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LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD

BY

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The study in the following pages represents an attempt to recount in a relatively small space the story of the relations between the United States and the Latin American countries during the crucial period of the American Civil War.

Since many works shelve the Latin-American relations during the Civil War period, it was of particular interest to the writer to delve into sources which would reveal any such relations and the policy underlying them in those critical years between 1861 and 1866. The greater portion of this study centers around our Mexican relations. Mexico, because of the "three-great-European power" interest in it, presented the major problems at the time.

In the preparation of this work the writer is especially grateful to Dr. P. Raymond Nielson, department adviser, whose course in "Latin America and the United States," opened up countless avenues of interest in our southern neighbors. His helpful suggestions and guidance in the preparation of this work lightened the task considerably.
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CHAPTER I

AMERICAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS ASSUME
A DUAL ASPECT

The Confederates worked untiringly in order to get the Juarez government to recognize the government of the Confederacy and to insure its assistance against the Union, and to prevent any possible alliance with the North. The Federals, on the other hand, tried to win the friendship of the Juarez government to prevent it from recognizing the Confederate government and to forestall the recognition of the same government by the European Powers.

Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederacy, entrusted the difficult task of accomplishing the aim of this contest to J. T. Pickett who was well suited for the position. Although he was overbearing, sharp-tongued, trouble hunting, he possessed a certain forceful energetic and fearless attitude which enabled him to size up the drift of events rather successfully. Pickett had also served as the United States consul at Vera Cruz, and while serving in that capacity, he learned a great deal about the party factions then prevalent in Mexico, and was able to judge as to which party affiliations would be most advantageous to the Southern Cause. Since the Liberal factions headed by Juarez had proposed to cede Lower California to the United States
to pay off the debts of Mexico and head off European intervention, Pickett decided that it was imperative to work toward securing the goodwill and recognition of that government.

While the South was a part of the Union, Pickett was an ardent advocate of the annexation of Mexico to the United States. After secession he favored getting Mexico for the South and in that way offsetting the plans of the Union government to acquire any Mexican territories.

Robert Toombs, the Secretary of State of the Confederacy, issued a note of instructions to the new appointee. He urged Pickett to proceed cautiously, but persistently to sound out the members of the Juarez government on the possibility of an alliance. He was to explain that the South had seceded from the Union on just cause and to suggest a treaty of closer friendship. He pointed out that the Confederacy and Mexico had very much in common which should conduce to such friendship. He stated:

The people both of the Confederate States and Mexico are principally engaged in agriculture and mining pursuits and their interests are therefore homogeneous. The

1. Frank Lawrence Owsley, *King Cotton Diplomacy* (Chicago: The University Press of Chicago, 1931), 95.

2. Ibid., 95

institution of slavery in the one country and that of peonage in the other, establish between them such similarity in their system of labor as to prevent any tendency on either side to disregard the feelings and interests of the other. In fact, it was to be urged that Confederate friendship was essential to Mexico because the Confederacy was the only country in a position to guarantee Mexico against foreign invasion.  

He was further instructed to intercept any plans or designs of the United States minister, Corwin, or others to obtain special favors or concessions in Mexico. He was to watch the proceedings of Corwin very closely, and to prevent the Mexican government from taking any step at his suggestion which would be prejudicial to the interests of the Confederate States, and give them just cause for interrupting those relations which it was their desire to keep and improve with time. In establishing diplomatic relations and drawing up treaties and watching the United States minister in order to prevent his obtaining unfair advantages, Pickett was warned not to insist upon formal recognition of the Confederacy unless the Juárez government was ready for it. In other words informal, confidential relations were sufficient. Pickett was given authority to grant letters of marque and reprisal to any of the trustworthy Mexican merchants, and he was to obtain the privilege from the Mexican government of allowing the prises

4. Owsey, op. cit., 94.

5. Ibid., 96.
captured by these privateers to be brought to the Mexican ports for adjudication.

While these instructions were prepared for him, he formulated a set of his own instructions which he submitted to the State Department for approval. Strangely enough these were stamped with favor, and later on proved a stumbling block in his negotiations to secure the goodwill of the Mexican government. He stated in one of these notes that money was an essential factor in getting the Mexican government to recognize the Confederacy.

Pickett set out on his mission with that daring boldness which was so characteristic of him. As soon as he arrived in Vera Cruz, he made contacts with many of his old friends and acquaintances in order to get their reactions to the situation he had to tackle. He assured men like Mata, a very close friend of Juarez, of the friendship that was harbored toward the Mexican people by his fellow secessionists. He figured that an alliance with men like Mata and De la Lave would insure a quick response from the Juarez regime.

Pickett was received by the Mexican government in July, 1861. Foreign Minister Zamacona had, through the offices of

John S. Grippo of South Carolina, granted an interview of confidential, private nature to Pickett. Pickett delivered his credentials and his instructions to Zamacona, and the latter assured him of the friendship and neutrality of the Juarez government.

His arrival in Mexico was not very praiseworthy as his own correspondence to Toombs revealed. He looked with contempt on the Mexicans and usually answered their inquiries with a certain air of disdain. Such remarks did not escape the notice of Corwin and the Juarez government. In his earlier correspondence Pickett revealed his real intentions in the interest in Mexico. In writing to a prominent statesman in the South he said:

I do not deem it necessary to do more than to allude in this hasty note to the immense advantages to accrue to the Confederate States in the future from the boundless agricultural and mineral resources of Mexico, as well as, the possession of the invaluable inter-oceanic transit of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Southward is our destiny and we may not look in vain upon the potent designs of our enemies in that quarter. 7

Other military officials of the Confederacy assumed an air of boldness in expressing their views after Pickett had made the initial step. Communications began to pour into the Confederate state department assuring it that the cause of the South was receiving special attention in certain parts of Mexico.

Practically all of the writers insisted that the neighbors to the
South would improve steadily under the Confederate influence.
The following note written to John R. Reagan, a member of Davis's
cabinet, was typical of most of the others:

We must have Sonora and Chihuahua. With Sonora and
Chihuahua we gain Southern California, and by railroad
to the Guaymas render our state of Texas the great high-
way of nations. You are at liberty to lay this note, if
you see fit before President Davis.

Jefferson Davis, however, was not quick to take
immediate action, because he, as well as other influential
leaders of the Confederacy, realized that everything possible
must be done to insure internal success first. Added territory
would only mean added obligations. On a number of occasions when
the Mexican governor had appealed for aid in time of border raids,
Davis had to refuse aid. But, on the other hand, that did not
mean that the Confederates were not doing all in their power to
win the goodwill of the Mexican government. It was essential that
they should because Mexico served as a medium of trade between
European countries and the Confederate States.

From all appearances Pickett was the man who was the
least capable in establishing any such friendly relations. In
his earlier communications with Zamacona, foreign minister in

8. Ibid., 231
Mexico, he made some blustering statements as to the possibility of employing large Confederate armies in order to prevent the Mexican government from giving the rumored aid to the United States government. The tone of his threats, however, changed by September 1861. He attempted at this late date to convince Zamacona and the Mexican government that the Confederacy had no aggressive designs as far as Mexico was concerned. In order to emphasize his avowals he stated that the Confederacy had more land than it would need in a hundred years that "So far from desiring to acquire any portion of the lands of the Mexican neighbors, the undersigned would be happy to receive and transmit to Richmond proposals for the retrocession to Mexico of a large portion of the territory hitherto acquired from her by the late United States." This quick turn of attitude toward the Mexican government on the part of Pickett did not dispel the suspicions that his former conduct had aroused.

It did not take long and Pickett began to conduct himself in a very disgraceful manner. He sought out places where Americans and American sympathizers frequented in order to insult them if they said derogatory things about the Confederacy. After giving one of the Americans a good beating on one occasion he was

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imprisoned, and kept there for thirty days. He obtained his release by bribing the judge and various other members of the government.

On December 51, 1881 while on his way out of Mexico, not as a diplomat but as disturber of peace, he wrote another dispatch urging more forcefully than ever that the Confederacy seize Mexican territory before the European allies got it. He went on to describe the lot of these unfortunate people so incompetent in the ways of self-government.

Sadly disappointed with Pickett's inability to cope with the Juárez regime, the Confederate authorities recalled him to Richmond. He had entered into negotiations in a confidential way, but he did not win the friendship or even the neutrality of the Juárez government.

This failure, as we have seen, was due to the Mexican suspicion of the South caused by his lack of diplomatic tact and skill.

Other factors that had contributed far more to his failure were the interception of private notes and dispatches to the Confederate government, and the diplomacy and propaganda of the United States through its minister, Corwin and his agents.

The duplicate and triplicate dispatches that Pickett was sending to the Confederate government by way of Matamoras were withheld. Only when he received a communication from Richmond that no news of his work had reached the Confederate government did he suspect the Mexican post-office of tampering with his mail. When he left his post in Mexico, he stopped at Matamoras and questioned the acting governor of Tamaulipas with reference to the letters that were sent out through the Mexican post-office. The Governor admitted frankly that all the letters that bore the slightest appearance of being official were held up and listed and the list forwarded to the Juárez government, and the letters themselves were sent if the government requested them. What was worse, these dispatches were turned over to Corain or sent direct to Washington after Juárez finished them. So while Pickett was saying such uncomplimentary things about Mexico and its inability to govern itself, and urging his government to seize the border states to fulfill manifest destiny or prevent their annexation by the United States, and expressing his allegiance and goodwill to the Mexican government, Zamacona and Juárez, also attesting their undying friendship for the Confederacy, were actually reading the dispatches intended only for the Confederate government.\textsuperscript{11} Pickett

\textsuperscript{11} Owsley, op. cit., 108.
was very much chagrined at this disclosure, and hastened to right the matter in part by having the dispatches reprinted in New Orleans and sent to the Confederate state department. The man, who had shown such great interest in executing his orders turned out to be a spy, and the dispatches intended for the Confederacy were sent to the United States state department.

Just as unsuccessful as the ventures of the Confederate diplomat turned out in dealing with the Juarez regime, just so hopeful they appeared in the border states. This time the Confederates were intent on obtaining three things, namely, arms and supplies, the extradition of criminals and deserters, and the nullification of the privilege of the United States to transport troops over Mexican territory.

The border states, on the other hand, were very cautious of incurring the displeasure of the Confederacy for several reasons. These states could sell their heretofore unsalable products to the Confederacy at an enormous price, whereas they could not sell to the United States. These same states could act as the medium through which European goods could be carried into the Confederacy or cotton carried out of the Confederacy, and they could levy exorbitant tariffs going and coming, and also act as the middleman for these goods.


The man who exerted the most influence in northern Mexico was Santiago Viduarri. He was the governor of Nuevo Leon, and he was very successful in wielding Nuevo Leon and Coahuila together.

In the early stages of the Civil War, Viduarri was nominally a supporter of Juarez, but his ambition to establish a kingdom of his own in Northern Mexico, caused him to deviate from the path marked out by the Juarez government. Naturally his course of action tended to bring about a complete estrangement from the Mexican leader.

Davis sent several agents to the border states of Mexico to reside there permanently. The most important of these was Juan A. Quintero, a native of Cuba and a citizen of the Confederacy. He received specific instructions to interview Viduarri because he knew him personally, and to demand that all be done in his power to stop any border raids and the possibility of any Union victories in these quarters.

In answer to the charge that expeditions were being fitted out against Texas, he assured Quintero that there was no foundation for such a report, and that he was actuated by friendly feelings toward the Confederates. When Quintero returned to Richmond with these assurances of goodwill, Viduarri was looked upon as a great friend of the Confederate cause. Without further questioning, Quintero was instructed to induce Viduarri to stop further
transportation of United States munitions and troops across the Mexican border. Quintero spent three quite successful years at the capital of Nuevo Leon, during which time he was at liberty to purchase lead, sulphur, copper and other materials vital to the South.

In the meantime, Viduarri was working with might and main to win the Mexican confidence and friendship for the Southern cause with the result that he was incurring the ever-mounting antagonism of the Juarez government. A decree from the Juarez government weakened Viduarri's position so completely that his followers deserted him and he was forced to flee to Texas in order to escape the displeasure of the Juarez government.

Border raids did not subside, but received new impetus under the leadership of such chieftains as Juan H. Cortina, Albino Lopes, Manuel Ruiz and Jose Marua Carvajal. In fact riots and minor uprisings became more frequent. General Bee, who knew the weaknesses and differences of the Mexican Union was assigned to the task of putting down these raids. The Confederate leaders also felt that while seeking cordial and profitable relations with the officials of the frontier Mexican States, it was just as necessary

15. Ibid., 71.
to make definite appeals to the French party in Mexico. General Bee, being at the helm now, sent Superviegle as the special envoy to impress the French Consul with the advantages that would accrue to them as a result of an alliance with the South.

