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WHO LIVES THERE:
ROLE OF EMBEDDED TROOPS IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

By
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A DISSERTATION IN PRACTICE

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Abstract

Since 2001, the United States Army has been involved in several armed conflicts around the world. These conflicts have involved insurgents and emphasized the tactics of counterinsurgency (COIN). The strategic and tactical goals of COIN operations are for governments to bring about stability and effective governance to the local populace of nations. These goals have not materialized the way US commanders have hoped. Thus, in future COIN operations it will be imperative for military leaders to understand how to succeed against insurgencies. This dissertation examines the effectiveness of COIN when small teams of Army personnel are embedded within local indigenous forces. This work challenges the conventional mindset of Army leaders that a heavy troop presence with firepower can win all conflicts. To test this argument, thus the purpose of this study was to compare and contrast COIN operations over the past 70 years in order to identify successful strategies that enabled governments to enhance the stability of governance while winning over the hearts and mind of its nation’s population. When an insurgency arises in a host nation it does so mainly because of grievances within the population. Recommendations for confronting an insurgency included having small teams that primarily accompany, assist and advise, while indigenous military forces take the lead to bring stability to an area.
Dedication

I am honored to dedicate this dissertation to my fellow veterans. I am an Air Force veteran by service, but I am unduly biased, as I hold every branch of the armed forces in great esteem. I want to dedicate this dissertation to the men and women around the world who face grave danger with courage and strength. This dedication reaches out to those who have come before us and those who have fallen. This research is also dedicated to those who make a quiet sacrifice and often overlooked sacrifice—the families who are left behind.
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By conventional wisdom an EdD is an individual and unique contribution to knowledge. However, the notion of individuality stretches only as far as is reasonable when undertaking an endeavor that requires academic, engagement, criticism, and redrafting. It helps to have a group of guides seeing one through the rough sports.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Background of the Problem

Counterinsurgency (COIN) has been at the forefront of military operations since 2001, beginning with the Global War on Terror (GWOT). COIN has engendered great debate on why the American military has struggled against insurgencies. The purpose of this comparative case study is to describe successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operations using PMSE (Political, Military, Economic, Social) framework as the basis of analysis. When a nation decides to confront a harrowing insurgency, the nation, and its military leaders must know the best approach at prevailing. This insight derives from the concept that since September 11, 2001 (9-11), the U.S. Army has been deployed in several armed conflicts, two of which were the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The war in Iraq ended in 2011 while combat operations in Afghan ended in 2014 and a small residual force staying past 2016. There were also more conflicts besides Iraq and Afghanistan, to which Army personnel were deployed. Most of these conflicts involved insurgents. This is on par, as history shows insurgency has been the dominant form of warfare for the past 70 years (Hammes, 2005).

According to a CNN/ORC International poll released in December of 2013, the Afghan war has become the most unpopular war in the history of American military, with only 17 percent of the population supporting the war (Political Unit, 2013). The Iraq war had similar results, with only 25 percent favoring the war at its conclusion in December.
Conflicts occur all over the world, for which Army personnel must be ready to deploy by order of the Commander in Chief.

These polls show that the American public grows weary of prolonged conflicts; thus, there is a finite timeframe for missions to be accomplished. A central aim of this research is to determine effective ways to engage and win such conflicts. The framework of this dissertation is to compare and contrast past conflicts that involved insurgents. Insurgency is a dominant form of warfare. A variety of strategies have been employed to defeat insurgents with a variety of outcomes. Describing the strategies used in eight notable COIN conflicts may inform stakeholders in planning future operations. This dissertation aims to inform stakeholders about the success or failure of historical counterinsurgency operations.

**Purpose of the Study**

When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, it did so with only 100 CIA operatives and 350 Special Forces operating with 15,000 Afghans (Stanton, 2009). This would ultimately lead to the defeat of the 60,000 strong Taliban. Former CIA Director George Tenet explained that teams of CIA personnel and Special Forces would be embedded within local forces to dislodge the enemy (Jones, 2009). Paul Wolfowitz, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, stated that the plan would allow for a limited troop presence in Afghanistan and not make the same mistake the Soviets had made in the 1980s (Jones, 2009). The capital city Kabul fell to the American and indigenous Afghan forces on November 13, 2001, without a fight (Jones, 2009). On December 22, 2001, an acting administration led by Hamad Karzai took control of Afghanistan, thus effectively
ending the control of the Taliban (Jones, 2009). In less than 90 days, the U.S. was able to remove the Taliban regime by military force. Beginning in 2005, the national security and stability in Afghanistan started to crumble due to a rising insurgency (Jones, 2009). This insurgency caused the multinational coalition to expand troop presence to over 100,000 and instability within the local population, which troubled U.S. and coalition forces. What this information shows is that the U.S., with minimal forces, was able to use its technology and military while embedded within local forces, but over 100,000 troops could neither keep peace nor stability.

On March 19, 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq. The Iraqi war started in a conventional approach with the barrage of missile and bomb attacks, which became known as “shock and awe.” The objective of the shock and awe strategy was to use overwhelming force to topple the Iraqi government. The invasion of Iraq showed initial troop levels to be at 149,000 (Blesco, 2009, p. 35). Three weeks into the invasion, coalition forces captured the capital city of Baghdad. On May 1, 2003, President George Bush announced aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln that the U.S. had prevailed during the war in Iraq. This speech was given across a backdrop in bold lettering “Mission Accomplished”.

This announcement would come much too early as an insurgency was brewing in Iraq. In 2003, the Iraqi insurgency started to grow with more and more lethal attacks against U.S. soldiers. In 2007, President Bush decided to change course in Iraq (Gordon & Trainor, 2013). He ordered General David Petraeus to implement the new plan, which would become known as the Surge (Gordon & Trainor, 2013). The Surge would provide the conditions for reconciliation amongst the ethnic factions and political parties.
Outlining his strategy for the Iraqi people, General Petraeus stated in *Military Review* (2008) that “the population needed to be secure, that areas must be held once secured, that enemies must be pursued relentlessly, and that soldiers must live amongst the people they are protecting” (p. 2). He famously wrote to his soldiers in both Iraq and Afghanistan, “you can’t commute to this fight” (Petraeus, 2008, p.2). Over the course of two years, the Surge worked to decrease the insurgency, and Iraq was on its way to being a sovereign country that could govern itself. On December 31, 2011, the last of the U.S. forces pulled out of Iraq, ending Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Since the Vietnam War, it has been apparent that the Army wanted to ignore the COIN lessons of the Vietnam War (Waddell, 2009). It was as if the Army wanted to downgrade the importance of COIN. The Army upgraded its “anti-armor capability, tanks, and armored personnel carriers into infantry units” (Waddell, 2009, Section 38, Para 2.). This was all contradictory to the reality of what happened during the Vietnam conflict (Waddell, 2009). The Army issued doctrine and guidance after the war that asserted that fighting conventional wars in Europe was more fitting than unconventional warfare (Fitzgerald, 2013, p. 39). In 1972, the JFK School of Special Warfare was only “devoting 10 out of 704 classes to COIN” (Fitzgerald, 2013, p. 47). In 1973, the Army created the “Total Force Concept, which expanded the conventional Army to 16 divisions, while deactivating four Special Forces Groups” (Fitzgerald, 2013, p.47). It can be concluded that senior Army commanders wanted to affirm in a traditional sense the Army’s overall mission. In July 1976, Army Chief of Staff General Fred Weyand, stated that the “Army should be taken out of the rice paddies of Vietnam and placed into the
Western European battlefield” (Fitzgerald, 2013, p.43). The Army wanted to reaffirm its identity during the cold war. The same officers who had lost the conflict in Vietnam were now making policy decisions affecting the future and restructuring of the Army (Fitzgerald, 2013). After the Vietnam conflict, there were many leaders in the Army’s chain of command who wanted to forget about any lessons learned. The Army reiterated that it wanted to focus on reaffirming a conventional role than any asymmetrical or unconventional method (Fitzgerald, 2013).

Sun Tzu (1910) wrote “one must know the enemy as one knows themselves” (p.18). Knowing the enemy means that in order for the U.S. Army to meet the challenges presented by insurgents they must understand the strategies to employ to defeat the insurgents. To understand a particular conflict, one must understand the insurgency itself: how it adapts to the surrounding environment, and how the government fuels it (Kilcullen, 2009). The Department of Defense (DOD) has noted that irregular warfare is just as important as conventional warfare and that irregular warfare could be employed across a combination of spectrums (DTIC, 2008). Thus, the conventional thinking of military leaders must be expanded for them to understand how to prosecute an effective COIN campaign. This directive acknowledges that irregular warfare in DOD is a national security issue along with traditional war. DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) acknowledging that the U.S. must change from a conventional way of thinking to an unconventional way of thinking (DOD, 2006) strengthens this concept. However, the 2014 QDR transitions back to a conventional mindset, stating the U.S. maintain its technological advantage over adversaries (DOD, 2014). The same 2014 QDR mentions
the word counterinsurgency three times, irregular warfare none, and unconventional warfare none. The current QDR suggests that military leaders might be transitioning back to the old European mentality. This thinking could pose a danger for future operations if leaders do not understand the effectiveness of COIN. The purpose then of this comparative case study is to describe successful and unsuccessful COIN operations using PMSE (Political, Military, Economic, Social) framework as the basis of analysis.

**Significance of the Study**

Foreign policy, which drives the military’s mission, has always been done so by a historical relationship and yet the military has struggled to understand how to effectively implement a COIN operation (Fitzgerald, 2013). This analysis will argue that after reviewing the historical record via a case study approach, the only effective COIN campaigns that are relevant in 2015 are ones in which a country had a small troop presence that assisted and advised local indigenous forces. This research will introduce the various roles of small led teams into a host countries Army. This analysis will examine both successful and unsuccessful COIN operations by a variety of armed forces over the last several decades with a focus on what tactical approaches led to the ultimate success or failure of the operations. Success is defined as achieving a country’s strategic objective in which the local populace supports the local government in a stable society with little to no violence.

Americans grow weary when American troops are involved in protracted conflicts with high casualty rates (Carroll, 2004). Even after the Vietnam War, American military personnel were involved in conflicts with a smaller Army troop presence such as in
Panama, Haiti, Grenada, and Beirut. With the wars of the past 14 years ending, the American public will not accept another large-scale conflict for the next 15-20 years because of the domestic constraints (Fitzgerald, 2013). The military, however, will still have a job to do when the U.S. strategic interests are involved.

With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, military leaders again are faced with a chance to learn how to effectively battle an insurgency. These leaders must not make the same mistakes that were apparent after Vietnam. Thus, this dissertation is a step toward offering insights into an effective campaign against an insurgency. If the U.S. Army is to be involved in any future COIN campaign, it will have to be invited by the host nation. This requires the U.S. government to negotiate with the host nation in creating an operational environment in which Army personnel can defuse an insurgency. In any conflict where American military is involved, the American people will insist on bringing stability to a nation and eliminate the insurgents. However, a large troop presence will not be acceptable to the American public for the foreseeable future. If the American troop footprint is small, it stays off the radar of the American people and the deployed Army personnel can achieve the strategic goals of the host nation.

**What is the Research Objective?**

What can an analysis of eight COIN operations tell us about the success or failures of these operations? The research question that motivates this analysis is “why do some countries defeat an insurgency while others do not”. This dissertation addresses the theory that COIN is most successful when a small team of Army personnel are embedded within the local indigenous forces. The role of these small teams is to assist and advise
while the indigenous forces take the lead in bringing stability to the host nation. This research will provide evidence-based solutions from four different case studies that show that when small teams of Army personnel are involved in COIN campaigns, the teams can defeat an insurgency while governments bring stability to a host nation. This dissertation will also discuss some of the tactical challenges for these soldiers.

This research will qualitatively compare and contrast approaches to COIN. The selected cases are resolved insurgencies since the 1940s. Since insurgencies have been the most common warfare for the last 70 years, the research focused on case studies covering this period.

This dissertation examines select successful COIN operations during the years 1949-1992. Specifically, 1) The Huk Insurgents in the Philippines (1949-1955), 2) Dhofar rebellion in Oman (1962-1976), 3) El Salvador forces against the FMLN (1979-1992), and 4) Thailand (1965-1985). These successes will be contrasted with the following COIN operations that failed: Algeria’s war against colonial ruling France from 1954-1962; the Cyprus insurgency against Britain from 1955-1959; Cuba (1956-1959); and Rhodesia from 1964-1980.

**Definition of Terms**

**Insurgents**

Insurgents use a wide range of asymmetrical and irregular warfare tactics. Army Field Manual 3-24 (2014) defined insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region” (p.1-2). Insurgencies want to challenge the existing government for control of all or a portion of its territory or
force political concessions in sharing political power. Insurgencies require the active support of some portion of the local population.

**Terrorism**

Terrorism is defined by the Department of Defense (2014) Joint Publication as the “unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political” (p.255). Terrorism is about power and can manifest itself in violence and propaganda. Terrorist groups can be regional, national, or international, and their ideology typically defines their geographic alignment.

**Counterinsurgency (COIN)**

COIN is defined in the Department of Defense Joint Publication (2014) as a “comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and control insurgency and addresses its root causes” (p.1-2). Counterinsurgency is an integration of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed insurgent violence. It should create and maintain stable political, economic, and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency, which in return can bring governance and stability. COIN is the most accurate term used; however, other names have been associated which will also be reflected in this paper, include revolutionary war, guerrilla warfare, irregular warfare (IR), low intensity conflict (LIC), stability operations (SO), and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (Waddell, 2009).
Center of Gravity

A DOD Joint Publication (2015) defined center of gravity as “the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act” (p. 29). The center of gravity target for an insurgent or counterinsurgent is a nation’s population. To control a country, the insurgent or counterinsurgent must control the population. When the enemy is denied the population, he loses his ability or will to prevail.

Host Nation

A DOD Joint Publication Document (2015) defines a host nation as “a nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory” (p. 105). For purposes of this research, a host nation is one for which an insurgency arises. Therefore, this research looked at what civil and military assistance was rendered to a host nation and whether it was successful or not.

Human Terrain

A U.S. Special Operations Command document (2013) defined the human domain as “the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence behavior in population-centric conflict (p. 1). The words human terrain and human domain are interchangeable when speaking of counterinsurgency operations. For purposes of this research, I will utilize the standard term of human terrain.

Grievance

G.L. Lamborn (2009) defined a grievance as “a cause of distress or suffering felt by an individual or group sufficient to prompt complaints, disaffection or general
resistance” (p. 89). Chapter Two will show grievances engender insurgencies whether social, economic, or political.

Limitations and Delimitations

Limitations

An investigation of COIN hinges on all the variables associated with a COIN operation. COIN encompasses the military, political and economic policy of a host nation. Because this research looks at a tactical perspective, any military success must be followed up with political and economic reforms that will defuse the root causes of an insurgency. Its conclusion could serve as a measure for other military organizations across the globe to follow. Another limitation is the pendulum change in leadership that is associated with military operations. An officer can implement his plan of operations; however, if he/she is removed and replaced with another officer who has a different concept of strategy and tactics, the COIN mission could fail. COIN is a protracted conflict which having a strategy that is sound, coherent, and consistent is important.

Delimitations

The first delimitation to this dissertation is both scope and content. This dissertation will look at conflicts over the past 70 years. Since conflicts arise all the over the globe, it is almost impossible to study every single one within the confines of a single dissertation. Another delimitation is not every soldier or marine can be identified. There are many soldiers involved in combat operations, each with a differing view on COIN. This study will not be able to account for every individual soldier or their viewpoints on successful and unsuccessful COIN operations. Thus, results are based on individuals and
cannot define the entire military population. Finally, the issue of human rights will not be discussed because of the questionable accuracy of information distributed by all parties involved in the conflict.

Summary

The Army has focused much of its mission and doctrine on a conventional mindset. Most wars in the future will involve some form of an insurgency as seen by the current world conflicts. One of the most influential current works on COIN operations is John Nagl’s *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Nagl (2009) argued that the Army failed in Vietnam because it didn’t understand the culture nor have the flexibility allowed to adapt quickly to the realities of COIN warfare, thus losing the conflict. Notre Dame Professor and author David Ucko (2009) notes, the same attitude towards COIN. He believes the Army suffers from what he called a “COIN syndrome and that leadership marginalize any COIN operation” (Chapter 2, Section 11, Para 2). If Army personnel are deployed, the right tactics can help reduce the antagonism and violence created by an insurgency.

Any COIN operation should involve the use of local proxy forces. Countering any insurgencies means that soldiers will have to adapt. To adapt, forces must be embedded in the local culture. This dissertation will prove, through historical case studies, how this must involve a strategy and not just a series of tactics. In the aftermath of Vietnam, the Army turned away from any experience it learned about insurgents and COIN. Neither the Army nor the military could escape missions that dealt with insurgents. This became firsthand knowledge when the Army struggled with insurgents in both Afghanistan and
Iraq. The Army has been involved in most small conflicts; however, the Army has failed to plan for such low-intensity conflicts, and the price has been lives lost and damage to national interests. The common characteristic of these Army units has been the overwhelming use of force (Waddell, 2009). The problem lies in the belief that the Army can use a big force to win its way to victory. This aversion has led to difficulty fighting insurgents, which suggests the question, how can an effective counterinsurgency be implemented in future conflicts? Historical case studies can influence policy not only in the immediate moment but also in the broader context of warfare in the future. By looking at warfare from a historical view, this dissertation will demonstrate that small led teams are associated with an effective COIN strategy. The history of warfare can be constructed to serve the wars of the future. Armies prepare to fight the next conflict with the lessons learned from the previous conflict. This is why understanding a successful COIN operation is significant to participants in future warfare. Now that the significance has been outlined, one must consider the participants involved in any COIN operation. This is addressed in Chapter Two, where literature reveals the key forces in any COIN operation.
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

This chapter discusses the literature surrounding COIN, as well as the defining characteristics of the study. The amount of literature concerning COIN is vast. Although there are multiple research studies on the concepts of COIN, there is little dedicated on how to effectively confront an insurgency. Analyzing an insurgency and the operating environment is a requirement for any study in trying to understand a COIN operation.

The literature review assists with this. Political, military, social, and economic programs (PMSE) are the components of any COIN operation (Lamborn, 2012). The literature review will show the following: the political component entails instilling effective and just governance that reduces the root cause of an insurgency; the military component will focus on clearing and holding territory to help the host nation expand on the other components; the social component helps to understand the dynamics of a population and how best to protect it and address its concerns; finally, the economic component can help to build and grow an economy giving the population needed resources while improving the effective governance of a host nation.

The research organized the literature into the PMSE elements. Any legitimate government will derive its power from how stable the security, political, economic, and social structure is of that society (Lamborn, 2012). When researching any COIN case study, one must have a better understanding of the COIN operation framework.
COIN FRAMEWORK

If there is an absence of any or each of the PMSE elements presented by a host nation, an insurgent can look to fill the void that a government might not be providing (Shelley, 2014). An insurgency is nothing more than the failed PMSE components of any government (Shelley, 2014). Nations fail to recover from civil wars because of no structural change made to the PMSE elements (Moore, 2007). Hammes (2006) argued, “the United States has struggled, if not lost in insurgency warfare” (p. 2). So that the Army can best address an insurgency, they must understand the theory behind COIN. Understanding the framework of COIN will allow one to focus on the strategy needed to confront and ultimately defeat an insurgency.

Political Factors

In 2011, the World Economic Forum released a report titled “Global Risks”, that stated, “the world has never been so unstable, and the likelihood of a major challenge to global stability is imminent” (Shelley, 2014, p. 73). James Fearon and David Laitin (2003) studied why civil violence breaks out in countries. Their study found that it had nothing to do with ethnicity or religion, but more when conditions are right, that tend to favor an insurgency. Grievances amongst the population can cause a breakdown in the PMSE elements, making the conditions right for an insurgency. Insurgencies can form at a rate of 67% when governments do not address populations’ grievances (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). This shows that when grievances are not addressed, insurgencies will most likely form within a host nation. In Small Wars Journal, Gian Gentile (2011) stated that
war cannot be a substitute for foreign policy, meaning the importance is on the political landscape of a nation.

A government must be able to bring about governance to its citizens. If it cannot, it cannot be perceived as legitimate, and cannot command the people’s allegiances. Policies should be geared towards the grievances of the people; thus, having a greater chance of ending any insurgency (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Governance might not be the number one factor in any insurgent; however, it can extend or spread an insurgency. Poor governance has high costs for society. Poor governance keeps states in cycles of violence and prevents the development of effective institutions of governance (Shelley, 2014). When resources are not made available to the public, the clock turns back on the development of a host nation. This in turn creates further instability and gives an environment for an insurgent to operate within. Insurgencies in the past overthrew a government at a rate of 25%, if their grievances of governance, military, social, or economics were not addressed; even if not overthrown, the insurgents made significant changes 16% of the time (Moore, 2007).

Lamborn (2009) wrote in “The People in Arms”, insurgencies take place within the PMSE framework, and these insurgencies are nothing more than a “war of ideas” (p.15). Lamborn (2012) noted any perception of injustice could be one of the most important grievances a society has against a government. A host nation with governance can convince insurgent leaders their goals are unobtainable, helping to confront any insurgency (Hammes, 2006). When a government makes changes on how it governs
which affects the living quality of a society, it will automatically change the way a COIN operation is conducted (Hammes, 2006).

In the global economy we live, citizens no longer confined by borders but connected to the international community (Hammes, 2006). Individuals are connected globally through technology; citizens of one country can see what happens in another. This connection might cause some to lose faith in the governance of their country and take up an insurgency, regardless of location. Government policies that incorporate a balanced society approach, utilizing the entire PMSE components for the entire population, can help when confronting an insurgency (Shelley, 2014). If individuals lose faith in their government, then individuals might look to remove the ruling government (Shelley, 2014). Research shows corruption in government facilitates insurgencies (Shelley, 2014). Corruption is a force multiplier to nations that border each other. Terrorist groups thrive in nations where corruption is rampant rather where governance is positive, and the population has stability (Shelley, 2014).

Military Factors

Lt. Col John Nagl (2002) argued that there are two approaches to COIN operations: direct approach, which is the annihilation of an enemy force; and the indirect approach, which focuses on winning hearts and minds of the local population. The annihilation of an enemy force is that of a conventional mindset that does nothing to seek the support of the local population (Nagl, 2002). Nagl supported the approach focusing on the hearts and minds. The Army will decide the objective of a COIN operation, which then will determine the success or failure of a COIN operation (Nagl, 2002). Thus, we
might conclude that a country must have an appropriate number of troops to restrict and degrade the insurgents. Classic insurgent leader Carlos Marighella (1969/2011) defined a guerrilla as “a man who fights military arms, using unconventional method, whom is a patriot fighting for his countries liberation, and a friend of the people” (p.1). Marighella (1969/2011) pointed towards the qualities of “initiative, mobility, flexibility, versatility, and command of any situation”, to be necessities of any insurgent (p. 4).

Galula (1964/2006) stressed the importance of utilizing the local forces. He stated that when forces are local, there would be family bonds, solidarity, and sympathy. This bond can help destroy the insurgencies political objectives (Galula, 1964/2006). With the support of the local populace, intelligence could be acquired on insurgents, and assist in defeating an insurgency (Galula, 1964/006, Chapter 5, Section 5, Para 2). Intelligence is paramount to defeating an insurgency, but this intelligence has to come from the local population (Galula, 1964/2006). He stated that heavy firepower and troop presence will not work because conventional military means is to destroy territory if not an enemy (Galula, 1964/2006). An insurgency holds no territory as they could be located anywhere (Galula, 1964/2006). If a counterinsurgent force is determined to carry out the mission, all that is needed is a small force to achieve loyalty amongst the population (Galula, 1964/2006, Chapter 6, Section 6, Para 2). Embedded troops should advise indigenous forces that the local population must see them as taking the lead in any operation to gain the support of the local populous (Lawrence, 1917/2011). Lawrence (1917/2011) cautioned an embedded force of trying to do too much for an indigenous force. Lawrence (1922/2013) famously wrote, “better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfect”
Lawrence infers that anything done from an indigenous force will be accepted and tolerated more than if it were to be from an outside force. Therefore, the role of embedded troops should be to offer advice to indigenous commanders (Lawrence, 1917/2011). Embedded Army personnel assisting and advising can bring national credentials to the indigenous force (Lamborn, 2012). Lamborn (2012) noted that a larger troop presence would make understanding culture difficult, which makes gaining the public support even harder. Using indigenous forces instead of an outside force brings improvements in intelligence from the local population about an insurgency and the way it may be structured (Cassidy, 2006).

From a tactical perspective, having an indigenous force taking the lead can dislodge the insurgents out of an area, help restore government legitimacy and control, and allow the host nation to assume the burdens of any military operation (Cassidy, 2006). Cassidy’s (2006) research found that previous COIN history and the lessons are applicable in 2015. His analysis showed that employment of an indigenous force with embedded Army personnel is an effective method for achieving success in any COIN strategy (Cassidy, 2006). With insurgents spread out, the area of operations becomes larger, requiring a larger troop footprint. This would make a smaller troop size approach better. Dr. David Kilcullen (2010) stated that any force must evolve and adapt quickly to the different environments involved in COIN operations. In the article, “The Future of Warfare”, T.X. Hammes (2004) stated in order to win future wars against insurgents, counterinsurgent forces must be kept small and embedded into local cultural.
In COIN operations, one must use people not just technology (Hammes, 2006). This again implies that people are instrumental in being the primary weapon against an insurgent, not the superiority of firepower that the Army processes. To be embedded with indigenous forces and the local environment, one must understand the culture. These teams will have to be well trained, intelligent, and creative; however, must remain small, as the larger the force, the harder to transition to the local culture (Hammes, 2014). To have a successful COIN operation, U.S. Army personnel will have to operate at a local level to understand the cultural (Hammes, 2006). Unconventional warfare, used by insurgents, can defeat the U.S. despite our advancement in weapons and technology (Hammes, 2006). Too big of a force can overwhelm the objective and make an operation inefficient (Hammes, 2006). Wars evolve rather than transform; therefore, the way a counterinsurgent fights should adapt to the insurgent threat (Hammes, 2006).

Both the insurgent and the terrorist have utilized the tactic of terror. The famous insurgent leader, Ernesto “Che” Guevara (1960/2010) considered night to be the best time for attacking; it allowed for the greatest impact on a force while allowing the insurgent to slip away undetected. He stressed the need for terrorism as a tactic at night since it could thwart any opposition (Guevara, 1960/2010). Guevara focused first on the political, social and economic factors of the population before trying to resolve with a military operation (Moore, 2007). Marighella (1969/2011) also believed in using terror as a tactic; however, he stressed the importance of discriminately choosing targets. He stressed that terrorism against government forces, done properly, could cause the forces to retaliate with brutal force; causing the population to gravitate towards the insurgent
side (Moore, 2007). Marighella (1969/2011) believed goading opponents to overreact was a potent weapon to guerrillas. He argued that terror attacks cost little (Marighella, 1969/2011). Terrorists’ strikes have evolved from striking individuals to now striking at a nation’s economy (Shelley, 2014). Any terrorist attack will seek damage to the military, people, economy or policy of a host nation (Shelley, 2014). The hallmark of any terrorist organization is the use of terrorism to achieve its objectives (Shelley, 2014).

