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dc.contributor.authorBurns, Timen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-14T18:51:36Z
dc.date.available2013-02-14T18:51:36Z
dc.date.issued1983en_US
dc.identifier.citation16 Creighton L. Rev. 1045 (1982-1983)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10504/39455
dc.description.abstractINTRODUCTION|In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court observed that custodial interrogation contains "inherently compelling pressures" which undermine the individual's will and which may force the individual to speak when the individual would not do so otherwise. In these situations, the individual's privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Therefore, the Court held that in order to safeguard the individual's fifth amendment rights, the accused, prior to any custodial interrogation, must be warned of the constitutional right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the right to have counsel present during interrogation. However, the Miranda decision noted that the suspect may waive these rights provided the waiver is knowingly and intelligently made. The "heavy burden" of demonstrating that the waiver was intelligent rests on the prosecution. Thus, in order for the government to admit a statement made during a custodial interrogation, the suspect must have been warned of the constitutional rights as set out in Miranda and have knowingly and intelligently waived those rights...en_US
dc.publisherCreighton University School of Lawen_US
dc.titleCriminal Procedure Ien_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.rights.holderCreighton Universityen_US
dc.description.volume16en_US
dc.publisher.locationOmaha, Nebraskaen_US
dc.title.workCreighton Law Reviewen_US
dc.description.note1982-1983en_US
dc.description.pages1045en_US


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