responsible for "dividing up our team". When Griffith replied that it was the British Government, Brugha remarked, "Yes, the British Government selected their men." Griffith insisted that the remark be written into the Cabinet minutes. Brugha then explained that he meant no reflection on the honor of Griffith and Collins, but felt that Lloyd George had appraised the delegation and had selected the two weakest members for the conduct of negotiations. Dail Eireann, Debate on the Treaty, 7 January, 1922, p. 333.
De Valera read with real concern the minutes of the 24 October plenary session, for external association as it had left Dublin, made no provision for acceptance of the Crown. Consequently, he wrote the delegation: "There can be no question of our asking the Irish people to enter an agreement which would make them subjects of the Crown or demand from them allegiance to the British King. If there is no alternative, we can only face it, and I think that the sooner the other side is made to realize it the better."

The letter evoked a strongly-worded reply from the delegation, protesting the interference with its powers, which, the letter said imposed no limits on freedom of discussion.

The period from 24 October—3 November, marked the second stage of the negotiations, during which Lloyd George secured provisional concessions from the Irish, with the understanding that he would try to persuade Sir James Craig to take the six counties into an all-Ireland parliament.

At this juncture the Unionists made a determined effort to bring the negotiations to an abrupt end. As Prime Minister of a Coalition Government, Lloyd George was confronted with a ticklish situation.

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16 Halligan, Anglo-Irish Relations 1921-1949, p. 44.
17 Ibid., p. 42.
Die-hards in Parliament became so suspicious and restive that the Prime Minister challenged them to an open debate, and on October 31, defeated them by a ten-to-one vote after one of the most skillful speeches he ever delivered, where he had to preserve the most delicate equilibrium between the conflicting forces.13

On the eve of the debate, Lloyd George met with Griffith at Winston Churchill’s home. He expressed his deep concern about two imminent events, as well as the Parliament attack on his policy. One was his forthcoming meeting with Craig and the other was the National Unionist Conference at Liverpool on 17 November. He was asking Chamberlain and Berkenhead to use their influence to beat down the anticipated forceful attack on the Government for negotiating with Sinn Fein. If the Ulstermen were convinced that the British were persuading the Irish to accept membership in the Empire, then they might be prevailed on to accept an all-Ireland parliament, while retaining their own subordinate legislature. Lloyd George asked for personal assurance from Griffith on the Crown, the Empire, and naval facilities. Given these, "He would go down to smite the Die-hards, and would fight on the Ulster matter to secure 'essential unity'."19

Griffith's letter containing the personal assurances was redrafted several times in order to satisfy Barton, Duffy,

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and Childers on one hand, and Lloyd George and his colleagues, on the other. The letter finally stated that Griffith, if satisfied on other points was prepared to make these concessions:

1. Irish recognition of the Crown as head of the association of free states;
2. A free partnership of Ireland with the other states associated within the British Commonwealth, with the formula defining partnership to be arrived at later;
3. Granting of coastal facilities to the British Navy, on the stipulation that neither armed occupation nor political control of the island was intended, and pending an agreement providing for Ireland's assumption of her own coastal defenses. Griffith emphasized that his assurances were "conditional on the recognition of the essential unity of Ireland."

On the question of Ulster, Griffith stated, he would agree to any necessary safeguards for the Northeast, including the maintenance of its Parliament. However, discussion on the nature of Ulster must be reserved for future discussion.

On 3 November, Griffith sent de Valera a copy of the letter he had given to Lloyd George and a report of the conference. He wrote:

They are satisfied to face the Ulster question on it (his letter) and assured us that if Ulster proves unreasonable they are prepared to resign rather than use force against us. In such an event no English Government is capable of formation of a war policy against Ireland.

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20 Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal, pp. 195-200.
21 Macardle, Irish Republic, pp. 555-556.
22 Ibid.
23 Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal, pp. 200-201.
Lloyd George's intent to resign rather than renew the war is substantiated by an entry in Lord Riddell's Diary. He quoted Lloyd George as saying:

I am not going to continue the Irish war if a settlement is possible. I shall resign and the King will have to send for some one else ... Sinn Fein is prepared to accept allegiance to the Crown and to agree that Ireland shall remain part of the Empire, subject to Tyrone and Fermanagh being joined to Southern Ireland, or, at any rate, to a plebiscite and subject also to the Irish fiscal, postal and telegraph arrangements being relegated to a central Parliament to be elected on the basis of population. If the matter can be settled on these lines, I am not prepared to continue civil war.24

Following the meeting of 3 November, Griffith felt that his delegation could temporarily stand aside and wait the outcome of the next phase of the conference, marked by negotiations between the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It was this stage, however, when the Ulster issue predominated, that Griffith's position was modified and weakened, while Craig's remained firm and unaltered.