Douglas Porch (2013) stated that a counterterrorism method such as violence against an uprising within a population is what has always deterred any possible insurgency (Porch, 2013). Therefore, COIN is nothing more than an action in war; not a separate type of category because it’s an evolution of anthropology (Porch, 2013). Porch (2013) also believed soldiers involved in COIN operations are nothing more than operatives between society’s government and the military; it is just that the emphasis is put on the military side. If history is recorded inaccurately, this could lead people to get killed because each insurgency is contingent upon doctrine and operations, which support a broad policy and strategy, not the other way around (Porch, 2011).

In the book, *Wrong Turn*, the American military is cautioned that its warfare strategy is heading down a dangerous slope with its current doctrine and views on COIN (Gentile, 2013). In an article written for *World Politics Review*, Gentile (2011) argued the American military has been obsessed with the tactics associated with COIN, and it has failed in strategy over the last 13 years of war. Even when there is a force to protect the local population, more than often not innocent civilians are killed (Gentile, 2013). Any military intervention should be seen through the reality of war, which is nothing more
than violence (Gentile, 2013). Throughout history, the Army has tried to win wars simply by changing generals, which then changes policies and tactics (Gentile, 2013). This has a negative impact on the Army as the transformation of the organization is done in a manner, which does not accurately reflect the history of war. Gentile (2013) argued the Army should look at the operational methods employed in war. Focusing strictly on COIN, could hinder the Army’s ability to fight across all spectrums and to think otherwise, is committing strategic irrelevance (Gentile, 2011). Gentile was arguing, that the Army is putting too much emphasis on COIN and should be prepared to fight conventional and unconventional. Gentile (2011) believed that a COIN way of thinking produces never ending nation building campaigns and changes societies.

**Social Factors**

An insurgency consists of individuals who make up the society of host nation. More than likely this means tribes and clans. When addressing tribes and clans, it is important to understand the culture and norms associated with them. In his book, *Insurgent, Terrorists, Militias*, Richard Shultz (2006) stated that these norms have values and ways of thinking that shape how these tribes thinks and fight. Different cultures will bring about different ways of thinking which can affect different politics (Shultz & Dew, 2006). Even in the globalization world, tribes have still maintained their autonomy (Kilcullen, 2009). The strength then of a tribe depends on its solidarity within the state. Professor Reza Aslan (2007) stated that the only way for a community in pre-Arabia to survive was to maintain its solidarity with its affiliation to a tribe. This means that the tribe was only as strong as its weakest member. When conditions are right, it takes only a
Lamborn (2012) noted these individuals are usually alienated from a host nation but in touch with the people and aware of the grievances. Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) study found that just 400-2000 guerrillas could make for a destructive insurgency.

Mao Tse Tung can be considered the first teacher of how to operate an effective insurgency (Lamborn, 2012). Mao believed insurgency must happen at the local level. Mao understood the grievances with the local populace, which allowed him to carry out a protracted war with popular support. He observed that the Chinese government did not meet the needs of the people and allowed his insurgency to brew (Nagl, 2002). Because his guerrillas had the support of the local populace, they could choose when, where, and how to attack government forces (Lamborn, 2009). Because he controlled the local populace, he controlled the conditions that drove the conflict. Mao’s insurgent build-up focused around the people thus making any insurgency people-centric.

Mao described his warfare as a jigsaw puzzle meaning instead of one definable strategy they could be broken into separate conflicts that outlined a broader goal (Lamborn, 2009). Mao stated that revolutionaries are “fish that swim in the water of the people” (Nagl, 2002, p.27). Guevara (1960/2010) was inspired by Mao, who considered insurgents to be the “Jesuits of Warfare” (p.7). What he meant was that insurgents are from the local populace, which means that any insurgent must act on what is best for the population. Marighella (1969/2011) believed the best way to gain the popular support is to be embedded with the locale. The people refuse to collaborate with the government if the guerrilla force is believed to be on their side (Marighella, 1969/2011). The goal again
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is to win the support of the people. Any insurgency seen operating on behalf of the people can grow immediately by the masses (Marighella, 1969/2011). The local population sees an insurgency as supporting their interests, and then the local population might be inclined to join the cause of the insurgency. The local population becomes the center of gravity, meaning the greatest importance. Center of gravity refers to the support of the population; therefore, it is a strategic, operational, and tactical objective for both insurgents and counterinsurgents. An insurgent will be judged by the population for what he promises, not what he does; therefore propaganda is a powerful weapon for any insurgency (Galula, 1964/2006). The only way for a COIN force to operate in a nation is with the support of the local populace (Galula, 1964/2006).

Lamborn’s (2012) assertion that COIN is a war of ideas shows that the strategy of any insurgent or counterinsurgent has a propaganda component. Focus on people and their communities help counterinsurgents bring stability and positive governance to a host nation (Lamborn, 2012). All conflicts should teach us to pay attention to the needs and wants of a population (Lamborn, 2012). The population is now a principal weapon of an insurgent or counterinsurgent. Insurgents do not own a formal nation with boundaries or capitals. They have no choice but to operate within local communities (Lamborn, 2009). Because insurgencies must have the support from the local populace, most insurgents are from the local population. Without the support of the population, neither insurgents nor insurgencies can survive (Lamborn, 2009).

British General Sir Rupert Smith stated that no longer will wars be fought against nations, but they will be fought amongst the people (Smith, 2007). Smith was stating that
the future of warfare will be with insurgents, not nation states versus nation states. The only way then to defeat an insurgency will be for military forces to reside within the population, confront an insurgency, and protect the population (Kilcullen, 2011). Gentile (2011) noted COIN operations cannot be won militarily but more within the political and social framework.

In order to understand the population, the military structure should understand the culture of a host nation. Nagl (2002) outlined America’s need to understand indigenous cultures. His book, *Learning how to Eat Soup with a Knife*, has been widely read amongst military leaders and COIN theorists. Nagl’s title comes from T.E. Lawrence’s famous quote: “making war upon insurgents is slow and messy, like eating soup with a knife” (Lawrence, 1922/2013, Chapter 33, Section 9, Para. 1). Lawrence (1922/2013) stressed the importance of understanding tribal affiliation, when his small British forces were embedded with Meccan Arabians and Bedouins. The Meccans and Bedouins had different cultures, so his troops had to understand each civilization. T.E. Lawrence (1917/2011) wrote that an embedded force must get to know the families, clans, tribes, and even enemies. He encouraged his troops to learn the local dialect and to speak it (Lawrence, 1917/2011). Lawrence (1922/2013) embraced the culture, by advising his forces embedded in the Bedouin tribe, to wear an Arab kit and headscarf. Wearing the local clothing allowed for trust to be built between the locals and the embedded force. This also confused the insurgents, because they could not distinguish individuals from the uniform (Lawrence, 1917/2011). The military, however, seems to have always had a problem with culture, which has hurt past COIN operations (Nagl, 2002).
Nagl explained that not understanding the history and culture of the Vietnamese people ultimately is what led to the defeat of the United States (Nagl, 2002). He argued that insurgents must be separated from the local population (Nagl, 2002, p.27). Military members must have respect for the local culture and make any population feel safe (Kilcullen, 2010). Kilcullen (2010) argued for what is termed a “population-centric approach to COIN” (p. 9). When using a people-centric strategy, the goal of the counterinsurgent force will always take into account the local population. In a population-centric approach, having a force embedded into the population compels the insurgents to come to the people, allowing far greater loss to the insurgents while connecting the population to the counterinsurgents (Kilcullen, 2010)

Insurgencies must be looked at as “social environments, which adapt, evolve, and consists of nodes, links, boundaries, inputs and outputs” (Kilcullen, 2010, p.197). If we are to view insurgencies as environments, forces should be embedded in the environment to possibly understand and defuse an insurgency. In the book *Arms of Little Value*, Lamborn (2012) noted that most of world does not know each other’s culture. This unawareness becomes a huge challenge for a counterinsurgent. A COIN force must understand the culture of any local populace (Lamborn, 2009). Lamborn (2009) outlined throughout his article, “The People in Arms”, insurgencies involved a portion of the population against their government and the best way to handle these insurgencies is with a small force. He stated that the counterinsurgent force should have a small footprint (Lamborn, 2009). British General Sir Rupert Smith (2007) argued that a country cannot just deploy troops but rather they must employ troops. Smith’s means that soldiers will
have to engage within the local communities they operate in. This engagement means understanding the culture.

Propaganda can grow an insurgency’s base or could be a method used by counterinsurgents to reduce the appeal of any insurgency (Lamborn, 2012). Propaganda will allow for insurgents or counterinsurgents message to be conveyed allowing the population to decide which side to take (Galula, 1964/2006). If a host nation fails to understand the strengths of the insurgency, then it does not understand the makeup of an insurgency (Lamborn, 2009). An insurgent will try to separate the people from the government; therefore, the counterinsurgent must separate the insurgent from the people politically and mentally (Lamborn, 2009). To do this, Army personnel involved in a COIN operation must constantly be amongst the people taking the strategic advantage away from the insurgent (Lamborn, 2009). This gives the notion that Army personnel must be embedded into the community. Propaganda is central to the insurgent spreading his message. Propaganda allows for tales of fighting, sacrifices, and assistance given to insurgencies (Guevara, 1960/2006).

Propaganda is important in the early stages of a COIN operation. Even small publicity can help establish future insurgent or counterinsurgent goals (Kilcullen, 2010). Propaganda is a tool for either side to utilize when trying to win the support of a population. Effective propaganda by a counterinsurgent creates a safe haven for the local population (Kilcullen, 2010). This safe haven can separate the insurgent from the population, marginalizing the insurgent, and creating space for grievances to be addressed. If a counterinsurgent builds a network of local allies, then it has support of the
local tribe, eliminating a possible sanctuary for insurgents (Kilcullen, 2011). If an insurgent’s propaganda is strong and compelling, it can be a key factor in the population supporting an insurgent (Hammes, 2006). When governments cannot provide basic needs to people, insurgents use this as propaganda to show corruption within a society (Shelley, 2014). Countering insurgencies are population driven, meaning culture must be understood and forces must be placed within the population to protect.

If COIN is going to take place within the population, one cannot view history from any other perspective except from that of the people who were affected by an insurgency (Gurman, 2013). Previous COIN operations show that all civilians have suffered, and this should not be deemed a success by the military (Gurman, 2013). In the end, the military’s version of COIN is contradictory, as it stresses the support of the local population, but fails to take into account the civilian’s view of success or failure (Gurman, 2013). Gurman (2013) argued there will be a plethora of information on COIN in the future, based upon the current conflicts; however, these conflicts could be misinterpreted because it might be looking through a military lens and not civilian perspective. There can be no such thing as a “good” population versus “bad” population in a COIN operation. It is an ill-conceived notion to think that one could divide an insurgency from the local populace, when there are family ties and bonds (Gurman, 2013). By taking into account the civilians’ perspective, Gurman believed future COIN operations can be defined as successful only by the local population (Gurman, 2013).

When the U.S tries to solve an insurgency through military force, standards of livings drop and individuals are displaced from their homes and country (Gurman, 2013).
Research shows that when a local government is corrupt, the local population is disenfranchised and can gravitate towards an insurgency, which then causes civilian casualties to rise (Gurman, 2013). This undercuts the mission to win hearts and minds. American soldiers will lay down their life in service of their country, but would they lay down their life for the protection of a local population? If not, then COIN is nothing more than rhetoric (Gurman, 2013). Gurman (2013) argued only the people decide victory, and that is either to support the insurgent or the counterinsurgent.

**Economic Factors**

Galula (1964/2006) stated that an insurgency is cheap, but for the counterinsurgent it will be expensive. An insurgency will take decades to defeat, and any planning operation must take this into account (Hammes, 2006). This means that any COIN operation will be a prolonged conflict, which could bring economic constraints to a nation wanting to confront an insurgency. Recruitment is easier for an insurgent when economic conditions are poor (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

In the article, “The Basics of Counterinsurgency”, Moore (2007) studied over 60 COIN operations over the past century and found that history provided a framework for all insurgencies. Economic inequality within a community is a driving factor in the rise of an insurgency (Shelly, 2014). Moore’s (2007) study showed that governance amongst the military and population had the most positive influence on recruitment towards insurgencies. Fearon & Laitin (2003) studied 127 civil wars from 1945 to 1999 and found that mass poverty in a nation is the best indicator for when an insurgency might form within the population (p.88). Because an insurgency recruits from a local population, then
an insurgency is an offensive activity, meaning the insurgent will determine when to strike and where to strike. Insurgencies do not have the resources for a quick, decisive victory; therefore, each insurgency must prolong the conflict as long as possible (Moore, 2007). For a COIN strategy, Moore (2007) found that nearly 40% of COIN operations over the past century either suppressed the insurgents to a manageable situation to local forces or ended the insurgency altogether. Research also showed that COIN operations took ten years or more (Moore, 2007).

Once a military force decides to confront an insurgency and is embedded into an indigenous force, history shows the confrontation is prolonged. The intent of any insurgency is to sap the morale and deplete the resources of a counterinsurgent (Lamborn, 2009). Prolonged conflicts will always favor the insurgent, as his effort is cheaper. For the counterinsurgent, a prolonged conflict is expensive with the cost of manpower and resources (Galula, 1964/2006). When conflict is protracted, there is a greater chance of increased casualties, which can wither the will of any support for a COIN operation. Any military force should prepare and bear down for an extensive COIN operation.

**Summary**

A researcher can look at the foundations of any COIN operation to determine how to succeed or fail when an insurgency is confronted. COIN operations must take into account the entire PMSE framework. If the local population does not feel a local government has their best interests, an insurgency could be formed. It does not take a large group to start an insurgency, and the support can increase very rapidly.
The population is just as important to a counterinsurgent as it is to the insurgent. Any insurgency will want a prolonged conflict to cause the most damage to a military force and the government. To help spread the message and build support, the insurgent and counterinsurgent rely on propaganda. The military side of COIN is to hold gains and give the host nation time to fix grievances that started the insurgency in the first place.

Insurgencies will utilize a variety of tactics, many of which are unknown due to the element of surprise. All insurgents will utilize terrorism. If all support comes from the local population, then one must understand the make-up of a certain society. These societies will come with different cultures, which originate from the kinship of tribes, clans, and families. Utilizing indigenous forces can strengthen the governance of a host nation. If a local populace sees its own people taking the lead on the government’s side, they would be more inclined to support any operation. These operations, however, must be discriminate and not hurt the population, or the insurgents could gain support. The U.S. military is the most sophisticated and technological military in the world. If the United States were to commit troops and help confront an insurgency, the military must know what the appropriate force should be. Research shows that smaller troop presence is better. If small teams of Army personnel are embedded they can assist, advise, and quickly adapt to a flexible insurgent and help defeat or defuse the insurgency. A review of the literature suggests the foundations and principles of a COIN operation.

The selected cases as shown in Chapter One are from resolved insurgencies since the 1950s. Before looking at the historical analysis, readers must understand why the qualitative method was chosen. Chapter Three will show us the purpose behind the
research to include the research methods and procedures. In this chapter, the research
described the participants chosen for the case studies. Furthermore, the research showed
the data gathered to answer the dissertation question, how the data was transcribed, how
the case studies are accurate, and the themes that were developed in the studying of the
case studies.
The purpose of this comparative case study described successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations using PMSE (Political, Military, Economic, Social) framework as the basis of analysis. Historically, military leaders have always favored tactics that emphasize conventional troop deployments with heavy firepower (Fitzgerald, 2013). This form of warfare is appropriate when fighting nation states; however, future warfare will more than likely consist of non-state actors such as insurgents. Knowing how to effectively confront an insurgency will allow the U.S. Army to adapt and tactically battle an insurgency successfully.

The research question which motivated this analysis is “why do some countries defeat an insurgency while others do not”. As discussed previously, defeating an insurgency is important to a host nation, as it ensures stability and credibility to a government – and the failure aspect comes when one fails to address grievances, which causes a conflict with an insurgent that unseats a ruling government. In this chapter, the method utilized will be discussed in which the ability of countries to defeat an insurgency was examined while also sharing the sources that supply the data accounted for the recorded data.
Research Design

A qualitative approach for this study was chosen for several reasons. In general, qualitative research methods are especially useful in discovering the meaning that history gives to events. It is also considered best when using real world scenarios (Creswell, 2013). The data would improve the way that the military fights insurgencies. Specifically, a qualitative approach is warranted when the nature of the research questions requires exploration (Creswell, 2013). Qualitative research question’s often begin with how or why, so that the researcher can gain an in-depth understanding of what is going on relative to the topic (Creswell, 2013). Qualitative research has the capability to generate theory and to help us understand the world from a participant’s perspective (Bryant, 2004). Qualitative research focuses on the nature of things, the meanings and descriptions, rather than the amount of something. This study employs a comparative case study design, using data collected from books, journals, articles, and open source documents. This design is appropriate for practical and logistical reasons.

A qualitative case study allows the research to explore the different factors associated with any COIN operation that might be difficult to extract or learn through conventional research methods (Creswell, 2013). For the present study, a host nation’s action was explored in confronting an insurgency while determining what worked to defeat the insurgency or what led to the defeat of the host nation. Third, qualitative research methods emphasize the researcher’s role as an active participant of the study (Creswell, 2013). In case studies, qualitative methodology was chosen specifically
because it has the ability to examine more closely social settings and the individuals who
inhabit those settings (Bryant, 2004). As noted in the literature review, any COIN
operation is influenced by the PMSE factors. Because COIN will be decided by the
people, it is important to understand the function and interpretation of how a military
force succeeded against any insurgency.

Qualitative research can be considered a science as long as it provides a
systematic way of discovering and explaining how the world functions and how these
realities arise and influence individuals and organizations (Bryant, 2004). The United
States Army is the organization for which results of this case study will benefit. The
research was carried out not only for the benefit of the Army but also for the benefit of
DOD in both the short and long-term.

For the present study, I will be the key instrument in data collection, and the
interpreter of data findings. Gaining access to personnel associated with each insurgency
or military personnel could have proved quite challenging because of the coverage period
for each case study. Some personnel might not be able to be located, where others might
not be alive to reflect accurately on their accounts.

A case study design makes it possible to rely on experts who have knowledge on
each insurgency. The case study design can reduce the logistical difficulties inherent in
coordinating multiple sample selections that would be necessary to approximate a
representative sample of all personnel associated with each insurgency conflict.
Sample Selection

A total of eight cases were identified for this comparative examination of insurgencies. Four will be considered successes and four will be considered failures. The host nations were chosen because of the strategic importance in current global affairs.

Table 1

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Data Collection

Data collection was to be conducted through literature documents, insider accounts, academic research, and any unclassified reports. Because the case studies are in the past, observation techniques were not employed. The population for this study would be military personnel, authors, academia who have knowledge on this subject. The pragmatic approach is a commitment to solving problems in the real world through generating useful knowledge, validated through a consensus theory of truth (Creswell, 2013). The pragmatic approach does not see the world as one (Creswell, 2013). This allows for research to identify the different cultures associated with each host nation. Pragmatism allows for identification of data-rich information and informs the study (Creswell, 2013). A person identification strategy is the concept that an individual might develop and their beliefs as they experienced the case studies (Creswell, 2013). Several
data sources, including available public information, academic journals, unclassified reports, and academia scholars would be included in the data set.

Analysis

Data were aggregated, analyzed, and categorized to correspond to components to the PMSE framework presented in Chapter Two. Insurgents and counterinsurgents utilized political warfare to either show the ills in a society or how the government operates for the people (Lamborn, 2012). The military will clear and hold territory so that a government has time to fix the grievances that start amongst the population (Kilcullen, 2010). Lamborn (2012) stated the social component is the “gap between common people, masses, and the elites” (p. 74). The economic component consists of such factors as currency, labor participation, and commodities/resources (Lamborn, 2012). All written and recorded information were protected in case any documentation has personal identifiable information in regards to the participants.

Validity

Sources and data were triangulated among public documents, academic and investigative reports to ensure researcher’s interpretation were valid. Triangulation directed the researcher to find and validate the evidence in various sources of data to assure the accuracy of the information and findings. Dependability was established with an audit trail which involved maintaining and preserving all documents, articles, reports, and books. The researcher collaborated with an outside evaluator during data analysis to ensure validity and to eliminate any subjectivity of the findings.
Ethics

To create a distance of the researcher’s own personal experience, theories, or assumption’s, the research required bracketing. The researcher has worked in various military organizations for over seventeen years and hold’s beliefs about the efficacy of COIN operations that, unaddressed, might bias the findings. To stay objective, personal opinion, experience, or emotion were uncolored and left out. The writing will describe scientific events by describing events and results. By scientific, the use of impressionistic or metaphorical language or language that appeals primarily to a reader’s senses, emotions, or moral beliefs will be avoided. The case studies researched will not be limited by any viewpoints, thus allowing for all accounts to be accurately researched. The strength of the research will depend on the quality of the case studies researched. The researcher will acknowledge all views, to demonstrate that he was aware and considered them carefully. This allowed for a process that developed non-judgmental studies that were not impeded by any perception.

Although served in a different military branch, the researcher has served with different Army units in training and real world situations. The researcher will allow the data to drive the outcomes of the study rather than to a pre-supposed conclusion. Creighton Universities Institutional Review Board (IRB) was contacted about the need for a review. The IRB stated that no review would be needed because my dissertation involves non-human subjects.
Assumptions

The literature is assumed to be historic in nature in that it has been either peer reviewed, considered military classic reading, or came as a recommendation by an academic subject matter expert by someone who has studied the case studies. The case studies sample will be assumed to serve as a fair representation and application of COIN operations. The Army is not the only branch which fields ground combat units so therefore the same approach could work for other military branches.

Significance of the Study

Insurgency is a dominant form of warfare and has been the most common form of warfare for the past 70 years; thus, having an effective strategy to confront an insurgency is important (Hammes, 2006). After reviewing the historical record via a case study approach, the only effective COIN insurgency campaigns that are relevant in 2015 are ones in which a country had a small troop presence that assisted and advised local indigenous forces. The various roles of small advising teams into a host country’s Army are introduced. This analysis will examine both successful and unsuccessful COIN operations by a variety of armed forces over the last several decades with a focus on what tactical approaches led to the ultimate success or failure of the operations. A variety of strategies have been employed to defeat insurgents with a variety of outcomes. Describing the strategies used in eight notable counterinsurgence conflicts may inform stakeholders in planning future operations.
Summary

Adopting a qualitative case study methodology, the purpose of the study is to analyze COIN operations through the lens of PMSE (Political, Military, Social, and Economic) framework to evaluate how U.S. Army personnel might best succeed when deployed into a COIN environment. This research will better allow military leaders to understand how best to implement an effective strategy against an insurgency if personnel are deployed to an area at request by a host nation. In Chapter Four, I will review this qualitative data in an effort to answer this research question.
CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

Introduction

In this chapter, the results of the data analysis are presented. The data were collected and then processed in response to the problems posed in Chapter One of this dissertation. The fundamental goal was to inform stakeholders about the success or failure of historical counterinsurgency operations.

This research began with in-depth examination with four compare and contrast case studies, covering the time period 1946-1991. Data sources included archived data, reference texts, and scholarly articles. To analyze the data, I used a comparative case study approach. As I progressed through the study, I was able to form themes and patterns based on the different COIN operations.

Counterinsurgency Research Question

My research question for this study was: What can an analysis of eight counterinsurgency operations tell us about the success or failure of these operations? My own military experience and a review of history have shown that the American military has struggled when facing an insurgency. Defeating an insurgency is important to a host nation, as it ensures stability and credibility to a government. This research qualitatively compared and contrasted approaches to COIN. With various outcomes associated with insurgency campaigns, answering the research question provided insights into what strategies are most successful when combating insurgents. A qualitative approach was
warranted when the nature of the research questions requires exploration (Creswell, 2013). Qualitative research questions often begin with how or why, so that the researcher can gain an in-depth understanding of what is going on relative to the topic (Creswell, 2013). Qualitative research has the capability to generate theory and to help us understand the world from a participant’s perspective (Bryant, 2004). For the present study, a host nation’s action in confronting an insurgency was explored while determining what worked to defeat the insurgency or what led to the defeat of the host nation. In case studies, qualitative methodology was chosen specifically because it has the ability to examine more closely social settings and the individuals who inhabit those settings (Bryant, 2004).

**Case Selection: Success and Failure in Counterinsurgency Operations**

A review of the history of warfare in the last century reveals many potential cases. Eight were selected on the basis of whether government efforts to defeat the insurgency were successful or not. Specifically, the Huk Insurgents in the Philippines (1949-1955), Dhofar rebellion in Oman (1962-1976), El Salvador forces against the FMLN (1979-1992), and Thailand (1965-1985) were considered successful. These successes will be contrasted with COIN operations where the host nation failed to suppress the insurgency. These failed operations were Algeria’s war against colonial ruling France from 1954-1962; the Cyprus insurgency against Britain from 1955-1959; Cuba (1956-1959); and Rhodesia from 1964-1980. These nations were selected to span different time frames and regions of the world. Fitzgerald (2013) argued foreign policies should be viewed from a historical perspective since it drives our military mission; as such a review of past
conflicts can assist to better understand future policy, conflict, and how past counterinsurgency affects current military mission.

Each of the perspective case studies had various outcomes and different governments and insurgents used different tactics. In these cases, events would trigger, mitigate or exacerbate the conflict, while shifting the momentum of the conflict to either the insurgent or counterinsurgency forces. The case studies will be reviewed using the criteria established by the PMSE (political, military, economic, and social) framework. PMSE allows for a contrast view of the differing components and their effects on the tactical successes of the counterinsurgency operations in the host nations, and the accompanying strategic effects on the larger conflict.

The Comparative Case Study Method

A case study design makes it possible to rely on experts who have knowledge on each insurgency. The case study design can reduce the logistical difficulties inherent to coordinating multiple sample selections that would be necessary to approximate a representative sample of all personnel associated with each insurgency conflict. Case studies have been used in a variety of investigations particular in social science. This methodology will reveal details from participants and subject experts by using multiple sources of data. Selecting case studies can maximize what can be learned in the period of time available for the study. This analysis will be multi-perspective: I will consider all the views and associated with each case. The case study approach allows me to capture the complexity of a particular counterinsurgency. An important aim of this approach is to capture the complexity of a single case, and that is usually achieved by incorporating
different levels of strategies, techniques, methods or theories; this process is referred to as triangulation, a process where many methods are combined in order to ensure the validity of each case studied (Creswell, 2013). The research for the eight case studies involved collection of in-depth and detailed data, and it included multiple sources of information such as documentation, archival records, and physical artifacts.

**COIN FRAMEWORK FOR CASE STUDIES**

**Political**

G.L Lamborn (2010) noted in *Jihad of the Pen*, that no two insurgencies are the same because no two countries are the same. At a fundamental core, some form of politics motivates all insurgencies. Therefore, the goal of any insurgency is to overthrow a ruling government and replace it with one of an insurgent’s vision. This will be a lens through which the researcher analyzed each case study. The researcher analyzed what the form of government was ruling the host nation, how the population perceived them, and what were the grievances for which the insurgency started. The researcher then examined if the policies were geared towards the people or if it benefited a society based on nepotism. History shows that insurgencies form 67% faster than normal societies when governments do not address populations’ grievances (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Using a historical case study, one can research whether policies incorporated an entire society or select elites benefited.