All looked well, and even very promising, until major victories of the North were reported. Then, the French very definitely decided to refrain from taking the position of Matamoras, a city that the Confederates were waiting to seize because of its importance to the United States government. In one of his earlier dispatches to Seward, Corwin warned the secretary of the state in the following terms:

Keep an eye on those consuls who may have had secessionist associations of one kind or another before. Only consuls of the highest recommendations should be placed at the post of Matamoras on the Rio Grande because of its strategic importance, and the probable attack by the rebels.16

The Secretary of State had little need to worry about the matter, however, after the taking of Brownsville and Vicksburg by the North because the French could not in the least be persuaded to cast their lot with the Confederates. Even when the new agent, Preston, appeared at the imperial court to open negotiations, the new Emperor was in no way disposed to open official relations with

the Confederacy, and so Preston was recalled.\(^{17}\)

One would think that the failure of the Southerners to secure any help in Mexico and elsewhere would have daunted their spirits, but nothing of the kind seemed to be the result. As a final stratagem renowned filibusterers continued to exert their influence. George Bickley won much popular support in the South for his filibustering organizations designed outwardly to win the friendship of the Mexican government, but inwardly intent on extending southern territory. Probably work like that of Bickley and his followers would have met with greater success had not their real intention been made known in Washington. Official dispatches poured into the State Department which reiterated the sentiments of most Southerners who happened to come under their influence. Practically all of them ran in the same tone as the one submitted by James H. Holmes of the State of New Mexico. The rebel General Sibley issued a proclamation in which he expressed views that were harbored by his fellow Confederates at the time of the greatest activity along the border states. He stated:

A wicked war is waged by the United States for the subjugation and oppression of the Confederates by force of arms and by the perpetration of other cruelties. If

Union Forces are free to fight in order to secure greater power, why must the Confederate States be criticised for their eagerness to procure the added territory. 18

In the same communication he made various misrepresentations in order to advance his own cause. Evidently, these selfish and personal declarations made rather carelessly at times, tended to fire the ever-growing animosity of the Mexican government instead of the friendships that the Confederate diplomats and leaders set out to acquire.

The annexationist and filibustering schemes begun before the War of Secession and extending throughout the war were prompted by two motives. The one was the extension of slave territory, the other was to secure by the occupation of strong strategic positions, undisputed control over any routes which might be opened in the future and regulate commerce and trade in case of the Confederate victory. While the rash methods of Southern statesmen, diplomats, and filibusterers destroyed any hopes of a Confederate-Mexican alliance, Northern statesmen and diplomats tended to achieve their purposes in Mexico.

The Lincoln administration placed the task of counteracting Confederate plans into the hands of Thomas Corwin who was well

fitted for the post. He was a champion of Mexican rights since he
was opposed to the war with Mexico. His appointment was not only
a fine counter irritant for the Southern diplomatic agents but an
excellent antidote for the generally bad impression held in Mexico
of Seward whose expansionist ideas were even greater than those of
Pickett or Davis or any Confederate, for he included not only
Mexico but also Canada in his wild dreams of "Greater America."

Seward's instruction to Corwin emphasized the exercise of
greatest vigilance in regard to all the Confederate schemes in
Mexico, including Mexican recognition - neutrality, or annexation
of Mexican territory, or any other move that would in any way
benefit the Confederate States. The work of Corwin, then, would
consist primarily in proving American friendship and Confederate
enmity. If Mexico could be convinced of the danger lying in
the Confederate success, then it would be easy to convince its
government of doing nothing which would aid the Confederacy.

When Corwin arrived in Mexico, he found many of the rumors
of Southern aggression afloat in Mexico. He set to work at once
to make friendly assurances to the Mexican government, and in his

first communication states:

That the president . . . is fully satisfied that safety, welfare and happiness of Mexico would be more effectually promoted by its complete integrity and independence than by dismemberment with transfer or diminution of its sovereignty, even though thereby a portion or the whole country or its sovereignty should be transferred to the United States.21

Among other things, Corwin was directed not to press for a settlement of claims against Mexico, but to impress upon the Mexican statesmen the idea that the struggle which the United States was then waging for the integrity of a republican nation was of great concern to every American statesman, since they were all trying out the republican concern. He advocated a "friend-in-need policy," namely, to be friends as well as neighbors to give the necessary help when the need becomes imperative.22

All seemed promising until Seward issued another set of instructions to Corwin in which he wanted him to get the necessary consent of Mexico to allow United States forces to intervene in case Mexico needed help, and to reassure the government that we had no desire of acquiring any of their territory, however, he felt that Mexico should be apprized of the fact that we should be willing to purchase Lower California in preference to seeing it

22. Rippy, op. cit., 225.
fall into the hands of the insurrectionary party either by purchase or conquest. The results of the battle of Bull Run tended to change Seward's attitude. This change is seen in his instruction to Corwin with reference to the defiant manifesto which La Reintrie had issued on Jan. 29, 1861. In this connection Seward writes:

I am very sure that this government cherishes the actual independence of Mexico as a cardinal object to the exclusion of all foreign political intervention . . . yet the present moment does seem to me an opportune one for formal assurances of the policy of foreign nations. Prudence requires that in order to surmount the evils of faction at home we should not unnecessarily provoke debates with foreign countries but rather repair as speedily as possible the prestige which these evils have impaired.23

By the time Pickett had arrived in Mexico City, Corwin and Seward seemed to have been very successful in convincing the Juarez government of the goodwill of the United States and the evil designs of the Confederacy.24

Corwin and Seward succeeded in checkmating Confederate diplomacy by obtaining the privilege of marching their troops across Sonora from California to Arizona. The action of the Mexican Congress on this question convinced them that the Juarez government was on the side of the United States to stay.25

23. As quoted in Rippy, The United States and Mexico, 255.
24. Callahan, op. cit., 211.
The most effective work done by Seward to outdo Southern diplomacy and intrigue in Mexico was the effort he made to induce United States to lend first nine, and later eleven, million dollars. Pickett had urged the Confederate Secretary of State that a million dollars would purchase recognition from the Mexican government. Corwin, therefore, used the same means for the purpose of defeating Confederate designs in Mexico, preventing Confederate recognition, and partly to forestall European intervention in Mexico.

Corwin was authorized to negotiate a treaty providing for the assumption by the United States of the payment of the interest at the three per cent upon the funded debt of Mexico (the principal of which was about $62,000,000) for the period of five years from the date of the decree of the Mexican government suspending such payment:

... provided that the government of Mexico will pledge to the United States its faith for the reimbursements of the money so to be paid with six per cent interest thereon, to be secured by a specific lien upon all the public lands and mineral rights in several states of Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora and Sinaloa, the property so pledged to become absolute in the United States at the expiration of the term of six years from the time when the treaty shall go into effect, if 25 such reimbursements shall not have been made before that time.

Seward decided that the treaty was to be ratified only after Dayton and Adams had sounded out the French and English on the subject because he did not intend to waste money if those
powers intended to intervene.

Both England and France answered that they would not agree to refrain from intervention, and France insisted that she wanted the principal not the interest.

On November 6, 1861, Dayton notified Seward that the question was closed. Lord Lyons declared that it would be better for the United States to join Great Britain and France in a course of action. The objectives and limits of any such joint action were to be clearly outlined before hand.

Corwin, however, was instructed to complete his treaty and forward it. Seward thought that the United States might act favorably. He cast all his influence to get support as far as the project was concerned. He was aided by Matias Romero, the Mexican Minister at Washington, who formed contacts with the most influential men in Washington. Through Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster General, he obtained knowledge of what was going on in the cabinet; he was a close friend of Charles Sumner, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate, and through these associations, gained considerable knowledge and experience.


27. Ibid., 205.
of the democratic ideals. Toward the end of 1861 and the beginning of 1862 he carried on an active propaganda in newspapers and periodicals in order to win the United States to the Mexican cause. Many of the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations rallied to his views on the Mexican question.

When the resolution endorsing the loan was brought to the floor, the Senate rejected it. In answer to the successive messages of the President, the members of the Senate Chamber passed a resolution, February 25, 1862, declaring the opinion "that it is not advisable to negotiate a treaty that will require the United States to assume any portion of the principal or interest of the debt of Mexico, or that will require the concurrence of the European powers."

It is not the purpose to give a full account of Corwin's treaty with all its ramifications, but merely in a general way, to show its effectiveness in winning Mexican friendship. Though aimed at Europe, it had the results of aiding greatly in turning the Juarez government against the South. The promise of the

eleven-million-dollar loan and accompanying Federal protection practically drummed Pickett out of Mexico. No doubt it was Corwin who was instrumental in bringing about Pickett's difficulties with Mexican authorities, including his long term in jail and threat of assassination. Corwin also induced Juárez to issue orders to the border leaders to stop communications with the Confederacy.

After a year and a half of successful propaganda Corwin was able to write to Seward:

Mexico, or rather the thinking men of Mexico, look upon our struggle with as deep and absorbing interest as that which they feel in regard to their own impending conflict. They seem to entertain a sad and profound conviction that our failure will be the doom of free government everywhere on the earth.31

31. As quoted in Osley, op. cit., 119.
CHAPTER II

SEWARD FACES THE "TRIPARTITE SITUATION"

The senate's refusal to ratify the loan treaty brought Seward face to face with the three European powers. France, England, and Spain determined to intervene in Mexico in order to collect the obligations recklessly contracted by the various revolutionary leaders who had been recognized as constituting the government of Mexico.

The United States fully realized that the powers had a perfect right to make demands because they knew the nature of these grievances. Those of the British were based on the non-settlement of claims of British bondholders; the British consul's murder at Tasto; the breaking into the British legation and the carrying off of $152,000 in bonds belonging to the British subjects; besides numerous other outrages committed on the persons and property of individuals. At an earlier date an agreement had been signed to pay the interest on the consolidated, and also on the sinking bonds. Spanish claims were similar and considered perfectly legitimate.

The French claims were quite different in character from those mentioned above. During the reign of Miramon by a loan negotiated through Jecker, a Swiss banker, $750,000 were to be
raised through the issue of bonds with face value of $15,000,000.
These bonds fell into the hands of Jucker's French creditors, friends of Napoleon, who demanded the repayment of twenty times 1 the original sum advanced.

The three powers met in London, October 31, 1861 to discuss the state of affairs in Mexico, and concluded that armed inter-
vention was necessary in order to collect their claims. The preamble of the convention stated:

That the three contracting parties being placed by the arbitrary and vexatious conduct of the authorities of the republic of Mexico under the necessity of exacting from these authorities a more efficient protection for their subjects, as well as, the performance of the obligations contracted toward them by the republic of Mexico, have arranged a convention between each other for the purpose of combining their common action.2

Since the powers recognised that the United States also had claims, they decided to ask her to be a partner to the agreement. England and France urged the cooperation of the United States, whereas, Spain opposed it. In compliance with the fourth article of the agreement, the convention was submitted to the government of the United States by a note dated November 30, 1861,

2. As quoted in Latane', op. cit., 203.
and signed by the representatives of Spain, France and Great Britain at Washington.

On December 4, Seward rejected the invitation, stating that it was unwise and unprofitable to seek satisfaction at a time of general unrest; and it was his desire to maintain the goodwill of Mexico.

Very emphatically, he made it clear from the very beginning of the complications that the United States had a deep interest in Mexico, and that no change should take place which would infringe on the right of the Mexican people to select their own form of government.

Although article two of the aforementioned agreement provided that the contracting parties would bind themselves not to seek any acquisition of territory or any other advantage and not to undermine the freedom of the Mexicans in their choice of government, Seward would not relent in his policy of safeguarding a neighbor's welfare or its common good.

5. Ibid., 205


Seward outlined his policy very clearly in a circular to the legations of the United States at the close of the first year of Lincoln's administration. In it he stated:

The President has relied on the assurance given his government by the Allies that they were in pursuit of no political object, but simply the redress of grievances. He entertained no doubt of the sincerity of the Allies and of his confidence in their goodwill and their faith, which, if it would be disturbed, it would be restored by the frank explanations given by them that the governments of Spain, France and Great Britain had no intention of interfering to procure a change in the constitutional form of government now existing in Mexico or any political change which should be in opposition to the Mexican people.

Nevertheless, the President regards it his duty to express to the Allies in all candour that a monarchical government established in Mexico has no form of security or permanence; in the second place, that the instability of such monarchy would be enhanced if the throne were assigned to a person alien to Mexico, but in these circumstances the new government would constantly continue to fall unless sustained by European alliances, which would be practically the beginning of a permanent policy of armed intervention by monarchical Europe, and at once injurious and inimical to the system of the government generally adopted by the American continent.

These views are based upon the knowledge and ideas of the opinions and political habits of American society. There can be no doubt in this matter of the moment that the permanent interests and sympathies of our country would be on the side of the other American Republics. We must not be understood as predicting on this occasion the course of events which may ensue both in America and in Europe, from the steps which are contemplated. It is enough to say that in the opinion of the President the emancipation of the American continent from the control of Europe has been the principal characteristic of the past century. It is not probable that a revolution in the opposite direction can succeed in an age which follows
this period, and which while the population of America increases so rapidly, while its resources develop in the same proportion, and while society forms itself so uniformly to the principles of the American democratic government . . . ?

Many at the time criticized Seward's conciliatory attitude during a crisis when so much was at stake for our own government and the country at large. Being a statesman, well acquainted with foreign relations and alliances of the past, he knew the great weaknesses within our own borders. To offer the necessary assistance would have been an invitation to the other powers to attack the integrity of our own country.