The third state of negotiations was an attempt by Lloyd George to persuade Craig to enter into an all-Ireland parliament; this phase of the negotiations lasted from 4 November, to the 16th. However, Lloyd George's attempts to convince Craig of the benefits of an all-Ireland parliament failed. Thus Tom Jones, who kept Griffith informed about the interviews reported

that since Lloyd George failed to gain his objective with Craig, he would meet with the Ulster Cabinet and if his proposals were refused, he would resign. That, Jones pointed out, would mean the formation of a Government under Bonar Law and a return to military rule in Ireland. Jones wondered whether the Irish delegation would support a plan for a boundary commission, should the Ulster Cabinet prove intractable. Such a commission would determine, in accordance with the wishes of the population, the frontier line between Northern and Southern Ireland.25

Griffith was of the opinion that Ulster would not accept delimitation of its area, because, as he wrote de Valera, this would mean the transfer of nearly all the counties of Fermanagh and Tyrone and parts of Armagh, Londonderry, and Down.26

Jones agreed that the boundary commission would not be acceptable, but argued that the proposal could be used as a tactical maneuver. Griffith reported that he finally told Jones that, "... it would be their proposal, not ours, and we would not therefore be bound by it, but we realize its value as a tactical maneuver and if Lloyd George made it we would not queer his position."27

26 Macardle, Irish Republic. p. 557.
27 Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal. p. 208.
Jones' diplomacy was successful, for Griffith without pledging support to the new proposal, had released Lloyd George from his promise to resign if he could not procure an all-Ireland parliament.

On 10 November, Lloyd George wrote Craig a long letter asking the Ulster Cabinet to come to a conference with him. He explained that the Southern Irish had conceded these points upon which Ulstermen themselves felt deeply about: (1) Ireland would give her allegiance to the Throne and be a member of the British Empire. (2) Provisions would be made for naval securities enabling Great Britain to protect herself as well as Ireland. (3) The Government of Northern Ireland would retain all the powers conferred upon her by the Government of Ireland Act. (4) The unity of Ireland would be recognised by the establishment of an all-Ireland Parliament, upon which would be developed the future powers necessary to form the self governing Irish State.28

Thus Lloyd George asked Northern Ireland to enter into an all-Ireland Parliament, with adequate safeguards against oppression by a Southern Irish state which would give allegiance to the Crown and accept partnership in the Empire. However Craig sent a prompt and firm refusal, stating that:

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28 Lloyd George to Craig, 10 November, 1921, in Correspondence Between His Majesty's Government and the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Relating to the Proposals for an Irish Settlement. Cmd. 1561, pp. 2-4.
The Government of Northern Ireland considers it their duty, in order to avoid misunderstanding, to say that their inability to accept an all-Ireland Parliament does not depend merely on the question of safeguards in regard to administrative details such as those referred to in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of your communication. They are certain that no paper safeguards could protect them against maladministration. The feelings of the loyal population are so pronounced and so universal on this point that no Government representing that population could enter into any conference where this point is open to discussion. For these reasons, therefore, they feel compelled to state that any discussion would be fruitless unless His Majesty's Ministers consent to the withdrawal of the proposal for an all-Ireland Parliament.29

In addition, Craig suggested that a solution might be found in also granting Northern Ireland dominion status.