If insurgencies are a war of ideas that takes place by individuals, which have associated grievances of the public, then an insurgency is armed politics (Lamborn, 2010). Effective politics is the means of effectively communicating ideas and goals for
which the mobilization of the public would support; therefore, in a war amongst the people, the insurgency will win by coercion and persuasion (Lamborn, 2010). If insurgencies take place amongst the people then I will analyze what was the public’s view of the conflict and when the conflict finally came to a population, what was the view or actions against the host nation. Ultimately, the researcher will be trying to find out if the government aided the cause of the insurgency or created the political action that might have been geared towards ceasing the cause of the insurgency. A government must be able to bring about governance to its citizens. If it cannot, it cannot be perceived as legitimate, and cannot command the people’s allegiances. Policies should be geared towards the grievances of the people; thus, having a greater chance of ending any insurgency (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

Military

Famous insurgent leader Carlos Marighella (1969/2011) stated the qualities of “initiative, mobility, flexibility, versatility, and command of any situation”, are necessities of any insurgent (p. 4). Che Guevara (1960/2010) considered night to be the best time for attacking. Ideal timing allowed for the greatest impact on a military force, while allowing the insurgent to slip away undetected. He stressed the need for terrorism as a tactic at night because it could thwart any opposition (Guevara, 1960/2010). Whether military, civilians, or both were targeted by the insurgents was researched. This is the same view for which the counterinsurgent will be viewed. How the population viewed the counterinsurgency, and what the military understood about the local environment and culture was investigated. TX Hammes (2004) stated people rather than technology is the
greatest weapon an insurgency possesses. People are similarly instrumental as the primary weapon of government forces against an insurgency. When reviewing a military’s response to insurgent attacks, the research analyzed the reaction of forces aligned with the government. Whether the military’s approach entailed large-scale operation with heavy firepower or small-scale operations using specialized forces was explored. Galula (1964/2006) stated, intelligence is paramount to any counterinsurgent force. The researcher analyzed how counterinsurgency forces gathered intelligence, what were the professionalism, capabilities, and resources of each military to include the host nation; and the reaction of the local population. Culture was addressed in the social component, but it is imperative to understand how it has been applied to military operations. Cassidy (2006) noted there are positives when a force is embedded with an indigenous force and that future warfare should consider embedding troops. The researcher explored the role of foreign troops and if they were embedded into indigenous forces. A final review of whether a host nation tried to solve an insurgency by strictly military component or did the host nation encompasses a civil-military approach.

Social

An insurgency will be made up of individuals who make up the society of the host nation. Richard Schultz (2006) stated that these norms have values and ways of thinking that shape how these tribes think about and fight. Different cultures will bring about different ways of thinking which can affect different politics (Schultz, 2006). When looking at the social component of a counterinsurgency operation, I will analyze the make-up of the population. If a counterinsurgent does not understand the culture of a
society, then he might not understand the complex structure of an insurgency. Insurgents will operate amongst society; therefore where they operate is important to understand. Whether or not the government supported a dominant cultural or ethnic group or, alternatively, encouraged a plural society will be investigated. Propaganda can grow an insurgency’s base or could be a method used by counterinsurgents to reduce the appeal of any insurgency (Lamborn, 2012). How propaganda utilized by the insurgent and counterinsurgent was used will be analyzed. Propaganda will allow for insurgents or counterinsurgents message to be conveyed, allowing the population to decide which side to take (Galula, 1964/2006).

Mao Tse Tung can be considered the first teacher of how to operate an effective insurgency (Lamborn, 2012). Mao believed insurgency must happen at the local level. Mao felt the grievances of the local populace, allowed him to carry out a protracted war with popular support. If the local population sees an insurgency as supporting their interests, then the local population might be inclined to join the cause of the insurgency. The local population becomes the center of gravity, meaning the greatest importance for any insurgent or counterinsurgent is the population. Center of gravity refers to the support of the population should, therefore, be a strategic, operational, and tactical objective for both insurgents and counterinsurgents. Since the population is the center of gravity, I will research and analyze the different aspects that made up the social component.

**Economic**

Insurgencies do not have the resources for a quick, decisive victory; therefore, each insurgency must prolong the conflict as long as possible (Moore, 2007). The
researcher explored whether an insurgency occupied rural, urban, or both lands. Furthermore, the researcher investigated whether land was obtainable and could it be cultivated for agricultural use. One must look at the socio-economic aspect of the society. Societies may or may not be diverse, and this will be important in understanding the economic relationships in an insurgency. Insurgencies receive support from the local population but can receive funding from all sources. The researcher analyzed the economic resources of insurgent groups and how this might have affected the conflict. When reviewing the economic situation, the researcher explored if there were programs of local assistance. Were these programs undertaken jointly by military or insurgent forces and local citizens aimed at providing basic administrative services? Was there medical and public health, educational and economic help until civilian governmental authority can sustain it? Prolonged conflicts are cheaper for the insurgent as insurgents will fight for a cause sometimes without pay (Lamborn, 2012). For the government, it is more expensive to fight an insurgency because the military must guard many potential targets at all times with an increased, cost in resources, and manpower (Galula, 1964/2006). When conflict is protracted, there is greater chance of increased casualties; which can wither the will of support for a COIN operation.
Case Studies


Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political</th>
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<td>The Republic of the</td>
<td>Democratic but</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>Relationship</td>
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Philippines and the Huk Rebellion, 1946-1955

The Republic of the Philippines is an archipelago located in Southeast Asia. In 1898, with the help of American forces, General Emilio Aguinaldo defeated the ruling colonial power of Spain (Karnow, 1989). During World War II, Japan occupied the Philippines, but would be defeated by the U.S., which granted independence to the Philippines on July 4, 1946 via the Treaty of Manila (Karnow, 1989). At that time, one insurgency was growing in the central island of Luzon, known as Hukbalahap or simply as the Huk Rebellion (Lembke, 2012). The Huk Rebellion started with perceived corruption within the government of Philippines and grew to land reforms for the peasants (Karnow, 1989). The Huk insurgency would last for six years, and was defeated in part by the Philippine military protecting villages and strategic strikes against the insurgents while Magsaysay made “true” reforms, which benefited the people.

Political

The Philippines has a constitutional democratically elected government (Karnow, 1989). The President is the head of the state and exercises executive power, legislative power is vested into a Congress, and judicial power is vested in the courts (Karnow, 1989). This style of government was implemented when Americans colonized the Philippines in 1902, after battling the Philippines and capturing Aguinaldo in 1901 (Karnow, 1989). After 1946, elections were rigged, and government officials were viewed as corrupt (Karnow, 1989).
Manuel Roxas became the first president of the newly independent Philippines. He issued a statement that the country would cooperate closely with the U.S. military (Karnow, 1989). Roxas’s own election was said to have been rigged (Karnow, 1989). In 1946, the Philippine Trade Act gave American corporations protection against currency inflation. Americans were also given equal rights to Philippine natural resources without granting Filipinos the same privileges to American markets (Karnow, 1989).

The guerrillas did not want a revolution but yearned for a more stable system of governance and land reform (Joes, 2004). Roxas vowed to defeat the Huks within 60 days. Two years later, the insurgency was still being battled (Karnow, 1989). Roxas passed away in 1948, and Elpidio Quirino succeeded him as President (Karnow, 1989). The Huk insurgents were offered amnesty if they chose to disarm. Taruc, however, wanted land reforms, dismissal of certain officials, and the repeal of the Philippine Trade Act- all which Quirino refused to grant (Karnow, 1989). Stanley Karnow (1989) argued that the greatest success that the Huk rebels had was due to the corruption within the Quirino government. Quirino ran for reelection in 1949, and even the Huk rebellion urged voters to vote for Quirino (Karnow, 1989).

If insurgents were not defeated, the Filipino government might fall to the communist Huk leadership - an ominous possibility given the fall of China in 1949 to the communists led by Mao Tse Tung. Because of this possibility, the U.S knew the need to intervene was critical (Lembke, 2012). In 1953, Philippine Defense Minister Ramon Magsaysay ran for President against Quirino. During the Japanese occupation, Magsaysay was himself an officer in an insurgency (Lembke, 2012). The Americans felt
Magsaysay understood the issues of the Philippines and started to use CIA money to assist in his election. Magsaysay won the election, and at his inauguration wore the traditional Filipino shirt titled Barong Tagalog, instead shunning the formal business suit that most politicians wore (Karnow, 1989). Fifty guests were invited to the inauguration, but 5,000 showed up (Karnow, 1989). In 1955, Taruc surrendered and received a 12-year prison sentence (Karnow, 1989). The total war casualties brought about 12,000 insurgents dead, 4,000 captured, and 16,000 surrendered (Karnow, 1989).

Military

The Huk insurgent force had approximately 17,000 rebels and another 50,000 supporters (Karnow, 1989). By 1950, the Huk attacks were better coordinated and more lethal, allowing for Taruc to wage a strategy of attrition against the Philippine force and government (Karnow, 1989). The rebel groups struck Philippine forces, and then retreated into the hills without any trace. At the start of the insurgency, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) only had about 25,000 poorly trained and underequipped troops (Joes, 2004). Taruc stated abuse against civilians committed by the AFP was the number one recruiter for the Huk’s (Joes, 2004).

The U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Myron Cowen stated that there needed to be a better plan in place and recommended placing clandestine American agents who could assist with advising the Philippine forces while also focusing on building the PMSE infrastructure (Karnow, 1989). The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which would later become the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had such an individual in mind in Edward Lansdale (Lembke, 2012). Lansdale was impressed the first time he met
with Magsaysay. Lansdale introduced Magsaysay to his superior, Frank Wisner. Both Lansdale and Wisner knew Magsaysay had to work with American coverts (Karnow, 1989). Quirino made Magsaysay the new Defense Secretary and even gave him new powers to address grievances (Lembke, 2012).

Magsaysay relocated both the Defense Department headquarters and his family from Manila to a location outside in a suburban setting (Karnow, 1989). Lansdale would be assigned to the US Army Forces Western Pacific, based in the Philippines; thus, giving an American Advisor to Magsaysay (Karnow, 1989). The mission was to advise, assist, equip, and train the AFP. Lansdale believed that if a government could win the people, no guerrillas would have a place to hide. If one could not hide, then the government could locate and destroy the rebels (Karnow, 1989). Lansdale brought Major Charles Bohannan, who brought Colonel Napoleon Valeriano in as his chief of the Philippine Army (Karnow, 1989). A memorandum from the Joint Chiefs in November 1950 recommended “increasing the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group to a strength of 32 officers and 26 enlisted” (Joes, 2004, p. 205). Bohannon argued the Philippine government had to see the recruitment of guerrillas through the eyes of the people and to understand their grievances (Valeriano & Bohannon, 1962). Bringing the war to the guerrillas, forcing them to fight in circumstances for which they were not ready, would be an advantage (Valeriano & Bohannon, 1962). Magsaysay ordered his troops to enter a village not as if they are enemies but as if they were soon to become allies (Joes, 2004).

When Lansdale and Magsaysay visited soldiers for the first time, it was noticed that soldiers had no guns, boots, and equipment was either malfunctioning or nonexistent
WHO LIVES THERE: THE ROLE OF EMBEDDED TROOPS IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS (Karnow, 1989). The Philippine Army had approximately 25,000 soldiers during this period (Karnow, 1989). These conditions brought low morale and decreased their fighting capability. Both Lansdale and Magsaysay knew something had to be done immediately. Magsaysay doubled the size of the military, restructured the mobile battalions, and with aid was able to bring modern equipment and pay raises to the Philippine force (Lembke, 2012). These changes increased morale and the Philippine force slowly started to push the guerrillas deeper into the mountains. Since the guerrillas had been pushed deeper into the mountains, the peasant support slowly started to wither (Karnow, 1989). The Philippine Army created small groups whose mission was to enter villages and hunt specific guerrilla leaders (Joes, 2004). Prisoners were treated more humanely; therefore, better intelligence was derived (Joes, 2004).

The military was able to keep the pressure on the guerrillas, disrupt communications and separated the guerrillas from the population (Lembke, 2012). Magsaysay knew that the hard-core Huk had to be destroyed militarily. He also knew that rehabilitation was best for the moderate rebels (Lembke, 2012). Sensing the tide turning, Taruc suggested negotiations with Magsaysay and the new government; however, Magsaysay declined and with better intelligence Philippine forces started to attack the Huks (Karnow, 1989).

Social

From 1565-1898, the Philippines were colonized by Spain, which brought Catholicism as the religion where it has remained the dominant religion in the Northern Islands (Karnow, 1989). When the Philippines were granted independence, peasants
started to notice the disparity in land owned by farmers versus the elites (Karnow, 1989). There were disputes between the landowners and the peasants over high-interest rates, loans, rent payments, and sharing agricultural expenses, which sometimes led to evictions (Karnow, 1989). This led to a growing unrest among the peasantry that would form the basis of the Huk rebels (Karnow, 1989).

The Huk commanders wore better clothing and had better cigarettes. Some peasants were killed just for sleeping on duty (Joes, 2004). Taruc gained in propaganda by appearing on radio shows and even had a movie made about his life (Karnow, 1989).

Unlike most Philippine government officials, Ramon Magsaysay was not from the ruling feudal landed class. Magsaysay was the son of a schoolteacher. His father made him start working at the age of seven on the farm. Later, he would be employed as a blacksmith (Lembke, 2012). He preferred the company of farmers and peasants to city politicians located in the capital city of Manila (Karnow, 1989). When running for President, Voice of America radio station transmitted pro-Magsaysay broadcasts on 41 stations across the Philippines (Karnow, 1989). He walked into crowds shaking hands, smiling, kissing babies and even had his own theme song. Magsaysay once said at a campaign rally that he would imprison his family if they were found to be breaking laws (Karnow, 1989). Lansdale started a psychological war with radio broadcasts, resulting in panic to some rebels who felt they were losing internal support (Karnow, 1989).

Magsaysay implemented the 10-centavo telegram, which allowed for residents to initiate feedback on a telegram, and send the comment to him directly at an inexpensive rate (Lembke, 2012). Bohannan (1962) argued Magsaysay’s most effective action was
immediately paying 1,000 pesos to families of a fallen soldier, guaranteeing support from the family and his village.

Magsaysay worked with banks to open up loans for peasants, he opened up medical clinics in villages, and he even created agrarian courts in which military lawyers would represent peasants in land disputes (Karnow, 1989). The most daring and successful program, which Lansdale promoted, was the giving of farms to rebels who surrendered (Karnow, 1989). The military advisors understood the importance of the local population. Bohannan stated “without vision the people perish; without people the guerrillas perish” (Valeriano & Bohannan, 1962, p.15). By winning over the people, Magsaysay believed that this would increase the effectiveness of operations against the guerrillas (Valeriano & Bohannan, 1962)

**Economic**

The economy was in shambles and unemployment was high due to World War II (Greenberg, 1987). The Bell Act of 1945 would not allow the Philippine government to change the value of the peso without U.S. consent (Greenberg, 1987). The Philippines had a landowner-tenant system of farming (Karnow, 1989). Landlords had invested capital in the land, and tenants would give their labor (Karnow, 1989). The landlords would get rich while the farmers had a hard time paying back loans for seed or rent money (Greenberg, 1987). The Philippine economy at the beginning of the insurgency was dependent on the US economy (Karnow, 1989). Farmers grew rice, sugar, coconuts and other various fruits to be sold on local markets (Karnow, 1989).
During the war with Japan, the entire society had suffered and was looking for a leader in the new government formed. Taruc was able to provide to the Huk’s, resources such as food, shelter, and intelligence on the Filipino force by having the support of nearly two million other peasants (Karnow, 1989). The Huk guerrillas were able to fund the insurgency by looting villages, robberies, and through extortion (Greenberg, 1987). It was estimated that the insurgents had an estimated 20,000 supporters from China or of Chinese descent on the island (Greenberg, 2017). One of Magsaysay’s first acts as President was to urge the local population to speak up and write about any corruption that had transpired. Within the first few weeks, over 30,000 complaints were received (Karnow, 1989). This proved that the population trusted the government now over the Huks. The Philippine economy would improve with economic aid packages totaling $95 million by the U.S. Congress (Greenberg, 1987). Magsaysay would order the building of schools, hospitals and roads in areas where there were none (Greenberg, 1987).

Conclusion

The Huk insurgency was a movement made up of peasants who wanted to reduce the political, social, and economic inequality (Lembke, 2012). The Huks had initial success in winning local support because of the corruption that had been happening in the government. This early success almost helped the Huks succeed. The U.S. had a vested interest in the Philippines and saw Ramon Magsaysay as the man who could fix the problems in the Philippines (Karnow, 1989). Magsaysay was a former guerrilla fighter who understood the grievances of the insurgency (Karnow, 1989). In September of 1950, Magsaysay would be appointed Secretary of Defense. Magsaysay’s appointment marked
a turning point in the conflict, and he instituted sweeping reforms that succeeded in
drying up civilian support for the insurgency by decreasing government and military
corruption (Karnow, 1989). These reforms brought about a tactical effectiveness against
the Huks. The Huk’s defeat in 1955 stemmed from several factors rather than any one
cause. Two of these factors the Huks had little or no control over: (1) the improved
morale, efficiency, and capability of the Philippine government and security forces after
September 1950 due to the appointment of Magsaysay; and (2) American financial aid in
support of Magsaysay’s social and civic policies aimed at defeating the insurgency
(Lembke, 2012).

Figure 2. Map of Cuba. From The World Factbook, Retrieved August 26, 2015 from
Copyright 2015 by The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Republic of Cuba</td>
<td>Democratic; corrupt</td>
<td>Cuban force of 40,000, weapon sales coming</td>
<td>American companies owned most farm lands,</td>
<td>Sugar, Tobacco, M-26-7 was funded by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>from the United States; M-26-7 had no more</td>
<td>American companies seen as fueling the</td>
<td>donations from Cubans, support from urban</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>than 1,500 insurgents at one time</td>
<td>corruption</td>
<td>organizers</td>
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Cuba and M-26-7, 1955-1959

Cuba is an island located in the Caribbean region, approximately 90 miles from the southernmost part of the state of Florida. Fulgencio Batista was the President of Cuba after a coup on March 10, 1952 (Gebhard, 2015). The U.S extended recognition to him as the official President a short time thereafter. Fidel Castro, a young lawyer, did not recognize Batista’s government as being legitimate. Castro furthermore believed that the U.S. had a monopoly on the Cuban economy and abetted the corruption of the Batista regime. In response to Batista’s lack of recognition, Castro led a band of rebels known as the 26th of July Movement (M-26-7) that waged guerrilla war against the Batista government. During the same time, an underground movement in the capital of Havana would start. The insurgency would last for three years and became known as the Cuban Revolution. M-26-7 was able to wage an effective propaganda campaign in concert with guerrilla operations, which supported the Cuban population (Taber, 1961/2014). Batista fled Cuba and Castro became President (Patterson, 1995).
In 1901, the U.S. Congress passed The Platt Amendment. This amendment set conditions for U.S. intervention in Cuba’s domestic affairs. The amendment prohibited the Cuban Government from entering into any international treaty that compromised Cuban independence or allowed foreign governments to use the island for military purposes (MacGaffey & Barnett, 1962). The United States also reserved the right to intervene in Cuban affairs in order to defend Cuban independence, relinquish claims on the Isle of Pines and agree to sell or lease territory, which led to Guantanamo Bay (MacGaffey & Barnett, 1962). The Platt Amendment was forced upon the Cuban government. Resentment against the U.S. followed even after cancellation of the amendment in 1934 (MacGaffey & Barnett, 1962).

On paper, the Cuban government was a free democratic society. Fulgencio Batista was President from 1940-1944 and decided to run again in 1952 (Patterson, 1995). Facing an election defeat, Batista staged a military coup, bringing him to power (Patterson, 1995). Batista enriched himself by stealing money and placing into foreign trust accounts (Patterson, 1995). Batista’s personal wealth was between $60-300 million (Patterson, 1995). On July 26, 1953, a young lawyer named Fidel Castro joined a group of rebels and attacked the Moncada military barracks located in Santiago de Cuba (Taber, 1961/2014). The poorly executed attack resulted in Castro’s defeat and the group’s subsequent arrest. Castro, his brother, Raul, and others were tried and sentenced to up to 15 years in prison (Taber, 1961/2014). Batista pardoned them and the rebel group relocated to Mexico (Taber, 1961/2014).
Castro had not given up his cause for revolution, regrouped and planned another attack. In December of 1956, Castro, and his guerrillas sailed from Mexico in a boat named “Granma”, to the Eastern Province of Oriente (Taber, 1961/2014). The boat was named after poet and national hero Jose Marti and sailed into Cuba on a mission to fight and rid Cuba of the Spaniards (Gebhard, 2015). These rebels would call themselves the 26th of July Movement (M-26-7) after the assault on the Moncada barracks (Gebhard, 2015). M-26-7 was based in the Sierra Maestra Mountains (Patterson, 1995). The rebels would remain a small organization; in December of 1957, the group only totaled 29 (Patterson, 1995). Frank Paiz rose as an underground leader against the Batista regime (Gebhard, 2015). Paiz initiated an insurgency in Santiago. Paiz integrated his group into M-26-7 with Paiz as the Chief of Action. (Gebhard, 2015).

The Batista government thought little of the movement and dismissed the area of operations as a territory that had no value (Taber, 1961/2014). Upon taking refuge in the Sierra Mastre, Castro started to impose a formal law. While the police and military were known for corruption and brutality, the U.S. support of the government started to become linked as U.S. aid helped maintain Batista in power. In 1953, U.S. military aid was $400,000; in 1958 it increased to three million dollars despite being earmarked for defense against other countries in the Latin American region (Patterson, 1995).

Batista started to censor media outlets in hope of countering any propaganda messages by M-26-7. The rebels set up Radio Rebelde, which helped spread their message (Taber, 1961/2014). Castro used his propaganda, to reassure the population he was alive and expand the rebel movement. He agreed to give an interview under the
condition a North American journalist would come to the mountains to interview him. New York Times journalist, Herbert Matthews, was selected to interview Fidel Castro (Patterson, 1995). Matthews reported that Castro was alive and well, the rebels’ morale was very high, anti-American sentiment was growing and that Castro was not a communist (Patterson, 1995). As the image of Castro and his cause spread, so did his recruitment. In April of 1957, Herbert Matthews placed CBS producer Robert Taber in contact with the rebels. Taber filmed a documentary titled “Rebels of the Sierra Maestra” (Patterson, 1959). In May of 1959, CBS aired the documentary. Castro stated that his aggression continued because of Batista and the U.S. military aid to the corrupt regime (Patterson, 1995). Castro scored another victory in the propaganda war, as he was able to facilitate the travel of two American journalists into Cuba in order to give two interviews. Ernesto “Che” Guevara stated that the presence of a foreign journalist was more of a victory than any fighting (Gebhard, 2015). Still in 2015, in the former Presidential Palace, now called the Palace of Revolution, there is an entire section devoted to the Matthews interview (Gebhard, 2015). The results of these propaganda victories were the increase in funds being raised in the guerrilla cause. Feeling that Batista was starting to lose ground in the conflict, American Ambassador Arthur Gardner told the State Department that if Batista used more force against the rebels and their supporters, he would win back the offensive in the conflict (Patterson, 1995).

In June of 1957, Earl Smith, the new U.S Ambassador to Cuba, replaced Gardner. Smith’s first preparation for Cuba was to meet with Herbert Matthews (Patterson, 1995). On July 28, 1957, Castro issued a manifesto, titled Sierra Maestra, which called for free
elections, social and military reforms, and the decrease of foreign mediators in Cuban affairs (Patterson, 1959). The documentary, Forgotten Revolution (2015), argued that M-26-7 needed a political goal for the people, so Paiz sent two emissaries to assist Castro in drafting a manifesto. On July 28, 1957, the manifesto was published in Bohemia magazine (Gebhard, 2015). The U.S. support of Batista, however, was still not wavering. The Embassy honored Cuban Colonel Tabernilla in June even though he had ordered the indiscriminate bombing of the village of Cienfuegos (Patterson, 1959). Batista, published photos showing the support that he had of the U.S (Patterson, 1995). The results further polarized Cuban politics. Noticing the gains that Castro had made, Batista promised free elections and the restoration of constitutional guarantees (Patterson, 1995). Although he promised fair elections, Batista refused to create the conditions necessary for that to happen all while increasing the force used against sympathizers of the M-26-7 (Patterson, 1995).

On November 3, 1958, the elections that Batista had promised were held. Ambassador Smith believed that the guerrilla insurgency would cease (Patterson, 1995). However, only one candidate ran because of many politicians feared of possible M-26-7 attacks (Patterson, 1995). On December 31, 1958, Batista informed the United States that he would be leaving the country. The government was turned over to General Cantillo (Patterson, 1995). Believing the moment right, Castro attacked Santa Clara. With Castro staying back in Oriente province at his headquarters, Santa Clara fell to M-26-7 on January 2, 1959, thus splitting the island in half (Patterson, 1959). With withering support
and continually losing military battle’s Batista would go into exile and thus on January 1, 1959, Cuba fell to Castro.

**Military**

At no time did the guerilla forces exceed 1,500 men (Taber, 1965/2002). The guerrillas known as *Fidelistas*, used small-scale attacks meant to be quick and depended on the element of surprise (Patterson, 1995). The guerrillas then would slip back into the hills and mountains (Taber, 1961/2014). Rebel leader, Che Guevara, stated that the initial attack should be small so that rebels could land and start to win over support of the local population (Dosal, 2003). Many of the rebels including Che Guevara saw themselves fighting for the cause of the people (Dosal, 2003). Under the tutelage by Alberto Bayo, Guevara helped to shape Castro’s belief in revolutionary warfare (Dosal, 2003). Guevara convinced Castro that guerrilla war could be waged from the mountains. He supported hit and run attacks on conventional military and supply lines. Once the base was established, the revolution could move to rural areas and then to cities. The most important part in all phases was to be seen as fighting for the people (Dosal, 2003).

The Cuban military force was approximately 40,000 strong (Fermoselle, 1987). Most weapons with which M-26-7 was armed were captured from the Cuban military (Taber, 1965/2002). Castro won huge propaganda victories as the international community took notice of M-26-7’s cause (Taber, 1965/2002). Batista tried to use heavy suppression against the guerillas. During one operation he sent 5,000 troops to the Sierra Maestra to try to eliminate the insurgents (Taber, 1965/2002). The Cuban Air Force would try to bomb guerrilla hideouts with high explosive bombs and napalm (Taber,
The quick, small-scale attacks against the Cuban forces demoralized the Cuban military. Soldiers did not trust each other and often refused to fight or defected (Taber, 1965/2002). In 1958, with desertions increasing, the military recruited 10,000 youths under the age of 20 and deployed them to the Sierra Maestra with only a few weeks of training (Perez, 1976).

Some 40 U.S military personnel from all branches were assigned to the Embassy as an advisory group to the Cuban military; however, they were not permitted to join in combat operations nor were they trained in counterinsurgency (Patterson, 1995). During one operation, Cuban military personnel were able to attack a rebel vessel approaching Cuban waters. Batista claimed Castro had been killed during this operation (Patterson, 1995). This claim was proved false with the Matthews interview and thus strengthened the Cuban popular image of Castro.