Probably nothing was more misunderstood in Mexico than the attitude of Seward and Lincoln. Much of this confusion can be attributed to Matías Romero, the Mexican minister in Washington. In his communications to Seward, Romero expressed his continual misgivings as to the course that might be taken by the discontented groups in Mexico. He made allusions to certain factions that were ready to reach out to foreign lands for help in government after having endured all the years of suffering under reckless and tyrannical leaders. The attempt to effect Juárez's resignation proved futile and his enemies were the ones who looked to France for a ruler to restore peace and order.


A few days after the conclusion of the treaty of London, he expressed his forebodings as to the real intentions of the Allies, and pleaded for clear and definite assurance of aid from the United States.

Seward's action was motivated by what he inferred from the intentions of the three great powers of Great Britain, France and Spain. Being very sympathetic at first, they watched for the opportunity to recognize the Confederacy should the Union government send any aid to the Mexican government. That possibility prompted Seward to tell Romero that the United States could not give any aid until the war was over. He promised that assistance would be given as soon as the Union cause would be certain of victory. But, such an assurance only tended to infuriate our youthful Mexican Minister and he made another appeal, and this time to the men in the Senate. Blair and Sumner, however, stood by the policy of Lincoln and Seward. Whereupon, Romero, totally enraged regarded the whole Republican party as Mexico's greatest enemies, capable of any felonious assault upon her liberties.

The invitation extended by the Allies to the United States to join the tripartite intervention arrested Romero's attention.


11. Ibid., 250.
so that his wrath cooled somewhat in the suspense that followed. The invitation was nothing but a transparent diplomatic gesture, which no one, and least of all the framers of it expected the American government to accept. Romero was eager to get Seward's answer to the invitation; so he importuned Seward for his reaction. Seward was silent and declined to commit himself as to the course that the Union government might follow. Romero regarded this silence as an indication of Seward's lack of interest in the Mexican plight.

Viewed fairly, Seward pursued the only course that could have been followed at the time of such internal strife and domestic peril. His reply to the Allies in which he expressed his faith in their unselfish protection encouraged them to make bolder moves from now on.

Of the three contracting parties Spain showed herself the most aggressive. Her fleet was the first to arrive at Vera Cruz and to seize the port as a pledge in a demand for the payment of debts. Corwin, realizing, the seriousness of the situation and still hoping to obtain permission to make the loan, was anxious to know whether the American policy was to join the three powers.

against Mexico. Fearing that Spain might start her program of reconquests in Central America, he urged Seward to call a special Latin American Congress of delegates from every South American republic in order to make immediate preparations to meet the French and Spanish in their initial inroads into Mexico.

Corwin believed that Spain, by her action, entertained the hope of preventing any peaceful adjustment between Mexico and any of the three powers, and that France and England, especially the latter wanted to extort from Mexico treaties conformable to their own ideas of justice. A unified Latin American demonstration, therefore, seemed the most timely move to stop Spain’s probable reconquest of her lost colonies.

The fact that the Spaniards had visions of establishing a Spanish Kingdom in this hemisphere was made known quite clearly after the London Convention. Their hopes were echoed in the press of the day, one of which made sarcastic allusions to the anarchical character of the Monroe Doctrine. The real cause of the trouble for Spain occurred, however, within its own ranks where a division of opinion divided her efforts into two camps, each trying to achieve its own purposes. Happily for Mexico, this resulted in the failure
of any Spanish achievements in Mexico.14

France was the one great power who did not wish to
relinquish her dream of a future monarchial position in Mexico.

Great Britain would be the only one of the trio that
could be acquitted of any ulterior motives. This was garnered
from the fact that she was willing to see the United States a
partner to the enterprise. Later, it was she, too, who tried to
dissuade France from establishing a new form of government in the
Mexican Republic.15

On February 19, 1868, at Soledad, the ministers of Spain,
Great Britain and France signed with the Secretary of State of
the Juarez government a preliminary convention recognizing the
government and disclaiming all designs against the sovereignty
and the integrity of the Mexican republic, and agreeing to negotiate
at Orizaba a settlement of their claims.16

Corwin followed all the proceedings at Orizaba with an
air of fear for the United States. He believed that if she did
not give the necessary aid in the form of a loan, she would be the
loser in the end. The Allies might take the public lands as
security, and thus deprive the United States of any security for

15. Ibid., 116.
the loan. The Convention drafted at Orizaba proved of short duration because the Allies did not agree among themselves.

At Orizaba the French proposed pushing further into Mexico and seizing the government. The British and Spanish were opposed and the conference broke up. When the three powers had signed the treaty of London, they had not agreed on a plan of coercion the Mexican government, had no plan for securing reparations and the French had apparently signed with mental reservations.

The immediate cause of the rupture and withdrawal from the convention of London was the protection extended by the French agents to General Almonte, Padre Miranda, and other leading men of the reactionary or church party. These men had been banished from their country and now maintained an active correspondence with Marques, Cobos and others of the armed bands then in rebellion against the constitutional government of the country. They were in favor of placing Maximilian on the throne.

When the Mexican government demanded the removal of General

Almonte and his associates from the camp of the Allies, the British and Spanish representatives acquiesced to the demand. The French, however, were stubborn in their resistance. The stormy conference at Crisaba revealed their true designs. There, they stated very plainly that they did not regard the London or the preliminaries of Soladad as binding. Specifically, then, the causes of the rupture were: (1) the persistence of the French commissioners in opposing the removal of the Mexican exiles and (2) their refusal to take part in the conferences which had been arranged by the convention with the Juarez government which were to be held at Crisaba April 15, 1862. The British government approved of the action of its agent, Wyke, in breaking up the conference and putting an end to the joint action of the three European nations.

When the intentions of France were pretty well made known in the United States, Seward still held firmly to the opinion expressed in his communication to Dayton:

France has a right to make war against Mexico, and to determine for herself the cause. We have a right and interest to insist that France shall not improve the war she makes to raise up in Mexico an anti-republican and anti-American government there. France has disclaimed such designs and we, besides reposing faith in the assurances given in a frank, honorable manner would, in any case, be bound to wait for, and not anticipate a violation of them.20

20. Ibid., 750.
Such an utterance on the part of the Secretary of State did not ease the itching pains for action that Romero was suffering. The Mexican minister, ever active, fanned the flames of indignation, and in a note no doubt intended for publicity and for American consumption made appeal to the Monroe Doctrine, whose lines, he declared, "seem to be written for the present occasion."

Since all odds were against the North during the days of military operations in the year 1862; the Mexican question could not receive the attention Romero was clamoring for.

After the weakest and strongest powers withdrew from the tripartite alliance, France was free to pursue its own policy, and proceeded to reinforce the Mexican expedition. The helpless condition, to which the War of Secession had reduced the government of the United States, brightened the prospects for the government of France. General Almonte instituted a government in the territory occupied by the French and assumed the title of "Supreme Chief of the Nation." But when General Foray assumed command of the expedition, he dissolved the ministry of Almonte, depriving him of his title and limiting him hereafter "in the most exact manner to the instructions of the emperor, which are to proceed as far as possible, with other Mexican Generals placed

under the protection of our flag, to the organization of the Mexican army.\textsuperscript{22}

Although the French government made more protestations that it had no designs on the independence of Mexico, and no intention to establish Maximilian on the throne of Mexican monarchy, it pushed forward the preparations which were to end in the attempt to establish a monarchy.

French troops continued to extend their military operations and occupied a greater extent of the territory week by week. The Juarez government still held the capitol, but the military operations progressed rapidly during the spring of 1863. The junta organised by Forey was hard at work occupying itself with the work of establishing some form of a permanent government in Mexico. On the 10th of July, the capitol of Mexico was occupied by the French army, and on the following day the Assembly of Notables declared that the Mexican Nation adopted a limited hereditary monarchy as its form of government. The conditions stated that Maximilian the Archduke of Austria be given the title of Emperor, and if he refused, it would be up to Napoleon III to select another prince in his place.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{22} As quoted in Latane\textsuperscript{1}, op. cit., 215.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 215.
CHAPTER III

FRANKO-MEXICAN RELATIONS COMPLICATED OUR
RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

The designs and activities of the French in reference to
Mexico did not pass unnoticed by the neighboring States. In fact
they caused a whirlpool of activity within the various countries
who looked to the United States for leadership in taking very
definite steps against the French. Agents of these Spanish-
American States saw that the minister plans of the French govern-
ment might prove dangerous to their own hard won independence,
and they did all in their power to persuade Seward to adopt a more
aggressive policy against the intruding government. The Minister
of Peru in Mexico interviewed the Secretary of State with the view
of winning him over to the idea of forming a Pan-American Alliance
for the purpose of expelling the French from Mexico. Despite
this earnest appeal, Seward did not wish to commit himself on the
ground that the minister was not accredited to the United States.
Later the Chilean minister approached the head of the State
department with the proposal that the United States should take
the lead in a formal demonstration against the establishment of a
monarchy in Mexico. Seward, however, assured him that the United
States could not consent to the establishment of a monarchy in
Mexico. That statement seemed to have satisfied the minister because we do not hear of his making any similar appeals for some time.

When the Peruvian minister arrived in Washington in March, 1865 with a tentative plan for an alliance, his project was rejected outright. Even the stipulation binding the Spanish-American States to the strictest non-recognition of the Confederacy did not move the well-poised diplomatic mind of the Secretary of State.

Not wishing to admit defeat, the envoys made the last desperate effort. This time they suggested a Pan-American Congress, but even before the United States received the invitation, Seward let it be known that the United States would not be able to take part in such an action. No doubt Seward foresaw that such an association with the other Latin-American countries, at a time when our own national security was tottering, might involve us in a semi-global war from which we would never be able to recover our former peace, liberty, and security. Nothing, therefore, could daunt this resolute diplomat. Neither persuasion nor compulsion swerved him in his determination to follow the neutral and steady course. The Spanish-Americans tried their final method to bend the mind and will of Seward to their way of thinking. They

1. Rippy, op. cit., 264.
resorted to active propaganda in the English press in the United States and in the Spanish newspapers which they had set up in their own countries. They even examined documents which Seward had written in order to see if they could find some false note in his diplomatic principles. They felt they had achieved a tremendous gain when they found a reference to the revolution in Granada, at which time Seward consulted England and France on a course of action to be taken after he had been asked to aid the people of Panama. The New Granadian Government felt that the assistance of the United States government was important in order to maintain the neutrality of the transit route in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty of 1846.

Seward’s document relating to this affair was published with a severe criticism of his whole American policy. The principle of joint intervention in Latin-American republics would not have been a healthy one because it seemed to the Latin-Americans a denunciation of the Monroe Doctrine. When he was approached on the topic, he very nonchalantly replied, “that it was not the custom of the State Department to notice anonymous communications or careless newspaper comments.” From this point on, the Latin-Americans saw the uselessness of arguing with Seward, and that even if they had continued their propaganda, it would avail nothing as far as a
change of policy was concerned.

Seward listened to all complaints, and continued to watch the oncoming events with a great deal of caution and his usual political sagacity so that all would be in readiness when the tide of European intervention should make its appearance on the shores of the Mexican republic.

Seward saw it slowly rising in the East and gradually increasing its speed as it crossed the Atlantic. Situation became critical when, on October 5, 1865, the crown of Mexico was formally offered to Maximilian by a deputation of Mexicans. He did not want to accept the throne until the whole nation confirmed by a free manifestation that it was their wish that he do so. This was an excellent resolution had the archduke adhered to it, but his accepting the crown six months later revealed either his insincerity or his ambition for imperial prestige. Probably it was an admixture of both that led him to go back on his word. Only a very small number accepted him as the Emperor. This minority group and those who were eager for imperial power asserted that while distraction and anarchy reigned, formal prosperity could not exist in Mexico.

2. Rippy, op. cit., 265.

Therefore, they argued that a stable form of government was the only cure for the misery of its people. Republicanism, according to their way of thinking, had failed miserably, and they felt that monarchy was the one answer to the difficulties and problems of that period.

In spite of the declaration of the Mexican Assembly, which showed so unmistakably the hand of Napoleon, the French government continued to repudiate the designs against the independence of Mexico, and Seward continued to express, officially at least, the satisfaction of the American government with the explanations given by France. The probable acceptance of the Crown by Maximilian was, however, the subject of frequent communication between the governments of France and the United States.

Seward instructed Corwin, first of all, not to address the new provisional government and granted him a leave of absence.

At the same time he asked Dayton in Paris, to sound out the policy of the French government from M. Drouyn de Huyes, the French minister of state. In August 1863, therefore, in a rather informal way Dayton expressed the fear that in quitting Mexico, France might leave a puppet behind her. Dayton was assured that France having enough colonial experience with Algeria thought

only of temporary intervention, and after her grievances were satisfied would leave no puppet behind. Delhuys replied to the puppet idea rather humorously: "No, the strings would be too long to work."

To Seward's other points of inquiry, M. Drouyn de Lhuys again disclaimed all intention to interfere with the right of the people to choose or maintain their own form of government, or to interfere in any way with the United States and the adjoining country.