Lloyd George wrote Craig that he, "... received with great regret your refusal to enter into conference with us unconditionally."30 He further stated that the counter-proposal of recognizing two Irelands and two separate dominions was impossible. He then repeated the need for a conference. Craig again refused, though he lukewarmly suggested he and Lloyd George might "interchange ideas" if any good purpose could be served.31

Meanwhile Lloyd George talked with Griffith and again

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29 Craig to Lloyd George 11 November, 1921, in Correspondence Between His Majesty's Government and the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Relating to the Proposals for an Irish Settlement. Cmd. 1561, pp. 4-7.
30 Lloyd George to Craig 14 November, 1921, in Ibid., pp. 7-9.
31 Craig to Lloyd George 17 November, 1921, in Ibid., pp. 9-11.
expressed his deep concern over the outcome of the Unionist Conference at Liverpool on 17 November. He asked Griffith if he would agree to these proposals so he would have a conclusive statement on the Irish position concerning Ulster: (1) That either Ulster may enter an all-Ireland parliament while retaining her present Parliament and receiving additional safeguards; or, (2) electing to remain subject to the Imperial Parliament retaining her present Parliament, and accepting a boundary commission to adjust the boundary in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants.32

Griffith reported to de Valera that he told Lloyd George:

"... it was his proposal not ours. ... If the Ulsterman accepted it, we would have to discuss it with him in the privacy of the Conference. I could not guarantee its acceptance, as, of course, my colleagues knew nothing of it yet. But I would guarantee that while he was fighting the 'Ulster' crowd we would not help them by repudiating him."33

"Lloyd George considered Griffith's reaction of such significance that he told Tom Jones to put the proposals in draft form. The next day the draft was shown to Griffith and he signed it."34 Chamberlain who talked with Lloyd George immediately

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32 Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal, p. 214.
34 Ibid.
after the 12 November conversation, got the impression that Griffith's promise precluded any possibility of a rupture on the Ulster question. "This interpretation was the one on which the British delegation insisted in the last tense hours of the conference, when the document of 12 November, was produced to prevent Griffith from staging the break down on Ulster, as he was desperately trying to do." A member of the British Secretariat remarks:

This insignificant scrap of paper which Arthur Griffith had agreed, crumpled and torn, and mislaid in one of Lloyd George's pockets, was dramatically produced by him in the last stages of the negotiations and thrown on the table as though it were the ace of trumps.

The fourth stage of the negotiations occurred between 17 and 30 November, when each side submitted draft proposals for a treaty and each rejected the offerings of the other.

What was to be a tactical maneuver against the "Ulster crowd" became the British proposals for a settlement. Proposals 10 and 11 of Britain's draft treaty declared that:

The powers of the Parliament and Government of Ireland shall not be excercisable as respects Northern Ireland for a period of twelve months and if within that period both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland present an address to His Majesty to that effect then the powers of the Parliament and government of Ireland shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland.

Then followed this proviso:

36 Ibid., p. 52.
Provided that if such an address is so presented a Commission shall be appointed to determine in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland and for the purposes of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, the Boundary of Northern Ireland shall be as may be determined by such Commission.37

When the Irish received these proposals, the Irish delegates brought forth their position labeled "Draft Treaty A". The first two articles of the draft treaty stated: "(1) Great Britain and the partner states of the British Commonwealth recognise Ireland as a sovereign independent state and Great Britain renounces all claims to govern or to legislate for Ireland. (2) Ireland agrees to become an external associate of the states of the British Commonwealth. As an associate, Ireland's status shall be that of equality with the sovereign states of the Commonwealth and Ireland shall be separately represented in the British Imperial Council, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, etc., and shall be so recognised by those several states."38

Lloyd George "was exasperated" at the Irish insistence on external association. Further talks took place between Lloyd George, Birkenhead, Griffith, Collins and Duggan in an effort to resolve the deadlock over dominion status and allegiance to the Crown. Ireland was offered the exact position of Canada, not

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37 Gallagher, Anglo-Irish Treaty. p. 120.
38 Ibid., p. 121.
only in law but in practice and constitutional usage, and Lloyd George promised to modify the oath of allegiance so as to make it more acceptable to the Irish.  

Griffith wrote to de Valera:

With this offer they knocked out my argument . . . that the Crown in the Dominions was merely a symbol but that in Ireland it would be a reality . . . . The Oath of Allegiance was an immense difficulty with them, but they would try to modify it if that would help us.

The fourth stage closed with the announcement that the final draft of the British proposals, embodying their utmost concession, would be presented on 6 December, at which time a copy would be sent to Craig. However, at Griffith's request, the British consented to give the draft to the Irish delegation by 1 December.

The Irish delegates returned to Ireland to discuss the final draft with de Valera. Thus the final stage of the conference from 1 to 6, December, was a tense and grave period for the Irish. The five delegates plus Childers, attended a seven-hour Cabinet meeting in Dublin on 3 December. Griffith, Collins, Cosgrave, and Duggan urged acceptance of the treaty proposals. Barton, Duffy, and Childers supported de Valera; Brugha and Stack opposed acceptance.