On February 17, 1957, three Americans not affiliated with the military left Guantanamo Bay to join M-26-7. A photo was published in The New York Times of the young men wearing rebel uniforms (Patterson, 1995). As military sales continued to the Cuban military, Smith recommended that U.S. markings on equipment be removed so it would not seem as if the U.S. was supporting the repression of Cuban citizens (Patterson, 1995). At the same time, the M-26-7 continued to increase its acquisition of equipment and supporters elsewhere in Cuba. In the summer of 1958, Castro’s rebels opened a new front in the mountains of Escambray in Las Villas Province (Taber, 1961/2014).
Social

In 1898, the United States defeated Spain and Cuba was granted independence in 1902 (Patterson, 1995). Although Cuba was independent, it remained a de facto protectorate of the United States with American casino and sugarcane companies setting up headquarters in Havana during the 1940s and 1950s (Patterson, 1995). Cubans were allowed to come over to the United States on visas (Patterson, 1995). As Americans and companies infiltrated Cuban society, Castro felt that they were fueling the corruption, controlling the Cuban economy, while ordinary Cubans suffered through lack of pay and land (Patterson, 1995). With growing popular support of the guerrilla movement, the U.S. Information Service (USIS) tried to outmaneuver the guerrillas by means of propaganda (Patterson, 1995). The USIS placed ads in newspapers touting the achievements of energy and medicine, and the positive influence the U.S. had on Cuban economy and society (Patterson, 1995). The embassy believed that educating the public alone would be enough to stop the growing support of M-26-7. This would not work because ordinary Cubans did not have access to a quality education system (Patterson, 1995).

Paiz and his group bombed government buildings and issued propaganda against the Batista regime (Gebhard, 2015). Paiz was instrumental in shaping Castro’s views on political, social, and economic reforms. Paiz provided urban organizers who supported M-26-7 with clothing, combatants, and supplies (Dosal, 2003). Dosal (2003) argued with Paiz support, Castro was able to focus on operations in the mountains and expand into other provinces, On July 30, 1957, Paiz was captured and executed with a shot in the
head (Gebhard, 2015). Paiz’s struggle in Santiago helped Castro’s movement to strengthen in the mountains (Gebhard, 2015).

On October 1, 1955, Jose Echeverria spoke to students at the University of Havana and encouraged the overthrow of the Batista regime due to corruption and torture (Gebhard, 2015). Echeverria never merged with Castro but signed a letter they held the same goals of the M-26-7 (Gebhard, 2015). To separate civic action from military, Echeverria’s group formed Directorio Revolucionario (Gebhard, 2015). The Directorio Revolucionario bombed and attacked politicians. The group became the number one target of the Havana police (Gebhard, 2015). These attacks caused the group to move underground. The movement started to increase attacks against infrastructures such as buses and warehouses. Coronet magazine published an article declaring Castro promised a representative government of the people, an end to corruption, and finally land reform. Castro went so far as to study Egyptian President Nasser’s land reform (Patterson, 1995).

In March 1957, Echeverria planned to assassinate Batista, as attacks in the city would divert the military and police forces (Taber, 1961/2014). Echeverria was to overtake Radio Reloj and announce a new democratic government (Gebhard, 2015). When the attack launched, the radio station had been overtaken; however, the attacking force failed and Batista survived and was still in power. Echeverria, unaware of the defeat, announced the execution of Batista and the formation of a new government (Gebhard, 2015). Havana was now in chaos and fighting erupted in the streets of Havana. Echeverria moved towards the University, but a subsequent shootout with police resulted in a shot in the back and his death (Taber, 1961/2014). Many rebels were now hunted
down by Batista’s forces and executed. This revolution would extend out to rural areas and other cities with groups that were not necessarily associated with M-26-7 and became known as the “War on the Plains” (Gebhard, 2015).

**Economic**

The Cuban economy was one of the most prosperous in Latin America during the 1950s. The economy, however, was geared towards the government elites and Americans. Cuba was a crop-based economy with sugar and tobacco (Patterson, 1985). American companies owned most farm lands (Patterson, 1995). U.S. companies owned approximately 40 percent of the Cuban sugar lands, cattle ranches, about 90 percent of the mines and mineral concessions, and about 80 percent of the utilities (Patterson, 1995). Havana was filled with casinos that became a symbol of the corruption and disparity of ordinary Cubans (Patterson, 1995).

Castro visited the United States and raised funds in Cuban communities from Miami to Connecticut (Patterson, 1995). Castro considered the war to be primarily psychological in nature rather than strictly military (Patterson, 1995). Jose M. Pepin Bosh y Lamarque, President of Bacardi Rum, gave a million dollars to the movement (Patterson, 1995). In 1958, the guerrillas kidnapped employees of a sugar mill and levied a tax on any shipments (Patterson, 1995). Taxes were collected by Castro to provide for education and medical care given to the local villagers (Taber, 1961/2014). Resistance throughout the country would grow, as students and laborers started a strike and closed shops in protest of the Batista dictatorship (Gebhard, 2015). The student revolution moved from protests to attacks against the government. M-26-7 desired good governance,
distribution of land and equitable distribution of profits (Patterson, 1995). Castro protested high electric bills, inadequate telephone services, illegal police taxes, and what he felt was the United States monopoly of Cuban business, especially sugar (Patterson, 1995). The Batista government began to take notice of the Castro rebels and started to imprison, exile, or kill them (Patterson, 1995). The result was that more citizens devoted their efforts to M-26-7. Bombs started exploding in nightclubs, schools, and government buildings all around the capital (Patterson, 1995). Fearful of attacks, the military and police attacked any citizen they feared represented M-26-7. Batista not affording to hold villages and farmlands abandoned those efforts for larger cities (Taber, 1961/2014).

Castro intended to release a manifesto calling for economic sabotage simultaneously as Matthews released his interview (Patterson, 1995). Batista separated the population and moved thousands into detention centers, which the Cuban people thought more as concentration camps such as those done by General Weyler during Spanish Wars of the 1890s (Patterson, 1995).

Castro continued his economic sabotage by burning sugar cane fields. In 1958, with rebel attacks increasing against foreign business, the Cuban economy deteriorated as sugar sales dropped by half from previous year (Patterson, 1995). Castro’s troops marched towards Havana for a potential overthrow. Army desertions mounted and morale plummeted. The U.S government analysis did not consider Cuba might experience an insurgency. The economy and political climate appeared to be safe (Patterson, 1995). The U.S. Ambassador praised Batista for his leadership (Patterson, 1995).
Conclusion

The Cuban revolution had broad base of support. Frank Paiz in Santiago de Cuba and Jose Echeverria at the University of Havana were instrumental in helping bring down the Batista regime (Gebhard, 2015). Castro’s forces chose their battles in the mountain while those in urban underground had to constantly be on the defensive (Taber, 1961/2014). With Paiz and Echeverria executed, when the rebel movement rolled into Havana in 1959, the entire citizens saw Castro (Gebhard, 2015). This gave the impression that Castro was single handedly responsible for the Cuban Revolution (Gebhard, 2015).

Fidel Castro was able to present himself as a fighter for the people and one who could restore an independent legitimate Cuban government that was not the United States puppet (Patterson, 1995). Cubans enjoyed Castro because he stated he would return Cuba to the Cubans. Castro mastered winning the population and even military officials, thus strengthening his propaganda message (Taber, 1961/2014). Communism was never associated with the insurgent movement, as the effort was more of a socialist national movement (Patterson, 1995). The United States Government never fully understood the insurgency or the political component of M-26-7 (Patterson, 1995). Batista had also been Army commander from 1934 to 1940. From 1952, Batista ruled largely by decree and succeeded in making many enemies in all parts of Cuban society (Patterson, 1995).

Urban agitation, accompanied by the spread of a nationalist appeal, contributed in no small part to Batista's fall (Taber, 1961/2014). The fact that the United States Government had maintained close relations with Batista did not help him and only helped to prolong the conflict by supporting a corrupt regime. With withering support and
continually losing military battles, Batista would go into exile and thus on January 1, 1959, Castro was able to anoint himself as leader of the country (Patterson, 1995).


**Table 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Kingdom of Thailand</td>
<td>Monarch; military coups within government</td>
<td>Professional, focused on conventional tactics and heavy suppression; military agreement with U.S for assistance in training</td>
<td>Buddhism, social hierarchy, family traditions strong; CPT members were mostly individuals outside Thai society</td>
<td>Agriculture, RTG received economic aid from the U.S; CPT support came from China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia</td>
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**Thailand and the CPT, 1965-1985**

Thailand is located in the Indochina peninsula, situated in Southeast Asia. Thailand is a strategic country as it lies between China, Japan, and other Southeast Asian
countries (Caldwell, 1973). During the Vietnam War, it was feared that Thailand might fall to the Communist Party (Lane, 1984). Thailand had an insurgent uprising in the Northern area calling itself the Communist Part of Thailand (CPT). The CPT wanted to overthrow the Thai government and replace it with a government modeled after that of Mao Tse Tung. The Royal Thai Government (RTG) would battle the CPT for 20 years before finally defeating the CPT.

**Political**

The Anti-Communist Act of 1952 stated no civilian should offer support to communist beliefs and violators would be imprisoned up to 10 years (Wongtrangan, 1983). The act did not describe how one should handle communists or why one would be motivated to join a communist party (Wongtrangan, 1983). In the capital of Bangkok, the RTG was ruled by a monarchy under a military dictatorship, as ordinary citizens were not allowed in government positions (Lomax, 1967). The RTG equated government positions with power and authority (Lomax, 1967). The military elites in power never thought regular Thais were ready to take part in politics and could easily be exploited by politicians who were concerned about their own interests (Bunbongkarn, 1988). Many Thai citizens lacked political consciousness, which led to low voter turnout (Bunbongkarn, 1988). Bunbongkarn (1988) stated that “military coups are accepted as normal political occurrences” (p. 4). Even with military coups and the elites in politics, the RTG had not been oppressive to the people (Caldwell, 1973). Caldwell (1973) argued that the Thai structure of *amphur-changwat*, meaning district and province, was created
to ensure loyalty to the monarchy. This loyalty would have defended against any attempt by any nation to colonize Thailand.

In 1965, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) was formed as the war in Vietnam spread. The CPT believed Thailand was under neo-colonial rule by the United States due to the American troop presence in Thailand (Moore, 2014). The goals of the CPT were to drive the U.S. out of Thailand, overthrow the government, and establish equality for the working class outside of a feudal system (Caldwell, 1973). Thailand, however, is the only country in Southeast Asia to have not been colonized by any European nation (Caldwell, 1973). In 1965 Radio Beijing announced the formation of the CPT as its war for nationalism expanded (Kerdphol, 1986). The insurgency began in November 1965, when a group of police officers from Charoen District in Ubon Ratchathani Province were ambushed and killed on the road from Mukdaham District (Moore, 2014). The CPT operated early with bribes against corrupt government politicians (Lane, 1994). The Chinese government assisted the CPT in the early stages by providing political, military and economic advice (Lane, 1994).

General Saiyud Kerdphol (1986) stated that the RTG “owes it to the people to provide services that contribute to national strength and prosperity and provide people with opportunities to improve their individual lives” (p. 39). To better coordinate COIN activities the government established the Communist Suppression Operations Command or CSOC (Moore, 2014). The CSOC created a unified approach bridging military, police, and civil programs deployed against the CPT (Caldwell, 1973). American COIN advisors recommended the Thai government establish a propaganda campaign by radio (Moore,
By 1970 the CPT had infiltrated 35 of Thailand’s 72 provinces (Moore, 2014). Caldwell (1973) asserted the insurgency was able to fester because of the disconnection between the government approach and the local villages.

Vietnam invaded Cambodia during the middle 1970s which caused friction with China (Moore, 2014). This friction caused a rift between CPT sympathizers of both countries. Feeling the friction, Thailand sent diplomats to Beijing to stop support of the CPT (Moore, 2014). This diplomatic effort worked and in 1979 the Chinese shut down CPT radio campaigns (Moore, 2014). The RTG saw results when it implemented psychological operations and utilized the provincial governors and resources (Lane, 1994). Caldwell (1973) argued that the CPT never had a plan to merge the political, social, and economic components into its military agenda; therefore, it never truly waged a people’s war within the villages of Thailand.

In 1980, General Prem would take command of the Army and appoint himself Prime Minister; he ordered plan 66/2523 and 66/2525, which would ultimately defeat the CPT (Lane, 1994). The 66/2523 plan used political means first with military to support the political goals (Moore, 2014). The 66/2523 plan stated that the reason for the insurgency and threat to Thailand was because of the poor governance and absence of democratic principles (Lane, 1994). The plan noted corruption, economic inequality, and dictatorship as reasons why the insurgency existed in Northern Thailand (Lane, 1994). Order 66/2525 called for all Thais including the CPT members to take part in the national development and political process in fixing the grievances of the people (Lane, 1994). The plan allowed for continuation of debate about how to correct the grievances. The
66/2525 offered amnesty to moderate CPT. By the end of 1985 there was not a single record of any attack, thus ending the insurgency.

**Military**

In 1967, there were approximately 1700 insurgents located in 80 provinces in Thailand (Kerdphol, 1986). In 1968, insurgents were now estimated at 2,500 with 25,000 sympathizers (Kerdphol, 1986). Insurgents received training in Laos, China and Cambodia. In January 1967, a CPT camp was raided where propaganda was found stating that the CPT must follow Mao in order to win the conflict although they did not follow Mao’s teachings (Lomax, 1967). The CPT used Laos as a staging area to wage attacks in Thailand and sneak back to Laos (Caldwell, 1973). From late 1960s to mid-1970s, China provided advisors and weapons to the CPT (Moore, 2014).

Military commanders moved too quickly from the protection phase to the suppression phase thus losing trust of villagers (Kerdphol, 1986). Differences in language and customs created problems that led to misunderstandings on military operations. The military used suppression as they thought the CPT was only operating in the jungles (Wongtrangan, 1983). General Prapass Charusathiara understood that COIN was a socioeconomic problem, not just military and enlisted the help of General Saiyud Kerdphol who was a student of COIN (Moore, 2014). The plan was to conduct kinetic operations against the CPT but simultaneously sustain villages with development projects (Moore, 2014). The RTG would also create the civil police military program (CPM), which would bring all COIN resources together for better coordination, which brought about greater intelligence for tactical operations (Marks, 2007). From 1965-1967 the
CPM program assisted in the arrest or killing of over 100 CPT leaders (Moore, 2014). Even as successful as CPM was, the RTG was slow to implement security force protections into the villages as of 1969 (Caldwell, 1973).

CSOC established the 09/10 plan, which placed 12 man military squads and police within 250 villages with the objective of denying the insurgents’ access to the population (Moore, 2014). This plan was effective; however, heavy suppression operations caused friction with the local population (Moore, 2014). The 09/10 plan actually grew the insurgency from a few hundred to approximately 10,000 by 1970 (Kraisoraphong, 2013). General Saiyud believed if the government had stuck to the program with lesser troop presence then the war might have ended before 1975. The CPT knew that massive operations amongst the population would alienate the villagers so the CPT intentionally drew the RTG into a protracted campaign (Moore, 2014).

The military started to get away from the CPM model and the 09/10 plan was forgotten. The CPT infiltrated more villages by late 1968 (Moore, 2014). The 110/2512 order was issued in 1969, and the military emphasized the political and psychological component against the CPT more than military operations (Kraisoraphong, 2013). The political component required civil servants, military, and police to abandon corruption and establish good governance (Moore, 2014). The psychological aspect educated the villages on Thai policy and warned against communism (Moore, 2014). Unfortunately, not many military leaders embraced the plan and large suppression operations against villages continued (Moore, 2014). Moore (2014) argued that prior to 1973, the Thai struggled in the COIN program because it was not seen as a national effort but more as a
security effort. In November 1977, new Army General Kriangsak initiated economic
reforms while also offering amnesty to students who were involved in the Thammasat
massacre (Moore, 2014). The amnesty program offered housing assistance and land in
some cases to individuals who switched sides to the government (Moore, 2014).

The government believed in recruiting, training, and arming villagers to protect
themselves. Local forces totaled 1.2 million over the course of the conflict (Moore,
2014). The reason why initial success was difficult was because the government assumed
any villager would fight for his country. The thought process was that normal Thais took
a patriotic stand (Moore, 2014). American policy dictated that military advisors were
stationed at the regimental level and below. It further stated that American advisors were
not allowed to partake in combat operations (Caldwell, 1973). With American advice, the
RTG knew it had to change the people’s opinion of the government (Caldwell, 1973).

Social

Mao preached that an insurgency must maintain contact with indigenous people,
which the CPT tried to imitate (Lomax, 1967). The CPT manpower and resources were
drawn from the village level (Lane, 1994). In 1965, the CPT stated that the only way to
victory was to make the conflict a people’s war (Lane, 1994). The RTG was able to
separate the population from the insurgents (Moore, 2014). Insurgents focused on remote
villages as they believed they could gain support from the indigenous people and create a
logistical support network (Moore, 2014). The CPT was closely aligned with China
(Caldwell, 1973). No educators, laborers, tax collectors, or medical personnel were ever
stationed in the Northern villages by the CPT (Caldwell, 1973). It is estimated that the CPT had 154,000 fighters throughout the entire insurgency (Moore, 2014).

General Kerdphol (1986) stated psychological operations were important as they informed rural populations of government programs and policies. Tribal people in the north were against the government because anyone suspected of supporting the CPT had their agriculture resources slashed and burned (Kerdphol, 1986). The tribal villagers did not understand that military operations were to protect them because the military did not speak the native language. This inability to communicate resulted in conflicts between villagers and soldiers (Moore, 2014). By 1973, the CPT was established in most villages so they increased their infiltration to include labor unions and universities (Moore, 2014).

Thai society has a high degree of being homogenous, which keeps the entire country closely knitted together (Caldwell, 1973). Within *amphur-changwat*, there is a sense of independence amongst citizens (Caldwell, 1973). Eighty percent of Thailand’s population works in agriculture while 85% of Thailand’s agricultural output is exported (Caldwell, 1973). Unlike other countries, land is individually owned and not controlled by an elite landowner class (Caldwell, 1973). Thai Buddhism follows the nonviolent *Theravada* school of thought, which teaches that society must coexist (Caldwell, 1973). Religion does not play a role in national politics (Caldwell, 1973). Caldwell (1973) argued that the independence of villagers makes it unlikely that many would commit to a revolutionary war. Villagers were more inclined to focus on family and kindred aspects of society (Caldwell, 1973).
Intelligence gathered on the CPT was given to the military by teachers, development workers, and village chiefs (Moore, 2014). General Kerdphol (1986) stated villages lacked the knowledge of how to self-govern. Kerdphol (1986) argued that stability would come when people believed social injustices had stopped. The government established the Mobile Development Unit (MDU) whose mission was to build schools, improve roads, and provide medical care to rural villagers (Wongtrangan, 1983). The RTG recognized early on the need to address the PMSE elements of the insurgency (Caldwell, 1973). Most members of Thai society did not support the CPT because this would go against the teachings of the Buddhist religion (Wedel, 1987). While waging war against the RTG, the CPT failed to recognize that it not only tried to reshape the government, but it tried to reshape Thai culture (Wedel, 1987). Most of the CPT were made up of ethnic Chinese insurgents not Thais and therefore did not understand the values of Thai society (Wedel, 1987).

The Thai government created the Village Scouts program in 1970 when it realized that a political situation was needed to defeat the CPT (Bowie, 1997). The purpose of the Village Scouts was to receive better intelligence from villagers, mend any divisions within Thai society, and help the emergence of a political movement by Thai citizens (Bowie, 1997). Scouts consisted of men and women from local villages (Bowie, 1997). Scouts eventually would be educated on Thai history, personal responsibility, and citizenship (Moore, 2014). The scouts would grow as large as 5 million individuals (Bowie, 1997). The Village Scouts program worked because citizens not only could see the threat that the CPT posed to Thai customs, but the locals protected their own while
assisting the Thai government in obtaining defectors from the CPT (Moore, 2014). The Village Scouts were created to be non-political; however, the Minister of Interior started to play a major role in the program and wealthy merchants and business owners soon started to fund the program (Bowie, 1997). Being political caused some problems. On October 6, 1976, thousands of students and individuals met for a pro-democracy rally at Thammasat University (Moore, 2014). Feeling that the students were making a mockery of the monarchy police, to include the Village Scouts, decided to end the protest (Moore, 2014). The security forces used brutal repression to quell the riots. In the end, hundreds were killed and thousands arrested (Moore, 2014). The students and Thais within the CPT wanted a better Thailand; however, the CPT could only offer revolution after the model of China, which again conflicted with Thai society (Wedel, 1987).

Economic

The CPT’s received logistical, political, and financial support from China, Laos, and Vietnam (Moore, 2014). Chinese support to the CPT was reduced after the RTG opened up political dialogue (Moore, 2014). Rice is the major crop grown in Thailand (Caldwell, 1973). The average rice farmer works four months out of the year (Caldwell, 1973). The RTG built over 200 dams to assist with rice production (Moore, 2014). These dams were valued, as Thailand found that no farmer can produce higher yields with just improved agriculture techniques unless there was water control (Caldwell, 1973).

Caldwell (1973) argued that the economic problems associated with grievances were not because of repressive policies but because of the environment. During the dry season, many workers traveled to Bangkok to look for work but had a hard time due to
their lack of education (Caldwell, 1973). The RTG’s economic development program helped achieve a political victory (Caldwell, 1973). In 1966-1970, the government established the Accelerated Rural Development (ARD), which built up better roads and infrastructure (Moore, 2014). By 1966, 60% of U.S. aid was going to economic projects in the Northeast that the RTG prioritized (Marks, 2007). The building of roads allowed for farmers to sell their goods at distant markets and allowed the government to reach village’s a lot easier (Moore, 2014). The RTG placed emphasis on projects with road building, then improvement of health, and finally growth of agricultural production (Caldwell, 1973). The RTG deployed police and military personnel to rural areas to assist with development programs that could assist with cultivating the land (Caldwell, 1973).

The U.S gave approximately $49 million to assist in development projects (Marks, 2007) When the insurgency began, farmers who owned land did not own resources such as tractors. As the war against the CPT prolonged, farmers acquired tractors from the government and individuals started to receive land and rice crops (Lomax, 1967). The exchange of goods and services between households increased (Lomax, 1967). Order 66/223 expanded the military’s role in assisting with rural development (Lane, 1994). The military was also involved with trying to eliminate social and economic injustices by providing programs that developed the democratic process (Lane, 1994). Caldwell (1973) stated that the government’s decision to focus on economic stability raised the Thai standard of living; thus, improving education, health, finances, and materials.
Conclusion

The CPT started a military campaign against Thailand with the hopes of overthrowing the ruling government. Villagers, farmers, and border areas were targeted by the CPT. The CPT did not take into account the Thais’ ethnic homogeneity and the deep respect that Thai citizens had for the monarchy (Lane, 1994). A foreign country had never colonized Thailand; therefore, the CPT could not state that they were liberating the country (Caldwell, 1973). As a result, the CPT was unable to maintain a lasting presence amongst the villagers and was marginalized in the border areas (Moore, 2014). With American advisors and economic help, the Thai military was able to upgrade equipment and training (Moore, 2014). From the onset of the insurgency, the RTG understood that the conflict would be won within a political context and not a military one (Moore, 2014). By the 1970s, the RTG and the military kept the insurgency to a manageable level but were unable to defeat the CPT entirely because the military focused on heavy fire power (Moore, 2014). Over time, the RTG focused on social and economic reforms that would ensure military success. With the engagement of China and end of CPT support, the RTG was able to defeat the insurgency (Moore, 2014).

Table 5

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Algeria</td>
<td>French colony ruled by a governing system; offered Algerians into Parliament, rigged elections</td>
<td>French troops, some embedded Algerians; FLN made up of majority Muslim population</td>
<td>Pied-noirs (European immigrants) ruled majority Muslim population</td>
<td>Agriculture, Muslim markets in Algiers, FLN was mainly supported by Algerians, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, other Middle Eastern countries</td>
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French and the FLN, 1954-1962

Algeria is a country located in the Maghreb region of Northern Africa. Many empires have ruled Algeria, but the French were able to colonize Algeria in 1830 (Batty, 2011). French citizens started to immigrate to Algeria and became known as *pied-noirs*.
The government took lands from the indigenous tribes (Horne, 1977/2006). Algerians lacked representation in the political, economic, and social aspects of the country, which created dissatisfaction amongst the indigenous people (Horne, 1977/2006). When Algerians were given the chance to have representation within politics, the elections were fraudulent; thus a nationalist movement was created which would fight France for eight years. The FLN was able to wage a war of attrition against France sapping the political and moral will out of the country (Horne, 1977/2006). In 1962, Algeria was given its right to self-determination; thus, the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria was formed (Batty, 2011).

**Political**

Algeria was the last colony ruled by the French government (Horne, 1977/2006). A governor general ruled Algeria and there was a parliament; however, this parliament was entirely representative of the pied-noirs (French) not Algerians (Horne, 1977/2006). In 1948, the Algerian population gained representation within the legislative assembly, but the elections were to be rigged by the French ruling class (Horne, 1977/2006). This showed the nationalist movement that they could not rely on the ballot box to gain their freedom. The nationalist movement would form the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN).

In February 1955, Jacques Soustelle became governor general (Horne, 1977/2006). Soustelle argued at first for a “French only solution”; however, in later interviews he would admit that there should have been some form of integration (Batty, 2011). Soustelle established the Specialized Administrative Section (SAS) comprised of 400 officers trained in culture, to prevent the FLN from taking control of rural Muslims.

French President Guy Mollet decided to increase the military presence to 500,000, which included calling up reservists (Batty, 2011). The French government did not consider themselves officially at war, so therefore, they did not have to follow accords nor would international involvement be needed (Batty, 2011).

Egypt, taken over in 1952, by Arab nationalist Gamel Abdel Nasser, was funneling weapons now to the FLN (Horne, 1977/2006). The French gave independence to Morocco and Tunisia in 1955 both of which were sympathetic to the FLN revolt (Horne, 1977/2006). This allowed the FLN to have a safe haven to the east and west of them. On October 22, 1956, Ahmed Ben Bella, one of the original members of the FLN, boarded a plane in Cairo bound for Morocco; however, the French forced the plane to land in Algeria where Ben Bella was arrested (Morgan, 2005). This act furthered strengthened the resolve of the FLN. The very next day in Morocco, 49 French citizens were murdered in anti-French riots (Horne, 1977/2006).

General Raoul Salan, commander of all French forces in Algeria, feared that French Prime Minister Pierre Pflimlin would arrange for a negotiated solution with the Algerian nationalists giving them control of Algeria. On May 13, 1958, Generals Salan and Jacques Massu took over Algiers and refused either to take orders or recognize any cabinet official and called for the return of former President Charles de Gaulle (Horne,
1977/2006). Riots took place in Algiers and were now spreading to France. Pflimlin stepped down as prime minister and there was tension in France that they could be headed towards civil war as other politicians did not want de Gaulle to return (Batty, 2011). De Gaulle spoke, stating his recommendation for a newly appointed premier, elected government, and a new constitution (Horne, 1977/2006).