It seems that somewhere in the hazy future the French calculated on the success of the Southern Confederacy which would insure Maximilian's good fortunes in Mexico. On the other hand, the Unionists cast their sympathies with the Juarez government. This state of affairs made it very difficult for the Lincoln administration to maintain neutrality. This was further complicated by the doubt as to the real purposes of the French government. In his communication to Dayton on September 21, 1865 Seward wrote:

The President thinks it desirable you should seek an opportunity to mention these facts to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and to suggest to him that the interests of France herself, require that a solution of the present complications in Mexico be made early upon the basis of the unity and


independence of Mexico. 7

In reply, the French minister declared the question of the establishment of Maximilian on the Mexican throne was to be decided by a majority vote of the entire nation; that the dangers to the government of the Archduke would come principally from the United States. He further asserted that the sooner the United States showed itself satisfied and manifested a willingness to negotiate with the newly established government, the sooner would France be ready to leave Mexico, and the new government to take care of itself. An acknowledgment of that government would do much to shorten and even to end all French complications in that country.

To this communication, Seward replied that the French government had not been left uninformed as to the opinion of the United States that the permanent establishment of a foreign and monarchical government in Mexico would neither be easy or desirable. Again, although stating that the United States practiced non-intervention in Mexico as elsewhere, he said:

This government believes that foreign resistance or attempts to control American civilization must and will fail before the ceaseless and ever-increasing activity of the material, moral, and political forces which peculiarly belong to the American continent. Nor do the United States deny that . . . . their own safety

and the cheerful destiny to which they aspire are
intimately dependent on the continuance of free re-
publican institutions throughout America.

As a result of its apprehensiveness this government
therefore did not neglect to provide for its own safety.

Although he knew that the majority in Mexico favored a
republican government, and although he admitted that the war
between France and Mexico had lasted longer than he had expected,
he maintained that the United States, adhering to the principles
of neutrality had "neither the right nor the disposition to
interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico, whether to establish
or maintain a republican or even a domestic government or to over-
throw an imperial or foreign one if Mexico should choose to establish
or accept it." To Motley who solicited the enforcement of the
Monroe Doctrine in order to prevent the recruiting in Austria of
troops who were to accompany Maximilian to Mexico, Seward replied
that the events did not warrant the enforcement of the principles
of the Doctrine.

On October 21, 1865, Seward pointed out that there was
considerable political rumor ascribing to France a purpose to
seize the Rio Grande, and wrest Texas from the United States.
Without a doubt such action would lead to war between the United

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9. Ibid., 295.
States and France and the other Latin American Republics. He sounded a warning note against any coalitions to be formed under French patronage between the regency established in Mexico and the insurgents cabal in Richmond. The President did not seem to be very apprehensive of these movements stating that the fires of such insurrections would die in the waning.

Consistently adhering to the policy of neutrality and the Monroe Doctrine, which would leave the destinies and sovereignty and independence of Mexico in the keeping of her own people, he still maintained kind relations with the Juárez government in the face of its increasing misfortunes and weaknesses, and did not expect an easy and permanent establishment of monarchy in Mexico.

Whatever avowals Seward made at the time, France did not heed his mild warnings, but encouraged by his repeated protestations of neutrality proceeded with its plan. On April 10, at Miramar, near Triest, Maximilian formally accepted the crown offered him by the Mexican deputies. The Mexican delegation was headed by Gutiérrez Estrada, Hidalgo and Father Miranda. They were received at Maximilian's castle of Miramar on the shore of the Adriatic.


These were commissioned by the minority group to offer the crown to Maximilian in the name of the Mexican people.

Naturally at a time like this the reader is bound to raise the question whether the people of France would be disposed to allow a foreign prince to act in the name of their Emperor. There seemed to be a division of opinion as to the choice of the Hapsburg prince. Some provincials regretted that their sacrifices did not serve to assure the throne at least to a French prince, but that it was offered to a prince of the House of the Hapsburgs, which was accustomed to astonish the world by its ingratitude. Others, on the other hand, considered the obligations and consequently the dangers less great for their country by the choice of a foreign prince. In case the project would be a failure the shame would not burn so deeply on the national honor of France. Despite all divisions and differences, Maximilian accepted the coveted crown. M. Gutierrez de Estrada, head of the deputation, delivered a long address, in which he dwelt on the importance of the national vote in Mexico.

The Archduke replied in Spanish expressing his goodwill and pleasure, and promised to do all in his power in order to establish peace, harmony, and a stable form of government. In conclusion he told the listeners that he would go to the Holy Father in order to seek his blessing on this all important venture in the New World.
Immediately the Mexican flag was hoisted on the Miramar palace and saluted with twenty-one guns. A "Te Deum" was sung by the members of the deputation who considered this the hour of salvation for the Mexican people.

When the Archduke and his wife finally landed at Vera Cruz on May 28, 1864, they were very much chagrined at the rather cool reception, but as they proceeded into the interior the reception took on more warmth.

The United States kept a very watchful eye on the things that were transpiring south of the Rio Grande, and since they perceived no extraordinary exertions on the part of the Emperor, they went on their war with the Union. During the first five months as Emperor of Mexico, Maximilian did not do anything very thoroughly, which brought sharp orders from Napoleon to begin with big things and lay a stable foundation for the future founding of an empire required constant effort and perfection, which could not be reaped at once, but could not be delayed. Anything was better than protracted uncertainty, the kind that the new ruler exhibited. Maximilian agreed to start after a reasonably brief interregnum.

12. Roeder, Juarez and His Mexico, II (1947), 560.

In November shortly after Maximilian made the resolution to begin to govern, the French Foreign Minister made formal overtures to Washington for the recognition of the Empire and offered in return for it, to withdraw the French troops from Mexico within a reasonable length of time. Seward retained the offer and rejected the condition and concluded his accomplished note with the soft but significant words:

Until the last four years whenever an American statesman or citizen asked what country of Europe was least likely to alienate the affections of the United States, the answer always was - France.

Obviously Seward said next to nothing, but enough under the strain of war nerves with its possibilities and probabilities to arouse Napoleon who began to negotiate very actively for a diplomatic settlement of the Mexican question. Probably the occasional news of increasing northern victories, along with Seward's subtle statements, convinced him that his gleaming imperial project was losing its lustre.

Another attempt was made to get the United States to recognize the new government through the confidential note of Luis de Arroyo, Maximilian's Secretary of State, to Corwin. Seward replied at once:

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It is the American government's fixed habit to hold no official intercourse with agents of parties in any country which stands in an attitude of revolution antagonistic to the sovereign authority in the same country with which the United States are on terms of friendly diplomatic intercourse and to hold no unofficial or private intercourse with persons with whom it cannot hold official intercourse.15

At the same time Seward informed Bigelow that Maximilian might be informed through the French government that exclusion of American consular agents from Mexico would have no influence in inducing the United States to change its political attitude toward Mexico.

Four days later, however, he analyzed the American policy more fully and more carefully. Though he had striven to be neutral he held that the United States could not renounce the doctrine that was the living sentiment of the people, that the continuance of free republican institutions throughout the United States and other American countries was absolutely necessary for the future peace and posterity of this country. No matter what views or ideas the ministers of the different countries had in regard to the government in Mexico, Seward held to his point of neutrality as long as circumstances would permit, and national safety demanded.

Seward's conciliatory policy up to 1864 met with little

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15. Callahan, Seward's Mexican Policy, op. cit., 301.
16. Ibid., 303.
favor from the influential men of the country, principally those
who sat in the halls of the legislature. At the beginning of
1864 there was popular agitation in favor of a more rigid policy
against the French.

Romero and some of the men in Congress were very much
disappointed when Lincoln voiced no intentions in reference to
the Mexican monarchy when he addressed Congress in March 1864.
They placed all the blame for this omission on Seward.

Congress was becoming restless in its anticipation of
a more severe and stern policy to be adopted toward the French
in Mexico. Senator McDougall of California introduced a resolution
declaring, "that the movements of an emperor, improvised by the
Emperor of France, demand by this republic, if insisted upon,
War." Although this resolution was never reported from the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations to which it was referred, the House
Committee led by W. Davis passed a resolution on April 4, 1864
declaring its opposition to the recognition of a monarchy in
Mexico. The same resolution was offered in the Senate, but it
was never referred to the committee.

In the House, Henry Winter Davis, the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, urged by Romero, and Kasson another
prominent member of the House, reported a resolution from his
committee on the 6th of April. It read as follows:
That the Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to have the nations of the world under the impression that they are very indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico, and that they think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchial government exerted on the ruins of any republican government in America and under the auspices of an European power. 17

There was hardly any debate on the topic, and the democratic leader H. Cox lamented that it was not phrased in stronger terms. The resolution passed unanimously, 109 to 0. This special emphasis at that particular moment was contrary to the principles of Lincoln and Seward who happened to view the entire Mexican question from all angles. In the nominating conventions that followed in the fall of 1864, the popular feeling reflected in the Davis resolution was once more, in some degree, manifested and Lincoln in accepting the Republican nomination approved the language of the convention. It read in part:

Resolved: That the people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of any European power to overthrow by force or to supplant by fraud the institution of any republican government on the Western Continent, and that they will view with extreme jealousy, as menacing to the peace and independence of their own country, the efforts of any such powers to obtain footholds for monarchial governments, unattained by foreign military force near proximity to the United States. 18

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Broadly speaking, then, the swelling tide of popular antagonism toward the end of 1864 against the French in Mexico called for definite steps to be taken. However, it is interesting to note that there was a considerable group right within the United States who favored the French policy in Mexico. The New York World and the Journal of Commerce did not carry any hostile attitudes in their columns. The National Intelligencer spoke of the Monroe Doctrine with contempt and even intimated that the American Minister to Mexico was not unfavorable to the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico.

The opposition group being so much larger tended to overthrow any possible influence that those in favor of the French policy might exert. An interesting fact about the opposition party was that it comprised so many different elements. There were the supporters of the administration, radical republicans, native Americans, and naturalized Americans, conservatives like Blair and his group, radicals like Chase and Chandler, the press without any distinction of party and the rank and file of the democracy, and the representatives of the well-to-do, all these blended into one group as the supporters of the Monroe Doctrine.

19. Ibid., 454.
Many wondered that Seward was not affected to more active steps against France in Mexico when he was in this swirl of popular agitation. History shows that he faced the ever rising tide of unrest with that same caution and keen alertness that mark his policy up to 1865. Even the threatening language of Drouyn de L'Huys did not precipitate him into action which he might have regretted later. Drouyn de L'Huys seemed to think that it might be possible by a strong tone to intimidate the American government from taking steps to force the French out of Mexico. Even the drain on the United States forces did not darken Seward's hopes in the least. He revealed a great deal of confidence in accomplishing his purpose, a fact well seen in his instructions in April 1865 to our minister to France which were to be conveyed to M. Drouyn de L'Huys. He informed the minister that the United States feared that Drouyn de L'Huys misunderstood the policy of this government in regard to the Mexican question. He was to assure him that not one voice had been raised anywhere, outside of the field of immediate insurrection in favor of the presence of a foreign power in Mexico; in favor of mediation, of arbitration or of compromise with the relinquishment of one acre of the national domain or even of the constitutional franchise. At the same time it is quite manifest to the world that our resources are abundant and our credit adequate to meet the existing emergency. Not much more had to be said to

assure the French government that the United States would be ready
to face the issue at any cost.

At times Seward found himself in a rather strained position
because there was always the forward and backward look which taxed
his energy to the utmost. He tried to refrain from open opposition
because he deemed that the time was not yet ripe for that. In the
closing days of the Civil War he had to keep his eyes focused on
the two groups within the United States who were exerting an in-
fluence on those in Congress and elsewhere. There were the
Confederates who were more than active in their final filibustering
campaigns this time directed toward a different end from that we
discussed in the first chapter. Twenty signed commissions were
given to privateers in order to interrupt any further Northern
shipping and transportation through this city of Matamoras. Then,
there was the large group of Unionists clamoring louder for a more
determined step against the French. Every precaution had to be
taken not to aggravate Napoleon into an action that he had been
planning to abandon as soon as he saw the mounting victories of
the North. So in line with his pacific policy, Seward had to guard
against any violent threats from the platform and from the press, or
any hostile proceedings along the Rio, or some indiscreet project
of the radicals which might provoke the French into action.

468.
Two projects which were undertaken at the end of 1864 did much to keep the Secretary of State watchful. Both of these were designed to bring about more territory to the South, and to smother a war of insurrection in a war of conquest.

Blair is credited with one of these projects. He suggested that an alliance with the Confederates would be the greatest aid in driving the French out of Mexico. Blair maintained that further opposition to the Union meant only one thing, namely, a war in favor of a monarchy and French supremacy in America. He appealed to Davis's honor and ambition for power by suggesting a transfer of his troops to Mexico where they should join the contingent groups of Juarez's army and drive the French out of Mexico. He was confident that even Northern troops would rally to the cause when they saw its success.

He painted an enlarged North American Union as a possible result which would place the name of Jefferson Davis alongside those of Washington and Jackson as the "defender of the liberty of the country."