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40 Pakenham, Peace By Ordeal. p. 250.
De Valera stated that the proposals gave Ireland neither unity nor independence and that he personally, could not subscribe to the oath of allegiance in the form in which it appeared in the draft. 41

Griffith remained adamant in his refusal to take responsibility for "breaking on the Crown". The stresses and strains within the Cabinet were such that at one point de Valera seemed on the verge of consenting to Barton's plea that he accompany the delegates to London.

Finally, however, the delegates were instructed to return to London to inform the British that they could not sign the draft treaty, but must refer it to the Dail for approval or rejection; to reject the oath of allegiance, unless it were altered; to propose external association again; and, in the last resort, to break on Ulster. 42

Reluctantly, Griffith accompanied Barton and Duffy to No. 10 Downing Street at 5 P.M., on Sunday, 4 December, in order to present the Irish amendments to the proposed "Articles of Agreement", as the British draft was entitled. 43 The Irish amendments were rejected. Griffith then insinuated that Ireland must

41 Halligan, Anglo-Irish Relations, 1921-1949, p. 52.
42 Pakenham, Peace By Ordeal, pp. 255-262.
43 Ibid.
have essential unity or negotiations would necessarily break down; thus putting the blame on Ulster. However, the British stated that Craig could only answer yes or no, in either case Ireland would benefit. If Craig said, "Yes", there would be an all-Ireland parliament; if he said, "No", a boundary commission would be set up that would give the counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh and parts of others back to South Ireland and thus Ulster could not stand alone. Thus the British maintained that negotiations failed not on Ulster, but on the issue of membership in the Empire (the Crown). The Irish were asked to send a formal rejection of the British terms on the next day, at which time the Prime Minister would notify the King, the Cabinet, and Craig of the termination of negotiations.

The situation on Sunday night seemed grim. Griffith felt that the delegation had doubly failed, not only to make peace but failed to make the Ulster issue the cause of the rupture.

However, Lloyd George, suspicious about the absence of Collins from the Sunday Conference, "Began to exercise what Asquith once called 'the most resourceful mind in Europe', and in twenty-four hours he had completely transformed the situation."\(^{45}\)

"Tom Jones was employed as intermediary to get Collins to


meet Lloyd George alone on Monday morning. As a result of that meeting, Lloyd George was convinced that Collins was more concerned about 'essential unity', the oath, defense, and fiscal autonomy, than about dominion status. Rightly or wrongly, Collins left the interview with the impression that Southern Ireland would through the operation of a boundary commission, gain large territories and that Northern Ireland, reduced to an uneconomic unit, would be "forced in before long." The historian Geoffrey Shakespeare commented on the situation:

As he (Lloyd George) has been accused of playing fast and loose with both sides in respect of this Boundary Commission, it is only right to recall that in Parliament on December 16, during the Irish Treaty debate, he implied that both Fermanagh and Tyrone might well be appointed to the South. No charge of break of faith can be laid against him on this score.

The conference was resumed on Monday afternoon with Lloyd George, Chamberlain, Birkenhead, Churchill, Collins, Griffith, and Barton in attendance. Lloyd George immediately directed the discussion on the issue of Ulster, arguing that the proposals in the draft treaty were exactly the same as those to which Griffith had agreed on 12 November, and on which he had undertaken not to let Lloyd George down.

Griffith replied that he had no intention of letting Lloyd

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46 Halligan, Anglo-Irish Relations, 1921-1949, p. 54.
47 Pakenham, Peace By Ordeal, pp. 275-277.
48 Shakespeare, Let Candles Be Brought In, p. 90.
George down but before he gave a decision on the earlier articles in the document, he must have a reply from Craig either accepting or rejecting the unity of Ireland. "Chamberlain then came to Lloyd George's assistance. Chamberlain and Lloyd George said that such a proposition was inadmissible, unreasonable, and contrary to the undertaking not to let Lloyd George down." 49

The British then made further concessions on defense, granted full fiscal autonomy and approved a new form of oath.