On June 1, 1958, de Gaulle became the head of government (Horne, 1977/2006). He was subsequently elected President and on June 3, 1958, a new constitution was ratified (Horne, 1977/2006). The new constitution gave all colonies the right to independence; however, Algeria was not included because it was considered at the time part of France (Batty, 2011). De Gaulle called for France to still rule Algeria. One of his first acts was amnesty to many prisoners, commute death sentences to life in prison, and to replace many of the military leadership in Algeria (Batty, 2011). This allowed him to rid those who might question his authority while it also caused many pied-noirs to start doubting whether de Gaulle’s actions were in their best interest. The FLN knew that real power lay in political diplomacy more than the gun. In 1958, the FLN met in Cairo and organized a government that could lead Algeria, showing their political might (Horne, 1977/2011). On January 29, 1959, de Gaulle stated that Algerians would have the right to self-determination and a choice in their independence once peace was established. He ordered that no soldier take part with the rebellion amongst the French Algerians (Horne, 1977/2006). De Gaulle visited countries where he reaffirmed that Algeria shall be given self-determination and stated that he was waiting for the FLN leaders to come to the peace table.
The government that had been set up in Cairo agreed to send a delegation to meet with de Gaulle. When news reached the French Algerians, they again started riots. In 1961, there were at least 4 assassination attempts against de Gaulle while he visited Algeria causing him to leave early. The plots caused de Gaulle to care less about the pied-noirs and more about the Muslim majority (Batty, 2011). The FLN met in May 1961, in Lake Geneva, Switzerland to negotiate an end to the conflict (Horne, 1977). Talks broke down because of the Sahara region, which the French wanted for its oil and resources (Batty 2011). On March 19, 1962, a cease fire agreement was agreed upon and Algeria was granted independence (Batty, 2011).

**Military**

During the eight year conflict, the FLN had approximately 330,000 fighters (Nadeau and Barlow, 2003/2013). The FLN recruited Algerian nationals who had witnessed what the indiscriminate heavy military suppressions and torture had done to families (Amirouche, 2014). Although the FLN was secular they sought the support of Muslims, Jews, and Christians (Amirouche, 2014). French paratroopers proved they were a formidable force, working with the local units known as harkis (Batty, 2011). The FLN could not fight the French army in cities, so they used small-scale attacks in rural and mountainous areas (Nadeau and Barlow, 2003/2013). The FLN cared more about the number of weapons taken from French soldiers than the number they killed (Amirouche, 2014). The FLN would collect weapons from attacks against the French military, but also received shipments from Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt (Batty, 2011). During meetings to organize the movement, the Algerians settled on a name for the group. They would be
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known as the *Front de Liberation Nationale* or FLN, and the first day of attack November 1, 1954 was a national holiday to French civilians known as All Saints Day (Horne, 1977/2006). Thirty attacks took place between military targets and police stations and 7 people were killed during the FLN operation (Horne, 1977/2006). Government officials and citizens thought the attacks were isolated and that the military could handle the situation. At the time, France had 60,000 troops in Algeria; however, only 3,000 were combat trained (Batty, 2011). These combat ready troops were sent into the Aures along with tanks to root out the FLN. The tanks proved useless in the mountainous terrain. Quick ambush attacks against French patrols were staged as the French military was noticeable by the green uniforms. Being local, the FLN knew everything about the operating environment. Having trouble distinguishing who the enemy was, the French military started to detain anyone it thought was with the FLN. Morgan (2005) argued that Algerians detained knew little to nothing about the attacks but the French military continued detentions by placing citizens in prisons or concentration camps. These detentions became the greatest recruiting tool for the FLN (Morgan, 2005).

The FLN started to attack Muslims who worked for the French (Morgan, 2005). The French Army wound up having more Muslims in *harkis* units than the entire FLN. These units were some of the most effective units because they knew the areas and the tribes (Batty, 2011). This knowledge however did not change France’s opinion that it needed a large scale conventional force made up of France’s own soldiers.

The only way the FLN stockpiled weapons was by stealing or killing Army personnel (Morgan, 2005). On August 20, 1955, the FLN attacked the city of Phillipville
in the Constantine District killing 123 civilians, 71 of whom were Muslim, including women and children (Horne, 1977/2006). Citizens back in France now saw every Muslim as a killer and wanted a harsh military retaliation, all of which the FLN hoped would happen. (Horne, 1977/2006). In what became known as the Battle of Algiers, French soldiers would become known for torture. Aussaresses stated it was called the Battle of Algiers because the aim was to either capture or kill individuals (Robin, 2003). General Paul Aussaresses (2006) stated he used torture to gain intelligence on FLN members, to prevent attacks, and that French politicians had ordered the torture even though politicians have denied this accusation. Aussaresses (2006) stated that the only way the French could be effective was to be more extreme than the FLN. Prisoners were executed but never in the same spot twice and were driven out of Algiers some 20 kilometers so they would just disappear (Aussaresses, 2006). Many others, who were not shot, were hung but it was made to look like a suicide (Aussaresses, 2006). General Aussaresses (2006) stated in his biography, *The Battle of the Casbah*, that torture and executions kept law and order in Algiers. General Aussaresses believed that he never tortured or executed anyone who was not guilty.

Henri Alleg was a prisoner in one of the French torture camps. He became famous because his manifesto *La Question* described the methods of torture and was smuggled out while he was still in prison. Alleg (1958/2013) stated he was water-boarded, electrocuted on his genitals, threatened with summary execution, and injected with Pentothal. As a prisoner, he could hear screams of prisoners to include women and children that were never seen (Alleg, 1958/2013). Paul Teitgen was a French politician
who opposed the use of torture, death squads, and disappearances. When he asked where certain individuals were, he was told that they were at camps even though Teitgen had looked for them. Then he was told that the rivers must have swallowed them (Robin, 2003). Teitgen stated prisoners feet were cemented and then dropped from a helicopter into water. These torture techniques were taught at a training center created by the Minister of Defense (Robin, 2003).

As the war became protracted, French paratroopers started to dislike politicians for sending them to fight for a war for which they did not agree or understand (Morgan, 2005). General Massu was banned by de Gaulle from going to Algeria (Batty, 2011). The military was ordered to put a stop to the pied-noir rebellion. Frenchmen were now fighting Frenchmen in Algiers. Trying to take back the city of Algiers, Frenchmen took over government buildings and threw up barricades around the city. The FLN still attacked, killing both Muslim and French Algerians. Soldiers threw up barricades with some pied-noirs; however, after the revolts, these individuals were arrested (Horn, 1977/2006). The pied-noirs knew the rebellion would soon be over (Horne, 1977/2006). The French military’s troop levels reached up to 470,000 during the eight year conflict, with another 90,000 harkis being stationed with French troops (Windrow, 1997). The French military was known for its indiscriminate use of heavy firepower against anyone suspected of rebellion and its use of torture.

Social

When the earliest settlers came to Algeria, Muslims were condemned to the slum parts of Algeria, such as the Casbah in the city of Algiers (Batty, 2011). In contrast, the
French nationals were given access to the finest lands and jobs where only Europeans could live (Batty, 2011). The birth rate amongst the Muslims increased due to Western medical technology, thus the urban population increased while the standard of living decreased. French citizens were known as colons or pied-noirs (Batty, 2011). The Muslims were considered French subjects. The only way a Muslim could become a French citizen was to denounce Islam, which betrayed their religion (Morgan, 2005). Family members would have to watch in their village as soldiers raped and caused harm to wives and daughters (Amirouche, 2014).

The summary executions and bombing of villages increased the recruitment of Algerians into the FLN (Amirouche, 2014). FLN member Hanou Amirouche (2014) felt that if the French had promoted an indigenous education program then they might have been able to moderate certain populations thus preventing a nationalist uprising. Fighters for the FLN known as fellagah’s would kill anyone suspected of supporting the French and would publicize it in local newspapers (Fearoun, 1962/2000). The FLN used coercion against the Algerian population as well. Although Mouloud Fearoun (1962/2000) welcomed the war, he felt pressured to support measures taken by the FLN that he found offensive. Fearoun (1962/2000) stated that he felt the FLN terrorized Algerians by making them follow a strict adherence to Islam. He also felt that these actions were because of a direct result of the brutality of the French military. Algerians were forced to carry around ID cards that called them French Muslims (Amirouche, 2014). The FLN was mostly made up of middle class Algerians (Amirouche, 2014). The Europeans in Algiers still tried to seem as if nothing had been happening to them. This all changed
when a mayor was murdered on December 28, 1956 in Algiers (Horne, 1977/2006). This act caused the city police duties to be given to the paratroopers in January 1957. General Massu would be in charge of the paratrooper force in Algiers.

On visits to Algeria, de Gaulle spent more time with the Muslim population, further alienating his image with the *pied-noirs* (Batty, 2011). *Pied-noirs* called for strikes and riots which might hinder the military and have the French government take note. It was the hope that the strike and revolt might show de Gaulle that he needed to support French Algerians. During some of these riots, paratroopers fired on the citizens, killing some (Horne, 1977/2006). With reports of torture in French newspapers, French citizens started to be horrified of the images portrayed by its own military.

Riots took place and again the military would be called to quell its own citizens, all of which disturbed French citizens. French politicians started to be concerned with coup attempts in the homeland, and ordered a show of military and police forces in the streets of Paris to dissuade anyone who might try to overthrow the existing government (Horne, 1977/2006). This showed *Parisians* there was a major crisis on their hands and it was now affecting the homeland. The media in France had reported as if the war had just started (Feraoun, 1962/2000). Any hopes of a military victory to stop Algerian self-determination ended. Up to 15,000 French soldiers started internal fighting (Batty, 2011).

In Algiers, new banners reading Organization of Secret Army (OAS) started to appear on buildings. OAS’s mission was to prevent an independent Algeria (Horne, 1977/2006). The OAS tried to assassinate De Gaulle because he was talking to the FLN (Batty, 2011). On October 17, 1961, Paris ordered a curfew for all Algerians living in
Paris; which Algerians protested with thousands being arrested and beaten by French police (Brooks & Hayling, 1992). The police stated violence could not come to France. There were 150,000 Algerians living in the slums of Paris. Immigrants in Paris supported the FLN and provided 80% of the funding of the FLN (Brooks & Hayling, 1992).

**Economic**

Robbing a post-office provided the FLN with their first operational funds (Horne, 1977/2006). Early on, the FLN received financial and political support from Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, the entire Middle East, and to some degree Russia (Horne, 1977/2006). The biggest support the FLN enjoyed was from local Algerians and those living in Paris that provided massive amounts of dollars in fund raising (Horne, 1997/2006). The FLN set up training camps stationed on the Tunisian and Moroccan borders (Horne, 1977/2006). Ben Bella would travel between Arab capitals raising funds and political support for the FLN (Horne, 1977/2006). The FLN even set up a fundraising arm called the *Federation de France du FLN*. Its primary mission was to raise funds abroad for the revolution (Horne, 1977/2006).

Agriculture was the key economic tool for Algerians living in country villages. French airplanes would bomb livestock to prevent their sale in local markets (Amirouche, 2014). The FLN would bomb nightclubs, cafes, and anywhere else French citizens and paratroopers might be (Horne, 1977/2006). Women started to be searched, as they were known to carry and place bombs (Horne, 1977/2006). On January 28, 1957, the FLN called for all Algerians to strike to coincide with United Nations discussions of Algerian independence (Horne, 1977/2006).
Massu could not let Algerians shut down the city, so he ordered his paratroopers to be ruthless in getting the Algerians back to work. Algerians were pulled from their homes and forced to open the shops or have all goods taken from them. Doors were blown off of shops so they could be looted (Horne, 1977/2006). Morgan (2005) argued that announcing the strike early was the biggest tactical error of the FLN during the whole war. Paratroopers raided homes at night trying to dismantle bomb factories while arresting thousands of Algerians (Morgan, 2005). Curfews were imposed and Massu gave orders that anyone caught after curfew could be shot (Morgan, 2005). The tough tactics and torture methods of the Algerian government led to the arrest of the head bomb-maker Saadi Yacef, who was hiding behind a makeshift wall in a house (Batty, 2011). This led to the end of what became known as the Battle of Algiers. The French military was funded by pied-noirs living in Algeria and France’s continued support of colonization towards Algeria (Horne, 1977/2006).

Conclusion

Feraoun (1962/2000) noted that the FLN was forced to fight violently because of France’s racist and colonial view of the Arabs, Berbers, and Muslims in Algeria for more than one hundred and thirty years. The FLN started with small attacks against the pied-noirs, which the French originally downplayed, assuming that their military might could put a quick end to the FLN (Batty, 2011). As the attacks increased, so did the response by the French military. Although France did use local individuals embedded into the French Army, they were never fully utilized as the French government fought the war with a heavily conventional military (Batty, 2011).
The FLN would go from small-arms and weapon attacks to bombs in marketplaces (Amirouche, 2014). As the brutality of the FLN attacks increased, so did the French response by using brutal torture tactics against anyone suspected of being FLN (Morgan, 2005). Citizens were detained and disappeared. France’s military made tactical gains and inflicted serious damage to the FLN, but the French were never able to overcome the political losses (Horne, 1977/2006). The Algerian war brought down the Fourth French Republic and installed Charles de Gaulle back into power (Batty, 2011).

De Gaulle realized war was not worth fighting and agreed to the right of self-determination by the Algerian people (Horne, 1977/2006). The right to self-determination turned the military against its political leaders. The OAS was established and started attacks in Paris (Horne, 1977/2006). With the war coming to Paris, Parisians started to reconsider the war (Horne, 1977/2006). After eight years of war, the French government finally had to succumb to the demands of the Algerian people. In 1962, Algeria was granted independence; thus, a victory for the FLN, with Ben Bella becoming its first President (Batty, 2011).
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Table 6

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<th>Country</th>
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<th>Military</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sultanate of Oman</td>
<td>Absolute Monarchy; feudal</td>
<td>Poorly trained, underequipped, no discipline; agreement with British forces; insurgents were Dhofari residents and a minority of foreign fighters</td>
<td>Various tribes within Dhofar region not associated with Omanis</td>
<td>Exploitation, Agriculture; Oil; The Front received support from South Yemen, Cuba, Iraq; arm shipments came from Soviet Union, training and indoctrination in China</td>
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Oman and Dhofar Rebellion, 1962-1976

The country of Oman is located in the Middle East, being east of Yemen and South of Saudi Arabia. Dhofar is Oman’s western province. In 1962, Oman was ruled by
Sultan Taimur who wanted to enrich himself and started to build up the Dhofar region for his own personnel well-being (Peterson, 2008/2014). The Dhofar region had always been dependent upon Oman but had its own social identity within the tribes. After an arrest of a prominent local sheikh, an insurgent uprising began. This insurgency, identified as the Front, would last for 14 years. The Front was defeated when his son overthrew Sultan Taimur, amnesty programs were initiated, strategic military strikes, and “true” reforms were enacted (Peterson, 2008/2013).

**Political**

During 1965, Sultan Sa’id bin Taimur was the Sultan of Oman and he showed great interest in the Dhofar region; however, this involved making improvements to his own palace and establishing private estates for select individuals (Peterson, 2008/2013). The Sultan made his permanent residence in Salalah, the capital of Dhofar; making the area his private property. This drove ordinary Dhofaris in search of work and education to other Gulf States (Peterson, 2008/2013). Incensed by the Sultan’s actions towards citizens, rebels met and produced a united front named Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF); the mission of the DLF was Arab nationalist in nature (Peterson, 2008/2013). They wished to remove the Sultan and all British occupiers (Peterson, 2008/2013). The Sultan ordered a new base to be built near the Yemen border, but this was attacked and destroyed by insurgents. The Sultan then issued an order that allowed the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) to arrest three or more men at any time (Peterson, 2008/2013). This order merely aided recruitment for the DLF.
Even as the Sultan built up his properties, the SAF never had the budget required for a conflict. The Sultan seemed to think it was only a minor tribal problem and that the DLF would be defeated by his military and his punishment of those who disobeyed him. The Commander of the Sultan’s Armed Forces (CSAF) recommended that more troops be sent, supported by civil and administrative engineers, to improve the roads and other areas within Dhofar. Sultan Taimur rejected all their proposals (Peterson, 2008/2013).

A military assessment showed that the SAF (with British training) were fighting with the wrong tactics and that the Sultan only had a military aim to defeat the insurgency (Peterson, 2008/2013). There were no measures to win back the support of the population, which also meant that the SAF had bad intelligence (Peterson, 2008/2013). Stephen Watts, a British political resident in Oman, suggested a five point plan which included: create better intelligence, encourage dissident rebels to surrender and be reequipped to fight with the SAF, institute a veterinary clinic to improve agriculture, provide medical assistance, and institute a propaganda campaign to win the hearts and minds of the people (Peterson, 2008/2013). By 1970, the mood in Oman was bleak. Sultan Sa’id was still spending money on his own luxuries while improvements to Dhofar and surrounding areas were slow. The British government knew a change in leadership was required or Oman would fall to the insurgents (Peterson, 2008/2013). On July 23, 1970, the Sultan was overthrown by his son Qaboos and forced to go into exile (Peterson, 2008/2013). Sultan Qaboos was not welcomed at first by the Dhofar tribes; but in 1971, with the help of the British government, the Arab League and the United Nations
recognized the Omani government (Barrett, 2011). This strengthened the international communities’ belief in the justified fight against the insurgents (Devore, 2011).

Military

An agreement between Sultan Said ibn Taimur Al Said and the British government in 1958 led to the creation of the SAF and the British promised assistance in military development (Peterson, 2008/2013). When the insurgency first began, the British Army feared that the Sultan underestimated the strength of the DLF and that the Oman Army could be defeated with small rebel attacks and propaganda (Barrett, 2011).

The DLF attacked an oil company and on June 9, 1965, the Dhofar Rebellion started (Barrett, 2011). The DLF attacked with only a few hundred insurgents (Peterson, 2008/2013). The DLF initially had the backing not only of jabbalis, but also countries of Yemen, Egypt, and Iraq (Peterson, 2008/2013). DLF members traveled to Baghdad and Cairo for training and some traveled to Moscow. On June 18, 1965, the armed forces arrested thirty-three suspects by cordoning off Salalah; the Sultan thought that he had ended the rebellion. In this thinking, he was far from the truth (Peterson, 2008/2013).

On April 26, 1966, the Sultan visited an Army camp outside Salalah. While there was a demonstration of the military’s capability, shots rang out as a guards tried to assassinate the Sultan (Peterson, 2008/2013). This event showed that the military had been penetrated by the DLF while also leaving the Sultan without confidence in his own armed forces. The Army immediately ordered a company to search for the assassins and they were ambushed (Barrett, 2011). It was increasingly evident that the DLF threat was growing and a more sustained response were needed. Brigadier General Tony Lewis, of
Britain’s military, stated the rebellion could have been put down quickly in 1966 if the armed forces had equipment and changes were made in governance (Devore, 2011).

Operations against the DLF continued, and improved training for the SAF with their British counterparts, but the British commanders thought there was a military stalemate (Peterson, 2008/2013). Peterson (2008/2013) argued there was a stalemate of manpower and equipment shortages, but more importantly because the Sultan refused to take the necessary political steps to defuse the insurgency. In 1970, the SAF had little to no intelligence as the intelligence staff was manned by officers with poor education (Jones, 2011). None of their vehicles could operate through the mountainous terrain (Peterson, 2008/2013). With the British pulling out of Yemen in 1966, this allowed the DFL to have better supply routes for weapons to be smuggled into it (Peterson, 2008/2013). The new government in Yemen would now be called the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) or South Yemen as some referred to it (Devore, 2011). The PDRY government was a Marxist single party state and aligned itself with the Soviet Union (Devore, 2011). The PDRY allowed for recruitment of rebels into the DLF (Barrett, 2011). In 1967, more support started to come in from South Yemen and the DLF decided to change the name from DLF to the PFLOAG meaning Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Gulf, or The Front (Peterson, 2008/2013). The name reflected that Dhofar was just the first step in overthrowing the monarchies of the Gulf States. The Front had a formidable force made up of 5,000 fighters, with even its own dedicated death squads named idaarat (Green, 2011). In 1968, weapons manufactured in the Soviet Union started to make their way into PFLOAG hands via Cuba (Peterson, 2008/2013). In
April of 1970, the SAF was on the defensive (Devore, 2011). Unless there was a change in strategy considered opinion was that the SAF could lose the war (Devore, 2011). In 1970, The Front established communications in Gulf newspapers and stated that their goal was to open a second insurgency in Oman (Devore, 2011).

With Sultan Qaboos, the military campaign now had a political component to defeat the insurgency. The SAF created a paramilitary unit made up of locals titled firqaḥ (Peterson, 2008/2013). The new Sultan came up with an initiative to have fathers of insurgents visit them and persuade their sons that the new government was for them. This approach was a success as Front members wanted to surrender and become part of the firqaḥ (Peterson, 2008/2013). The firqaḥ deployed for the first time with British Advisory forces into the city of Sadh. The firqaḥ entered the city and with British forces took it back. The operation netted four prisoners who were later released. The front leader for the area, Muhammad Salim Narawt, surrendered and led the firqaḥ and British advisors to a wadi where 140 men were waiting. After careful negotiations all 140 men declared their allegiance to the new Sultan (Peterson, 2008/2013). Forty of these members were embedded into other operations on March 19, 1971. In June of 1971, the firqaḥ went on operations without British advisors and the Sultan fixed the pay issues, increasing morale (Peterson, 2008/2013). Launching a new offensive, the SAF was able to escort 40 civilians and 2650 livestock from rebel controlled territories (Peterson, 2008/2013).

Operation Jaguar was launched to take back areas of Eastern Dhofar. Two squadrons of SAS, 300 firqaḥs, and other SAF elements defeated the guerrillas and took back the area (Peterson, 2008/2013). The Sultan ordered the immediate opening of
medical clinics, schools and shopping districts. A follow-on operation titled Operation Capricorn allowed for airlifting or extraction by vehicle of over 1500 goats and 700 cattle to be sold in the Salahah markets for the farmers (Peterson, 2008/2013).

Seeing gains made by SAF and British advisors, the Sultan got commitments from Jordan and Iran to add Special Forces and engineers embedded into the SAF (Peterson, 2008/2013). Feeling a need for a major victory, The Front decided to wage a battle in Mirbat. It was there they hoped to win a kind of Omani Tet Offensive (Peterson, 2008/2013). On July 18, 1972, 300 rebels gathered to overtake the city. A thunderstorm caused the attackers to attack earlier than planned and the SAF was able to quickly defeat the attack, as the rebels had lost the element of surprise (Peterson, 2008/2013).

In 1974, SAS opened up Radio Dhofar; dropping propaganda leaflets over Dhofar while expanding medical and veterinary services to tribes (Devore, 2011). Intelligence reports suggested that the rebel strength had dropped from 860 to 745 (Peterson, 2008/2013). The Sultan decided it was time to take steps to end the war. He ordered any prisoner should be shown leniency and should be repatriated back into society (Peterson, 2008/2013). At the end of 1974, the SAS believed it was time to launch the last attack on the insurgent stronghold, which was located in a mountain complex in the Shirshitti caves. Intelligence suggested the rebel strength was now only 600 (Peterson, 2008/2013).

There would be one final push against the insurgents named Operation Hadaf on December 1, 1975. The operation would involve elements of the SAF, British, Iranian and Jordanian advisors. The operation cut off the insurgents from their foreign sponsor, PDRY, and seized the Shirshitti cave complex that served as the headquarters, crushing
morale (Peterson, 2008/2013). The primary drivers motivating defectors in November were hunger and fear. The SAF decided to halt operations for a week in order to allow for more defecting insurgents. The west was now cleared and on December 11, 1975, the Sultan would declare the war over. In 1964, the SAF troop strength was approximately 2,200 and in 1970 it was 4,038 (Peterson, 2008/2013). By war’s end, there would be approximately 11,000 troops in the Dhofar region, 5,000 SAF, 3000 Iranians, 1200 firqahs, 1000 British, and 800 Jordanians (Devore, 2011). The SAF continued to grow and by late 1970s, the strength was 11,000 (Peterson, 2008/2013).

Social

The capital of Dhofar is Salalah with the population being mixed from three tribes: al-Kathir, Bayt al-Rawwas, and al-Marahin (Peterson, 2008/2013). Outside these tribes live two other communities with one claiming direct lineage of the Prophet. The Dhofar region is separated by 500 miles of desert and is culturally different than the rest of Oman, which Sultan Said never comprehended the difference in tribes (Devore, 2011). Dhofaris have always considered themselves to be culturally different from Omanis (Jones, 2011). In the Dhofar area it is known as the jebel for the mountains and hills with the citizens known as jabbalis.

Approximately 20,000 inhabitants lived in the coastal plains, while another 10,000 were made up of the Bait Kathir and Mahra tribes (Peterson, 2008/2013). Tribes in the Dhofar region were connected by bayats known as houses and led by a shaykh (Jones, 2011). In 1963, Sheikh Musallim bin Nufal bin Sharfan al-Kathiri of the Bayt Kathir tribe, was stopped and thrown in prison (Peterson, 2008/2013). This would be a
prelude for the Dhofari insurgency as Kathir Muslims would attack the Sultan’s forces after Sheikh Mussalim was released from prison. Because of attacks, the Sultan ordered the SAF into the Dhofar region for the first time ever (Peterson, 2008/2013).

Yemen had been forwarding Cuban and Russian weapons to the rebels (Devore, 2011). China supplied weapons, training, and political indoctrination based on its policy of aiding liberations (Peterson, 2008/2013). Most members who joined the DLF simply joined to fight against the Sultan’s government; however documents in 1971, showed that some DLF members wanted to incorporate Marxism into their beliefs, which conflicted with the role of Islam and the tribal beliefs (Peterson, 2008/2013). The Front’s goal was to unite all Arabs living in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In 1970, PFLOAG would control 80% of Dhofar (Devore, 2011).

Sultan Qaboos ordered the prison release of certain Dhofaris who were thrown in prison by his father (Peterson, 2008/2013). He made trips unannounced to Musca, Matrah, and Bahla Jabrin to meet with local tribes. Sultan Qaboos offered amnesty to prisoners as well as curtailing any offensive operations in the Dhofar region. These visits allowed for him to show the new attitude in the war (Peterson, 2008/2013). The NDFLOAG started to become concerned that certain tribal leaders might defect to the government and ordered the killings of some tribal leaders while confiscating camels for supply convoys (Peterson, 2008/2013).

In July 1970, the Sultan accepted the British plan for more SAS troops to be embedded into the SAF to assist and advise (Peterson, 2008/2013). The SAS immediately deployed 80 SAS who had experience in intelligence, medical, and veterinarian services
throughout the SAF and into Dhofar regions (Peterson, 2008/2013). The SAF now divided the war into four phases to defeat the insurgency. These phases consisted of preventing The Front from winning over the population, preparing for offensive measures against The Front, and then offensive operations to take back territory, and finally consolidating the people into these areas while expanding governmental control and resources (Peterson, 2008/2013). The SAS took more of a role in being embedded while assisting and advising. Civil assistance started to bear fruit in towns such as Taqah, Mirbat and Sadh. By late 1970, the SAF had its first defectors after these rebels realized that the new government was offering freedom and opportunities. The government then turned 80 of these men into a fighting formation called *firqah* and would later deploy them in operations against The Front (Peterson, 2008/2013).