Davis and other Confederate leaders gave the joint filibustering enterprise considerable thought, and it figured rather prominently in the Hampton Roads Conference. But in the words of Nicolay and Hay, "the government councils at Washington were not ruled by the spirit of political adventure. Lincoln had loftier conceptions of patriotic duty and higher ideal of national
The mission, like the conference to which it gave rise ended in failure.

Before the fate of this project was made known, Lew Wallace, former Brigadier General, conceived of a conference which met at Palo Alto. It was his idea that the Confederates of the Trans-Mississippi Department might be persuaded to come to terms with the Northern Commander, Grant, on the basis of a joint attack and final expulsion of the French party in Mexico.

Wallace's project, like that of Blair, was a failure. Wallace himself admitted on his return to Washington that he despaired of its success shortly after its initiation because of a probable alliance between the Confederates along the border and the Mexican Imperialists.

Seward could hardly approve of such actions since they were opposed to his judgment and policy. On February 7, 1865, he wrote Bigelow:

You will read of projects on the part of our insurgents to suspend the present conflict, or end it, by a combined war against France alone or against France and England. If they come into question, you may confidently say that the government prefers to fight this civil war on the present line, if no foreign state intervenes in behalf of the insurgents. 24

22. Rippy, op. cit., 266.


24. U. S. Department, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865, III, 363.
All is very clear that the war would continue on its former lines until one party was victorious. No mention is made of armed intervention in Mexico despite the urgent requests for such action from the members in Congress. All things must take their course in bringing about a change in the status of Mexico without actual warfare in that direction as far as the United States was concerned. His policy was ever the same, if we are attacked by the foreign country on our own soil, or directly, then only will we retaliate by force of arms.

All the activities thus far enumerated were exerting considerable pressure on the Secretary of State to assume a more vigorous policy against France. By June 1866, the clamor for a firmer stand on his part reached him from all sections of the country.

The first apparent sharp tone that was sounded was that of July 6, in his instructions to Bigelow. It was a protest against the smuggling of Confederate goods into Mexico for French use.

Seward wrote:

“You will inform Drouyn de L'Huys that renewed instructions have been given to the general commanding the United States military forces in Texas to permit no aggressive movements of troops under his command within the Mexican territory, unless special instructions from the War Department should be rendered necessary by a condition of affairs not now anticipated. This message must be transmitted immediately.”

Hardly had one event been settled when another loomed up for consideration. This time William M. Gwin's activities in Sonora tried Seward's patience. Gwin had been a senator from California, who was imprisoned as a Confederate sympathizer at the beginning of the War. Released in 1863, he went to Paris, and there got into touch with Louis Napoleon. He was encouraged by the Emperor to go to Mexico, to undertake schemes of colonization, in connection with the exploitation of the mines of Sonora. Seward heard of this project in 1864, but he did not act at once. Only when Romero handed Seward a number of intercepted documents revealing Gwin's intentions and schemes did Seward send these, along with sharp instructions to Bigelow with the intention that they be brought to the attention of Drouyn de Lhuys. Again he assured in these instructions that the American sympathies were cast with the republicans of Mexico or by the Imperial Government of France will tend greatly to increase popular impatience.

The French government did not promise the prompt withdrawal of its troops, but there was for the first time, an expression on the part of its government a willingness to discuss the Mexican question.

During the months that followed all discussions only tended

26. Ibid., 492.
to bring about a more determined tone from the Secretary of State.

On September 6, therefore, he sent another note voicing his determination:

It is perceived with much regret that an apparent if not real, a future if not immediate antagonism between the policies of the two nations seems to reveal itself in the situation of Mexico. The United States have at no time in history left it doubtful that they prefer to see a domestic and republican system of government prevail in Mexico rather than any other system. This preference results from the fact that the Constitution of the United States itself is domestic and republican and from a belief that not only its constituent parts ought to preserve the same form and character, but that as far as is practically and justly attainable by the exercises of moral influences the many American States by which the United States is surrounded shall be distinguished by the same peculiarities of government. 27

The French minister did not receive the dispatch from Bigelow with very much grace although he did make the statement that the French government was eager to get out of Mexico. He did not specify the exact time which led Bigelow to believe that there was no intention to insure the stability or financial compensation before the withdrawal of the troops. Discussions between Bigelow and Drouyn de L'Huys finally revealed that the French were eager to get an early assurance on the part of the United States that it would enter into relations with the Mexican Empire simultaneously with the withdrawal of the French army. 28

27. Ibid., 498.

28. Ibid., 500.
About the same time Seward was confronted by the Schofield episode. General Schofield, Grant and a number of other army officers were bringing pressure upon the government to intervene against the French. Schofield was to go to the Rio Grande, bearing the title of Inspector of the Army of the United States, and was to receive a year's leave of absence. He was to direct a mustering campaign whereby troops, materials and war necessities could be transported in a moment's notice into Mexico against the French. It was to be a secret enterprise, but at the last moment, Schofield decided to present the plan to Seward and seek his advice. Seward very tactfully flattered Schofield into believing that his talents were needed in diplomacy more than on the battlefield. He said to the General in his own impressive way: "I want you to get your legs under Napoleon's mahagony and tell him that he must get out of Mexico." Seward knew that Schofield would not be as belligerent in the presence of the Emperor as he was in Washington, and above all, he had the greatest confidence in Bigelow's tact and ability to handle Schofield when he arrived in Paris. The plan worked out just as Seward had anticipated it would.29

29. Rippy, op. cit., 269.
Schofield never came in contact with the Emperor of the French, and if it had been the purpose of the secretary to have him do so, the matter certainly could have been arranged. It looked as if the Schofield case was a bluff to distract the General from his Mexican schemes.

Finally, on December 16, 1865, Seward addressed what was practically an ultimatum to France. He pointed out that Congress, then in session would, no doubt, take the initiative in a vigorous policy against the French. In his communication he stated:

It has been the President's purpose that France should be respectfully informed upon two points, namely: First, that the United States earnestly desire to continue and cultivate friendship with France. Second, that this policy would be brought into imminent jeopardy, unless France would deem it consistent with her interest and honor to desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico, to overthrow the domestic republican government existing there, and to establish upon its ruins the foreign monarchy which has been attempted to be inaugurated in the capital of that country. It remains now only to make known to M. Drozyn de L'Huys profound regret that he has thought it his duty to leave the subject, in his conversation with you, in a condition that does not authorize an expectation on our part that a satisfactory adjustment of the case can be effected on any basis that thus far has been discussed.31

As late as November, the French government, through Monthonl, French Minister in Washington, insisted that the United States

recognise Maximilian before they make the arrangements for the recall of their troops.

The reply to Seward's note was received through Montholon January 1866. M. Drouyn de L'Ruys still insisted that the French expedition had in it nothing hostile to the institutions of the new world, and still less to those of the United States. He recalled the fact that the United States at one time had acknowledged the right of France to make war on Mexico, and continued:

On the other part we admit, as they do, the principle of non-intervention; this double postulate includes, as it seems to me, the elements of an agreement. As far as the government in Mexico now established, it was being called into being by the voice of the Mexican people. It was they who invited Maximilian to the throne.33

Seward's reply was a vigorous protest against this way of thinking. He expressed himself quite frankly when he stated that the United States did not see any satisfactory evidence that the people of Mexico had called into being the so-called empire. He finished off the communication with a virtual ultimatum:

We shall be gratified when the Emperor will give to us . . . definite information of the time when the French military operations may be expected to cease in Mexico.34

Napoleon, seeing the futility of any longer delay, and

33. Ibid., 96.
34. U. S. Department, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865, III, 403.
not wanting to risk a war with the United States, announced that the troops would be withdrawn from the Mexican territory in three detachments, Seward very fortunately left a loophole in his dispatch of February 12, in the statement that the United States would continue its policy of neutrality after French evacuation. To this assurance De L'Huys replied:

We receive this assurance with entire confidence and we find therein a sufficient guarantee not any longer to delay the adoption of measures intended to prepare for the return of the army. 35

Whether we should attribute Napoleon's decision to Seward's diplomacy supported by a vast army, or to the brewing European troubles is a question that cannot be answered explicitly. No doubt that both played an important part in his final decision but unsettled state of affairs in Europe had the greater influence in causing him to abandon his Mexican scheme. He had to play another diplomatic game, and this time with Bismarck who eventually outplayed him and forced him into war. In order to be free to meet the situation, he decided to yield the American needs. 36

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CHAPTER IV

WEBB STEERS THE DIPLOMATIC SHIP IN BRAZIL

While the War of Secession raged, the United States found it imperative to establish friendly ties with other Latin American countries that might in time cast their allegiance with the Confederacy. Brazil, because of the nature of its occupation and the class of workers employed, might be lead to sympathize with the South where similar conditions existed.

Seward sent General James Webb to Brazil. Webb was a rather bold, adventurous and likeable man for Latin America. He had distinguished himself as frontiersman among Indians. Later as a newspaper man, he introduced innovations such as the pony express for dispatches and packet boats to meet in coming schooners. In his capacity as editor of the New York Morning Courier and later of the Courier and Enquirer he had supported Seward both in his state and national ambitions. It is not surprising, then, that he was given a diplomatic post. That was one way of Seward's expression of gratitude for his former support.

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1. Monaghan, on cit., 69.

2. Lawrence F. Hill, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1932), 146.
General Webb accepted the Brazilian post on June 3, 1861 following his refusal to be exiled to Turkey on an inadequate salary. His arrival in Rio de Janeiro was delayed somewhat because he had to go there by way of France and England for reasons of safety.

He wanted to call on his friend who had become Napoleon III of France. This wish of his was not realized because he had to stop in London where he was more anxious to interview R. K. Meade his predecessor, on the state of affairs in Brazil. Meade assured him that he had discharged his duty toward the Union very conscientiously. That assertion, however, paled into thin air when Webb learned from the captain and the officers of the "Tyne", the steamer that took Meade to England, and carried the new Minister to Rio, that Meade had denounced the Lincoln government. He had justified the Southern rebellion and even went so far as to say that he and every true son of Virginia would rather see his state go back to its colonial position than to consent to its going back to the American Union.

When he arrived in Brazil, Webb learned from Charge Blackford, secretary of the American legation that Meade, in his parting interview with the Emperor, had expressed sympathy for the Southern cause, and predicted the continuance of the war in the United States for twenty years. Such assertions on the part of
his predecessor aroused the fury of the new minister and he re-
solved to reply to those statements which he considered those
of a traitor.

Webb decided that the opportune time for such a reply
would be the occasion of his formal presentation to the Emperor.
He wished to refute his predecessor's statement on the question
of slavery, and his reference to the length of time that it would
take before the war would be over. To the first point of Meade's,
that unity existed between the United States and Brazil on the
basis of slavery which was a common institution deeply rooted in
the soil of the two countries, he asserted that slavery was not a
national institution in the Northern Republic, but the creature
of local law. The idea that the civil war was going to last
twenty years was altogether false, and it was brushed aside by
the reply that, in the first place, the conflict was not a civil
war but a rebellion which would last for a brief period.

When the Brazilian foreign minister insisted that he
leave out any references to slavery which would be very embarrassing
to the Emperor at the time of a full court, he persisted in his
resolution. Only after the Brazilian government showed itself
stubbornly opposed to his ideas, did he acquiesce to leave out
the objectionable parts of his speech.

S. U. S. Congress. House Executive Doc. 57th Cong., 2nd
699.
The formal presentation took place on October 21. In his speech to the Emperor, he assured the imperial government of his country's goodwill and reiterated the policy of mutual cooperation and friendly intercourse and stressed that his mission was to cultivate the closest political, friendly, personal and commercial relations between the government and the people of the United States and the people of Brazil. He believed it was his obligation to do all in his power to regain that goodwill towards the Union government which his predecessor had destroyed by his secessionist attitudes.

On August 1, 1861 the Brazilian Emperor announced a neutrality proclamation, which like that of other maritime powers, did not commit Brazil to a recognition of the independence of the Confederacy nor to the reception of diplomatic agents. When she extended to the Confederates the rights of belligerents, it entitled their flag to recognition on the high seas and their ships of war and commerce were to be granted the same privileges in neutral ports as were accorded the ships of the North.


A few incidents, however, provoked much thought and debate after her intentions were announced to the American government. About five weeks after the neutrality decree was made, the "Sumter", one of Jefferson Davis's privateers, entered the port of Maranhao, where it was allowed to take on a supply of coal. Webb was determined to take action even before he received definite instructions and orders from the American government. The Brazilian foreign minister maintained that Brasil did not break her neutrality because it considered the "Sumter" a man of war.

Webb's reaction on the occasion is best set forth in his own words:

I expressed my regret that I had not rendered myself acceptable to the government, as there could be no doubt the course he indicated a disposition to adopt would result in my recall, the suspension of diplomatic relations, and resort to such measures as the wisdom of my government might suggest.6

Webb set forth the view of his government in a communication on the following day. In it he stated that the War of Secession could be crushed by winter, the "Sumter" and other Confederate cruisers were piratical and that coal was contraband of war. By denying Brasil the right of recognizing Confederates as belligerents, he refused to her the status of a neutral.