About 7:30 P.M., Lloyd George delivered his famous ultimatum. As Winston Churchill remembered the scene, the Prime Minister bluntly told the Irish that:

We would conclude no more and debate no further. They must settle now; they must sign the agreement for a treaty... or else quit; and further, that both sides would be free to resume whatever warfare they could wage against each other. This was an ultimatum delivered... face to face, and all present knew and understood that nothing else was possible.

The Irishmen gulped down the ultimatum phlegmatically. Mr. Griffith said, speaking in his soft voice and with his modest manner, 'I will give the answer of the Irish delegation at nine to-night; but, Mr. Prime Minister, I personally will sign this agreement and will recommend it to my countrymen.'

'Do I understand Mr. Griffith,' said Mr. Lloyd George, 'that though everyone else refuses you will nevertheless agree to sign?' 'Yes that is quite so Mr. Prime Minister,' replied this quiet little man of great heart and great purpose. Michael Collins rose looking as if he was going to shoot someone, preferably himself. In all my life I have never seen so much passion and suffering in restraint. 50

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49 Gallagher, Anglo-Irish Treaty. p. 158.

Lloyd George had achieved a victory of which he at once perceived the extent. He had broken the unity of the delegation, even the unity of that solid phalanx of the Irish people which had so long resisted British dominance.  

Before the Irish delegation left the Cabinet room, Lloyd George impressed upon them the necessity for a quick decision. Picking up two letters from the table, and holding one in each hand, he dramatically announced:

I have to communicate with Sir James Craig tonight. Here are the alternative letters I have prepared, one enclosing the articles of agreement reached by His Majesty's Government and yourselves, and the other saying that the Sinn Fein representatives refuse the oath of allegiance and refuse to come within the Empire. If I send this letter, it is war—and war within three days! Which letter am I to send?

Lloyd George demanded to know by 10:00 P.M. whether the Irish desired war or not; he made a final appeal to the delegates to think before rejecting so generous an offer. In addition, the Prime Minister made it plain that there was to be no treaty unless every member of the delegation signed and promised to recommend it. Robert Barton told the Dail, a few days later, of the terrific impact of Lloyd George's words on him:

Speaking for himself and his colleagues, the English Prime Minister, with all the solemnity and power of conviction that he alone, of all men ever met, can impart by word and gesture—the vehicles by which the mind of one

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man oppresses the mind of another—declared that the signature was necessary or war would follow immediately.\(^{53}\)

When the Irish left, the British were of the opinion that only Griffith would sign and doubted that his solitary signature would have any validity.\(^{54}\)

Ireland's fate was decided at its London headquarters, where the five envoys plus Childers convened. From 9:00 until 11:15 P.M., the agonizing arguments went on. "The tension was so painful that nobody thought of lifting a telephone and calling the President.\(^{55}\) To sign meant to abandon the Republic and unity of Ireland. To refuse meant to plunge Ireland into immediate war without consultation with the Cabinet or Dail.

Collins and Duggan soon joined Griffith in the decision to sign, and the three concentrated on winning over the third Cabinet member—Barton. \(^{56}\) He and Duffy both preferred war to breaking their oath, but dared not assume the responsibility for bringing war to the Irish people. "With tears he recalled young men in one of the jails whom he had seen go out to execution. It was too much for Barton. Thus beset by phantoms, he


\(^{54}\) Ibid.


broke at last. He could not face having to take on his own shoulders a responsibility so terrible. The very prospect drove from his mind all thoughts of President, Cabinet, everything but that he must save his people.\textsuperscript{57}

When Griffith, Collins, and Barton appeared at 10 Downing Street about 11:30 P.M., Churchill recalls that:

As before they were superficially very calm and quiet. There was a long pause, or there seemed to be. Then Mr. Griffith said: "Mr. Prime Minister, the Delegation is willing to sign the agreements but there are a few points of drafting which perhaps it would be convenient if I mentioned at once."

Thus by the easiest of gestures he carried the whole matter into the region of minor detail. . . . Soon we were busily talking about technicalities and holding firmly to these lest worst should befall. . . . But underneath this protective chatter a profound change had taken place in the spirit and atmosphere. We had become allies and associates in a common cause, the cause of the Irish Treaty and peace between the two races and two islands.\textsuperscript{58}

At 2:20 A.M. on 6 December, 1921, the copies of the final test of the Articles of Agreement between Great Britain and Ireland were signed. The British carried the last minutes off graciously; as the Irishmen rose to leave, the British Ministers upon a strong impulse walked round the table and for the first time shook hands.\textsuperscript{59}

Outside in the lobby, according to Lloyd George, "Sat a man who has used all the resources of an ingenious and well-

\textsuperscript{57}Gallagher, Anglo-Irish Treaty. p. 168.