**Economic**

In the 1960s, Dhofaris seeking employment left the area for Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries (Barrett, 2011). DLF ordered attacks against oil companies and their interests in early 1965 (Barrett, 2011). On November, 1970, the Sultan ordered that Dhofar would not be considered a province within Oman and would receive equal standing from the government and resources (Peterson, 2008/2013). The Sultan ordered an increase in troops in the Dhofar region while simultaneously ordering improvements to roads, medical care, water wells, and veterinary services by the civil government. He also ordered more civil jobs for the *jabbali* population (Peterson, 2008/2013). March 17, 1973, the Sultan announced that civil development was now the number one priority in the *Jabal* (Peterson, 2008/2013). The end of the year, brought about the permanent
opening of roads between Salalah and Thumrayt, which gave direct routes to the markets. The Sultan then deployed civil action teams consisting of a leader, a teacher, medical officer, and economic officer to areas to assist the villages (Peterson, 2008/2013). Most of 1975 was spent securing the gains the military had made with civilian governance. Major General Ken Perkins stated the East was secure but it was done not by military means but by civil projects the government had undertaken (Peterson, 2008/2013).

**Conclusion**

The Dhofar rebellion was started by tribes seeking independence from the repressive rule of Sultan Said ibn Taimur (Peterson, 2008/2013). The Sultan was ignorant to the realities of the insurgency and thought that they could be crushed by military force alone (Peterson, 2008/2013). Even the Sultan’s own military were constrained by lack of equipment, resources, and pay, and therefore did not perform at optimum performance during some of these conflicts (Barrett, 2011). Once in power, Qaboos modernized the military, which increased morale (Peterson, 2008/2013). He allowed British advisors to adopt a more effective COIN campaign that combined a civil-military approach while bringing reforms (Peterson, 2008/2013). With Sultan Qaboos addressing the needs of his population, he was able to achieve military victories, bring more recruits into the military through amnesty, and help reduce the insurgent footprint, while increasing his support from the local populace (Peterson, 2008/2013).
Table 7

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Cyprus</td>
<td>British Colony ruled by Governor General</td>
<td>British Troops, EOKA was made up of Greek Cypriots</td>
<td>Greek Cypriots Majority and the Orthodox Church; Turk Cypriots Minority; EOKA wanted <em>enosis</em></td>
<td>Shipping-Imports/Exports; Agriculture; EOKA received support from the Orthodox Church, clandestine support from Greece</td>
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Cyprus and EOKA, 1955-1959

Cyprus is located in the Eastern portion of the Mediterranean Sea. In 1914, Cyprus was annexed by Britain; however in 1915 Cyprus was offered to Greece as long as they fought for Britain in World War I. Greece, however, turned down the offer. When the British lost the Suez Canal in 1956, the British government started to rethink its strategic locations across the globe (Lapping & Percy, 1985). The British government
decided that Cyprus would be a great staging area for its troops with access to the sea (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Greek Cypriots, the dominant ethnic group, had always seen the island as a part of Greece and wanted unification along with enosis (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). In 1955, an insurgent group named the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters or EOKA was formed and launched attacks against British forces (French, 2012). This insurgency would last for four years (French, 2012). EOKA would not receive enosis or unification with Greece, but they waged a war of attrition against Britain, winning a moral victory; thus, the British government gave Cyprus independence (French, 2012).

**Political**

In 1950, Archbishop Makarios III was installed as the head of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus by the British government, making him the de facto leader; Makarios was more of a politician than a priest (Lapping & Percy, 1985). The Cypriots did not want a national country. They wanted to be identified with Greek counterparts, known as enosis (Lapping & Percy, 1985). The British government outlawed teaching enosis, but priests and churches found ways to preach it (Lapping & Percy, 1985). With Britain losing control of the Suez Canal, the Chief of Staff Military Headquarters was moved from Egypt to Cyprus in 1956 (Lapping & Percy, 1985).

In July of 1954, many Cypriot citizens pondered why they had no say in their own affairs (French, 2012). Lord Colyton, Minister of State for Colonies, stated certain territories should never expect to be fully independent (Lapping & Percy, 1985). The word “never”, was displayed all around the world in newspapers giving Makarios a propaganda victory (Lapping & Percy, 1985). The Greek government decided to take the
Cypriots right of self-determination to the United Nations. Britain believed that denying *enosis* was a British matter not a concern of the United Nations. Britain was able to get enough U.N. votes against *enosis* and soon riots started in Cyprus (Jones, 1959). In August of 1954, British police using repressive measures injured 70 Greek Cypriots. These measures damaged the view that British police forces were there to protect Cypriots (Jones, 1959). George Grivas, a colonel in the Greek Army, arrived to Cyprus with the intent of spreading *enosis* (Lapping & Percy, 1985). While the country quietly calmed, Grivas started to form a guerrilla Army in the country that would oppose the British. This guerrilla group became known as National Organization of Cypriot Fighters or EOKA (Lapping & Percy, 1985). David French (2012) argued that Grivas knew Cyprus was too small to pursue a Maoist strategy; so he hoped that by mounting opposition against the British by insurgency and massive civil disobedience would bring political victory by discrediting the British in the eyes of the international community. Grivas (1962) stated his aim was “to enlighten the public opinion, at home and abroad, about the justice of our cause as well as to draw attention to those acts of our opponent which were likely to discredit him internationally” (p. 19). The British looked to Makarios to denounce the violence. Makarios denounced violence but also made it very plain that he was against the British policy of not giving Cypriots the right to self-determination (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Makarios insisted to Grivas no harm come to civilians even as he supported the insurgency (Panagiotis, 2010). Grivas’s (1962) strategy was to wear down Britain’s military while causing internal fighting with Britain’s government; thus, hoping for the international community to demand a political solution.
Britain never accepted the Cypriot grievances or that the violence was an expression of discontent. Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd stated, “they were criminals who were responsible for wicked and malicious activities” (French, 2012, p. 60). Now desperate, Britain sent Sir John Harding to be governor of Cyprus. Makarios was impressed by Harding and stated that he would denounce violence and end his push for enosis, so long as the British would give Cypriots the right to self-determination within a few years (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Harding had just retired from the General Staff and was known as a hard soldier (Panagiotis, 2010). Harding consulted Britain and returned with the answer. The British did not rule out self-determination, but rather suggested that given British problems in the wider Mediterranean, it might be delayed (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Makarios stated that he could not accept this answer and consequently Harding prepared for war (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Makarios was willing to sign a peace deal; however, he wanted concessions of amnesty for the EOKA fighters, proper security, and majority rule in the parliament (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Britain refused and no settlement was conceded. Makarios traveling to Athens for discussions with EOKA’s leadership was detained by British forces and flown 3000 miles to Seychelles where he was held as a prisoner (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Grivas (1962) argued the way to defeat an insurgency like EOKA was with “statesmanship and diplomacy as it would isolate the guerillas from the population” (p.73).

Harold MacMillan became the new Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and started to rethink Britain’s need for Cyprus (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Prime Minister MacMillan determined that all that the British needed was a small base; but, he still
needed to negotiate with someone (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Therefore, he released Makarios, but refused to let him step foot on Cyprus. Makarios turned to select British Labor Party with his concession that Cyprus would not be linked to Turkey or Greece making it an independent state recognized by the United Nations (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Grivas was astonished, as he had not been consulted, so he ordered EOKA to attack all soldiers and citizens. A vote at the United Nations to give Cyprus full sovereignty was defeated; however, Makarios agreed to meet with a leading Turkish Cypriot insurgent named Dr. Fazil Kuku (Lapping & Percy, 1985). In 1959, the two agreed to meet in London, in what was referred to as the Zurich Conferences (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Kucuk stated that Turkish Cypriots would guarantee Cyprus’s sovereignty, but only if the Turkish Cypriots were protected. Greece, Turkey, and Prime Minister MacMillan agreed to the deals because the British got to keep two military bases (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Grivas was not happy that Makarios had settled for lesser terms and headed back to Cyprus (Jones, 1959). Grivas (1962) stated that his plan for the insurrection was to draw international attention, specifically any ally of Greece to enosis. 

Military

In 1956, EOKA had a force strength of approximately 973 fighters (Taber, 1965/2002) EOKA was made up of teenagers and young adults that Grivas recruited (Panagaiotis, 2010). Grivas (1962) believed that guerrilla warfare would be the future of warfare. EOKA would then use small-scale attacks against British forces while slipping away undetected afterwards (French, 2012). The advantage of guerrilla warfare allowed EOKA to save on manpower, resources, and finances (Grivas, 1962). EOKA members
had to swear an oath of allegiance and anyone who discredited EOKA would be killed (French, 2012). EOKA knew they could not defeat the British militarily, so the plan was to win a war of “attrition” and “win a moral victory” (Grivas, 1962, p.5). On April 1, 1955, EOKA started to bomb targets all over Cyprus. Fifty-three percent of all attacks against British took place in an urban area, mainly Nicosia (Markides, 1974). Grivas stated that he was willing to have freedom either through politicians or blood from war (Lapping & Percy, 1985). EOKA was able to infiltrate the police and port authority. Britain found out that most police sympathized with EOKA, but had to keep most of them because no one else understood the culture (French, 2012). Plans for anti-terrorism raids by British forces were given to EOKA; customs helped smuggle in weapons to EOKA (Lapping & Percy, 1985). EOKA was infuriated that Makarios had been exiled, which only escalated the violence.

With Greek help, EOKA was able to set up a radio station, Athens Radio, which assisted with the recruitment of young teenagers into the insurgency (Panagiotis, 2010). With war now being raged, EOKA was not only able to keep its bases in the mountains, but they were able to continue operations in towns where their support base was (Lapping & Percy, 1985). With the increased attacks, British soldiers started to search all Cyprus citizens, while some were even shot in the back (Lapping & Percy, 1985). British units started to resort to mass arrests, with 2,100 Greek Cypriots being arrested on one night (Grivas, 1962). British Army units had to act as local police-duties for which they were not trained (Panagiotis, 2010). The police functions performed by the British military further alienated the Greek Cypriots (Panagiotis, 2010). EOKA believed the British
lacked discipline to fight an irregular war (Jones, 1959). Grivas (1962) argued that sabotage was one EOKA’s most effective weapons because it sapped the morale out of British soldiers.

The guerrillas blended into the population and almost all citizens knew what EOKA would do if intelligence was given to British soldiers. In 1956, Harding ordered large-scale operations in urban areas. All this did was increase resentment from villagers (Panagiotis, 2010). In 1956, British forces increased from 4,000 to 20,000 with another 5,000 police forces (Taber, 1965/2002). Grivas welcomed the additional forces as he saw more targets (Taber, 1965/2002). Throughout the conflict, British military and security forces enjoyed a 32:1 soldier to insurgent ratio advantage over EOKA (Lamborn, 2012).

Thousands of normal Cypriots were tortured or detained without trial, yet no charges were brought against them (Lapping & Percy, 1985). The British government in London supported Harding in his measures. With Makarios out of the country, Harding believed that Grivas was isolated, so the British started to recruit more Turkish-Cypriots into the police force to take action against the EOKA and other Greek-Cypriots (Panagiotis, 2010). This action led to even further alienation between the Turk Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots (Panagiotis, 2010). Grivas (1962) argued that Britain thought its greatest weapon was the “use of force” but all it did was drive the Greek Cypriot population to support EOKA. In 1958, it was thought there were 138 EOKA spies embedded into the police force (Panagiotis, 2010). This coupled with the Turkish-Cypriot police made gaining any informant in EOKA virtually impossible (Panagiotis, 2010). Makarios and Grivas would not speak for three years while the former was in exile.
When they finally met, Makarios told Grivas there must be a political settlement to which Grivas stated there could only be a military settlement (Jones, 1959).

**Social**

Britain tried to justify its rule of Cyprus by arguing that Turkey had ruled Cyprus for 300 years and was only 40 miles away (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Eighty percent of Cypriots were Greek Cypriots and wanted *enosis* while 20% were Turk Cypriots, thus, making it difficult for British to balance local interests (French, 2012). In November 1956 the death penalty was established for any Cypriot civilian caught with a weapon (Panagiotis, 2010). There was some success, as certain civilians would lead British soldiers to EOKA hideouts (Panagiotis, 2010). Britain had to get its intelligence from local journalists early in 1955 (Panagaiotis, 2010). Grivas knew that Britain would try to use the radio as a tool to discredit the EOKA movement; so he had EOKA members get to know 50 newspaper and magazine editors where they were “tutored in the gentile art of news manipulation” (Jones, 1959, p. 58). Other insurgents produced leaflets that were passed around to all Greek Cypriots (Jones, 1959). The British Army had few troops who spoke Greek, so they took national service members who might have learned Greek in school and threw them in as interpreters (French, 2012). David French (2012) argued Britain never won the hearts and minds. Police enforcements were Turks or knew nothing about Greek Cypriot history or culture; which helped push Greek Cypriots to support EOKA (French, 2012).

The Orthodox Church supported the right to *enosis* and although it did not support violence, it did support the people’s uprising against the British government. The Kykkou
monastery provided food to insurgents (Jones, 1959). Grivas prepared excellent maps of facilities for movement and communication (Jones, 1959). He also had a network of agents that gathered precise intelligence on the police and military so he always knew their movements and operations (Jones, 1959). Fighters were given code names so British intelligence would have a hard time establishing their real identities (Jones, 1959). In October 1955, Athens Radio broadcast a letter from a detainee who said that the Superintendent of Prisons and Turkish warders were beating and executing prisoners (French, 2012). EOKA created a unit strictly for propaganda means against the British (French, 2012). EOKA intelligence was able to penetrate all levels of government (Panagiotis, 2010). A waiter who worked in the governor’s house was able to plant a bomb under Lord Harding’s bed. It did not detonate, but showed clearly that EOKA fighters could penetrate the staff of even the top British official in Cyprus (Panagiotis, 2010). Having seen British tactics in the Battle for Athens in 1944-1945, Grivas took refuge in the mountains (Jones, 1959). EOKA attacked restaurants where British and foreigners converged. One attack killed a CIA agent (Gup, 2000).

With Makarios released, Turkey worried about Turkish Cypriots. Britain’s Secretary of Colonies told Turkish leaders in Ankara that Cyprus could be partitioned. Turkish Cypriots would have their right to rule on their own land (Lapping & Percy, 1985). In Athens, Makarios refused to negotiate with the British as long as Turkish Cypriots would be represented (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Harding resigned and was replaced by Sir Hugh Foot, who started to visit local people (Panagiotis, 2010). These local people in-turn made the Turkish government believe that Britain had no loyalty to
Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots now started to attack Greek Cypriots (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Fighting now spread throughout the whole country between EOKA, Turkish Cypriots, and British soldiers. Prime Minister MacMillan offered that all parties should share Cyprus; however, EOKA did not accept the offer (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Grivas (1962) argued that no insurgency could survive unless it has complete support of the population.

**Economic**

The Cypriot Orthodox Church offered material and ideological support to EOKA and was instrumental in helping shape the outcome (Novo, 2013). The church helped shape the view of nationalism and *enosis*, but could not justify violence; therefore, the leaders kept a distance between themselves and the terror from EOKA (Novo, 2013). With linguistic, cultural, and religious ties, EOKA received money and arms support from Greece (Kraemer, 1971). Novo (2013) argued Cyprus gained a propaganda victory, as Makarios was able to travel to Athens, DC, New York, Egypt, and Lebanon during the 1950s to spread the message of unification and *enosis*. Grivas (1962) had previously mentioned his aim to bring international attention to the struggle. EOKA’s strength at the end of the conflict totaled approximately 1,250. Two hundred fifty were regulars and 1,000 were active underground (Kramer, 1971). British forces totaled 40,000 with 32,000 being regulars and another 8,000 being auxiliaries (Kramer, 1971).

In 1956, British intelligence learned the percentages that Grivas spent on EOKA. Grivas allocated 30% of funds for maintenance, 19% to EOKA family members, 16% for weapons, 17% for smuggling operations, 5% for propaganda, 2.5% for medical care, and
the remaining percentage was used for trials and bail of EOKA members (Panagiotis, 2010). Attacks started to hit government officials within the economy.

Harding created an auxiliary police force but this force was created of the minority Turkish Cypriots not the majority Greek Cypriots (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Harding started to punish villages with fines and curfews for any village suspected of housing EOKA guerrillas. EOKA members who utilized sympathizers land paid market value for food and other resources. Grivas remembered what it was like when Germany occupied Greece and what the Germans did to the Greek peasants (Panagiotis, 2010).

**Conclusion**

EOKA was a youth movement, which had the broad support of the population (French, 2012). EOKA was able to survive not only with the populations support but also because of the deep resolve the fighters had to *enosis*. Britain was able to inflict great damage on EOKA but could never fully defeat the committed fighters (Grivas, 1962). By 1959, EOKA could not continue its struggle because the political support both from Makarios and from the Greek government had been withdrawn (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Nevertheless, Britain was still forced to negotiate with Greece and Turkey, both of which called for Cyprus to be granted its independence under a power-sharing constitution, which was representative of the people (French, 2012). Britain blocked *enosis* but lost sovereignty except for two bases.
WHO LIVES THERE: THE ROLE OF EMBEDDED TROOPS IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS


Table 8

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<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Military coup; established a junta, then free elections</td>
<td>Brutal tactics; lack of officer and NCO troops; lack of discipline, advisors from the U.S.; the FMLN were leftist guerillas made up of 4 different organizations</td>
<td>Political and military elites, Catholics</td>
<td>Coffee, sugar, corn, rice, beans, textiles; GOES had 55 American advisors; FMLN received support from Nicaragua, Cuba, and Soviet Union</td>
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El Salvador and FMLN, 1979-1992

In 1979, with grievances in the disparity between the social classes a civil war would start between the El Salvador government and five rebel groups that by fall of 1980, would call themselves the FMLN. The FMLN stood for the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front. The group is named after Farabundo Marti who was a peasant leader of an uprising in El Salvador during the 1930s (Cale, 1996). A civil war was fought. The FMLN lost support of the population and agreed to a peace treaty in 1992 (Lamborn, 2012). The FMLN agreed to demobilize the military wing and form a legal political party (Lamborn, 2012). The FMLN currently holds the majority in the Government of El Salvador (GOES).

**Political**

Traditionally, the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) had been a place for society elites or those that could not obtain priesthood (Manwaring, 1988). From the 1960s, the Catholic Church increasingly embraced the poor and moved away from serving as an auxiliary to the rich landowners (Manwaring, 1988). In the ESAF an increasing number of younger officers were drawn from the middle class (Manwaring, 1988). The military started to feel pressure from the international community and made a statement that the country should have fair elections (Figueroa, 2013). After another fraudulent election, younger officers felt the need to act and therefore deposed President Romero (Manwaring, 1988). The coup was established as junior officers were dissatisfied with the style of government (Cale, 1996). The first thing the junta did was pass land, banking, and commerce reforms (Manwaring, 1988). The military coup, however, caused unrest by the military government and a civil war started which the FMLN would take part (Figueroa, 2013). The junta had a temporary president in Alvaro Magana; however, the first election in 1984, Jose Napolean Duarte won (Manwaring, 1988). The military was to the right of Duarte, but the Minister of Defense announced that they would stand
behind the new President (Hamilton, 2014). The U.S government, concerned about the fall of the government in Nicaragua and the spread of communism, sent 55 advisors to El Salvador (Cale, 1996).

The FMLN never considered the conflict in military terms. The plan was to integrate politics into a political-military confrontation to overthrow the government (Wilkerson, 2008). The FMLN thought that they could wither American support with a protracted war as happened in Vietnam (Manwaring, 1988). The primary objective of the war in El Salvador was to promote the spread of democracy while defeating the communist supported FMLN from taking over the country (Clark, 1990). Friction between American government agencies to work together slowed the American strategy; which Ambassador Corwin recommended creating a standard operating procedure for operations and not just ad-hoc policy (Corum, 2007). In 1983, Vice President Bush visited El Salvador and stated that any future aid would be dependent upon human rights reforms. Prisoners must be held in known facility detention centers, the International Red Cross must be allowed to visit prisoners within 24 hours, and the ESAF had to conduct business in military uniforms (Waghelstein, 2002).

President Duarte stated he understood why individuals might want to start an insurgency. He knew that if GOES could offer reforms that the people could believe in, then there was no need to join the revolution (Manwaring, 1988). With the FMLN losing support, they started to focus strictly on military victory. This loss of support allowed the GOES to focus on gaining support internally and externally (Manwaring, 1988).
In 1984, Jose Napoléon Duarte would become the first freely elected President of El Salvador (Cale, 1996). G.L. Lamborn (2012) stated it is his belief this was the first part of ending the insurgency. Maj. Paul Cale (1996) believed that the election of Duarte legitimized the GOES and the quest for democracy. The election proved that the FMLN did not have broad support amongst the public as voter turnout was large and considered a success (Waghelstein, 2002). By 1989, failed military operations against the ESAF by the FMLN showed that many leaders wanted to have serious negotiations with the government (CIA, 2002). The FMLN was also becoming increasingly isolated from the population (CIA, 2002). In 1992, tired of fighting, the FMLN decided it was time to end the military aspect and focus on changes as a political party (Manwaring, 1988). On 17 January 1992, the GOES and FMLN signed a peace accord and ended the civil war (Cale, 1996). The peace accord ended the insurgency by political means, promoted democracy across the nation, and respected human rights (Manwaring, 1988).

**Military**

The FMLN had approximately 12,000 fighters when the insurgency started (Cale, 1996). In January 1981, the FMLN wanted a “final offensive” as it was called, with the objective of defeating a weakened government and military (Manwaring, 1988). The offensive operation did not meet its objectives, but it did show that the FMLN organized at will (Manwaring, 1988). From 1981-1984, the FMLN showed it could attack where and when it wanted with up to 600 men at one time (Manwaring, 1990). During this period, the FMLN focused on conventional large scale attacks; however, these attacks did not defeat the ESAF (Waghelstein, 2002). In 1985, the FMLN began using quick
unconventional small attacks while dispersing into the mountains (Waghelstein, 2002). In November 1980, the FMLN had over 600 tons of weapons that were supplied either through attacks on ESAF or from outside countries such as the Soviet Union, Cuba, or Nicaragua (Cale, 1996). The FMLN believed it had a propaganda advantage over the ESAF because of the repressive tactics used by the GOES and ESAF against the civilian population (G.L. Lamborn, personal communication, February 20, 2015).

Almost all the military officers deployed to El Salvador thought the only way for victory within El Salvador was to focus on the political, economic, and social reforms that the country needed (Clark, 1990). The challenge for the U.S. military advisory team was to find a way to win the war without being directly involved in combat (Clark, 1990). Col John Waghelstein (2002), commander of the first advisor teams, stated that contrary to Army doctrine belief, “small is better”; furthermore, he stated that a large force would cause the Salvadoran public to grow wary and possibly result in open-ended deployment.

In the beginning, the ESAF suffered from lack of equipment, lack of leadership, and lack of training (Cale, 1996). Far worse than these deficiencies was the public image of the ESAF and death squads that terrorized the local population (Cale, 1996). The ESAF was designed for static operations, meaning those that were not involved in death squads would protect mostly governmental infrastructure. This also meant there were not enough troops to conduct a COIN operation, which required kinetic operations (Waghelstein, 2002). The core of the mission throughout the conflict was to separate the population from the FMLN (Waghelstein, 2002). On a trip to Washington DC, General Eugenio Casanova stated he knew the ESAF officer corps was part of the problem and
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needed to be reformed (Waghelstein, 2002). Maj. Paul Cale (1996) stated that when the advisors deployed to El Salvador they knew where the death squads operated as they just followed the vultures. During the first year of the war, estimates put the civilian death toll at 10,000 by death squads (Corum, 1998). At first, the ESAF fought the FMLN the only way they knew which was with brutality (Cale, 1996).

The advisors stated the first two goals of training the ESAF was to correct the human rights abuses and to build up an esprit de corps within the enlisted rank structure. All of which the advisors knew would take years (Cale, 1996). The ESAF had an officer promotion system where all officers were promoted regardless of merit. This process enhanced the lack of leadership at certain levels (Cale, 1996). ESAF personnel were also sent to the United States to attend certain professional military courses (Cale, 1996). ESAF Secretary of Defense, General Carlos Vides Casanova, stated that if it were not for the retraining of the ESAF, the ESAF would not have been legitimate, but with retraining, and a greatly changed attitude, the ESAF became known for fighting for the population, not against it (Cale, 1996). The military also provided air support to the ESAF greatly enhancing operations. In 1984, the Salvadoran Air Force (FAS) had 19 helicopters. By war’s end they had 46 (Corum, 1998). Some FMLN leaders stated that improvement in FAS played the key role in turning the tide (Corum, 1998). At the beginning of the war, the FAS attacked villages at will. Towards the end, pilots refused to attack, instead focusing on intelligence and insertion of troops (Waghelstein, 2002).

After focusing on human rights and leadership the advisors then focused on intelligence. The advisors stated that ESAF should take prisoners and treat them
humanely. Intelligence started to grow as the ESAF treated locals better (Cale, 1996). The U.S. Army expanded the Salvadoran Army by creating a light infantry battalion that was specifically trained in COIN measures (Corum, 2007). In 1985, the ESAF changed tactics by focusing on small unit attacks on FMLN leadership (Cale, 1996). The ESAF had force strength of 10,000 but grew to over 55,000 by war’s end (Cale, 1996). The advisors convinced Salvadoran military and government officials that the center of gravity was the population; therefore, if reforms focused on the people the GOES and ESAF could gain the support of the population (Cale, 1996). An Intelligence Assessment showed support for the GOES had increased with the election of Duarte but also because of the decreased human right violations by the ESAF (CIA, 2002). By 1989, the fighting became one of attrition as both sides became tired of fighting (Cale, 1996). U.S. advisors had Army manuals translated into Spanish for the ESAF so they could have a clear understanding of how to handle the local populace (Waghelstein, 2002). The ESAF established Radio Cuscatlán to provide a psychological advantage. The mission of Radio Cuscatlán was to spread the government’s message that democracy and reform were coming to El Salvador (G.L. Lamborn, personal communication, February 20, 2015).

In 1980, there was an estimated 10,000 political violence murders. By 1991, it was down to 100 (Childress, 1995). With the professional development of the ESAF by American advisors, the violence went from a systematic problem to one of an individual based (Childress, 1995). Overtime, even FMLN fighters either saw that their fight was pointless or that the GOES was making genuine reforms that were inclusive of all citizens. This was apparent by the defection of Miguel Castellanos. Castellanos was a
political-military leader with the FMLN. He defected and went on his own campaign letting citizens know that taking up arms was not the right thing to do (G.L. Lamborn, personal communication, February 20, 2015). Although the FMLN killed Castellanos, his message of putting down weapons and taking a political approach was having an effect psychologically (G.L. Lamborn, personal communication, February 20, 2015). FMLN fighters were just counting their time. With the reforms of the Salvadoran government and the professional development of the ESAF, the FMLN was unable to maintain its insurgency. A CIA (2002) Intelligence Assessment stated that the FMLN had no more military strength and therefore was losing political support amongst the population.