6. As quoted in Hill, op. cit., 147.
Replying to Webb, the foreign minister stated in part:

That the practice of European nations, the size of the Confederate armies, the policy of blockade maintained by the Union government, and the exchange of prisoners conferred upon the Confederates the status of belligerents. Furthermore his government in recognizing the belligerency of the Richmond government was but following the policy of the United States with reference to the revolting groups in the Western Hemisphere. Finally, he flatly denied that coal was contraband of war or that the "Sunder" had been allowed to violate Brazilian neutrality inasmuch as she had been compelled to conform to all rules of international practice applicable to such cases.7

Webb could not be baffled and on December 17, he responded with a fifty-two page letter in which he reiterated his former arguments.

Numerous communications passed between Webb and the Brazilian foreign office between 1861 and the spring of 1865, neither side wishing to yield on the major issue involved — whether Confederates were rebels or belligerents. It is interesting to note the attitudes taken by Seward and the General. Seward's cautious attitude, in most part, was attributable to various European reactions toward the Civil War, and his policy toward Brasil was tempered by these reactions on various occasions. Webb, on the other hand, exhibited a blustering nature in his dealings with the Brazilian government on the question of the

7. Ibid., 161.
"Sumter". At one time he showed himself willing to wait for Brazil's reparation, and at other times, he threatened to do everything from deposing the governor of Maranhao to the use of armed intervention in order to bring Brazil to terms.

Scarcely had the trouble over the "Sumter" subsided, when news reached Rio that the "Alabama", another Confederate vessel, captured half dozen American whalers in Brazilian territorial waters, and had received aid in the port of the Island of Fernando de Noronha. This report was just too much for Webb, and he immediately sent a vigorous protest to the Brazilian foreign office. The Brazilian government made a thorough investigation at once and found that the commanding officer of the island had been over-friendly to the Captain of the "Alabama" and immediately dismissed him. The captain of the "Alabama" was given twenty-four hours to leave the territorial waters.

Not long after that, Webb received information that the Confederate cruisers "Alabama", "Florida", and "Georgia" were obtaining coal and provisions in the ports of Pernambuco and Bahia. Fiery Webb would not remain silent on hearing such news; so he sent a protest, in fact, he sent many of them, one of which

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was almost one hundred pages long. No new ideas were incorporated in them. In his long communication of September 24, 1865, there was considerable space reserved to an appeal for the "necessity of maintaining in the Western Hemisphere, an American policy—entirely distinct from that advocated by the nations of Europe."

Upon receiving the protest of Webb, the Brazilian foreign minister, again gave assurances that His Majesty, the Emperor, was firmly resolved to maintain and cause to be respected, the neutrality of Brazil.

While Webb was protesting that Brazil was un-neutral in thus supplying the Confederate ships, the "Florida" arrived at Bahia on October 4, 1865 and was given forty-eight hours by the authorities to repair her boilers and obtain other provisions and coal. The "U.S.S. Wachusett" under the command of Capt. Collins, fired on, captured and towed the "Florida" out of port under cover of darkness. The Brazilian commander set out in search of the vessel but could not overtake her, and so the "Florida" was brought to Hampton Roads. Consul Wilson, who had violated his trust, escaped to the United States with the "Wachusett" and her prize.

10. Ibid., 1176.

The Brazilian government was infuriated by this action and demanded:

A public expression on the part of the Union government that this action was regretted and condemned: the immediate dismissal of the United States commander, followed by the proper process of dealing with such persons, a salute of twenty-one guns to be given in the port of the capital of Bahia by some vessel of war of the United States having hoisted at her masthead during the salute, the Brazilian flag. 12

Webb, in his formal correspondence with the Brazilian foreign minister expressed the idea that his government would be more prompt in its action than if one of her cruisers had committed the same act in a port of the most powerful nation of the world. But, he insisted that the *amende honorable* would be made under "protest" because Brazil had treated the "rebels" as belligerents. The foreign minister made it clear that the proposal to make the reparation under protest was neither pleasing to Brazil nor admitted by her. As to the question of recognition, his government considered no further argument necessary.

From this time on the Brazilian government did not have very much to say to Webb. When the General protested a few weeks later because four vessels were lying in Rio de Janeiro, which

13. Ibid., 159.
happened to belong to the Confederates, were up for sale, the Brazilian government offered very little comment on the subject. It said next to nothing, which may have meant only one thing, that it considered it futile to carry on further negotiations with Webb. Negotiations of great and minor importance shifted to Washington directly.

The Brazilian charge, therefore, presented his government's demands for the violation of its sovereignty to Seward directly. In a note to the Brazilian government dated December 26, 1864, Seward replied that the President disavowed and regretted the proceedings at Bahia; that he would suspend the commander of the "Wachusett" and direct him to appear before a court-martial; that the consul would be dismissed; that the flag of Brazil would receive from the United States the honor customary in the intercourse of friendly maritime powers. The final demand that all on board the "Florida" were to be freed, and the vessel returned to Brazil could not be met because of her sinking in Hampton Roads supposedly due to a collision. All the other demands would be complied with on the ground that the capture of "Florida" was an unauthorized, unlawful, and indefensible exercise of the United States naval


force within a foreign country, in defiance of its established and duly recognized government.

After some deliberation the salute was fired by Commander F. S. Blake's ship in the harbor of Bahia, and the Diario da Bahia, (the paper alluded to in Stuart's work, Latin America and the United States) characterized the event thus:

It is thus that a great and spirited people give, in the civilized world, a public and solemn proof of the sincerity of its possessions of the sacred principles of justice.16

The Brazilian-American negotiations in reference to the events recounted in the foregoing pages convince one that the United States government, especially in denying Brazil's stand on neutrality, assumed a position contrary to the general practice of nations, and even her own practice. That the friendly attitude toward Brazil was maintained, despite various difficulties, may be attributed to the ever-watchful eye of Seward. Although he sent the fiery Webb to guide affairs there, he felt that he could keep the minister well under control.

After reading accounts of Lincoln's allusions to the probable necessity of acquiring territory for munition purposes, Webb hit upon the idea of transporting these liberated persons to the region along the Amazon.

16. As quoted in Stuart, op. cit., 466.
Writing to Seward April 1865, Webb stressed the necessity of supplying Brazil with labor, and the possibility of obtaining free black labor from the United States as the ideal thing. Furthermore, he argued that from the very nature of her climate and soil, black labor is preferable to white. And because free labor is stationary and cannot be recovered from regions to which it has accommodated itself, free labor from a national point of view was preferable to slave labor.

To prove his point more thoroughly, Mr. Webb cited the conditions of labor on the coffee plantations in the southern regions. The steady increase of the price of coffee in the southern provinces tended to drain the workers from the North. Labor there being primarily slave labor, left the owner free to transfer or sell his labor where he pleased. According to well-established principles of political economy, labor like every other commodity will necessarily flow where it commands the highest prices. So, according to the law of demand and supply, the labor of northern provinces being slave, and transportable at the will of the owner, it followed as the most natural conclusion that just as demand for labor increased in southern provinces, and prices of the slaves advanced, the demand would be supplied by transferring slaves of the northern regions to places where the demand was greater and consequent higher prices existed.18

With a very conclusive air, therefore, Webb assured the American government that the North-American Negroes, largely because of their African home they had lived in similar latitude, were exactly fitted by nature to the conditions along the Amazon. Surely the "finger of God" was pointing the way.

The New York diplomat, though, failed to consider the feelings of the liberated man on this score. His lot among the whites was not as dark as some writers painted it. There were many things in life that the emancipated Negro anticipated which could be realized by him and his posterity in a country like the United States, and not along the Amazon.

Unmindful of any other view but his own, he hurriedly worked out a plan for the establishment of a colony for the liberated Negroes. His plan provided for a creation of a stock-colonization company, the liability of every subscriber being limited to the amount of his subscription. The President of the United States was to appoint a president of the company, who of course would be General James Watson Webb. The freed Negroes were to be transferred to the corporation before transportation, and once there were to render service to the corporation for three years. At the end of that period each Negro was to receive certain agricultural implements.

small sum of money, not more than twenty acres of land, of which at least five acres were to be made fit for the cultivation at the expense of the company. To say the least, there was very little choice for the supposedly free Negro. He would be pretty well tied to the manager of the project. The last stipulation, keeping the size of the plot of land, certainly disclosed the selfish aims of the prospector. The company stockholders would be the fortunate recipients of the lion's share of all wealth, and would hold the colony planned for others in the palm of their hands.

In presenting his plan to the American government, he shrewdly pointed out the countless benefits that would accrue to all. He stated in part:

The United States will be blessed by his (the Negro's) absence, and the riddance of a curse which has well nigh destroyed her, Brazil will receive precisely the species of laborers and citizens best calculated to develop the resources and make her one of the powers of the earth; and the miserable, ignorant, and downtrodden slave, who is a mere chattel, with body and soul alike uncared for will have his shackles knocked off, be liberated, educated for freedom and have bestowed upon him the great boon of personal liberty.30

Webb's plan was submitted and studied with a great deal of circumspection by the astute secretary of state. Seward in replying told him that his speculations upon the political and social evils of slavery were just, yet, courtesy to the state forbade our government from assuming the complete truth, and from making a proposition

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with a view to a relief of those evils without having some overtures from the head of the empire. Moreover, we had no right to assume that the Emperor of Brazil would prefer an expelled caste from this country to other supplies of populations for improvement of the laboring class. A detailed copy of the resolutions adopted in reference to the freed slaves was also forwarded to Webb with the hope that he would make no more misrepresentations in this regard.

In the meantime, Webb confident that the government would authorize his negotiating a treaty by which the scheme would be carried out hurriedly made his plans of presenting the scheme to the Brazilian government in order to insure its acceptance by that government.

Washington's quick response saved the Brazilian government the chagrin of making known their attitude toward the project.

The Utopian plan met its coup de grâce at Washington. It left the American Minister somewhat discouraged, because his personal aims, ambitions and interests were frustrated, and not because he could not help the great cause of humanity.

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22. Seward, The War for the Union, V, 357.

His colonisation plan having failed Webb devised a new plan - to establish a steamship line between the United States and Brasil. He gave two solid arguments for such a project, one political and the other commercial. Both of these were put into use upon the officials of the two governments. These were especially appealing to the Brazilian government because of the hatred toward England. This was mostly due to reprisals of British cruisers and finally a break in the diplomatic relations.

Webb said that the stage was set for a political friendship of all the governments of the North, South, and Middle America. This union was to adopt a set of principles quite opposite to those of the Old World. Strange, as it may seem, these attempts toward a political fusion never materialised because neither United States nor Brasil gave any thought to a treaty in that direction.

The commercial argument seemed to bear the greatest strength as far as the Americans were concerned. Webb cited statistics to show that England had wrested the lion's share of profits from the Brazilian products just because the United States was so slow to see the advantages of a direct route to Brasil. Before the end of the Civil War the United States was sending from fifteen to twenty million gold dollars to London annually to pay for coffee and other Brazilian products. Instead of sending this money to English ports she could have been sending twenty million dollars worth of her own manufactured goods to Brasil.
From experiences of his own in Congress, he knew that anything presented to that body of our government had to be clear, well-outlined, and strongly recommended to warrant its passage. He held numerous sessions with imperial officials, wrote articles and published these in the United States at his own expense, in order to gain the popular assent and enthusiasm. A plan that he presented to the Brazilian legislature provided for a line of steamers from New York to Rio de Janeiro via the West Indian Island of St. Thomas and the Brazilian ports of Para, Pernambuco and Bahia. When the communication from Seward advocated internal improvements instead, Webb remembered to point out to the secretary and others that Brazil had invited European capitalists to invest money in building of roads and railroads, but this offer had been turned down.

Shrewd capitalists foresaw the lack of workers and did not wish to see money invested in any regions where railroads in absence of workers to cultivate these sections would leave them without profit. Webb knowing that Lincoln favored the steamship line project, prepared to meet an opposition from Congress which body would be called to pass the measure for the subvention. In order to meet any crisis, Webb called upon his friends in the United

States, among whom were the Parsons, late American consul at Rio, Reverdy Johnson, and Seward to be ready to rush to the rescue at the strategic moment.

The letters that Webb sent to Seward reveal something of what was entirely unknown to Lincoln up to this time. Among the unknown features was that naming Robert S. Webb as the concessionaire. The son of course was to assign his rights to the father immediately. He further stated that if any one deserved that, it was he who worked so diligently on the plan. He placed all the responsibility of pushing the measure through on the shoulders of Seward.

Unfortunately, for the General and his friends, the scheme to floor England and make the United States paramount forever did not work as he had planned. Seward, friend of his as he was, considered duty before personal considerations felt compelled to show some of this private correspondence to Lincoln. He asked, however, that it be forgotten for his friend's sake. The result of that submission was anything but gratifying to the President who had been disposed toward the project very favorably. Now he flatly refused to submit Webb's proposal to Congress. The realization of the Minister's hopes to become the beneficiary would have been a violation of the statute which said, "that no agent of the United States shall in any case or by evasion, receive for his official
service any pecuniary reward beyond the compensation expressly provided by law."

