EU Constitution and the Union's democratic deficit
Creighton Authors
Sieberson, Stephen C.
Sieberson, Stephen C.
Admin. Units
School of Law
School of Law
Subjects
European Union; Constitutional law; Balance of power; Democracy
European Union; Constitutional law; Balance of power; Democracy
Title
EU Constitution and the Union's democratic deficit
EU Constitution and the Union's democratic deficit
Authors
Sieberson, Stephen C.
Sieberson, Stephen C.
Book
Expanded EU: From Autonomy to Alliance.
Expanded EU: From Autonomy to Alliance.
Editors
Dogan, Nejat; Kovalov, Maxsym; Khovonova, Kseniya M.
Dogan, Nejat; Kovalov, Maxsym; Khovonova, Kseniya M.
Publisher
Rodopi: New York, NY
Rodopi: New York, NY
Pages
121-132
121-132
Date
2008
2008
Metadata
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Other Link(s)
Library Catalog SSRN
Library Catalog SSRN
Citation
Stephen C. Sieberson, The EU Constitution and the Union's Democratic Deficit, in Expanded EU: From Autonomy to Alliance 121 (Kseniya M. Khovonova, Nejat Dogan, & Maxsym Kovalov eds., 2008).
Stephen C. Sieberson, The EU Constitution and the Union's Democratic Deficit, in Expanded EU: From Autonomy to Alliance 121 (Kseniya M. Khovonova, Nejat Dogan, & Maxsym Kovalov eds., 2008).
Abstract
This article weighs the European Union's proposed Constitution against historical complaints that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit. Various manifestations of the deficit are identified from official documents, scholarly works and other sources. The concerns include complaints that the EU's structure is too complex, that its institutions lack accountability, and that its workings are not transparent. In addition to these broad themes, the analysis examines concerns relating to specific EU institutions. For example, it has been suggested that the European Parliament should have more legislative and oversight authority, that the Council should make greater use of qualified majority voting, and that the Commission should be more accountable. For each identified concern, the relevant provisions of the Constitution are identified to determine whether the issue would have been resolved. The conclusion is that the Constitution offered welcome improvements to the EU system, but its changes relating to the democratic deficit were incremental. Significant aspects of the deficit would have remained in place if the Constitution had been ratified.