\textsuperscript{59}Ibid., p. 322.
trained mind backed by a tenacious will to wreck every endeavor to reach agreement, Mr. Erskine Childers, a man whose slight figure, whose kingly, refrained and intellectual countenance, whose calm and courteous demeanour offered no clue to the fierce passions which raged inside his breast. At every crucial point in the negotiations, he played a sinister part. He was clearly Mr. de Valera's emissary and faithfully did he fulfill the trust reposed in him by that visionary.

One of the British secretaries, Geoffrey Shakespeare, wrote in his memoirs thirty years later:

I have never understood why the Irish accepted the ultimatum at its face value. Why did they not call the bluff? Lloyd George stated over and over again that he had promised to let Sir James Craig know the next day (Tuesday, December 6), one way or the other. Supposing Arthur Griffith had said: 'What is so sacrosant about Tuesday? We have waited hundreds of years for a settlement. Ask Craig to wait one week. If you feel you must inform him tomorrow telephone to Dublin Castle, or direct to Belfast, and explain a delay. Are you really going to break the Truce and plunge Ireland again into war without giving the Irish Cabinet the chance even of discussing your latest proposals?' How could Lloyd George have persisted with the ultimatum if Arthur Griffith had argued like this? But the Irish delegation did not counter the ultimatum with logic. They bowed to it and signed.

What had been signed as the Articles of Agreement contained eighteen articles and an annex. Ireland, according to the terms, was to have the same constitutional status in the Empire as the

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61 Shakespeare, Let Candles Be Brought In. p. 94.
Dominion of Canada, with a Parliament and Executive, and was to be known as the Irish Free State (Articles 1 and 2). Article 4 read:

The oath to be taken by Members of the Parliament of the Irish Free State shall be in the following form:

I......do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established and that I will be faithful to H. M. George V, his heirs and successors by law, in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.62

By Article 5, the Irish Free State assumed liability for the public debt of the United Kingdom and for war pensions in such proportion as might be deemed equitable, any counterclaim by Ireland being taken into consideration; any disagreement on the matter was to be arbitrated by persons who must be citizens of the British Empire.

Naval and coastal defense of Ireland was to be undertaken by the Imperial Forces, the Free State, however, being permitted to provide for protection of its fisheries and revenue. This provision (6) was to be reviewed by a Commission of the British and Irish Governments after five years with a view to Ireland's undertaking a share of her own coastal defense. The defense force of the Irish Free State was to be limited in numbers according to population (8).

The powers of the Government of the Irish Free State were

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not to apply to Northern Ireland until one month after the passing of the English Act ratifying the Treaty (11). If within that month the Northern Parliament expressed a wish for exclusion, Northern Ireland was to become excluded from the Irish Free State and keep its powers under the Act of 1920. (Thus "statutory" Northern Ireland need never come under an All-Ireland Parliament even for one day.) If exclusion was decided upon, a Boundary Commission was to determine the Boundaries of Northern Ireland, "... in accordance, with the wishes of the inhabitants so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions." This Commission was to consist of a Chairman appointed by the British Government, another member appointed by the Northern Government, and a third appointed by the Government of the Irish Free State (12).

The Free State Parliament was to have power to elect members to a Council of Ireland, should such Council be established, as provided for in Act of 1920 (13). There were Articles concerning ports, payment of pensions, religious and educational freedom and there were transition clauses concerning the transference of powers from the British Government and the legalising of the Treaty, and provisions for possible arrangements between the Northern Government and the Government of the rest of Ireland. 64

64 Ibid., pp. 162-163.
It was not such a Treaty as would conceivably be freely negotiated and freely signed between two independent States. "It not only made Partition possible but it prevented the wishes of the inhabitants from being the sole determining factor in de-limiting boundaries." Consequently, there was no rejoicing in Ireland when the results of the negotiations were made known.

Before the Treaty could go into effect, it had to be ratified by both the British and Irish Parliaments; it was easier accomplished in the former than the latter. There had been preparations to arrest the Delegates when they arrived, for high treason against the Republic; a top army official, Cathal Brugha refused to allow it.