The news of his failure to secure the President's support disheartened Webb to such a degree that he contemplated on resigning his position. On second thought, he decided to plead some more with the Secretary of State. In the communications that followed he recalled at length all the favors that he had rendered Seward, and complained that he was left alone. He could not quite understand the change of attitude taken by the secretary. He pleaded that his project receive some attention, and a trial at least.

When all pleading seemed in vain, he made a final suggestion which he thought would receive some attention of Congress. He suggested that if time would not admit of the passage of the bill otherwise it might be attached as a rider to the general appropriation bill. Many measures had been passed that way. He insisted that the bill must be passed by the Congress then in session or it would be too late. Partly as a result of President Lincoln's failure to recommend Webb's proposed bill to the American Congress and partly because of the American minister's inability to look after his pet measure owing to the illness of several weeks, the Brazilian legislature refused the appropriation for subsidizing

the steamship line.

To add to Webb's aggravation, the American Congress passed an Alley Law, "an act authorizing the establishment of ocean mail service between the United States and Brazil." The measure was defeated in the Brazilian senate probably due to the efforts of the disappointed General who was provoked at his government's giving encouragement to a rival project. He made a last desperate attempt to submit another proposal with his son's name attached to it as the agent. Washington flatly refused to consider any such proposal and the promoter was told to forgo all support of any project that came into conflict or competition with the plan sanctioned by Congress. He yielded with a feeling that the government was very ungrateful for great services rendered by him.

In June 1865, the Brazilian legislature finally passed the act authorizing the government to establish the steamship line. The first direct route steamship communication between North and South America went into service toward the end of the year 1865. This was the first step toward the break in European communication monopoly which continued until after World War I. It was a preparation for greater Inter-American solidarity, and paved the way to a certain extent for the future "good neighbor policy." In all fairness to the man who made so many attempts at this
project, credit should be given to Webb, at least for making possible the initial venture, though this does not stamp with approval the methods that he often employed.

27. Ibid., 169-171.
CHAPTER V

SPANISH MANEUVERS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Just one month after the firing on Fort Sumter, the eyes of the administration had to rivet their attention, for a time at least, to the "twin republics" of Santo Domingo and Haiti. Spain undertook to challenge the vitality and validity of the Monroe Doctrine.¹ The opportunity for such action developed in the revolution-rent Dominican Republic, which, officially had asked for annexation to Spain. Spain accepted the invitation and in May 1861, incorporated it into the Spanish Empire.² This action, of course, was not undertaken without previous thought and consideration. Dominican politicians had been conferring with the representatives of any foreign government which might help to maintain them in power. In the 1860's they had been evincing a special preference for Spain. General Santana, president of the Republic, was securing secret aid from General Serrana, Governor General of Cuba. Negotiations for a closer understanding with Spain opened at Madrid. At first the Spanish government under Marshall O'Donnell demurred because it feared the intervention of the United States government.


Through the encouragement of Serrana, however, President Santana proclaimed annexation, and Spanish troops from Cuba appeared on the scene. Formal annexation, as mentioned above, followed, leaving the ministry in Madrid in a rather awkward position from which it was unable to withdraw. A month previous to this, Secretary Seward had sent a threatening note to the Spanish minister at Washington in which he challenged Spain's right to take back Santo Domingo. In the note, we see the blunder of the Secretary which was very characteristic of his first war year's relations with foreign aggressors. He stated:

An attempt to introduce Spanish authority within the territory of Dominica . . . cannot fail to be taken as the first step in a policy of armed intervention by the Spanish Government in the American countries which once constituted Spanish America, but have since achieved their independence; and it cannot be known where the next demonstration of the ambition it would imply would take place; it might be regarded as threatening Haiti, Mexico, the seven states on the Spanish Main, and even those once Spanish American States, which having been peacefully acquired and admitted into the American Union now constitute a part of this republic.

In the remainder of the note he made threats and utterances that were hardly plausible at the time. He inferred in the course of his communication that the President could hardly believe that Spain would be animated by any unfriendly attitude. However, if such should be the case, the United States government should be ready to meet further prosecutions of enterprises of any kind in respect to the Dominican Republic or any part of the American
continent with a prompt resistance.  

Right on the heel of Secretary Seward's threat came the diplomatic note of the Charge d'Affaires at Madrid, Horatio J. Perry, with specific and concrete appeals to the Monroe Doctrine, and protesting in formal terms against the Spanish decree of annexation. He stated:

It is the moral and political significance of Spain which gives it importance, and because this is the first instance since the foreign policy of the United States was announced to the Allied Powers of Europe in 1823, that any nation has failed to see its own clear interests in the maintenance of that policy on the one side and the other.

Spain alone and for the first time has chosen not to respect it. . . . By the act of Spain the United States are no longer bound to that policy which up to this time has been faithfully observed on their part, as well as in their relations with the people of the different nations of the European continent as with other of their colonies.

He concluded his note with a vigorous protest against the assumption or exercise of Spanish authority in the island of Santo Domingo.

It is interesting to note that this was the first time that such a full exposition of the Monroe Doctrine had ever been addressed

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4. Ibid., 141.
to a foreign government. In its statement of general principles
the note of June 19, 1861, expresses the very essence of the
Monroe Doctrine, and for that reason, it is classified as one of
the most important diplomatic documents in the history of our
foreign policy.5

Seward continued to inform Mr. Koerner, American Minister
to Spain, that any attempt on the part of Spain to retain her
dominion in America will end in disappointment even if that had
to be delayed until the successful close of our own troubles.6

The Spanish Foreign Minister, Calderón Collantes, made
the views of her Majesty quite clear to Seward in the words:

It is not easy to comprehend how the United States,
which recognizes as the fundamental principles of their
political existence that of universal sufferage, that of
popular sovereignty in all its extent and followed out
to the last consequences, can deny to other peoples
constituted in a manner analogous to their own right to
exercise their sovereignty in accepting the form of govern-
ment which they think most convenient, or in reconstruc-
ting and reconstituting themselves in the way which they may
judge most advantageous to their interests and their future
well-being.7

Spanish rule in Santo Domingo so light-heartedly assumed,
was from the first, a failure almost incredibly tactless and


6. U. S. Department, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 1864,
Part IV, 19.

A practically immediate revolt of the population against the Spanish regime manifested how limited the popular acclaim for reannexation must have been.

Mr. Koerner intimated to Seward that the revolution in the republic caused a great deal of concern to the Spanish people. It would not have been difficult to subdue the insurgents near the coast, where troops could be subsisted by the fleet. But, the interior was too thinly populated, so little cultivated, so densely covered by primeval forests; so destitute of roads that no armies could penetrate into the interior, where bands of natives could live and were ever ready to attack the Spanish posts.

The prospects of any progress were dimmed, therefore, from the outset. Although Spain continued to send reinforcements year by year so that by 1864 she had placed 25,000 troops in the island, she could not overcome the native resistance, aided as it was, by the ravages of yellow fever and other subtropical diseases. Revolutionists had asked aid from the United States, but engaged in a great struggle of her own, she refrained from extending the

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10. Ibid., op. cit., 108.
necessary help. In answer Seward informed Koerner of the claims against Spain for the loss of property and life. 11

Meanwhile the cost of the enterprise was becoming staggering. Even the Spanish Commander himself was ready to admit that there was no advantage in trying to hold the island, though with the pride of his caste and race he did not wish to leave until the insurrection be put down. 12

Disease and the desperate courage of the islanders succeeded in pushing the Spaniards out in 1865; so credit is given to these two forces rather than the bluster of Seward and the dead hand of Monroe. 13

At the time that the Spanish government had incorporated Haiti's sister republic under its protection, the United States had not, as yet, recognized Haiti. At the time of Spain's intrusion, Haiti looked toward the United States for recognition and assistance against the aggressor. The United States did not fail to see the strategic importance of Haiti. Northern vessels enjoyed unusual privileges in Haitian ports and the United States had established a coaling station at Cap Haitien. 14

Since the appeal for recognition, seemed to fall on deaf ears at first, the American commercial agent in Haiti, represented the serious danger to our coaling stations in that part of the world in case of war between Spain and Haiti. A. Usher, the commercial agent wrote on May 25, 1861; that the reestablishment of the Spanish rule in Haiti would be an infringement of what is called the Monroe Doctrine.

Seward's only reply was given in the following note:

I beg to assure you that this government regards with much interest and sincere sympathy the patriotic people of that Republic, which have under an enlightened administration proved themselves deserving the freedom they have acquired, of which we earnestly hope they will be permitted to remain. 15

In spite of the warnings and suggestions from the American commercial agents stationed in Haiti, Lincoln waited until the opening of the regular session of Congress before recommending the recognition of Haiti. In his message of December 5, 1861, he pointed out:

If any good reason exists why we should persevere longer in withholding our recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Haiti and Liberia, I am unable to discern it. Unwilling, however, to inaugurate a novel policy in regard to them without the approbation of Congress, I submit for your consideration the expediency of an appropriation for maintaining a Chargé de' Affaires near each of these States. It does not admit of doubt

15. As quoted in Ibid., 297.
that important commercial advantages might be secured by favorable treaties with them.\textsuperscript{16}

It took time and deliberation before Congress had anything to offer. Meanwhile, Seth Webb, agent at Port-au-Prince, sent urgent pleas to the administration to take action before it would be too late.

In due time the Senate and the House of Representatives authorized the President of the United States to appoint diplomatic representatives to the republics of Liberia and Haiti. Each of the said representatives so appointed was to be accredited as commissioner and consul general, and was to receive the compensation according to the Act of Congress.\textsuperscript{17}

This action on the part of Congress did not necessarily imply perfect agreement on the subject among the members of Congress. In the Senate the debates revealed party and sectional views. Senator Garret Davis, democrat from the border state of Kentucky, declared that Washington society was not quite ready to receive a black minister, Salisbury, another democratic senator from the border state of Delaware, objected to the eventual presence of a Haitian minister in the senate gallery reserved for diplomats.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} As quoted in \textit{Ibid.}, 298.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Congressional Globe}, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess. 350-362.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, 1506.
The Republican stand was taken by Charles Sumner from the free state of Massachusetts, who overcame all opposition. He brought out the importance of immediate recognition as a means of preventing the restoration of the Spanish colonial rule in the eastern part of the island from constituting a threat to that balance of power which is daily becoming of increased importance to the United States.\(^{19}\)

In the House the measure was supported by Daniel W. Cochrane of Massachusetts, Fessenden of Maine, Kelly of Pennsylvania and Mayard of Tennessee. All favored recognition as a means of warding off Spanish occupation. Sectionalism and party loyalty amassed thirty-seven votes in the House against the eighty-six Republican and Abolitionist votes.\(^{20}\)

President Lincoln signed the bill for the appointment of the commissioners on June 5, 1862. Benjamin Whidden of New Hampshire became the first diplomatic representative to Haiti but only in the capacity of a commissioner.

Early in 1863 the first Haitian diplomatic representative, Ernest Roumain, presented his credentials as Chargé de' Affaires, and established the first Haitian Legation in Washington.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 2505.

\(^{20}\) Logan, op. cit., 303.
The United States proceeded to conclude treaties of commerce and amity with Haitian government. As a result of its recognition, Haiti departed considerably from its strict neutrality in order to exceed to a number of demands that were made by the United States.  

Although everything was done in order to bring about these friendly relations between Haiti and the United States, there was one disturbing element that hindered the accomplishment of perfect harmony. That was the attempt to colonize American Negroes in Haiti. Lincoln like many other statesmen, believe that the best solution to the troublesome Negro problem in the United States was the colonization of the Negroes in countries where they would be better treated.  

Why should men in power have ever given such an idea a thought, is very strange and contrary to our principles of democracy where all men are to share equal rights and privileges be they black or white.

Strange as it may seem, many of the Congressmen who opposed recognition favored colonization.

Doolittle took the initiative in expounding the idea of colonization in lands beyond the confines of the United States.

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21. Ibid., 304.

22. Ibid., 308.
In his lengthy discussion he maintained that men who were disciples of emancipation would achieve very little if they did not associate their ideas of freedom with colonization. He put forth his idea in a strong policy, "for a generous policy for both races, black and white." Homesteads for free white men of the United States in all temperate territories; homesteads for free colored men in the tropics and islands of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.

The economic value of such a policy was beyond any doubt. Commercial trade routes could be established whereby the United States could make huge profits yearly. It was this aspect of the policy, just as in the case of the Brazilian colonization project mentioned earlier in this work, which smacked too much of personal gain and profit, to be popular with the republics concerned.

On December 31, 1862, the Department of Interior entered into a contract with Bernard Kock, who had obtained a lease of the Île a'Vache from the Haitian government, by which Kock was to receive fifty dollars and a head up to fifty thousand voluntary colored emigrants. In accordance with the terms of Kock's lease these emigrants were to declare within two months after their arrival


their intention of becoming Haitian citizens. Since Kock did not have the necessary capital for this undertaking, he induced a group of New York capitalists headed by Forbes and Tuckerman to finance it. They subscribed seventy thousand dollars for the ship to convey the first five hundred to the island. But by the time the ship was ready to leave, Lincoln had cancelled the contract because of the evidence of Kock's shady dealings. The Haitian government, too, showed opposition to the project.