Social

The FMLN was a group of five different political groups that merged together to form the insurgency (Cale, 1996). A small middle class appeared by the 1950s in El Salvador (Lamborn, 2012). Moreover, an increasing number of Salvadoran students attended universities outside El Salvador where they were exposed not merely to new ideas but to more open and modern societies with greater freedom and social mobility (Lamborn, 2012). Some returning students came home as social democrats seeking gradual change, but others came home as social revolutionaries bent on violent upheaval (Manwaring, 1988). On March 24, 1980, Archbishop Oscar Romero, spoke out against military abuse and asked for military aid to be suspended. The next day he was assassinated (Cale, 1996). Archbishop Romero was assassinated in the cathedral (Cale, 1996). Lamborn (2012) argued that the killing of Romero almost brought the government down, but did not because the Salvadoran government was capable of change with the
ongoing reforms. The U.S. believed that no government would survive without the help of Archbishop Romero (G.L. Lamborn, personal communication, February 20, 2015). Most intelligent individuals within El Salvador were considered to affiliate with Jesuit University. The elites would not listen to the university or the church (Cale, 1996). In 1989, six Jesuit Priests were killed at Central American University; military officers were put on trial for the killings (Waghelstein, 2002). This showed how far reforms had come, even if there was still room for improvement. Col. Carlos Aviles, Chief of Psychological Operations in the ESAF, turned in the military officers responsible for the deaths, showing the growth in the ESAF of respect for the law (Hamilton, 2014). A lieutenant and approximately six enlisted individuals were arrested and sentenced to prison terms for the assassination (Waghelstein, 2002).

The American media compared sending advisors to El Salvador to the beginning stages of Vietnam (Cale, 1996). When the first American casualty happened in May of 1983, Newsweek magazine’s title was “The First Casualty” (Cale, 1996). When another soldier died in 1987, the media stated that he was a casualty of America’s foreign policy (Cale, 1996). With the American people wary of sending troops into a conflict, Congress and the Reagan Administration agreed that no more than 55 military advisors would be sent to El Salvador at one time during a 12 month deployment and that U.S. troops were not allowed to serve in combat (Cale, 1996). The Administration also tied any aid to mandatory reforms in government and human rights (Cale, 1996). Although these restrictions hampered to some extent what the U.S. advisors wanted to do, they ensured the ESAF would have to defeat the FMLN by the training provided by advisors (Cale,
G.L. Lamborn (2012) argued that the FMLN was gradually eliminated by social reforms enacted by GOES. It withered away any support they might sustain from the local population. The FMLN called for a protest against the GOES on Labor Day, May 1, 1989. It was estimated that the FMLN protest would draw 25,000 Salvadorans; however, only approximately 4,000 showed up (CIA, 2002). The FMLN lost support of the population and was unable to recruit, which forced them to mandate service of civilians further alienating the population against the FMLN (CIA, 2002). One villager reported that the FMLN would make family members kill their children (Todd, 2010). During one FMLN attack, they lost 1500 fighters, mainly because of newly and poorly trained recruits (CIA, 2002). The civil war was exploited by Cuba, Honduras, Soviet Union, and Nicaragua (Cale, 1996). The FMLN received training and support from Nicaragua (Cale, 1996). The greatest failure of the FMLN was not gaining the support of the populace (Clark, 1990). A poll taken in 1990 showed that 55% of Salvadoran citizens believed that the FMLN were committing the most human rights abuse, compared to 12% believing that the ESAF committed the most (CIA, 2002). By 1991, the FMLN had lost the hearts and minds of the Salvadoran people (Lamborn, 2012). In 1992, the ESAF held a peace rally and an estimated crowd of 200,000 showed up. The FMLN tried a counterdemonstration and could only muster 13,000 (Lamborn, 2012).
Economic

El Salvador had economic prosperity in the 1950s, which lead many middle class citizens to become aware of their lack of political power (Lamborn, 2012). Prior to the war elites owned 80% of all the land in El Salvador; (Lamborn, 2012). The wealthy and military elites controlled the government which also meant it was not inclusive of the overall population (Lamborn, 2012). This caused a disparity between the standard of living and the quality of life between the peasants-middle class and the elites (Cale, 1996). Peasant farmers were known as campesinos (Lamborn, 2012). El Salvador had an emerging middle class that advocated for reforms (Lamborn, 2012). Others that were educated wanted a social revolution and became the basis the FMLN (Lamborn, 2012).

The infant mortality rate was very high in El Salvador and a lack of economic opportunity pushed many El Salvadorans across the border into Honduras (Corum, 1998). Starting in 1984, the FMLN attacked markets, economic infrastructure, and any other government symbol. The intent was to show the local populace that the Salvadoran and American governments could not address the grievances (Manwaring, 1988). The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) insurgency in Nicaragua had a supply relationship with the FMLN. FSLN Sandinistas would hide weapons or explosives under shipments of bananas or scrap iron (G.L. Lamborn, personal communication, October 6, 2015). Cuba provided a handful of advisers. It is believed the Soviet Union funneled its assistance through Cuba (G.L. Lamborn, personal communication, October 6, 2015).

After the peace treaty was signed, 39,000 former soldiers and campesinos were given land purchased by the United States government (Cale, 1996). The United States
spent close to $6 billion on the war and 100,000 El Salvadorans died during the conflict (Cale, 1996). The economy improved tremendously after the war. A New York Times (1990) article stated that El Salvador had grown from an agriculturally based to an industrialized based society. Workers earned more than the minimum wage and this increase in wages has helped to bridge the disparity in working classes. In a captured document, the FMLN stated ESAF and the U.S. military had won a psychological victory by ensuring that the population understood the war was against the FMLN and not the citizens of El Salvador (G.L. Lamborn, personal communication, February 20, 2015). Polling data appear to show that the Salvadoran citizens had grown tired of the leftist violence and damage to the economy and this was evident in the 1990 Presidential elections (CIA, 2002).

Conclusion

Responding to the crisis in El Salvador, junior officers of the ESAF staged a coup in 1979 to come into power (Manwaring, 1988). Although a junta was created to begin reforms, Right Wing elements in the Salvadoran government continued the human rights abuses (Lamborn, 2012). Many disenfranchised centrists or center-left politicians left government. Extreme Left groups formed the armed insurgent group called FMLN. Worried about the spread of Marxism and Communism from Nicaragua, the United States agreed to deploy a small number of U.S Serviceman to El Salvador to advise the ESAF (Cale, 1996).

The deployed advisors were contingent upon human rights abuses ceasing and respect for all citizens occurred (Lamborn, 2012). The U.S government wanted to fight
the FMLN but from a political-military approach, not just through security forces (Lamborn, 2012). The ESAF started to build on its COIN capacity not just militarily but politically, socially, and economically. While increasing its tactical skills the ESAF embarked on becoming keen on respect for human rights (Lamborn, 2012). The security forces transformed themselves into a kinder and gentler military that sought the campesinos as peers, equals, and friend’s not just outcasts (Lamborn, 2012). Military members of the ESAF started to recognize that their actions had consequences, positive or negative. With the U.S government’s stance against death-squads, the free elections of 1984, and genuine reforms, the Government of El Salvador increased its legitimacy at home and aboard, and thwarted the FMLN which looked as though it might take over El Salvador in the early 1980s (Lamborn, 2012).

### Table 9

**Components Leading to Insurgency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Rhodesia</td>
<td>Elected government, declared Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain</td>
<td>Professional, consisted of Infantry, Special Forces, small mix of Africans embedded; ZANU/ZAPU quick attack against Rhodesia forces; followed Mao strategy</td>
<td>5% White minority rule</td>
<td>Tobacco, Farming, Oil; Rhodesia had support from Portugal; ZANU/ZAPU used Mozambique and Zambia as staging areas; received funds, arms, and training from Soviet Union and China</td>
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**Rhodesia and ZAPU/ZANU, 1964-1980**

Along with the mining company British South Africa, Cecil Rhodes acquired land in 1890 and named it Rhodesia (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). Rhodes was the first prime minister and established white minority over the African majority (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). By 1964, Britain had granted independence to its entire African empire, except for Rhodesia. In Rhodesia, five percent of whites ruled over 95% of blacks a with the white minority wanting to keep economic and political status quo (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). Given this disparity, two insurgent groups formed an insurgency against the Rhodesian government. ZANU and ZAPU waged war against the white Rhodesian government until 1980 when free elections formed a new black majority government and renamed the country Zimbabwe. The term blacks was used by Prime Minister Ian Smith (Godwin & Hancock, 1993).
Political

Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith believed the only way to guarantee the ruling authority of white Rhodesians was independence (Lapping & Percy, 1985). On July 1, 1965, the Rhodesian parliament approved a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) for Rhodesia from British rule (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). Rhodesia was different from other British colonies, as Rhodesia had its own military, police force, and civil service. Britain opposed UDI, but without civil power, Britain could only impose sanctions (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). If Smith recognized black majority rule, Harold Wilson, Britain’s prime minister, would confer independence on Rhodesia. Smith rejected any such deals on the premise that white Rhodesians did not want to lose their European lifestyle (Lapping & Percy, 1985).

In opposition to UDI, two nationalistic parties were formed with the names Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). Robert Mugabe broke from ZAPU in 1964 and formed an insurgent group titled The Patriotic Front of ZANU (ZANU-PF) (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). Mugabe merged with ZANU later on and the group became known simply as the Patriotic Front or PF (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). With their radical beliefs of black majority, ZANU and ZAPU were banned from Rhodesia in 1964 (Cronin, 2012). Bishop Abel Muzorewa, led a group named the United African Nationalistic Party (ANC), which represented the nationalists interests to the Smith government (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Sithole would join Muzorewa, so most of the fighting done in Rhodesia was with Nkomo...
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and Mugabe forces. With Muzorewa rejecting violence, ZANU and ZAPU separated from the ANC (Godwin & Hancock, 1993).

Villagers were educated by ZANU on what the nationalist movement was about (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). Guerrillas themselves spent their daily routine by attending political lectures, which had guerrilla themes (Moocraft & McLaughlin, 2008). If enough villagers supported the guerrillas, then the Smith regime might collapse; thus, setting up a black majority rule (Lapping & Percy, 1985). As the political message of the guerrillas developed, recruiting increased (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). In 1976, Smith tried to settle with Nkomo but Smith would never concede majority black rule (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). As the war increased, Smith conceded in bringing blacks into parliament (Lapping & Percy, 1985).

Mugabe was considered too radical and was banned from politics. Ian Smith wanted a moderate black within the government (Lapping & Percy, 1985). He thought Muzorewa had support of the entire black nationalistic movement (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Smith agreed to form a government with black ministers; however, the civil services, police, and military forces remained in white control (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). Controlling the civil infrastructure allowed for whites to dominate society. On March 3, 1978, Smith signed the Salisbury Agreement, which transitioned white rule (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). The agreement allowed transition from white minority rule to black majority rule with the moderate Muzorewa heading the new government (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). The new name of the country was Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Ian Smith believed the Africans to be the happiest people in the world (Lapping & Percy,
1985). With blacks in power, Muzorewa argued that there was no need for guerrillas to keep fighting and Rhodesian independence should be recognized. Nkomo and Mugabe rejected the new government, as there was no transfer of power, which for them was true independence for the black nationals (Godwin & Hancock, 1993).

In April 1979, Bishop Muzorewa was elected the new prime minister. Britain refused to recognize the independence of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Margaret Thatcher soon became Prime Minister of Britain (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Secretary of State, Lord Carrington, worried if the new government was recognized the Soviets might align with Mugabe and be brought into the war (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). On September 10, 1979, Britain brought all parties to a meeting titled the Lancaster House (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). With Muzorewa as the Prime Minister, Ian Smith still came as part of the official delegation of the Rhodesian government. The British thought that Muzorewa should step down and a British governor should rule until elections were held and Muzorewa agreed (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Smith disagreed and left Lancaster House. His replacement was the top Defense Ministry General Walls (Lapping & Percy, 1985). While the conference still transpiring, the Rhodesian military launched an all-out battle to destroy the PF in Zambia and Mozambique (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). The objective was to destroy the PF, weakening them politically at the Lancaster House conference. A tentative agreement was formed which would lead to free elections. Mugabe thought he could fight his way to victory and disapproved of the agreement. Mugabe finally accepted the agreement, which brought free elections for Rhodesia (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Muzorewa would represent the current makeshift of Rhodesia;
however, Nkomo and Mugabe had differed on who should lead the PF, so Nkomo would lead the PF, and Mugabe formed his own political party. With elections taking place, Robert Mugabe became President. Mugabe’s ZANU secured 63% of the votes, Nkomo won 24%, and Bishop Muzorewa only won eight percent (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). On April 18, 1980, Mugabe announced the independent country of Zimbabwe.

Military

On December 21, 1972, attacks against farmers took place all over Rhodesia by ZANU (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). Insurgents attacked and fled to the mountains as they followed Mao’s blueprint (Reid-Daly, 1999). Knowing tactics had to change Zimbabwe black nationalists in small numbers were sent to Tanzania, Cuba, China, and parts of Eastern Europe, learning how to fight using Mao’s guerrilla warfare methods (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). Mugabe stated that his guerrillas had to use the people, like a fish in water. (Lapping & Percy, 1985) The conflict in Rhodesia became known as the bush wars. ZANU guerrillas had a force strength of 25,000 (Preston, 2004). ZAPU’s guerrillas force strength was 20,000 (Lohman & MacPherson, 1983).

Rhodesia pseudo guerrilla teams were highly effective in gaining intelligence against the insurgent groups. Pseudo teams were recruited from the areas from which they originated and became ideal trackers and interpreters. These pseudo teams knew the terrain because they were from the local area (Reid-Daly, 1999). Pseudo team members were motivated by a desire for justice and revenge. The tribes and kinship, which they belonged to, were the primary beneficiaries of violence (Reid-Daly, 1999). The Rhodesian Army had its own Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) Company. RAR was made
up of Africans from different tribal backgrounds such as the Ndebele tribe of southwest Rhodesia and the Shona tribe of Northwest Rhodesia with white officers in charge (Stewart, 2011). RAR soldiers saw themselves as soldiers first, regimental members second, and finally whatever tribal affiliation they might have (Stewart, 2011). The values of the government did not matter. The regiment drew the loyalty of these men and in return the regiment was loyal to them (Stewart, 2011). Small-scale teams, made up of Rhodesian soldiers disrupted the guerrilla network by infiltrating Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). The Rhodesian military was trying to win by kill ratios and body counts. All of which they tried to use as propaganda (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). Even with blacks embedded into military formations, racial prejudice existed on the part of white Rhodesian officers. Whites thought black soldiers fought as cowards (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). Blacks that were drafted into the military had derogatory names such as being called a houtie, which means “wooden-head” (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). Selous Scouts originally was created for internal operations inside Rhodesia, but often worked external operations such as counter-terrorism attacks in Mozambique (Reid-Daly, 1999). The small-scale tactics employed by Selous Scouts decimated the insurgents and the insurgents had no place to hide amongst the population (Reid-Daly, 1999). Local Africans lead these counter-terrorism assaults so as not to been seen as a white minority Rhodesian led attack (Reid-Daly, 1999). The Rhodesian fighting force against the insurgents was 52,800 made up of regular army units, police, and reservists (Lohman & MacPherson, 1983).
The tactics employed by the Rhodesian forces were different depending on unit. The Selous Scouts along with pseudo teams used asymmetric clandestine means to sabotage ZANU and ZAPU while also gathering human intelligence (Reid-Daly, 1999). The Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) used small teams called “Fireforce” (Cocks, 2012). Fireforces reacted to enemy ambushes, attacks, or sightings (Cocks, 2012). Fireforce assault teams were an assault force consisting of approximately 32 soldiers broken down into four man teams called “sticks” (Cocks, 2012). Fireforce deployed with gunship helicopters and close air support (Cocks, 2012). The Rhodesian forces became known for their human intelligence and successfully targeting insurgent infrastructure. Author Daniel Tharp (2013) argued that the Rhodesian military might be the most effective counterinsurgent force ever. The Selous Scouts accounted for 68% of all ZANU/ZAPU kills either by direct fire or by calling in FireForce units (Tharp, 2013).

Captured insurgents informed the military of how nervous insurgent commanders were of being infiltrated by pseudo teams (Reid-Daly, 1999). When insurgents were interrogated they were never tortured. Interrogators wanted to build a trusting relationship with any prisoner (Reid-Daly, 1999). Coercion was used to get the insurgent to switch sides instead of face prosecution (Reid-Daly, 1999). The soldiers had differing views of what hearts and minds meant (Reid-Daly, 1999). With the war dragging on, Ken Flower, Director of Intelligence, acknowledged that the intelligence dried up and Rhodesian military forces were on the defensive rather than the offensive (Lapping & Percy, 1985). This meant instead of pre-empting attacks, the Rhodesian force was involved in fighting on-going attacks.
Beginning in 1979, soldiers felt the government had lost the political battle. Therefore the war was almost over (Reid-Daly, 1999). The military started to spy on each other with even Daly-Reid’s phone being tapped by Military Intelligence (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). Reserve call-ups now increased from nine months to one year (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). Military call-ups stretched the manpower requirements beyond the capability of the military and the white Rhodesian public (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). The Rhodesian public however still denied that a civil war was being fought in their country (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). The guerrillas had success with quick strikes and then disappeared into the night (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). Until 1976, the hearts and minds approach was only used in the limited context of military operations not political reform (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). White Rhodesians were confused on what they were fighting for, but the guerrillas knew the fight was for black majority rule (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008).

Social

African Rhodesians outnumbered white Rhodesians by a 12:1 ratio and had a higher birth rate (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). Guerrillas consisted of peasant farmers who understood how other villagers might live (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). ZANU and ZAPU waged a people’s war in Rhodesian. On August 5, 1970, the Minister of Education stated the government’s first priority for education should fall to the Europeans, then Asians, and finally Black Rhodesians. Meaning that the black population, as majority, would lack certain basic services (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). Villagers thought guerrillas would have little chance against the superior Rhodesian military force and thus
The White Rhodesian way of life promoted family values. These values were termed western and should be the majority rule (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). Rhodesia enjoyed support from South Africa and Mozambique; however, in 1975 Portugal would wind up giving independence to Mozambique, drawing down its own troops, thus giving the guerrillas another area from which to operate (Lapping & Percy, 1985). Nkomo infiltrated from Zambia and Mugabe from Mozambique (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). This infiltration extended the Rhodesian forces’ patrol area over 1000 miles with border skirmishes, conflicts increased in Rhodesian villages and cites. If villagers gave intelligence to Rhodesian forces they felt the wrath of the guerrillas. The Catholic Church, represented by a large population of both white and black Rhodesians, became critical and vocal about security force operations (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). In 1978-1979, ZANU and ZAPU became entrenched amongst the people and brought more people into the revolution (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). From 1970-1980, every Rhodesian was affected by the war. Ken Flower stated publically that Rhodesians were losing the political war (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008).

With most white Rhodesians living in Salisbury, they never knew the war was happening. This ignorance changed when the insurgent groups started to attack Salisbury
(Godwin & Hancock, 1993). When reservists came home, families heard the derogatory names towards blacks and used them in societal settings (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). At conflicts’ end, over 30,000 citizens were killed, an estimated 20% of the black population was malnourished, 850,000 made homeless, and 100,000 unemployed, with 250,000 refugees, and 483,000 kids displaced from schools (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008).

**Economic**

In 1968, ZAPU set up Viet Cong style base camps in Rhodesia, bringing medical care, and food and equipment into the villages (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). In an effort to halt the guerrillas’ movements, the Rhodesian government reverted to harsh measures on the villages. Fines were imposed, cattle were confiscated, and facilities shut down on villagers who were suspected of not providing adequate intelligence (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). ZANU and ZAPU were funded by China and the Soviet Union (Tharp, 2013). China also sent advisors to train the guerrillas (Tharp, 2013). Rhodesia was surrounded by African nationalistic conflicts that were inspired and aided by China, the Soviet Union and Cuba (Tharp, 2013).

June 1970, the average black Rhodesian earned $312 annually where whites earned $3,104 (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). The white Rhodesians enjoyed a high standard of living due in part to the cheap labor rates of black Rhodesians (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). The government started to deport radical professors from local colleges who preached against white rule (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). Civil service jobs were given to minority Rhodesians because they believed that the Africans might politicize the jobs (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). Therefore, civil service became part of the revolution,
while simultaneously keeping the minority government in power. Recession hit in Rhodesia in 1974 (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). OPEC prices rose, causing oil prices to triple, which caused money to be transferred out of the banks (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). The GDP growth rate in 1975 was only 1%. From 1972-1978, Rhodesian tourism fell by 74 % (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). The UN placed sanctions against the Rhodesian government and assisted in crippling the Rhodesian economy (Godwin & Hancock, 2008). Sanctions banned the exports of weapons to Rhodesia, British export of capital was banned, and the purchase of Rhodesian tobacco, the country’s main export, was banned (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). Guerrilla warfare meant higher taxes for the white population. This taxation caused many white Rhodesians to migrate to South Africa or Britain (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). With the emigration, the economy started to lack skilled workers (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). An uncertain future, lack of possibilities, and the burdensome military call-ups were the main reasons white Rhodesians left (Godwin & Hancock, 1993).

As the war continued, security forces utilized more reserve call-ups. Reservists started to wonder if jobs would be available upon return from service (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). The call-ups affected the economy negatively as skilled workers were taken from the market (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). With the length in service, divorce rates increased amongst society (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). In 1978, the Rhodesian government implemented martial law, while also being more aggressive against the guerrillas (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). With peace talks still on going, the
conflict continued. Muzorewa ordered fuel rationing to take effect with a mandate of ten percent to the population (Godwin & Hancock, 1993).

Conclusion

The conflict started with Ian Smith refusing to transfer power to the country’s black majority (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). ZANU and ZAPU organized an insurgency and even though these insurgents operated separately they had similar military tactics (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). The insurgents would launch attacks from Mozambique and Zambia but were not able to establish a full presence in Rhodesia because of the military at the beginning of the conflict (Goodwin & Hancock, 1993). The Rhodesian military infiltrated Mozambique and disrupted insurgent operations by capturing or killing insurgents (Tharp, 2013). The insurgents that were captured could be reformed and many switched sides and fought for the Rhodesian military. The military did a great job of utilizing locals into their forces and were able to use tradecraft in capturing insurgents. In 1975, Mozambique received its independence from Portugal and thus Portuguese troops left the country (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). This had an immediate effect on ZANU and ZAPU as it enabled them to expand their bases and operations. This expansion also meant that Rhodesia would have to increase its military presence when attacking the insurgents but also patrol the borders (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). This increase in troops came from the reserves, which meant that now large numbers of white Rhodesians were getting pulled into the fighting (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). ZANU and ZAPU were able to increase their recruiting base. Both
insurgent groups even modified their tactics and would start educating villagers on their goals and missions (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008).

Militarily, the Rhodesian was effective but politically they were not. As the conflict prolonged, the economy suffered while the insurgents grew their political base. Once Rhodesians in Salisbury saw the effects of the conflict as terror came to the capital, many started to emigrate to Britain or South Africa (Goodwin & Hancock, 1993). Facing mounting pressure, Smith would finally concede majority power. As effective as the military tactics were, they could not overcome the political obstacles that the Smith government faced (Lapping & Percy, 1985).

If the Rhodesian military had focused on political and social grievances of the population instead of body counts, they could have won more hearts and minds (Moorcraft & McLaughlin, 2008). If the Rhodesian government viewed the insurgents as an internal threat and not as communists, they might not have dismissed the demands of the black majority (Tharp, 2013). With no political reform, there was nothing done to weaken the political strength of ZANU or ZAPU and in the end Mugabe would lead the country of Zimbabwe (Lapping & Percy, 1985).

**Summary**

This study employed data collected from eight insurgencies begun and completed between 1946 and 1992. Each case was supported by a detailed case narrative and also by qualitative data on four factors that focused on the political, economic, military and social (PMSE) structures. In each of the eight case studies the reason for the insurgency was the grievances perceived by a portion of the population. Corruption, limited access to banks,
lack of resources, rigged election, and denial of land ownership by citizens was main causes in the creating of an insurgency. When host nations made reforms of political policies and made changes to address the grievances of the population, these nations were all successful in defeating the insurgency. Insurgents in all case studies utilized terror as a tactic. Terror attacks would target government security forces, buildings, and politicians. Other terror attacks would focus on the economies of a host nation or landmarks of the ruling power such as markets and nightclubs. Insurgents used quick attacks mainly at night when attacking. After these quick attacks, the insurgents would disappear into the mountains, jungles, or other areas of the local terrain.

An important part of successful counterinsurgency campaigns was the amnesty of moderate insurgents or counterinsurgents. Host nations garnered better intelligence when insurgents defected and were allowed to join the military and transition back into society government. Defections were done by engaging in diplomatic conversations with insurgents or utilizing individuals such as family members who had close ties to the insurgents. Successful host nations were able to convince insurgents that they could win by being part of the political solution, not an armed conflict.

A review of the case studies shows that four nations used an indirect approach and four used a direct approach. The nations of Cuba, France, Britain, and Rhodesia all utilized a heavy military presence with large-scale operations that included bombing campaigns. Other nations such as the Philippines, Thailand, Oman and El Salvador used precise military operations that targeted insurgents while simultaneously protecting the local population. When a government’s military understood the culture of the population,
the population’s perception of the government changed to a favorable viewing. The countries of the Philippines, Thailand, Oman, and El Salvador had foreign advisors embedded into the local population. The local population however always took the lead in combat operations and these embedded advisors were kept to a small contingent. The nations of France, Britain, and Rhodesia had security forces that were made up of the indigenous population; however, the locals did not lead military operations. Therefore, in these three nations, it did not have the face of a local operation, but more of the government for which the insurgency was trying to replace. In the case of Cuba, there were limited advisors but these advisors were not properly trained on effective counterinsurgency operations and, therefore, were not even utilized.

In the successful cases, each nation focused on a civil-military approach versus a military capability first followed by civil changes. Nations that utilized torture as a tactic only drove more recruits into the insurgency. In the case studies of Philippines, Thailand, Oman, and El Salvador, many prisoners were captured but reformed to fight on the side of the host nation. These reformed fighters wound up recruiting other insurgents into switching sides, therefore, fighting on behalf of the government they once were trying to overthrow. The population was the center of gravity in each of the case studies. Whether the insurgents or host nation, whoever was seen as operating on behalf of the people, was the winner. In all the case studies, it only took a handful of individuals to start an insurgency.

Mao (1938) stated the way an insurgent should fight is by the encirclement and destruction of the enemy’s regular military units in numerous small engagements of a
broad area. This is why the battle is a jigsaw type with smaller conflicts taking place in
the larger context of a broader conflict (Lamborn, 2009). The insurgent movements of M-
26-7, FLN, EOKA, and ZANU/ZAPU used the strategy of Mao’s jigsaw puzzle adapting
to their local situations. In the ouster of Batista, there was an underground movement led
by Jose Echeverria, a separate front in Santiago led by Frank Paiz, and, of course, the
rebels of the Sierra Maestra. The FLN drew the French Army into the mountains of
Algeria while simultaneously operating in the Casbah area within in Algiers and attacked
European targets such as markets and nightclubs. EOKA utilized the mountains and the
streets of Nicosia to attack British security forces while using Archbishop Makarios III to
carry the message of *enosis*. ZANU/ZAPU attacked the villages of white Rhodesians,
slipped away into the countries of Zambia and Mozambique, and then attacked the capital
of Salisbury.