After a five-hour Cabinet meeting de Valera could not persuade the delegates to repudiate the document. De Valera made a public statement the he could not accept the Treaty himself but he would submit it to the Dail for acceptance or rejection. When the Dail had been called to meet, Griffith took steps to represent the settlement as a "fait accompli". To add to the favorable passing of the Treaty, the Catholic Hierarchy gave it their support. In fact, the Catholic clergy maintained it was a Catholic's moral duty to accept the Treaty.

65 Macardle, Irish Republic, p. 592.
66 Ibid., p. 595.
67 Gallagher, Anglo-Irish Treaty, p. 185.
From 14 December, 1921, to 7 January, 1922, the Great Debate raged in the Irish Parliament. The tone centered on the issue of war or acceptance. Finally, on 7 January, the Dail voted, delegates were in favor of the Treaty and 57 were against. There was no shout of triumph in the House. "Nobody moved, nobody cheered, nobody even spoke." 

Then Eamon de Valera rose to his feet. "He was very pale. He was heard to say, 'The Republic still goes on until the Nation itself has disestablished it.' He paused and then continued, speaking with obvious difficulty: 'Before we rise, I should like to say my last word. Up to this we have had the record of four glorious years of magnificent discipline in the nation.' He paused again, struggling to master his words: 'The world is looking on at us now...' The voice died away. He stood there looking out over that assembly, white-faced and haggard. The silence was complete as every eye held its gaze upon him. His outstretched hand fell to his side and he collapsed into his seat, and throwing himself forward he buried his face in his arms, and this man, who had never before shown his feelings, sobbed aloud." The Irish Independent reported, "The strong man


70 Ibid., pp. 187-188.
who had defied the might of an Empire, scorned its jailers, and faced its armies had broken down. The painful silence was soon broken in every part of the Chamber, and not only women, but stalwart men, sobbed and wept like children."71

The following period is most pitiful in Irish history for Civil War broke out. The tactics that were devised against the British were now used by the Irish upon each other.

No similar period in Irish history shone with such idealism and such self-sacrifice. Not for a century had the common people borne trials so great or endured an agony so long drawn out and now to result in civil war.

In conclusion, the Irish did gain dominion status from their five-year struggle with the British; however, during that same time, the Irish sacrificed so much physically as well as morally that dominion status was regarded as anti-climatic. The Irish delegates only signed the Treaty for fear of continued war; Dail Eireann followed the same logic.

The Irish believed that throughout history their relationship with England was one of discrimination, not integration. This held true for modern times as well as ancient. In 1914 and 1916 there may have been valid arguments for suspension of Home Rule and martial law, however, the double dealing so evident in

the negotiations from 1916 on became intolerable. Even after
the signing of the Treaty, the British maintained that the
Boundary Commission which was to redefine the Irish borders if
Craig did not incorporate Ulster in an all-Ireland Parliament,
was meant to mean that political considerations were to override
the wishes of the inhabitants. Thus the counties of Tyrone and
Fermanagh were forcibly annexed against their wills to the Orange
State. This was not the interpretation Lloyd George gave the
Irish delegates when they signed the Treaty.

The Irish Question was not solved for either the British
or the Irish. Ireland had neither its independence nor unity
by the Treaty. Although Ireland received the former in 1949, the
latter is still a point of friction between the two islands.
IRISHMEN AND IRISHWOMEN: In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she receives he old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom.

Having organised and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organisation, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organisations, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, having patiently perfected her discipline, having resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and, supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first on her own strength, she strikes in full confidence of victory.

We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people. In every generation the Irish people
have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty: six times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State, and we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades-in-arms to the cause of its freedom, of its welfare, and of its exaltation among the nations.

The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman. The Republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien government, which have divided a minority from the majority in the past.

Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment of a permanent National Government, representative of the whole people of Ireland and elected by the suffrages of all her men and women, the Provisional Government, hereby constituted will administer the civil and military affairs of the Republic in trust for the people.

We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God. Whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and
we pray that no one who serves that cause will dishonour it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.

Signed on Behalf of the Provisional Government

THOMAS J. CLARKE,
SEAN Mac DIARMADA,
P. H. PEARSE,
JAMES CONNOLLY,
THOMAS MacDONAGH,
EAMONN Ceannt,
JOSEPH PLUNKETT
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