• Login
    View Item 
    •   CDR Home
    • School of Law
    • Creighton Law Review
    • View Item
    •   CDR Home
    • School of Law
    • Creighton Law Review
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Defining the Article III Judicial Power: Comparing Congressional Power to Strip Jurisdiction with Congressional Power to Reassign Adjudications

    View/Open
    CLR_53-1_Olson.pdf (155.5Kb)
    Citation Information

    Title
    Defining the Article III Judicial Power: Comparing Congressional Power to Strip Jurisdiction with Congressional Power to Reassign Adjudications

    Authors
    Olson, Andrea

    Journal
    Creighton Law Review

    Volume
    53

    Issue
    1

    Pages
    111-156

    Date
    2019, December
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    Separation of powers principles find their way into countless United States Supreme Court opinions, providing justifications for a variety of rules—from the nondelegation doctrine to standing. Predictably, they are also found in cases where the Court defines the amount of power the legislative branch should have over the judicial branch and over adjudications as a whole. The Court’s decisions detailing Congress’s power to control the federal judiciary by stripping jurisdiction and Congress’s power to control adjudications through delegations to legislative courts both rely heavily on separation of powers principles. Curiously, however, the rules come out seemingly opposite. On the one hand, the Court holds that separation of powers requires that Congress have wide, perhaps limitless, latitude to assign or withdraw jurisdiction from Article III courts. On the other, the Court holds that separation of powers prohibits Congress from assigning jurisdiction over certain claims to non-Article III courts. This article examines the puzzling divergence of those rules, with a focus on the distinct separation of powers principles the Court uses to justify them. Finding that the principles applied in the two rules are logically inconsistent, this article asks how the Court found itself in such a logical bind.
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10504/125948
    Collections
    • Creighton Law Review

    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2015  DuraSpace
    Contact Us | Send Feedback
    Theme by 
    @mire NV
     

     

    Browse

    All of the CDRCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular Authors

    DSpace software copyright © 2002-2015  DuraSpace
    Contact Us | Send Feedback
    Theme by 
    @mire NV