Insurgents would live and hide amongst the local population. In cases such as
France and Rhodesia, insurgent groups would attack the local population if the
population was suspected of giving intelligence to the host nation forces, and the host
nation did not protect the tribes or villages. Security forces and military personnel in the
nations of Philippines, Thailand, Oman, and El Salvador would clear an area from
insurgents and then hold that area to protect the population. When these countries cleared
and held territory, intelligence increased.

When host nations set up assistance programs to better the population, these
programs helped to diffuse the insurgency by decreasing the recruitment ability. Some
examples were, Magsaysay offering up loans to the peasants to own their own land, the
RTG building roads so local villagers could access markets, Sultan Qaboos fixing roads, opening up veterinary clinics, and even using military helicopters to transport cattle and Dhofari’s to markets. In the case of El Salvador, the GOES gave land to campesinos and FMLN members who defected. Castro even collected taxes from corporations to build schools and hospitals for the villages.

In conclusion, when an insurgency arises in a host nation it does so mainly because of grievances within the population. The population is the center of gravity for the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. Research showed that when confronting an insurgency, a host nation must take a civil-military approach. The host nation must start with reforming itself to fix the grievances of the local population. The military will need to take action against insurgents, but it must do so in a very strategic manner as to not alienate the local populace. This strategic approach was done through small led teams. If a host nation is going to utilize outside advisors, these advisors must be embedded into the indigenous population. The indigenous forces must take the lead in any military operation, as it will provide a local face against the insurgency. Security forces must be seen as operating on the behalf of its citizens. Security forces must be professional and assist the villagers by clearing territory and holding the territory. By clearing and holding territory, this allows the host nation government to make “true” reforms work for the people. When security forces are seen as operating on behalf the population, intelligence will increase. Further intelligence and support from the local populace will assist in the declining recruitment of the insurgency. Propaganda is a powerful psychological weapon in defeating an insurgency as it shows their cause is not just and sap the will out of an
insurgent. Utilizing the entire PMSE spectrum, a host nation will then be able to confront an insurgency and ultimately defeat it.

Table 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1949-1955</td>
<td>COIN Win</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1956-1959</td>
<td>COIN Loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1965-1985</td>
<td>COIN Win</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1954-1962</td>
<td>COIN Loss</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1962-1976</td>
<td>COIN Win</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1955-1959</td>
<td>COIN Loss</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1979-1992</td>
<td>COIN Win</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhodesia</td>
<td>1964-1980</td>
<td>COIN Loss</td>
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

Introduction

The final chapter sums up the preceding analysis into four sections: key findings, recommendations, conclusion with insights into future conflict, and the potential for future research. The research question that guided this dissertation was what could an analysis of eight COIN operations tell us about the success or failure of these operations? This study employed data collected from eight insurgencies that began and were completed between 1946 and 1992. Each case was supported by a detailed case narrative and also by qualitative data on four factors that focused on the political, economic, military and social (PMSE) structures. I conclude with a reprise of key takeaways from the findings, elaborated and expanded by way of conclusions and recommendations.

There were three major implications for leaders that this study found. The implications are that political and military leaders must consider an intimate knowledge of local culture and conditions are critical to fighting insurgents, effective political means to address grievances are very important to creating legitimacy for the government and the military forces fighting insurgents, and is very important for military forces to be connected to the people who security they are trying to secure.
Key Findings

Political

Fearon and Laitin’s (1993) study in 1983 found that insurgencies begin when conditions in a country are right. These conditions involve the political grievances of the populations within a country. A Rand Corporation study (2013) supported Fearon and Laitin’s finding that grievances sustained insurgencies.

In each of the eight case studies in this dissertation, the insurgencies were fueled by such grievances. In the Philippines, Cuba, El Salvador, Thailand, and Oman insurgencies, corruption within the existing government was a leading factor. In the case of Cyprus, Algeria, and Rhodesia insurgencies, minority rule over the majority was a central grievance. In each of the eight cases examined, there were other secondary grievances that sustained and helped recruit for the insurgencies. These consisted of limited access to banks, limited to no access of land ownership, lack of resources, and rigged elections.

The Philippines, Thailand, Oman, and El Salvador reformed political policies and made changes that addressed the grievances of the population. All were successful in defeating the insurgency. The governments of Cuba, Algeria, Cyprus, and Rhodesia made changes but attempted to stay in power. In these cases, the ruling government was overthrown. An important part of successful COIN campaigns was amnesty granted to moderate insurgents or, alternatively, to counterinsurgents. In the Philippines, Huk insurgents that defected were allowed to join the army and transition back into society (Karnow, 1989). The 26th of July Movement (M-26-7) welcomed members that defected
from the Batista regime (Patterson, 1995). The government of Thailand welcomed villagers who once supported the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) into the government, and in some cases made them part of the Village Scouts, because they knew their local terrain (Moore, 2014). Defected insurgents from the Dhofar rebellion were welcomed by Sultan Qaboos government without any repercussions (Peterson, 2008/2013). The reformed Government of El Salvador (GOES) welcomed members of the FMLN into society (Cale, 1996). Great Britain and Rhodesia are the only nations which did not have a concerted effort to have diplomatic communications with The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)/Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). The British and white Rhodesians both lost their wars. Although, Grivas was not ensured enosis, the British government was forced to concede independence to Cyprus (French, 2012). Rhodesia was forced into the Lancaster Meeting by the British government, which the vote awarded Rhodesia to Mugabe; thus, a loss for Ian Smith and his vision of Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) (Godwin & Hancock, 1993).

**Military**

Lt. Col. John Nagl (2002) stated that there are two approaches to COIN operations: a direct approach, which is the annihilation of an enemy force, and the indirect approach, which focuses on winning hearts and minds of the local population. A review of the case studies shows us that four nations used an indirect approach and four used a direct approach. Batista’s Cuba, the French in Algeria, the United Kingdom (UK) in Cyprus, and Smith’s Rhodesia all utilized a heavy military presence with large-scale
operations that included bombing campaigns. Other nations such as the Philippines, Thailand, Oman and El Salvador used precise military operations that targeted insurgents while simultaneously protecting the local population. With true reforms and government forces viewed by the people as operating on behalf of the population, these four nations defeated the insurgency. Thus, providing support and protecting the population is more important than a direct approach of killing the enemy.

When a government’s military understood the culture of the population, the population’s perception of the government changed to a favorable viewing. Philippines, Thailand, Oman, and El Salvador had troops embedded into an indigenous force. Only in the case of Oman, did the British Special Air Service (SAS) go into combat with the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) (Peterson, 2008/2013). In the Oman case, the local population took the lead in combat operations. In all cases, these embedded advisors were kept to a very small number. The French, British, and Rhodesians had security forces that were made up of the indigenous population; however, the locals did not lead the military operations. Therefore, in these three nations, it did not have the face of a local operation, but more of the government the insurgency was trying to replace. In the case of Cuba, there were limited advisors available but these advisors were not properly trained on effective COIN operations and, therefore, were not utilized.

In the successful cases where a host nation was able to defeat an insurgency, each nation focused on a civil-military approach versus a military capability first followed by civil changes. Nations that utilized torture as a tactic such as France only drove more recruits into the insurgency. In the case studies of the Philippines, Thailand, Oman, and
El Salvador, many prisoners were captured but reformed to fight on the side of the host nation. The reformed fighters, seeing the government was on the side of the people, recruited other insurgents. Insurgents in all the case studies utilized terror as a tactic against a population. Terror attacks targeted government security forces, buildings, and politicians. Other terror attacks would focus on the economies of a host nation or landmarks of the ruling power such as markets and nightclubs. Insurgents used quick attacks mainly at night. After these attacks, the insurgents would disappear into the mountains, jungles, or other areas of the local terrain.

Evidence shows that when armed forces of a nation use force to coerce the population, the people tend to increasingly support the insurgency. Such tactics involved mass arrests, detentions, or heavy combat operations that did not benefit or protect the populous. Further, evidence shows that insurgents would live and hide amongst the local population. In cases such as Algeria, Cyprus, and Rhodesia, insurgent groups would attack the local population if the population was suspected of giving intelligence to the host nation forces, and the host nation did not protect the tribes or villages.

Security forces and military personnel in the Philippines, Thailand, Oman, and El Salvador, would clear an area from insurgents and then hold that area to protect the population. When these countries cleared and held territory, intelligence increased. Castro’s M-26-7 ordered his men to seize, hold, and protect villages. Castro even collected taxes from corporations to build schools and hospitals (Patterson, 1995). Mao (1938) stated the way an insurgent should fight is by the encirclement and destruction of the enemy’s regular military units in numerous small engagements of a broad area. This
is why this type of battle is a jigsaw type with smaller conflicts taking place in the larger context of a broader conflict (Lamborn, 2009). The insurgent movements of M-26-7, FLN, EOKA, and ZANU/ZAPU used the strategy of Mao’s jigsaw puzzle adapting to their local situations.

In the ouster of Batista, there was an underground movement led by Jose Echeverria, a separate front in Santiago, led by Frank Paiz, and, of course, the rebels of the Sierra Maestra (Gebhard, 2015). The FLN drew the French Army into the mountains of Algeria while simultaneously operating in the Casbah area within Algiers and attacked European targets such as markets and night clubs (Horne, 1977/2006). EOKA utilized the streets of Nicosia and the mountainous area of Cyprus to attack British security forces while Archbishop Makarios III carried the message of enosis (Grivas, 1962). ZANU/ZAPU attacked the villages of white Rhodesians then slipped away into the countries of Zambia and Mozambique (Reid-Daly, 1999).

**Social**

In all the case studies, the host nation had a population, which was made up of different cultures, and norms that were unique to that area. The population was the center of gravity in each of the case studies. Whether the insurgents or host nation, whoever was seen as operating on behalf of the people, was the winner. In all the case studies, it only took a handful of individuals to start an insurgency. Each of these nations outside of Cyprus and Thailand was started from individuals who represented the true identity of the nation. Both Grivas and Makarios were Cypriots; therefore, there was a Cypriot face to EOKA (French, 2012). Utilizing Mao’s teaching, the insurgencies of M-26-7, EOKA,
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FLN, and ZANU/ZAPU were able to choose when, where, and how to fight because they had the support of the local population. The insurgencies consisting of the Huk’s, CPT, The Front, and FMLN constantly were on the defensive as host nations took the advantage away from the insurgent groups. The CPT was not made up of ordinary Thai citizens and did not understand the closeness of Thai society. This lack of understanding led Thai citizens to believe the Thai government fought for them (Moore, 2014).

In reviewing all eight case studies, propaganda was found to be an important component to insurgents and counterinsurgents. The military and insurgents utilized propaganda with the intent to sway the population to one’s side. In the Philippines, the Huks image was not representative of the Filipino people (Karnow, 1989). The U.S. broadcast pro-Magsaysay messages across the Philippine islands while also broadcasting messages to the Huks that they were losing the war (Karnow, 1989). In Cuba, Castro set up Radio Rebel, which helped spread the message that M-26-7 was fighting for the Cuban people (Patterson, 1995). Castro also was able to get journalists Robert Taber and Herbert Matthews in country; thus, strengthening the image of Castro while debunking the myth that Batista was defeated M-26-7 (Patterson, 1995). Continued military and economic aid to the Batista regime reinforced the message that U.S. supported the corrupt government of Batista (Patterson, 1995). When French troops engaged in torture, it further increased the negative view that Algerians had of France while also increasing the recruitment capability of the FLN (Horne, 1977/2006). When violence came to the streets of Paris, ordinary French citizens started to call for the right of self-determination of Algeria, as they felt the war had finally come home. Radio Beijing was established in
Thailand to announce the formation of the CPT (Moore, 2014). Through diplomatic efforts the Thai government was able to convince the Chinese to shut down Radio Beijing. American advisors helped the Thai government establish their radio broadcasts, showing the Thai people that the government was on their side (Moore, 2014). In Oman, British SAS established Radio Dhofar and started to drop leaflets in the Dhofar region explaining the medical and veterinary services that had been established (Peterson, 2008/2013). With Sultan Taimur claiming land for his private usage, Dhofaris’ were incensed by his actions, which led to a continued negative view of him by normal Dhofaris’ and increased recruitment into the Popular Front of Liberation (Peterson, 2008/2013). Athens Radio assisted with the recruitment of teenagers into EOKA and spread messages of torture by Turkish and British wardens (Jones, 1952).

Understanding British tactics, Grivas had EOKA members establish a rapport with journalists and editors to manipulate the communication of news to the Cyprus public (Jones, 1959). EOKA also distributed leaflets letting Greek Cypriots know EOKA was fighting for them and the vision of enosis (French, 2012). Grivas even used Makarios, the head of the Orthodox Church to spread his message. In El Salvador, Radio Cuscatlán helped spread the message of democracy to citizens (Lamborn, 2012). The image of a reformed El Salvadorian Armed Forces (ESAF) in regards to respect for human rights, portrayed an image that the ESAF was on the side of the people; thus a propaganda victory for the ESAF (Lamborn, 2012). Finally, the image of Ian Smith, not wanting to give up white minority rule, not only increased the image that ZANU/ZAPU was fighting for the majority African rule, but Britain refused to grant independence to
Rhodesia (Godwin & Hancock, 1993). This led to the Lancaster Meeting which the vote led to Robert Mugabe being elected President and ending the country of Rhodesia.

**Economic**

Hammes (2004) stated that insurgencies would be a prolonged conflict. Moore’s (2007) study of over 60 COIN campaigns took 10 years or longer. Most counterinsurgencies then will be a prolonged conflict and host nation governments will need to have the political will to stay the course. A review of the eight case studies shows that the mean of the eight insurgences was approximately 9 years. The longest was Thailand versus the CPT and the shortest was M-26-7 against the Batista regime. Even successful nations that succeeded against an insurgent started off the wrong way. The mistakes of using too heavy tactics and not understanding the grievances and addressing means the counterinsurgent will have to make up for lost time in order to defeat an insurgency. The counterinsurgents stand for the status quo, so in most cases starting off they are at a disadvantage (Lamborn, 2012). This was the case for Thailand, where campaigns for the people were undertaken, but military operations used heavy fire suppression and troops did not understand the human terrain of a village. The Philippines tried to defeat the insurgents militarily until Magsaysay was appointed Defense Minister and went on to become President. GOES was not able to take the offensive away from the FMLN until reforms were made including addressing human right abuses by the ESAF (Lamborn, 2012). Oman did not have success against the insurgents until the British government was able to convince the Sultan’s son to overthrow his father and
implement reforms for the people while making the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) more professional (Peterson, 2008/2013).

Land inequality and elitists was crucial factors in the insurgencies undertaken in the Philippines, Cuba, and El Salvador. They were a multiplying factor in the Thailand and Oman insurgencies. Because of the ruling minority governments in El Salvador, Algeria, and Rhodesia, insurgencies were formed in these host nations. Lamborn (2009) stated that the intent of an insurgency is to sap the morale and deplete resources of a counterinsurgent. This intent was apparent in all eight case studies and successful in the four nations, which were able to overthrow and replace the governments.

The Huk insurgents tried to attack the economy of Philippines but were never successful as reforms were enabled for the population and the Philippine Army was successful at protecting villages. The Philippine government made bank loans and capital available to peasants so that they could own their own land. Magsaysay was able to sap the will of Luis Taruc as Huk members defected in droves (Karnow, 1989).

The indiscriminate violence and force used by the Cuban security forces drove citizens to support M-26-7 since the military supported the Batista regime. Most foreign economic aid money went to the banks of Cuban government officials who used the money for their own personal wealth (Peterson, 1995). The U.S. support of the government started to become linked as U.S. aid helped maintain Batista in power. With Santa Clara falling to Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Batista knew his time was coming, lost the will to fight, and slipped out of the country at night (Peterson, 1995).
In Thailand, the CPT tried to attack villages, but the Royal Thai Government (RTG) knew from the beginning that a civil approach was needed, even if it started out wrong (Moore, 2014). Outside of Thammasat massacre, the CPT only operated in rural areas with minimal success (Moore, 2014). The RTG focused on building dams that could irrigate farmers’ crops and built roads so that these crops could be sold in markets (Lane, 1994). These roads allowed for farmers to sell not only in rural areas but make trips to urban areas such as Bangkok (Lane, 2014). The demise of the CPT came with reforms, Chinese support ceasing, and not understanding Thai society (Moore, 2014).

The National Liberation Front (FLN) drew French troops into mountains with quick attacks, while understanding that they would have to strike at pied-noirs in Algeria. The FLN would attack nightclubs, markets, and residences of pied-noirs. The FLN brought protests to the streets of Paris since there was a substantial Algerian presence. Able to split the opinion of French military officers, the Organization of the Secret Army (OAS) was formed and attacked Parisians in their hopes to convince the French government that Algeria was France’s (Batty, 2011). The actions of both the FLN and OAS sapped the will out of ordinary French citizens; thus, strengthening De Gaulle’s position of the right to self-determination for Algeria.

When Sultan Qaboos overthrew his father, he immediately set out on reforming the government. He opened up medical and veterinary clinics (Patterson, 2008/2013). Qaboos utilized military helicopters to transport Dhofaris and their cattle to markets. He built roads that could link other parts of Oman to the Dhofari region. It also allowed Dhofaris to travel to other areas of Oman and sell commodities (Patterson, 2008/2013).
With “true” reforms that benefited the Dhofari people and strategic and surgical tactical strikes, Oman was able to end the insurgency (Patterson, 2008/2013).

EOKA attacked British troops, British families, and Cypriots who were thought to be providing intelligence to British forces. 53% of all attacks against British took place in an urban area, mainly Nicosia (Markides, 1974). EOKA attacked restaurants where British and foreigners converged and one attack killed a CIA agent (Gup, 2000). With Britain losing the Suez Canal and a military stalemate in Cyprus, Britain no longer had the will to fight (Grivas, 1062). At the same time, the Turkish Republic realized that something was better than nothing, the Cypriot political leadership cut a deal that was satisfactory to Turkey and generous to Britain (Lapping & Perry, 1985). There was to be no union with Greece, and the U.K. could retain two leased bases; however, independence was granted nonetheless.

The FMLN attacked markets, Salvadoran infrastructure, and any other targets that were a symbol of the GOES. The FMLN was intent on showing the Salvadoran people that GOES was incapable of fixing their grievances (Lamborn, 2012). With the reforms made by the GOES and the ESAF, the GOES was able to sap the morale out of the insurgents and show them their cause was not worth fighting. The way to fixing any grievances the FMLN had was through the political process (Lamborn, 2012). Polling data showed that ordinary citizens had grown tired of the attacks and that the reforms were working (CIA, 1990). This was no more evident than the mass public support during the Presidential elections. GOES distributed land to over 39,000 former FMLN soldiers and campesinos after the peace treaty was signed (Cale, 1996). Furthermore, the
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economy grew after reforms had taken place. What was strictly an agriculturally based economy now had industrialization happening with increase in minimum wages (Gruson, 1990). Documents captured by the ESAF shows that the FMLN knew they lost war because they had lost support of the Salvadoran people (Lamborn, 2012).

Recommendations as a Result of This Study

Chapter Two attempted to establish a few important premises for the research based on observations about the intellectual history of counterinsurgency strategy. Those points can be summarized as follows: Insurgency has been the most dominant of any warfare, insurgency forms when there are grievances amongst the population, the population is the center of gravity for an insurgent or counterinsurgent, terror will be utilized by an insurgent, forces should be indigenous to the operating environment, intelligence can only be gathered when the population believes that people are fighting on their behalf, there will be many cultures associated within a host nation, any operating force must account for cultures and norms when planning military operations, and that insurgency will be a protracted conflict with the insurgent trying to sap the morale and resources of a host nation. The analysis presented in the study suggests these conclusions about the nature of how to effectively confront an insurgency in the future.

Political

This analysis suggests that governments fighting an insurgency must enact meaningful reforms to address grievances. The analysis also showed that an insurgency is established by grievances or perceived grievances in a host nation. Therefore, the people are the center-gravity for any COIN operation. Lamborn (2012) argued that “true”
reforms are most important for a counterinsurgent as it robs the insurgent of his greatest weapon, which is the support of the people. Some grievances can come from oppression, literacy rates, income disparity, hunger, unemployment, or land rights. Current data show the world’s population is increasing while becoming urbanized, littoralized, and connected through electronics (Kilcullen, 2013). This means that future world’s population will be crowded, urban, networked, and coastal. More people in urban areas will now be competing for employment opportunities and other resources. With increased populations fighting for limited or scarce resources, insurgencies could form for which a host nation might need assistance.

American stakeholders should see intuitively which governments are likely to be able to overcome insurgency through willingness to make “true” meaningful reforms. These governments deserve US military support if requested which can enable them the time and space necessary for those efforts. Counterinsurgency support to host nations that are unwilling to take the difficult steps towards improving themselves in the eyes of their people will almost always lose, regardless of how much support the U.S. might provide.

Military

The analysis suggests any COIN operation must be a civil-military approach versus strictly a military. When troops are committed, the human factor in the military operations will be the most important because the people are the center of gravity. Army personnel must be sent in as advisors and embedded into an indigenous force. These advisors should be kept small in number(s). The indigenous force must take the lead in operations and be seen as the face of any operation. This does not mean that U.S. military
personnel cannot or should not be sent into combat with an indigenous force. There is a need for embedded Army personnel to be sent into combat. An embedded advisory force, utilizing American enablers such as military intelligence, logistics, air power, and precision weapons, could bring about a combat force multiplier on the battlefield against an insurgency. These missions would be to accompany, advise, and assist. The operations would still have to have a local face.

A key component for the military will be to accept defectors into the fight against any insurgent group. Leaders must be actively engaged with an insurgent group as well. There are moderates in an insurgency and it could be negotiated that they put down arms and join the political process, even if they have blood on their hands. Daniel Marston (2008) argued an insurgent could be the enemy one-day and the solution the next. Leaders of an insurgent group that would not negotiate or put down arms then can be dealt with tactically. Propaganda is important as it can assist in winning over the population while showing the insurgent force that it is not in their interest in taking up arms. Propaganda is a psychological component that can lead to better intelligence. Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple audiences.

**Social**

The analysis also determined the human terrain in counterinsurgency operations is as difficult and as important as the physical terrain. Instead of exclusively focusing on science, engineering, and mathematics, the U.S. Army could put more emphasis on the language, cultural understanding, and societies. Lamborn (2012) argued that an insurgency is a social war made up of different religions, ethnicities, and groups. Because
each insurgency will be different, the U.S. military will need to have a force capable of
understanding the cultures and norms of each host nation. Thus, the military needs to
understand “Who Lives There”. Any COIN force must be seen as operating on behalf of
the local populace, or any deployment would be done so in vain. American troops can
support the people while not supporting the ruling government. American Army
personnel will need to promote social progress and bring about “true” social change if
needed. Successful insurgents usually require external support. Mobility and dispersal are
essential to the insurgent survival.

Economic

The analysis found the stability of a government depends on its effectiveness of
politics but also on economic development. Many nations that suffer from social-
economic conditions are ripe for instability. Soldiers will need to take notice of any
distribution of wealth. Traditional conventional military resources will not be accessible
in the future operating environments. Any COIN operation will be a protracted war and
the American people must have the will to stay the course, however long it might be.
Army troops will need to be aware of the politics affecting the people living in locations.

Conclusion

As the U.S. ends the war in Afghanistan, it is forced to ask itself one question. What
comes next? The findings of this analysis and how it applies to future conflicts can assist
stakeholders in answering this question. The central findings of this research and how it
relates to future conflicts are:
WHO LIVES THERE: THE ROLE OF EMBEDDED TROOPS IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

• U.S. Army is more likely to confront a non-state actor such as an insurgent than a conventional nation state actor
• Host nations fighting against insurgents must enact meaningful political reforms to address any grievances or perceived grievances of a local population
• Insurgency has its roots in the people; therefore, the population is the center of gravity
• Counterinsurgency operations will be difficult and protracted
• Imperative the Army retains a counterinsurgency capable force
• Military action is not sufficient to win, capacity-building is required
• A civil-military approach is needed over strictly military direct action approach
• Army personnel will be embedded into indigenous forces
• Indigenous forces must take the lead in operations, giving any operation a local face while establishing security and governance
• Army personnel will accompany, advise, and assist
• Army personnel must understand the social network analysis and composition of an insurgency
• The chief weapons against an insurgent will be intelligence, counterintelligence, political warfare and passive resistance
Propaganda must be continuous and coherent while reaching a specified target audience.

Moderates within an insurgency can be communicated with in hopes of defecting to the host nation side.

Dr. John Nagl (2015) argued that counterinsurgency is the graduate level of warfare. The military knows how to wage conventional war but has trouble focusing on the integration of economic development, understanding cultures, and understanding tribal dynamics. Trying to integrate all these skillsets is what makes counterinsurgency the graduate level of war. It seems apparent that some senior military leaders and policyholders have an “allergy” to counterinsurgency operations. This view though is contrary to the kind of warfare that our military force is most likely to engage in. Imagine if a football team only prepared for a passing game and not a run game or defense. This is the mindset of some military stakeholders. This mindset does not mean there is no need for readiness against a conventional nation state. Rather that the military needs to be ready for what it is most likely to confront while still maintaining conventional force ready for state actors. When leaders and policy makers are going to commit America’s sons and daughters to a war, then policy should not be flawed and the appropriate military strategy should be employed.

**Recommendations for Further Research**

I found additional topics to be interesting as I conducted this research: This study suggests that any counterinsurgency operation will be protracted and that understanding the human terrain is important for Army personnel. With insurgencies the dominant form
of warfare, I contend the Army will rely more heavily on its Guard and Reserve forces. Should the Guard and Reserve forces be reshaped focusing on specific countries? A Guardsman from Kansas understands how to grow wheat in cold climate; therefore, what could they teach other countries? A police officer serving one weekend a month understands the importance of community policing, which would be a great asset in a counterinsurgency campaign.

Nagl (2015) asserted that it takes up to two years to truly understand a social environment. Because understanding a society will take time, should the Army reconsider how it deploys its soldiers? Currently, the Army will deploy brigades, platoons, and battalions to a conflict, replacing other units. An entire unit leaves, meaning that one has lost important lessons. Could the Army go to stagnant deployments by individuals therefore saving experience and further supporting a local populace?

Information used in intelligence dossiers before the Iraq War was taken in part from individuals who lived outside of Iraq. Some of these individuals such as Ahmad Chalabi, Aya Allawi, and Ibrahim Al Jaffari had been removed or exiled for up to 30 years (Gordon & Trainor, 2013). These individuals were far removed from the realities of everyday Iraqis and therefore could not have known “who lived there”. These individuals might have had their own political agenda as well (Gordon & Trainer, 2013). Therefore, the question arises how could the United States utilize better human intelligence (HUMINT) when troops are going to be deployed in an insurgent environment? Chapter One started off with a quote from Frederick W. Lewis, which stated, “the time to win a war is before it begins”. If this is true and an insurgency starts with grievances amongst
the local population, then one will need to research what countries might be susceptible to an insurgency forming. This analysis would also certainly benefit from inclusion of more case studies. Small numbers of case studies inevitably can constrain the process of generalizing insights to draw conclusions and derive recommendations for policy and strategy. I will be looking at these questions in future research.
References


Lomax, L. (1967). *Thailand: the war that is, the war that will be*. New York, NY. Random House Publishing.