Lincoln, in his message to Congress July 2, 1864, pointed out that the Spanish-American republics, on the whole, had protested against colonization projects within their respective territories. Freed Negroes, on the other hand, were not eager to go to these places either. An Act of Congress, approved December 23, 1864, discontinued the further use of funds for the colonization of free Negroes. The great hearted President who labored so intensively for the freedom of the Negro, could hardly violate the Negro's equality and freedom by forcing him out to lands not of his own choice.

25. Logan, op. cit., 308.
27. Logan, op. cit., 310.
In conclusion, therefore, we can say that when the South seceded, she not only gave Lincoln the legal means to free the slaves in the states, a power which he consistently held he did not have in time of peace but she also paved the way for the recognition of Haiti and Liberia. Lincoln had given the Negro of the Western world a higher status that he had ever enjoyed.

At the time of Lincoln’s assassination, Bruno’s note of condolence declared that the death of Lincoln would “everywhere excite the same veil of sorrow and condemnation.”

Lincoln sent Christopher Robinson to Lima to set about establishing friendly relations with Peru. Robinson was instructed to point out to the Peruvians that since the countries and states founded upon the American continent have common interests arising out of their neighborhood to each other, their common attitude toward states in the eastern hemisphere; that owing to the inexperience of mankind in conduct of republican representative institutions, and incompleteness of assimilation in the people of these American States, there is always too much danger of faction at home. Faction at home inevitably tended to invite intrigue from abroad for the overthrow of the American powers with

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the hope of reconquest from Europe. 29

All this was to be made known to Peru in order to strengthen the bonds of unity, and to put Peru on the alert against any possible attack by Spain who was carrying on her reannexation policies in the Carribean.

The United States did not have to wait too long in order to find out what the designs of Spain in Peru were. Through the imprudence of an overzealous naval officer, and an equally overzealous diplomat, Spain had become embroiled in a quarrel with Peru which resulted in the seizure of the Chincha Islands. In the circumstances such an act of violence was bound to arouse suspicions both in Latin America and in Washington. 30

Things looked bad in South America, because as many in South America and the United States feared, this was the beginning of Spain's reconquest enterprises. Apprehensions of her real motives were felt in both Americas. When Senator Brown asked if there was any danger of Spain's annexing Peru, Seward's answer was in the affirmative. In fact he showed great concern by saying that there was grave danger unless the Army recruited rapidly, and that there would be a show that the military reverses

29. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, II, 14.
had not discouraged the North. South American countries showed
anxiety in Spain's unexpected move also. Chile's reaction brought
to the notice of Seward through Thomas Nelson, our minister there,
revealed that Chile was concerned over the seizure of the islands.
This action on the part of Spain tended to destroy all party lines
in Chile and everyone was fired with ambition to fight the common
foe.

The following resolution adopted by officers, professors,
and teachers of the University of Chile showed their confidence
in the United States even at a time when she, herself, was battling
for her own existence from within. The resolution read as follows:

> It is our duty in this crisis to solicit with earnestness
> the powerful influence of the United States of America.
> We have a well-founded confidence in the stability of the
> institutions of that good people in the policy of her
> illustrious chiefs, and in the great soul of Lincoln, the
> hero destined by Providence to complete the work of
> Washington.

Seward expressed satisfaction in the confidence that the
Chilean people had placed in the United States, but refrained from
making any hasty promises or uttering any threatening words as he
had done in the Santo Domingo question.

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32. U. S. Department, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864,
IV, 181.
33. Ibid., 183.
June 1864, convention day, party representatives from all loyal states were seated together "a pool of faces with puffs of tobacco smoke rising to the rafters." Many of the delegates carried newspapers with headlines announcing that Spain had invaded Peru, another violation of the Monroe Doctrine.34

The long tolerance that Seward had displayed toward Spain was now about to be broken. He instructed Koerner, the American Minister, in these terms:

It will be your duty to make it known to her Catholic Majesty's government that the United States cannot yield their assent to positions assumed by Spain to repossess Peru by conquest and reannex its territory to the kingdom of Spain. This government thus far was neutral in two wars which are waged by European States in positions of America. The war of France against Mexico and to the Civil War to which Spain is a party in the island of Santo Domingo. Should the settlement of this country demand a reconsideration of the policy of neutrality which this government has hitherto maintained, it is much to be feared that new complications might arise, which would not merely disturb the existing systems of commerce, but might endanger the general peace of nations.35

In taking this high tone on June 14, 1864, Seward was perfectly safe. A communication from Dayton, our Minister to France, assured Seward that the "Talalmo Question," which this dispute between Peru and Spain was called, received attention in

34. Monaghan, op. cit., 354.
35. U. S. Department, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864, IV, 21.
France. M. Drouyn de l'Hiuys asserted that he advised Spain, in conformity with Seward's wishes, to settle the question peacefully. 36

Prime Minister, Senor Mon, told Koerner that there was no intention of retaining the islands, and on June 21, 1864, the Foreign Minister, Llorente, addressed a circular to the diplomatic corps in which he disavowed all thought on the part of the Spanish government of recovering any part of her ancient colonial dominion in Latin America. 37

The islands were given up in January of 1865 and the Latin American countries were free to breathe easier now.

36. Ibid., 21-24.

CONCLUSION

In summarizing the events occurring within the period of the American Civil War, it is interesting to note not only the decisive stage which they mark in the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine, but also the gradual evolution of Seward’s foreign policy.

When Spain chose to challenge the validity of the Monroe Doctrine, Seward met that move by a strong threatening note, the language of which was much stronger than the political situation warranted at the time. Armies were gathering for the initial struggle for national unity, and Seward had to face a diplomatic retreat when he had to apprise Tassara, Spanish minister at Washington, that Congress alone had the power to take action.

Toward the end of the War when Spain appeared with hopes of re-annexation in Peru, Seward proceeded more cautiously in formulating his policy.

Probably that blustering mistake at the beginning of the Civil War in the Santo Domingo questions prepared him for the alternative policy which he adopted in the major problem of the period, namely, the French intervention in Mexico.

In all his diplomatic correspondence after the recognition of the Confederates as belligerents by Great Britain, Seward was
hampered by a sense of the possibility of a combination between one or more of the great maritime nations with the insurgents, and a fear of the probable effect of such a combination upon our efforts for the preservation of the Union; and his efforts were directed toward the preservation of peace with all other nations without impairing the dignity of his own country. He stated with entire candor, and with unmistakable distinctness our position in regard to the French intervention in Mexico, yet in a courteous language carefully avoiding any expressions which could be construed into a threat, or give France an opportunity for breaking in upon us.

The years marked by military success, however, tended to change the conciliatory policy of the Secretary of State to one of vigorous protest against the invader to the South. Being assured of internal peace, he was ready to uphold his policy by force of arms. He was spared such a move because of the quiet withdrawal of the French army from Mexico.

The annals of diplomacy show no more brilliant victory than that won by Seward, whose great mind and powerful pen guided the diplomats representing our country in the European countries and in the Latin American States where there was a significant movement toward closer cooperation in order to uphold the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.
In all the events recounted the Latin American countries recognized the Union government, and not that of the Confederacy. During the Mexican intervention the Juarez government made frequent appeals to the Union government for help and assistance against the aggressor. The government of Mexico also showed itself favorably disposed toward the Union by allowing Union troops to pass through Mexican ports in order to secure supplies for war purposes.

During the French intervention in Mexico, Peru and Chile approached the State Department with suggestions for an alliance among the Latin American countries. Their faith in the Union government filled them with the assurance that it would take the initiative in forming such an alliance.

The troubles and difficulties in the Dominican Republic and Peru caused the representatives of these countries to evoke the mediation of the Union government.

In 1865 the American nations emerged from the Civil War with a deeper sense of understanding of each other's problems, and with the firm conviction that the good neighbor policy is essential as a bulwark of unity and defense in the future.
I. Guides


United States Document Office. Checklist of the United States Public Documents, 1789-1909, Congressional, to the close of the Calendar Year ending with the 60th Congress.


II. Primary Sources

Public Documents


This is a series of collected papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States. It was begun in 1861 and continued to 1865. It contains all correspondence between the Department of State and our foreign ministers in the Latin American countries and the European countries.


The Congressional Globe was used principally for the reactions to the colonisation projects in Haiti, Brazil, Liberia and other Latin American States. The volumes were also helpful in getting sectional and party ideas on the question of French intervention in Mexico.
This document was very helpful in the preparation of the chapter on our relations with Brazil during the Civil War. Most of the work centered around Webb’s efforts to establish friendly relations with the Imperial government there. This was necessary in order to counteract the bad influence of Webb’s predecessor, Masi, who did not prove to his trust.

The president brought out the views of the Latin American countries in reference to the colonization projects advocated by so many Americans. Latin Americans did not favor the idea of populating their lands with the free Negroes from the United States.

This is a discussion of the plans and final procedures that were adopted by the three powers in reference to Mexico.

This was used in finding out the relations between Romero and Seward.

This was another document which proved very useful in this compilation of the chapter dealing with the complications that arise because of the French intervention. Most of the communications dealing with the avowals of M. Drouyn de Lhuys were found in it. Repeated intentions of withdrawal from Mexico are brought out more forcibly. Napoleon’s inability to cope with the situation across the Atlantic, and with the mounting difficulties on the home front cause him to make his intentions of withdrawing the French army from Mexico known to the world.
This was used in the chapter dealing with the formal acceptance of the Crown by the Archduke Maximilian at Trieste. It brought out interesting facts in reference to the Mexican Legations work at the time they were sent to offer the Crown to the new Emperor. The reactions in Mexico on the occasion of the arrival receive treatment also.

This brings out the communications between the French Minister and Secretary Seward concerning the supposed Mexican Monarchy according to the will of the people.

Newspapers

*Winona Daily Republican 1861 - 1865.*

The city paper which elaborated considerably on the Mexican question. It brought out the plight of the Mexican people, and their plea for mercy with a suggestion that French intervention might prove a solution to the problem. It brought this fact out in a number of its issues. The Colonization Projects received attention also with views and ideas concerning these.

**III Secondary Sources**

**Articles**


This article brought out the fact that the treaty broke down because the Allies did not agree in advance on a very specific mode of coercing Mexico, because there was no definite plan for securing reparations, and because the French signed the agreement with certain mental reservations.
Books

This work of the Chilean publicist includes innumerable opinions and expressions of Latin American and North American statesmen who, in his opinion, were best calculated to show the nature of the Monroe Doctrine. The work was used principally in the chapters on Mexican relations.

Diplomatic contacts with others in the Western Hemisphere is brought out in a very interesting way in this work.

The author writes the history of Mexico in six volumes.
Volumes IV and VI were the ones used in the writing of this paper. The material dealt with filibustering schemes and projects.

This is a very fine historical interpretation of the Latin American policy of the United States. The Chapter dealing with the Monroe Doctrine from 1821-1895 was used and the treatment of the foreign intervention in the Dominican Republic and in Mexico was especially well done.


Both of these works were a great aid in formulating some idea of the policy that was followed by the State Dept. during the crucial years of the Civil War. The chapter on "Seward's Mexican Policy" in the latter mentioned work was used extensively in the writing of the three chapters dealing with the Mexican situation. It is a very well-rounded discussion of diplomatic relations between United States and Mexico.

This is an interpretive history of Mexico and the Mexicans. The author stressed the point that any intervention in Mexico if it were to be worthwhile had to be permanent, and with such a state of affairs the consequences would be annexation.

Hill, Lawrence F. *Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil*. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1952. Chapter VI of this work was used extensively in the writing of the fourth chapter. It deals mostly with Seward’s and Webb’s policies.

Latane, John H. *The United States and Latin America*. New York: Doubleday Page & Co., 1922. The author gives a very good picture of Latin American relations in the light of the Mexican question. It is the most complete work on the subject of the French and United States relations that could be found in one work.

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*A History of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1934. Three chapters of part IV were consulted on the subject of our diplomacy during the Civil War. Most of the material centered about the French intervention.


In this work too much credit is given to Abraham Lincoln in guiding the diplomats of foreign countries.

A very thorough study of the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine in reference to the Dominican and Mexican question.

Another excellent work on the Monroe Doctrine, this one somewhat different from the above-mentioned since it gives a general history of the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine. Chapter IV entitled, "The Hour of Peril" discusses the French and Spanish defiance of the Monroe Doctrine.

The chapters dealing with filibustering schemes during the period were replete with information on the topic for the first chapter and Seward's diplomacy in reference to the French received frank treatment by the author.

A general survey with most of the emphasis on our Mexican relations.

A biographical history based on material found in the Archives of Benito Juarez. Practically all material has been drawn from Spanish sources. Very interestingly written, and contains a wealth of information of the French-Mexican-American Relations.

This volume contains those portions of Mr. Seward's almost daily dispatches to our Ministers abroad, designed to give them authentic annals of the war. The views given were usually those also of the Chief Executive.
Although most of the material is of a general nature, and not much space has been given to the problems during the Civil War Period, the questions in reference to Brazil and Mexico and also the Peruvian War were helpful.